


NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE
GENERAL STAFF

National Security And The General Staff



By
MAJOR GENERAL OTTO L. NELSON, JR.



IIPA LIBRARY



WASHINGTON
INFANTRY JOURNAL PRESS

COPYRIGHT 1946 BY OTTO LAUREN NELSON, JR.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission. For information address The Infantry Journal, 1115 17th Street NW, Washington 6, D. C.

12045-13
N 335

FIRST EDITION

MAY 1946

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Contents

CHAPTER	PAGE
PREFACE	v
I INTRODUCTION	1
II SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT ..	10
III THE GENERAL STAFF EMERGES	39
IV THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE—1904-1916	73
V THE TEST OF WORLD WAR I—1916-1919	187
VI CONSOLIDATING THE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT AFTER WORLD WAR I	274
VII DEFECTS IN WAR DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AT THE OUTSET OF WORLD WAR II	314
VIII THE WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION OF MARCH 9, 1942	335
IX WAR DEPARTMENT AND ARMY DEVELOPMENTS DURING WORLD WAR II	397
X THE GENERAL STAFF DURING WORLD WAR II	465
XI WHAT OF THE FUTURE?	569
INDEX	603

Preface

It is usually helpful to the reader if some explanation is included on the background, experience, and bias of the writer, and what prompted or motivated him to write his book.

This book is a revision and an expansion of a thesis¹ I submitted to the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard University in March 1940. At that time, as a Captain of Infantry in the United States Army, I was completing work on a Littauer Fellowship and to attain a degree a thesis was required. Fifteen years of varied service in the Army, completion of courses at The Infantry School and The Command and General Staff School, and work and reading while serving at West Point as an instructor had stimulated my interest in War Department and Army organization and administration. Graduate work in the theory of public administration had increased my curiosity to learn more about how the War Department functioned in comparison with other governmental departments and about the specific application of general principles of organization and administration. The initial result was at least a start on a subject about which surprisingly little had ever been written.

In December 1941 I participated in the work leading to the reorganization of the Army Air Forces and in February and March of 1942 in the activities of the War Department Reorganization Committee which culminated in the March 1942 reorganization which established the Army Air Forces, Ground Forces, and the Services of Supply (outlined in War Department Circular 59 of that year). From March 1942 until December 1944 I was assigned to the War Department General Staff with duties that gave me an unusual opportunity to observe and ponder the complex problems of organization and administration which arose. During seven months in 1945, duty in an overseas theater headquarters gave me an opportunity to compare the problems of organization and administration in an overseas theater with those of the War Department.

My book is thus a combination of ideas and information obtained through academic research, tempered and modified by on-the-job experience and observation. I confess that the more intimately one becomes involved with these problems, the less positive he is of the right answers. One thing is certain, however. Whenever complex organiza-

1. "The War Department General Staff. A Study in Organization and Administration." Submitted March 1940, to the Division of History, Government and Economics, Harvard University.

tional or administrative problems do arise, even the boldest man of action is interested in searching out anything that can be found to bear on the problem. Such questions come up as: "Has this same type of problem ever been considered before and what did people think about it then?" "Are there any useful analogies from our past experience that can be used to help us solve this problem?" "Can it not be demonstrated that the proposed solution has been tried before and failed?"

There were two main reasons which led me to revise my earlier study and include much additional information gained while serving on the War Department General Staff during World War II. Officers on duty in the War Department and others continually asked permission to use my thesis of 1940 and each request reminded me that something ought to be done to improve my first effort. I also believed that orientation and background material on the subject would be sought out by others just as eagerly as I had tried to find background material to supplement my own experience and knowledge whenever complex organizational and administrative questions arose—which they very frequently did.

And so a helpful analysis has been the goal.

Chapter I

Introduction

... There should be a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less unbusiness-like, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness. . . . We must go on to adjust executive functions more fitly and to prescribe better methods of executive organization and action.

WOODROW WILSON,
Essay on "The Study of Administration"

WAR DEPARTMENT. The War Department General Staff. What mental pictures do these words suggest? The ready answer is that the War Department is the mammoth Pentagon Building with its thousands of workers. At the peak of World War II there were on duty in the Military District of Washington more than 15,000 officers. Counting both civilians and military personnel, the total was more than 100,000 persons, many of whom worked in the offices in the Pentagon and the many other War Department buildings. Somehow this large group, assisted by the War Department General Staff, a group of a very few hundred officers who acted as the directing brain of the Army, did manage to guide the manifold activities of an Army of eight million men scattered over the world.

Popular connotation to the contrary, the War Department and the War Department General Staff are not countless officers, enlisted men, and civilians in incredibly large and numerous buildings; they are *organizations*. How do these organizations work? What is the distinction between them? How have they developed and through what process and experience have they reached their present state? What problems and difficulties are still present? What organizational and administrative principles are exemplified by the ways in which they operate? Is there a basic organizational philosophy which one must understand in order to be an effective worker? From the experience of the War Department and the War Department General Staff is it possible to formulate for application to all large organizations of business, education, and government, as well as the military, workable guides or rules on organization and administration? The purpose of this book is to attempt an answer to these and related questions.

The organizational and administrative problems besetting the Armed Forces, and thus the War and Navy Departments, are the most complex to be found anywhere. Most large business corporations are concerned

with manufacturing or selling a limited number of products or with providing services of distinct types. But modern war requires an army that includes practically every known trade or profession. Soldiers must be taken care of on a twenty-four-hour basis and every service from the cradle to the grave must be available as subsidiary undertakings to the unbelievably complex job of fighting an army in modern war.

Very little has been written on the organization and administration of the War Department and the Army. There are, of course, the many organization charts and statements of function for the various divisions of the War Department General Staff and for its three major commands. There are the histories that emphasize properly the story of the campaigns in the wars the armed forces of the United States have fought. However, except for scattered comments in biographies of our military leaders the story of how and why the War Department has come to be organized the way it is has been largely neglected. This is surprising because most army officers are interested in the question of War Department and Army organization. It is an old saying that every officer is a qualified and a self-acclaimed expert on how the Army should be set up and how the promotion system should be improved to give him a promotion. It is intriguing to draw, label, and connect with lines and arrows the rectangles which then become organization charts, though too often this is done with little understanding and regard for previous experiences. Not infrequently organizations go through the motions of periodic reorganizations that do not seem to make any real improvement; the organization charts change but everyone continues to work in the same old fashion.

Some men profess to ignore organizational questions by saying that it is not the type of organization that counts but the kind of people who staff it. Unquestionably, a model organizational structure will falter and break down if the key personnel are incompetent. On the other hand, it is a stupid oversimplification to assume that the right kind of people automatically create the right kind of an organization. There have been too many instances where competent individuals in key jobs have had their effectiveness nullified or blunted because of organizational maladjustments and defects. Likewise, there have been instances where individuals who could neither be classed as able or industrious have done surprisingly well in key jobs when for some reason their organization functioned efficiently in spite of them. As Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior and Petroleum Administrator for War, aptly observed, "Able people, working in accordance with a sound, clear cut plan of organization, are prime requisites to successful administration."

Having both you can't miss - - - - -
With only one you are seriously handicapped—
Without either—God help you! - - -¹¹*

Knowing how a large organization has been established, how it has changed over the years, and what organizational principles or philosophy exist for it is important. Without such an understanding one can hardly expect to function smoothly in any important or unimportant job. In the Army an anomalous circumstance tends to create a state of mind which is not appreciative of the importance of organizational relationships in the War Department. Junior officers in small tactical units operate under tables of organization and equipment for their units which have been prescribed by the War Department and which cannot be changed officially except in Washington. This being the case, it is natural for organization charts of small units to be accepted unthinkingly or ignored by the junior officers who fill the principal command and staff positions in these units. When these junior officers rise in rank and are assigned to the War Department, it is not strange that their attitude on organizational questions should be influenced by their early experiences. Frequently officers have taken the attitude upon assignment to a War Department job that they intend to do it in their own way and therefore they pay little or no attention to organization charts and statements of function; they either do not read them at all or at best have glanced at them so hastily that they do not understand them—and they may say so with pride.

One can function efficiently in small organizations without understanding the organizational implications. So long as the direct, indirect, and cross-relationships in a small concern are few and simple, no organizational problems arise. But when a disdain for organizational and procedural questions becomes the typical attitude of the staff of a large organization, then trouble, much trouble lies ahead. When everyone ignores or freely violates the organization charts and statements of function, when everyone pushes ahead in his own way with several people all trying to do much the same thing and consequently getting mixed up and in each other's way, then confusion will exist and the situation is just as one perplexed colonel described it in speaking of the organization in which he worked—"It's just a can of worms, it's just a can of worms."

The story of the development of the organization of the War Department General Staff has interest for students of organizations in other fields of endeavor. With the continued growth of large organizations

*Footnotes are at the ends of chapters.

both in government and in business, problems of organization and coordination become increasingly complex. The answers are not simple and useful analogies from other fields are sought eagerly. Dr. W. F. Willoughby, a recognized authority in public administration, has written: "Much the best example in the national government of the necessity for and the experience with staff agencies is furnished by the War Department."²

Other writers on public administration confirm the view that the experience of the War Department General Staff is not peculiar to and applicable to the military alone. Instead it presents a type solution to problems that arise out of the phenomena of any large numbers and complex operations. This view is supported by Professor John M. Gaus who says in a *Study of Research in Public Administration*: "There is a special field of public administration in the Federal Government which the average student of the subject has never invaded. I refer to the activities of the War Department and the Department of the Navy. Those who have read the memoirs of Lord Haldane or his testimony concerning the organization of the War Office in Great Britain before the Royal Commission on the Mines some ten years ago, will remember how he drew upon his experience in that office in formulating general principles of public administration. There should be much to interest us and inform us in this general field in the activities of these two departments."³

There is also the Report of the Machinery of Government Committee⁴ which Lord Haldane headed and which stated:

"Turning . . . to the formulation of policy, we have come to the conclusion, after surveying what came before us, that in the sphere of civil government the duty of investigation and thought, as preliminary to action, might with great advantage be more definitely recognized. It appears to us that adequate provision has not been made in the past for the organized acquisition of facts and information, and for the systematic application of thought as preliminary to the settlement of policy and its subsequent administration. . . . This is no new notion. There are well-known spheres of action in which the principle has been adopted of placing the business of enquiry and thinking in the hands of persons definitely charged with it, whose duty is to study the future, and work out plans and advise those responsible for policy or engaged in actual administration. The reason for the separation of work has been the proved impracticability of devoting the necessary time to thinking out organization and preparation for action in the mere interstices of the time required for the transaction of business. . . . But the principle

ought by no means to be limited in its applications to military and naval affairs. We have come to the conclusion that the business of executive Government generally has been seriously embarrassed from the incomplete application to it of similar methods."

While most students of administration are familiar with the very substantial contributions made by Lord Haldane, very few realize the extent to which he adopted and rephrased principles of organization enunciated by Elihu Root when he was endeavoring to establish our own General Staff.⁵ Root's biographer, Philip C. Jessup, has written: "When Lord Haldane was called from civil life to serve as Secretary of State for War . . . in 1906, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler who had been his close friend from student days in Germany teased him 'about the incongruity of his philosopher's training and pre-occupation and his official post.' Lord Haldane replied in substantially these words: 'Really, you know, I do not need to know anything about armies and their organization for the five reports of Elihu Root made as Secretary of War in the United States are the very last word concerning the *organization* and place of an Army in a democracy.' "

In the business world, Mr. James D. Mooney, one time President of General Motors Export Company and who wrote in collaboration with Mr. Alan Reiley, expressed the view that "the modern military application concentered in the term 'general staff' is something to which the student of organization must give his careful attention. . . . There is a vital respect in which military staff organization is in advance of anything yet developed. . . ."⁶

There is some basis then for the belief that organizational and administrative principles of general application may be deduced from a study of the War Department General Staff. Moreover, some understanding of the way in which the War Department organization has developed is indispensable to those who are to serve effectively within it. And a knowledge of how the War Department has developed organizationally in the last half century is necessary as background to the present issue of what kind of an organization for national defense is needed for the post World War II period and the era of the atomic bomb.

I shall attempt in this study of the organization and administration of the War Department General Staff to go behind organization charts and statements of function to get at reasons and principles. Where possible the philosophy of organization will be described in the words of its leading proponents. To do this it is also necessary to give the opinions of those who advocated changes or defended existing methods. In such analysis it is impossible to divorce the War Department General Staff

from the rest of the War Department and the Army. Thus I have included much material that touches indirectly on the War Department General Staff but that is nevertheless pertinent. Although historical sequence is followed, the treatment is not historical. Only a small part of the history of the General Staff is included. In fact, a somewhat distorted historical presentation results from the necessary emphasis on the stormy periods of General Staff existence whereas the long periods of comparative tranquility are largely ignored. Certain incidents and events also are high-lighted because of the way they reveal administrative and organizational principles.

Many aspects of the planning and coordinating activity of the General Staff are extremely difficult to present, for intangibles play an important role in them. What its members and heads have thought about the General Staff is often of interest. Why the General Staff functioned in a certain manner is as important as how it functioned. Therefore the testimony and the philosophy of numerous men who have played an important role in General Staff activities will be examined in considerable detail.

It may be useful to those who are unfamiliar with the War Department to consider briefly for purposes of orientation the general organizational structure of the Army and the War Department. Chiefly as a result of historical accidents, the Army in peacetime was divided into a large number of relatively small groups which garrisoned army posts scattered throughout the United States and in our overseas territories. The army units have been organized traditionally in tactical units such as regiments, brigades, and divisions with the chain of command leading from the field to the War Department. Experience has proved the need for some form of geographical organization and so the overseas garrisons were organized as Departments while the United States was divided into areas which were called at various times Departments, Divisions, Districts, and Corps Areas. Normally all the military units in such an area were under the area commander so that the chain of command extended from unit commanders to area commanders to the War Department.

Until the General Staff was established in 1903, there was some uncertainty over the internal relationships and the responsibilities in the War Department itself. Prior to that time the army units in the field were under the Commanding General of the Army who, as one of the principal War Department officials, was in theory the senior officer of the Army. There were, however, a number of senior army officers who headed supply and administrative departments in the War Department and who claimed the right to report directly to the Secretary of War.

In the absence of other coordinating authority the Adjutant General of the Army assumed that authority. All communications to and from the War Department were addressed to or routed through the Adjutant General's Department. After the establishment of the General Staff in 1903, the office of the Commanding General of the Army was abolished and the position of the Chief of Staff was established. Under this arrangement the President as Commander in Chief exercised his power through the Secretary of War who relied upon the Chief of Staff for the direction of the field forces and for the coordination of all War Department and Army business.

The General Staff was organized as a planning, coordinating, and supervisory body to assist the Chief of Staff in directing the Army and coordinating the War Department activities. The supply and administrative bureaus in the War Department were pushed down one rung on the organizational ladder and in contradistinction to the General Staff were called the Special Staff. Immediately prior to World War II the Special Staff consisted of the offices of seventeen arm and service chiefs headed by the following: Chief of Infantry, Chief of Cavalry, Chief of Field Artillery, Chief of Coast Artillery, Chief of Air Corps, Chief of Engineers, the Chief Signal Officer, the Inspector General, the Judge Advocate General, the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Finance, the Surgeon General, the Chief of Ordnance, the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Chief of Chaplains, and the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. The General Staff was divided into five divisions: Personnel, G-1; Military Intelligence, G-2; Operations and Training, G-3; Supply Division, G-4; and the War Plans Division.

After the entry of the United States in World War II the War Department was reorganized by consolidating and grouping the offices of the seventeen arms and service chiefs into three major commands: the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces. The General Staff was reorganized and streamlined. In the process the Operations and Training Division became the Organization and Training Division, and the War Plans Division became the Operations Division.

Prior to World War II the Commanding Generals of the nine Corps Areas into which the United States was divided and of the overseas Departments reported directly to the Chief of Staff with the Adjutant General's Office as the official channel of communication. After the 1942 reorganization, Service Command areas replaced Corps Areas and their commanders reported to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, in Washington. Commanders of arms, schools, and other train-

ing or separate tactical organizations of the ground forces reported to the Commanding General of Army Ground Forces. All air units and installations in the United States were under the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, who also exercised in practice control over air forces in overseas theaters of operation. Commanders of the Defense Commands in the United States and of the overseas theaters of operations, bases, and military missions reported to the Chief of Staff through the Operations Division of the General Staff.

Difficulties of terminology and other complexities must be faced. The term "General Staff" has been used loosely. Prior to the creation of the General Staff in 1903, the various War Department bureaus were called the General Staff. Major General Henry C. Corbin, then the Adjutant General of the Army, had his Chief Clerk, Raphael P. Thian, compile legislative histories of The Adjutant General's Department, the Inspector General's Department, the Judge Advocate General's Department, the Subsistence Department, the Medical Department, the Pay Department, the Corps of Engineers, the Ordnance Department, and the Signal Corps and several minor bureaus. These were published under the title *Legislative History of the General Staff of the Army of the United States from 1775 to 1901*. But in this book these agencies will be called "the special staff" or "special administrative or technical staff." In early times certain of these special staff officers also performed general staff duties. As used in the modern sense, the term "general staff" excludes the special staff and refers to those immediate advisers who provide informative, contemplative, and supervisory services for their chief, the commander. There are relatively few clear cut concepts and agreement on definition is far from complete. As an example, varying answers would be found to the simple questions: What is the boundary or distinction between the War Department and the Army? Are the headquarters of the three major commands (Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces) a part of the War Department or are they the top Army structure above which the War Department begins?

Because the War Department and the Army are engaged in such numerous and complex activities the organizational structure is simple only in exceptional cases. Frequently complexities, compromise, custom, obsolete laws, combinations of systems, and reorganization, overlaid on top of previous arrangements which continue on in part, combine to produce a blurred composite which few people see alike.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

1. Harold L. Ickes, Petroleum Administrator for War, *Organization Manual, Petroleum Administration for War*, Plan of Organization.

2. W. F. Willoughby, *Principles of Public Administration* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), p. 143. Courtesy The Brookings Institution.
3. Same, p. 35.
4. *Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, Viscount Haldane of Cloan, Chairman*, (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1918) p. 6.
5. Philip C. Jessup, *Elibu Root* (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1938) Vol. I, p. 240.
6. L. Urwick on page 61, "Organization as a Technical Problem" in *Papers on the Science of Administration*, Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, Institute of Public Administration, Columbia University, 1937. See p. 240, "Onward Industry," by James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley, *Harper's*, 1931.

Chapter II

Setting The Stage For The General Staff Concept

CATASTROPHE or near catastrophe has all too often been the driving force impelling change in the structure of our governmental machinery.¹ Unfortunately this has been as true in the War Department as in any other part of the government. Custom and precedent have cut paths and ruts which made it difficult to change for the better. This has been the case not so much because the administrators in the War Department were unaware of the need for change. For the last half century ambitious junior officers have filled the professional military journals with articles criticizing existing anachronisms and urging, in many instances, startling innovations.² But moves toward change have often been spiked by seniors who have achieved success in the existing patterns as they are. However, some onus must be placed on Congress also. All too frequently, some dramatic emphasis of glaring failure or interest-provoking scandal has been necessary before Congress could be persuaded to act.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT AFTER THE CIVIL WAR

From 1861 to 1865 the Civil War had usurped the whole attention of the people of the United States. Overshadowed by the confusion incident to the application of the spoils system both in raising regiments and securing supplies, defects in organizational structure received little attention. This is surprising for "there was so great a lack of coherence in the management of affairs during that conflict that a committee of Congress sat almost continuously investigating the conduct of the War."³ So many things were wrong, confusion was so rampant that individual defects received little attention.

Had not the problems of reconstruction loomed so large immediately after the Civil War, there might have been a chance to profit by past mistakes and to recast our military system. The immediate tasks of reconstruction and financial retrenchment so completely filled the political scene that all other matters were forgotten. The Army was reduced to a skeleton force and scattered throughout the West. This rapid demobilization brought about a centralization of affairs in the War Department which persisted, becoming more ingrained with the passage of time.

This phenomenon did not pass unnoticed. Critics both in and out of the Army were well in agreement with General Carter who wrote that

"after the close of the Civil War in 1865 the necessity for immediate and continuous retrenchment in the expenses of government brought about a centralization of affairs in the War Department which has loaded down every officer employed there with administration paper work far beyond the average capacity. This system on the one hand not only deprives the Department and the Army Commanders of much of that general control that should be left to them but on the other, it leaves the officers at the War Department, overwhelmed as they are with routine matters, little or no opportunity for the consideration of very important questions requiring their decision."⁴

Undoubtedly, this abnormal situation in the War Department was regarded at the time as a temporary expedient, a stop-gap system to be used only during the transition from war to peace and to be changed as soon as the future military policies of our country could be determined. And there was much to justify such a stand. Not long after the demobilization of the volunteer war force the necessity arose of again expanding our Army. "The disturbed condition of the South and the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by the Allied invasion of Mexico compelled Congress to increase the Regular Army from 39,273 to 56,641 by the Act of July 28, 1866."⁵ On July 25, 1866, the grade of General was restored⁶ and given to Grant but nothing was done to change the organizational structure of the Army.

This expansion of our military structure was short-lived. With the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico and with Emperor Maximilian's execution following shortly thereafter, the possibility of external conflict became remote. Reconstruction of the South though proceeding midst difficulties did not arouse sufficient fears to overcome the desire to reduce military expenditures. On March 3, 1869, the strength of the Army was lowered by Congress and fixed at 37,313.⁷ Although this operated in the main to reduce the line forces, the number of infantry regiments being reduced from forty-five to twenty-five, the staff departments were also pared down.⁸ A year and a half later, additional cuts were made.⁹ The grades of general and lieutenant general were abolished and the number of brigadier and major generals was decreased. The authorized strength of the Army was set at 35,353 and provision was made to establish a board of officers which was to designate the officers who were to be eliminated. "During 1874, 1875, and 1876 Congress effected in five separate bills a gradual reduction in the strength of the Army to 27,472."¹⁰ For the "ensuing twenty-two years the actual strength of the military establishment never exceeded 28,000."¹¹

Significantly, no general reorganization of the War Department structure was accomplished during this period of frequent attention to the

size of the Army. What had been accepted as temporary improvisation after the Civil War remained as a permanent handicap.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT IN THE 1890S

"In the middle 90s there seemed reason to believe that our wars were over."¹² The Army had been greatly reduced; for more than thirty years appropriation bills and other legislation had successively and consistently presented a reducing diet. But no streamlining had been envisaged either by the military or by Congress. While the greater part of the country totally ignored the Army, those sympathetic to its needs accepted the emaciated structure as basically sound and only in need of more adequate appropriations to build it up to a state of health. In fact, the widely scattered units were, as individual and independent small commands, in excellent shape owing to the almost uninterrupted Indian Wars which provided an effective if rugged means of training. Likewise, the officer personnel included many seasoned veterans of the Civil and major Indian wars.

The paring down process, stretching uninterruptedly over a quarter of a century, left its mark most indelibly on the officers. Promotion was so slow that gray-bearded lieutenants were common. Able officers who had had important commands in the Civil War were relegated to the many small Army posts where lethargy of thought on all but local military problems was natural. Little new blood and few new ideas reached those in positions of authority. In carrying out the Congressional mandate for retrenchment, it was perhaps inevitable that more and more detailed supervision by the War Department should result. At all events, a state of affairs was reached in which the most minute details in the smallest and most distant garrisons were regulated and handled by the War Department bureaus and offices in Washington.

The size, distribution, and organization of the Army just prior to the impact of the Spanish-American War is in effect a summary of what had happened to the Army during three decades. "On the first of April, 1898, our standing Army consisted of 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men distributed over the entire country. This force may be classified as follows:

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted Men</i>
General Officers and Staff Corps.....	532	2,026
Cavalry	437	6,047
Artillery	288	4,486
Infantry	886	12,828
Miscellaneous		653
Total	2,143	26,040" ¹³

This total was distributed among seventy-seven military posts.¹⁴ An idea of the strength of these commands may be gained from the data presented in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1896 which stated that "six had garrisons of one company each, seventeen had two companies, nine had three companies; there were nine of four companies, four of five companies, two of seven companies, and twenty at which eight or more companies are serving."¹⁵ The bulk of the Army was located in the prairie and mountain states. With respect to the Infantry "the equivalent of five regiments (were) . . . stationed in the Pacific states, fifteen (were) east of the Missouri River and the meridian of Kansas City, and twenty regiments (were) located in the plains and mountain country. . . . Of the Cavalry arm one regiment (was) on the Pacific, one and a half regiments (were) east of the meridian of Kansas City and the rest, seven and one-half regiments (were) serving in the prairie and mountain region. One regiment of artillery (was) serving on the Pacific Coast, one on the Gulf and three on the Atlantic. Of ten batteries of field artillery two are in California, one in Texas, three in Kansas, one in Illinois, one in Rhode Island, one in New York, and one in the District of Columbia."¹⁶

Although there was much direct supervision and correspondence by the War Department with each of the many posts, the chain of command ran through Department commanders who exercised nominal control over their respective geographical areas. The seventy-seven military posts in the United States were thus distributed among the following military departments:¹⁷

<i>Name</i>	<i>Headquarters</i>	<i>Geographical Limits</i>
Department of the East.	Governor's Island, New York.	The New England States, States of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and the District of Columbia.
Department of the Missouri.	Chicago, Illinois.	States of Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas. Indian and Oklahoma territories.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Headquarters</i>	<i>Geographical Limits</i>
Department of Dakota.	St. Paul, Minnesota.	States of Minnesota, South Dakota (in part only), North Dakota, Montana and the post of Fort Yellowstone, Wyoming.
Department of Colorado.	Denver, Colorado.	States of Colorado and Utah and the territories of Arizona and New Mexico.
Department of California.	San Francisco, California.	States of California and Nevada.
Department of Texas.	San Antonio, Texas.	State of Texas.
Department of the Platte.	Omaha, Nebraska.	States of Iowa, Nebraska, Wyo- ming (except Fort Yellow- stone), Idaho (in part), and South Dakota (in part).

This departmental organization was not well suited for the mobilization and prosecution of the war against Spain. Accordingly, in view of possible hostilities in Cuba, there was established pursuant to General Order Number 7, Headquarters of the Army, March 11, 1898, two new military departments. The Department of the Lakes was to consist of Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana, taken from the Department of the Missouri, and Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, all formerly a part of the Department of the East. The Department of the Gulf, created for the more direct control of the troops about to be concentrated at camps in the southern states, was to consist of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi, taken from the Department of the East, and Texas which had previously constituted the Department of Texas. The Department of the Missouri, to offset losses to the Department of the Lakes, absorbed the Department of the Platte. Thus, the Departments of the Platte and Texas were discontinued.

Higher in the organizational pyramid, the chain of command and the channel of communication was uncertain and foggy both in fact and by law. There was no uncertainty concerning the position of the President of the United States as the Commander in Chief of the Army for this was specifically prescribed by the Constitution.¹⁸ The difficulty arose on the level just below the President where a duality of control existed that had caused bickering and confusion for more than a century. Although the Secretary of War was the regularly constituted official through whom the President's wishes were presumably to be effectuated, the General Commanding the United States Army had come to occupy,

through a long standing custom aided by Congressional action, a position which was in some respects coordinate with that of the Secretary of War. The difficulty was not so much that the Commanding General considered himself beyond the authority of the Secretary of War. The trouble arose mainly among the subordinates in the War Department. Some bureaus insisted that they were under the exclusive authority of the Secretary of War and not answerable to the Commanding General. In 1901 this anomalous condition was made the subject of a memorandum to the Secretary of War by a distinguished student of military organization, Brigadier General William Harding Carter,¹⁹ who wrote:

"The first thing to be considered is the question of the command of the Army. During the Revolutionary War the Army was commanded, except for about six months in 1777 when Washington exercised full command, by the Continental Congress, part of the time directly and the remainder of the time through the Board of War and the Secretary of War. After the Revolutionary War General Knox, Lieutenant Colonel Harmar, General St. Clair, General Wayne and General Wilkinson were, in succession, the senior officers, but they were not assigned to the command of the Army which was exercised practically by the Secretary of War. In 1798 Washington was commissioned 'to be Lieutenant General and Commander in Chief of the Army to be raised in the United States.' Washington did not, however, enter upon the active duties of this office but he held the office until he died.

. . . When the war with Great Britain broke out in 1812, Henry Dearborn (ex-colonel of the Continental Army and ex-secretary of War) was appointed major general, but was not assigned to and did not assume command of the Army. The first time, subsequent to the appointment of General Washington in 1798, when war with France was imminent, that the senior general officer was formally assigned to the command of the Army was in 1828 when General Macomb having been appointed major general, was directed by the President 'to assume command of the Army,' which was done by an order of May 29, 1828. General Scott succeeded General Macomb in 1841 and issued an order assuming command of the Army, which he continued to exercise nominally, at least, until his retirement in 1861. General Scott's age and infirmities caused him to be practically ignored when the great rush of business came on at the beginning of the Civil War, and upon his retirement General Halleck was brought to Washington and succeeded him. A careful study of the situation leads to the conclusion that the functions performed by General Halleck were those of Chief of General Staff. He worked in harmony with Secretary of War Stanton and was confi-

dential adviser in all military matters. He continued in practically the same office, except in name, after General Grant was made General of the Army. (See General Order 98, March 12, 1864.)

It will be remembered that General Grant continued with the armies in the field and did not remove his headquarters to Washington during active hostilities.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war with Spain, the Major General commanding the Army left Washington and proceeded, first to Santiago, Cuba and later to conduct the campaign in the island of Porto Rico. During his absence from Washington the great work of organizing, arming, equipping, and mobilizing the Army of volunteers went steadily on under the direction of the Secretary of War.

Theoretically the senior general of the Army commands the Army, but as a matter of fact no commanding general has ever had the authority presumed to go with such an office, and it is possible, under the American form of government, no general officer will ever have such authority. Much of the difficulty has arisen from confusion of 'command' with 'administration.' The attributes of the office of the Commanding General of the Army are almost wholly administrative.

The Constitution makes the President the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. The theory of administration is that the Secretary of War shall act only on the fiscal affairs of the Army and the Commanding General of the Army shall act on all matters of administration and discipline. . . .

The history of the office of the Commanding General of the Army leads to the conviction that while not a constitutional office it is one that has resulted from the willingness of Congress to grant the highest position and emoluments to certain generals who have seemed to deserve something beyond the ordinary reward open to them in the Army. That this sentiment has brought about an unfortunate condition of business affairs has long been apparent to all students of the situation. Many remedies have been suggested to ameliorate the embarrassed business conditions, but none of them have placed the office upon a plane sufficiently distinct and high to relieve it from endless bickerings and controversies. These controversies have existed through the greater part of the century and have involved many men who have won high honors in military and civil life."²⁰

There was an interesting example of this battle for authority between the satellites of the Commanding General and the Secretary of War during President Grant's administration. "When General Grant became President, Sherman was assigned to command the Army, and in his order

assuming command announced the various permanent bureau chiefs of the War Department as members of his staff. The new Secretary of War was John A. Rawlins, who, as a volunteer officer, had been chief of staff for Grant during the last years of the Civil War. General Sherman's exercise of full command was terminated in a few weeks and he was directed to revoke the order regarding the bureau chiefs. In disgust, Sherman forsook Washington, taking his titular headquarters of the Army to his home city of St. Louis, where it remained for many years."²¹

Thus in the 90s it would have been exceedingly difficult for any organizational chart to show the actual relations existing between the post and garrisons and the military departments on the one hand and the hydra-headed War Department on the other. Army regulations were clear prescribing:

"The Military Establishment is under orders of the Commanding General of the Army in that which pertains to discipline and military control. The fiscal affairs of the Army are conducted by the Secretary of War through the several staff departments."²²

* * *

All orders and instructions from the President or Secretary of War relating to military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the Army will be promulgated through the commanding general."²³

* * *

The supply, payment, and recruitment of the Army and the direction of the expenditures of the appropriations for its support are by law entrusted to the Secretary of War. He exercises control through the bureaus of the War Department. He determines where and how particular supplies shall be purchased, delivered, inspected, stored, and distributed."²⁴

While this classification of duties may appear theoretically clear, the attempts to separate command and administration signally failed in practice. Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, an officer thoroughly acquainted with conditions in the War Department, by virtue of serving in Washington prior to the Spanish-American War, wrote:

"When we come to look into the condition of things at the War Department we find that here the distribution of power and influence is almost reversed. That not the line but its servant, the staff, is virtually supreme (each staff within its own presence), and that there is little correlation between the various departments of the staff. At Washington the positions of the chief of the special staffs, who control the

disbursements, and perhaps, to some extent also the patronage of their respective departments, have, owing to the growing importance of their respective functions and their close contact with the legislative and executive branches of the government, become increasingly independent. Most of them, watching their opportunity and following a natural and perhaps legitimate impulse, have endeavored, sometimes without much reference to the needs of the Army, to enlarge the jurisdiction as well as the number and rank of the officers of their respective Corps, and have succeeded; while a few with equal if not better claims to an increase, have failed to secure any worth mentioning. One of the results of this expansion along independent lines has been, and is, that in some cases the spheres of two or more departments overlap, and that double or treble machinery is unnecessarily employed for the performance of the same kind of service, or to supply stores of the same class to the sacrifice of both economy and efficiency.

All the heads of the special staff have also managed by degrees to emancipate themselves from strictly military control until now they are in reality subject only to the authority of the Secretary of War. Owing to the close relation which the latter sustains to the President or constitutional Commander-in-Chief, the Commanding General of the Army, though a Grant or Sherman, has always felt himself to be little more than a figure-head when stationed in Washington.

While permitted to exercise limited power in the line, he has never been able to influence appreciably, much less control, the work of the staff without whose cooperation the action of the line may be paralyzed. The exercise of control implies knowledge, but this a civilian Secretary is not likely to possess when he enters office—or to acquire until about the time when he quits it. Moreover if he were ever so well informed, he would find it physically impossible to pass intelligently upon all matters that require his sanction. The best equipped soldier could not possibly do it alone. Accordingly, his decisions on questions submitted to him by bureau chiefs are apt to be based on their recommendations and are liable to conflict—since one bureau may be ignorant of the doings of the other—or to be ill advised, for few bureaus are or can be in close touch with the line.

That this condition of things is highly unsatisfactory even in peacetime is easy to see; each of the ten unrelated bureaus holds, thru its chief, direct communication with the Secretary of War, who cannot fittingly represent the line, and much of whose time is necessarily occupied in conference with the President, members of Congress and the general public, not to mention the urgent business of a quasi civil nature that he is constantly obliged to dispose of—. In some of the bureaus,

though apparently working under high pressure, much of the time of the officers is frittered away, on the one hand with the consideration of small details in purely routine matters that do not legitimately belong in the War Department at all, and ought to be determined by the local or departmental authorities, and on the other hand by the attention they are required to give to oral requests of a personal nature coming from men in high station, or to the schemes or proposals more or less visionary pressed upon the Secretary or Assistant Secretary and which they feel bound to have investigated and reported upon. Under the circumstances questions vitally affecting the policy on the welfare of the Army at large have little chance to receive just consideration and in many cases must be and are allowed to 'drift.' When war comes the hurly burly and confusion of the War Department, apparent even in ordinary times, is turned into chaos and this is instantly felt by the troops at the front and may produce disastrous results. Let the War office be held by the tallest and strongest man living, and he would stagger or be crushed under the weight of the labor and responsibility falling on his devoted head. This lack of unity, this pulling and hauling at cross purposes, cannot justly be laid at the door of the bureau chiefs, each of whom in his own way, according to his own lights, is continuously striving to work out the destiny of his own specialty. It is not their fault if there is no united effort toward a common end."²⁵


Some concept of the structure of Army organization in the late 90s may be gained from the chart on page 21. Among these War Department bureaus, the Adjutant General's office was perhaps the most important in that it exercised what little coordinating influence did exist. Officially designated as the bureau of orders and records of the Army,²⁶ the Adjutant General's office, by virtue of its contacts with Congress and by reason of its functioning as the principal operating agency of the Secretary of War, had become the most powerful staff agency of the Army. All orders emanating from the War Department were published by the Adjutant General with the notation, "By order of the Secretary of War." Much of the correspondence to the War Department from lower units cleared through the Adjutant General's office. The supply function was split between three bureaus: the Quartermaster Department, which in addition to clothing the Army was also charged with the duty of providing means of transportation of every kind;²⁷ the Subsistence Department, which was in charge of the distribution and expenditure of funds appropriated for the food of enlisted men and for purchasing articles kept for sale;²⁸ and the Ordnance Department, which supervised the manufacture, issue, and repair of military weapons and equip-

ment. The duties of the Pay Department, Medical Department, the office of the Chief Signal Office, and the office of the Chief of Engineers showed a functional decentralization in the War Department that was to be expected. The Inspector General's Department embraced an Army-wide "sphere of enquiry, including every branch of military affairs except where otherwise prescribed in these regulations or orders."²⁹ Inspector General "will exercise a comprehensive and general observation within their respective districts over all that pertains to the efficiency of the Army."³⁰ The Record and Pension Office, the Board of Publication of War Records, and the Board of Commissioners of the Soldier's Home, while presumably under the Secretary of War, had virtually complete independence. In fact, all of the War Department bureaus were quite independent within their spheres; a condition brought about by the habit of Congress of enacting laws that preserved in great detail the structure and activity of each bureau. Because of this, successive Secretaries of War conveniently argued to the great satisfaction of the bureau heads that statute law provided practically all the direction needed.

Another factor which made for the overlapping of duties and the flaring up of jealousies and jurisdictional disputes was the system of promotion in vogue in the Army. Up to and including the grade of colonel, promotion was by seniority within the staff or line branch. That is to say, promotion in the Adjutant General's Department depended upon the number of vacancies created by the death or retirement of senior officers of that department alone. This might be much slower or faster than promotion in other staff departments or in the line. One thing was certain; promotion would be expedited if Congress made the department larger and gave it an increased quota of officers. Conversely, if the activities of the department were curtailed with a corresponding reduction of its officer quota, promotion would stagnate until the decrease had been absorbed. It was therefore quite natural for all staff departments, and the line branches also, to enlarge their fields of activity whenever the opportunity offered and to resist all attempts to reduce or streamline any of their activities. There was thus a great barrier to that coordination which results from the "development of the desire and will to work together for a [common] purpose."³¹ Coordination by mutuality of purpose was severely handicapped.

Despite the fact that there was a duly constituted agency designated by law to handle each phase of military activity, the organizational structure was not such as to facilitate coordination or planning. The organizational pattern and the complex channel of command, administration, and communication limited the Secretary of War to two alternative

THE STRUCTURE OF ARMY ORGANIZATION IN THE 90'S



* Soldiers' Home
Total of 77 posts

CHART 1

courses of action, both of which were unsatisfactory. He could either attempt to regulate and coordinate the innumerable bureau affairs or he could give free rein to the bureau chiefs. Attending to the multitudinous affairs involved in the inter-relation of twelve bureaus and several boards and the line forces scattered throughout the country was more than one man could handle; the attempt to do so tended to immerse the attention of a Secretary of War in details so completely that the big picture of a proper and efficient national security was lost. Permitting bureau chiefs to pursue their own course encouraged an autonomy that in time brooked no interference and that demanded that other officers make whatever adjustments would be necessary. Even the official War Department view of its staff organization sometimes took cognizance of this condition. In the Report of the Secretary of War for 1896 the Honorable Daniel S. Lamont, then the Secretary, remarked of staff organization:

"In previous reports attention has been called to what are believed to be defects in the organization of the Army staff—a redundancy of staff corps, more officers in some corps than can be usefully employed and an excessive number of staff officers of high rank.

Notwithstanding the reductions that have been recently made, the public interests have in no manner suffered as a consequence, the work is not in arrears or lacking in thoroughness, and there has been no complaint to the War Department that any officer is over worked. On the contrary, it is believed that *some further reduction can be made without detriment to the service.*

Any temporary deficiency of staff officers can be readily and satisfactorily supplied by details of officers from the line, a course which would meet every possible necessity of the service."³²

THE WAR DEPARTMENT IN THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Two years later with the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the clamor was for a larger and more experienced staff. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War from March 5, 1897, until August 1, 1899, noted after the declaration of war against Spain on April 21, 1898, that "the governmental machinery was altogether inadequate to immediately meet the emergency. It had, during thirty years, been called upon to plan for and meet the requirements of the Regular Army in time of peace, and naturally enough had become quite fixed in the narrow grooves of peace."³³

The impact of the Spanish-American War was enough to try severely the most effective staff organization. The weaknesses of the existing organization made the task of the War Department especially difficult.

In fairness it must also be said that the apathetic attitude of Congress toward national defense over the thirty-year period preceding the war and the volunteer system, the defects of which together with the lack of equipment and the incapacity of politically appointed officers, would have wrecked any setup for handling a war, were responsible for much of the disorder and maladministration that did ensue.

Although in the end the war was brief and there was no stubborn resistance on the part of the Spaniards, the problem confronting the War Department upon the declaration of war was a big one.

"On the 1st day of April 1898, the whole strength of the Army was 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men. War with the Kingdom of Spain was declared April 21, 1898. Just before the war began portions of the Regular Army were stationed in Washington, Idaho, California, Utah, Nebraska, Wyoming, Montana, the Dakotas, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and at various posts amounting in all to 80 in number. On April 15, 1898, by direction of the Secretary of War, the regiments of the Regular Army with few exceptions were ordered to proceed to various points in the South—Chickamauga, Georgia, New Orleans, Louisiana, Mobile, Alabama, and Tampa, Florida. By proclamation of April 23d, the President called for 125,000 volunteers and on May 25th for an additional force of 75,000. Congress also authorized an increase of the Regular Army to 61,000 and in addition provided for 16 regiments of volunteer infantry, cavalry and engineers. On May 31, 125,000 volunteers had been mustered into the service. In August, 1898, the Regular Army numbered 56,365, the Volunteer Army 207,244; a total of 263,609.

These figures of themselves indicated the immense task placed upon the War Department. After thirty-three years of peace, during the greater part of which the Army did not exceed 26,000 men, it suddenly became necessary to arm, clothe, feed, and equip more than a quarter of a million."³⁴

On the other hand, it should be noted that the Spanish resistance crumbled so rapidly that the Army very fortunately did not face any severe military test. It was due to this fact, perhaps, that public attention became focused chiefly on the confusion and maladministration attendant upon mobilizing the forces. The war was indeed a continuous field day for newspaper reporters. So energetic had been the Hearst and Pulitzer papers in drumming up the martial spirit necessary to bring on the war, and in dramatizing the events of the war with all the force of sensational journalism, that it has been frequently alleged that the war with Spain was instigated as the *pièce de résistance* of a circulation cam-

paign. Some idea of the way the press covered the war may be gained from the fact that "eighty-nine war correspondents, representing the principal newspapers and magazines in the country, accompanied the Shafter expedition."³⁵ Some idea of the coverage by reporters of the War Department itself may be gained from the observation of General Carter then on duty in the Adjutant General's office in Washington, who wrote:

"From the moment that it became apparent that a volunteer Army was to be raised and that there was to be an increase in the Regular Army, the offices of the Secretary of War and the Adjutant General and Assistant Adjutant General, and the corridors of the War Department were uncomfortably crowded. . . . The Secretary of War and the Adjutant General could only attend to the proper functions of their office in guiding the organization, equipment, and mobilization of the great volunteer Army then being put into the field by secreting themselves for a few moments at a time, or during the night, when most of the real business of the department had to be conducted, to avoid the pressure from office seekers.

Among the crowds which filled the rooms and corridors was a host of newspaper reporters who listened to almost all the business which was carried on between the Adjutant General and his assistants. It was next to impossible to keep anything from the press under those conditions. Almost all the orders given appeared in the newspapers about the time or before they were received by those for whom they were intended. The system of centralization of authority had been carried to such an extreme for many years that the department was forced to attempt to run everything from Washington."³⁶

While much of the confusion could probably be blamed on other causes, maladministration provided the theme which the news reporters took up with a crusader's zeal. Their material was excellent.

To begin with, the scene in Washington was disheartening but newsworthy. The Honorable R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, lamented that "the life of the Secretary of War was not a happy one in those days of active military operations. . . . The office of the Secretary was daily visited by not less than one hundred persons whose business or position entitled them to a personal hearing. So urgent was the pressure that almost the entire day was given up to them. . . . The persistent clamor of the office seeker, the appeal of those who wished to leave the service, the demands of the sea coast cities and towns for immediate and impossible protection, and the savage criticism of the military administration, plans of campaign and battle, with the apparently endless lists of short comings

and grievances have left an ineffaceable impress of time and experience upon the weary shoulders of those in authority."³⁷

In addition, "no definite army plan of campaign (had) been developed in anticipation of war, a fact which marks as strongly as possible the hap-hazard system of our army."³⁸ Even worse, the War Department had little or no information on which to base an intelligent plan of campaign. Captain Charles D. Rhodes, writing of the experiences of our Army noted that "for nine years preceding 1898, a division of military information had been maintained as an adjunct of this department (Adjutant General's Department) but through no fault of its officers had been so dwarfed and subordinated to the routine work of the department that the outbreak of the war with Spain found it without accurate maps of the enemy's territory and with but meager information of his defenses and military resources. Due credit should be given to Lieutenants Andrew S. Rowan and Henry H. Whitney who went to Cuba and Porto Rico respectively to obtain military information (after hostilities began). . . . The Spanish War found us again unprepared. . . . Plans of mobilization had received little or no attention, and no efficient system of organization, equipment, and means of training our reserves had been worked out in detail. The staff departments failed to pull together according to any settled governmental policy; in fact, there was rarely any policy that was not liable to continual change or amendment. . . . In a thousand ways there was lack of coordination which not only led to miscarriage of plans but to extravagance in expenditures and lack of harmony in administration."³⁹

A striking example of this planlessness was to be found in the spectacle of sending Shafter's expeditionary force to tropical Cuba clad for the most part in winter woolen uniforms. Not until July 20th did the 20,000 suits of light clothing reach Santiago.⁴⁰

To a considerable extent, the War Department reflected the vagaries and changeability of General Nelson A. Miles, the general commanding the United States Army, who toyed with a number of plans and vacillated back and forth, first favoring one plan, then another. The day before Shafter was scheduled to sail from Tampa to Cuba with his expeditionary force, General Miles changed his mind and recommended the abandonment of the movement to Santiago until after the taking of Puerto Rico.⁴¹ Secretary of War Alger, an unusually mild-mannered person, commented somewhat later very feelingly about General Miles:

"Many of the general's proposals were obviously impracticable, and not infrequently absolutely impossible. He recommended the shipment of 12,000 men to Key West, where all the drinking water would have

to be brought in tank ships; with our hands full at Santiago and not enough troops there, he proposed to send 'a battery of artillery and a regiment of infantry' on an expedition to the Isle of Pines, then of no military or strategic importance. He insisted on sending to Cuba, for use with infantry operating in a tropical jungle and over a country impassable to vehicles, his 'portable' shields, each weighing 1000 pounds and each occupying as much room on a transport as a hospital ambulance; he recommended the abandonment of Santiago, after Cervera's fleet had been destroyed, thereby lifting the siege of the city and large garrison, without reaping the fruits of victory then practically in our hands; he wanted 500 marines of the navy placed under his control; he expressed the opinion that a proposed force of 16,452 men, mostly volunteers, was '10,000 more than will be required' for General Merritt's Philippine expedition; and while in Puerto Rico he cabled to the War Department a recommendation that 'the manufacture of Springfield rifles, .45 calibre ammunition, all white canvas tentage, and black leather equipment of every description be discontinued, as they are obsolete and should not be a part of the army equipment.' In answer to this last recommendation the following dispatch was sent:

W. D. Aug. 3, 1898

General Miles—Puerto Rico

As you ought to know, the last calibre .45 Springfield rifle was manufactured in ninety-three. Smokeless powder cartridges are now being manufactured and will be forwarded. I suggest that you get along with what the government has on hand.

R. A. ALGER

Secretary of War

During the week in which war was declared he recommended that the manufacture of Krag-Jørgensen rifles 'be reduced to the minimum if not entirely suspended,' advising at the same time the substitution of another small arm twice previously rejected by the military experts who had selected the adopted type of gun then in the hands of our regular army. Of the General's numerous disapproved recommendations none demonstrated his lack of judgment more than this. To suddenly change the type of magazine rifle meant also a change in the machinery and methods of the government armory where these arms are made. Even if his recommendations in this respect enjoy the advantage of some reason or excuse, a crisis like the outbreak of a war is not the time to change the type of arms or the machinery for their manufacture.

Moreover the law making appropriations for the manufacture of arms at the Springfield Armory always designates the model of the gun

to be fabricated, a fact which the President of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications and the officer bearing the highest rank in the Army should have known."⁴²

Secretary Alger's remarks revealed the frayed relations that existed between the Secretary of War and the Major General commanding the Army. Nor was lack of harmony limited to these two officers. The Inspector General in his testimony before the Dodge Commission, appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the war with Spain, indicated subtly his dislike of the way the Adjutant General's office had invaded the sacred provinces of the Inspector General's department. General Breckinridge had left his post as The Inspector General to assume a field command on the outbreak of the war with Spain but returned to his bureau on the cessation of hostilities. When summoned by the Dodge Commission, General Breckinridge gave this interesting colloquy:

Question: But as I understand it, the inspector general inspects everything.

Answer: Yes, Sir.

* * *

Question: Who inspects the inspector general?

Answer: Nobody.

Question: I say there is a wrong somewhere, or as far as I can see, it is in the very fact as you stated; if as you say, the thing stops with the general, it never gets to Washington at all.

By Governor Woodberry.

Question: The fact of your leaving left your office of very little value during the time you have been gone.

Answer: I can hardly say this. It may seem like criticizing somebody else but according to my humble notions the office had become of very little value before I ever left it.

By Colonel Denby.

Question: Will you explain that?

Answer: You can see that I am treading on rather sensitive ground. It is rather a question of policy. That is the trouble about explaining any of this. But to go back as a matter of chronology, we had a system of inspection by which everything over the country was under central supervision and was reported to Washington to the highest authority. This was called the district system of inspection. Just as war was breaking out, as all the troops were leaving the departments, these officers were removed from the districts and assigned to the departments. There

was not anybody there to inspect and they were told to address their reports to the Adjutant General. Now the bureau office of Inspector General of the Army from that moment ceased to have much weight. This disintegration of the inspection service has been tried before and naturally weakens or destroys effective unity of action and gives opportunity for public scandals by disorganizing the Inspection Bureau of the War Department."⁴³

And the conflict between General Miles and General Egan, the Commissary General of the Army, provided entertainment of the Gilbert and Sullivan variety. General Miles' insinuations and whispering campaign concerning the army ration, embalmed beef, and the Commissary Department in general reached a point where General Egan, honest Irishman that he was, lost his temper and directed such a burst of descriptive and heart-felt profanity at General Miles that the Commissary General was tried and convicted by a court martial for conduct unbecoming an officer. Apparently the Commanding General of the Army had no control over the head of the bureau charged with the important task of feeding the Army other than to goad him to the point where he overstepped the bounds of propriety.

The other bureaus did not escape criticism. "On the day after [Theodore Roosevelt] had been sworn in as a lieutenant colonel of volunteer cavalry, he was already jotting into his diary his sweeping verdict upon the organizations which he proposed to ornament."⁴⁴ He wrote feelingly: "The delays and stupidity of Flagler and the Ordnance Department surpass belief. The Quartermaster Department is better but bad. The Commissary Department is good. There is no head, no management whatever in the War Department. Against a good nation we should be helpless."⁴⁵

Conditions outside of Washington reflected the confusion existing there. The Regular Army, while well trained, had not been organized in units larger than regiments since the Civil War. It was concentrated in the South for the war and organized into brigades and corps. Spotlight was soon thrown on events around Tampa where the Cuban expeditionary force was assembling. Here again the War Department's planlessness was evident. Instead of arriving at a decision on what was to be the mission of an expeditionary force and deducing from that the size of the force needed and the points of embarkation and debarkation, the actual procedure was to see how many troops, ships, and supplies could be congregated at Tampa, and then decide what to do with them.

The confusion at Tampa was so terrible that viewed almost half a century later it appears ludicrous. General Miles wrote that "the re-

ports of conditions of affairs at Tampa, Florida, became such that [he] determined to take the field in person." On arriving he found "great confusion . . . with indiscriminate accumulation of supplies and war materials. The confusion was occasioned partly by the want of rail facilities and partly by the system of loading and invoicing war materials. The side tracks of the railroads from the port of Tampa to Columbia, South Carolina, were blocked with cars and trains."⁴⁶ On June 4, 1898, General Miles reported to the War Department: ". . . there are over 300 cars loaded with war material along the roads about Tampa. Stores are sent to the Quartermaster at Tampa but the invoices and bills of lading have not been received so that officers are obliged to break open seals and hunt from car to car to ascertain whether they contain clothing, grain, balloon material, horse equipment, ammunition, siege guns, commissary stores, etc. . . . To illustrate the embarrassment caused by present conditions, 15 cars loaded with uniforms were sidetracked twenty-five miles away from Tampa and remained there for weeks while the troops were suffering for [lack of] clothing. Five thousand rifles which were discovered yesterday were needed by several regiments. Also the different parts of the siege train and ammunition for the same which will be required immediately on landing, are scattered through hundreds of cars on the side-tracks of the railroads."⁴⁷

Lieutenant John D. Miley, Aide to General Shafter, the Commanding General of the Tampa force, corroborating General Miles' impressions, wrote:

"Often the components needed to complete the ration were on trains that could not be brought to the wharf at the time, and the transport then being loaded would have to be pulled into the stream and another brought into its place to receive what remained on the train being unloaded. . . Cars of meat would come to port direct from some place in the North, cars of hard bread or flour from another place, cars of other components from still another place, and these cars were scattered along the congested tracks from the Port to Tampa City, a distance of ten miles. There were in round numbers about ten million pounds of rations placed on board, a great deal of it carried there on the backs of stevedores. . . The siege artillery and the ammunition had come from different arsenals and at different times and much delay arose in gathering all the parts and mounting the guns on the carriages. For several reasons it was deemed necessary to mount the guns before placing them on board the transports and the artillery troops worked day and night to hasten the work. To add to the congestion of the railroad, passenger trains were continually running between Tampa and

the Port carrying crowds of sightseers and tourists. The regular freight, passenger, and express business . . . between Tampa and Key West went on without interruption. Large quantities of naval supplies were . . . shipped from Tampa. . . .

Everybody was in a feverish haste to go on board the transports; even before one regiment was completely embarked the next would arrive impatient and chafing at any delay in giving them the assignment to a vessel. . . . The anxiety to go on board a transport, no matter which one, was heightened when it was discovered on June 1 that the fleet, which by some mistake in calculation was supposed to easily accommodate 27,000 men with all their necessary impedimenta, had only the carrying capacity of 18,000 or 20,000. It was evident that many organizations would have to be left, and the frantic efforts for places on transports were only equalled by similar efforts to put back to the United States after the expedition had been in Cuba a short time."⁴⁸

Another picture of the anarchy that prevailed was revealed by Theodore Roosevelt in his testimony before the Dodge Commission:

" . . . When we moved down to Port Tampa I again thought there was a good deal of higglety-pigglety business although I can't say how much was due to the congested condition of the tracks. We were told to go to a certain track at 12 o'clock and take a train. We got there and then Colonel Wood and I wandered up and down trying to find somebody who knew where the train was and we couldn't find anybody and at 3 o'clock we were ordered to move to another track, and at 6 o'clock we got some coal cars. I believe these coal cars were not intended to take us but we construed that they were and went down on them and so got to the quay. You see, we had been told that if we didn't get aboard by daylight we would get left, and we didn't intend to get left, and we took these coal cars and slipped down. . . . We reached Port Tampa in the morning. There were lots of regiments there; the trains backed up everywhere along the quay and the quay was swarming with some 10,000 men, soldiers mostly. Transports were pulling in from midstream but nobody could tell us what transport we were to go on. Finally, General Shafter told us to find the Quartermaster, Colonel Humphrey. I expected, of course, at a time like that the Quartermaster would be directing things from his office where you could get at him as he was the only man to tell us what transports we were to board. He was not in his place and had not been there for some time and nobody could tell us where he was, and Colonel Wood and I started on a hunt for him in opposite directions and finally we found him almost at the same time and he allotted us the *Yucatan*. The *Yucatan* was coming in

at the dock and by that time we found there was a great scramble for the transports and Colonel Wood jumped in a boat and went out in midstream, (to board and pre-empt the boat). I happened to find out by accident that the transport, *Yucatan*, had also been allotted to the 2d Infantry and the 71st New York, and I ran down to my men and left a guard and took the rest and rushed them down to the dock and got on the *Yucatan*, holding the gangplank against the 2nd Infantry and the 71st New York and then letting aboard only the 2d Infantry, as there was no room even for all of them, and I understand the 71st spent the next two nights on a train. We ultimately kept four companies of the 2d Infantry aboard with us but we had the *Yucatan*.

Question: "To what do you attribute that confusion, lack of administrative ability or overworking the people in charge?"

Answer: Gentlemen, I would not know; I was only a lieutenant colonel; I can give you the facts but I do not know the explanation."⁴⁹

After the transports had been loaded with troops packed on board as tightly as sardines, rumors of the approach of the Spanish Fleet caused the expedition to linger for five days offshore in Tampa Bay. When the start was finally made, the convoy moved at snail's pace. The trip to the vicinity of Santiago took seven days, and another two days were spent lying offshore. Considering the summer heat and the heavy wool uniforms worn by a large part of the command, it was remarkable that the expedition was not immobilized by the confusion and maladministration. Had it not been for the "Round Robin" incident and its attendant publicity, the early difficulties of the Shafter expedition would probably have been forgotten with the collapse of Spanish resistance. The eighty-nine newspaper correspondents accompanying this expedition of 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men assured adequate publicity. Symbolic, perhaps, was the incident that occurred at the formal surrender of Santiago. The correspondent of the *New York World*, Mr. Sylvester Scovel, was naturally anxious to appear in a prominent position in the photographs of the ceremony at the Plaza, where a large military guard of honor and a huge crowd had gathered to witness the hoisting of the United States flag and the twenty-one gun salute. He therefore climbed to that part of the roof of the palace where the flag was to be raised but was ordered off. Appealing to "General Shafter standing in all his monumental dignity in the square below,"⁵⁰ Scovel met further indignities. General Shafter directed two troopers to throw the correspondent off the roof. "Mr. Scovel saw them coming and got down, but, justly incensed at this display of military autocracy, he advanced upon the General and protested 'in a loud voice while the

General and his staff were standing before the assembled troops, ready for the formal raising of Old Glory.' 'One word,' according to the General's account, 'led to another,' until Mr. Scovel suddenly launched a blow. Fortunately it missed; but it was only by a hair's breadth that the commanding general, in the very hour of his triumph, escaped the indignity of being punched in the nose by a newspaper correspondent."⁵¹ The "Round Robin" episode provided the punch that did land, jarring the War Department with a publicity that was brutal.

On July 13 General Shafter had informed the War Department that there were 100 cases of yellow fever in his command. The War Department then instructed General Shafter to put his troops in camp near Santiago but above the fever belt as soon as the Spaniards surrendered. However, after the Spaniards capitulated on July 16, the troops were all of one mind; they must not be kept in the fever-ridden tropics; they wanted to go home. The War Department was desirous of keeping this force in Cuba as the military situation demanded that an army be retained in Cuba. Likewise, the quarantine authorities in the United States did not welcome the return of an army infected with yellow fever. Such an attitude was not confined to health officials. On hearing of the possibility of returning these troops to the New England coast, several prominent Senators called on the War Department to protest against such a possibility.⁵² Anxious to conserve the health of his command, General Shafter informed the War Department that the move to the hills could not be made, the health of the command being what it was and the transportation being inadequate. In an effort to acquaint the War Department with the necessity for immediate return to the United States, General Shafter telegraphed the War Department that "in my opinion there is but one course to take and that is to immediately transport the 5th Corps (the expeditionary force) . . . with the least delay possible to the United States. If this is not done, . . . the death rate will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every medical officer present. I called together today the General Officers and the senior Medical Officers and telegraph you their views:

"To Major General William R. Shafter,
Commanding United States Forces in Cuba.

We the undersigned General Officers, commanding various Brigades, Divisions, etc. of the United States Army of Occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army must at once be taken out of the Island of Cuba and sent to some point on the northern seacoast of the United States; that this can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that there is no epidemic of yellow fever in the

army at present, only a few sporadic cases; that the army is disabled by malarial fever to such an extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by the epidemic of yellow fever sure to come in the near future. We know from reports from competent officers and from personal observations that the army is unable to move to the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a move if attempted, and will not be until too late; moreover, the best medical authorities in the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season, without losses from malarial fever almost as deadly as from yellow fever. This army must be moved at once or it will perish as an army. It can safely be moved now. Persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful personal observations, and are also based upon the unanimous opinions of army medical officers who are with the Army and understand the situation absolutely.

JOS. WHEELER
SAMUEL S. SUMNER
WILLIAM LUDLOW
ADELBERT AMES
LEONARD WOOD
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
J. FORD KENT
J. C. BATES
ADNA R. CHAFFEE
H. W. LAWTON
C. MCKIBBIN

Signed,
SHAFTER⁵³

There was nothing improper in the action of General Shafter in telegraphing this "Round Robin" letter of his commanders to the War Department. Some such emphasis was needed to prod the War Department into action. However, certain of the officers who signed the letter decided, with considerable shrewdness but with an appalling disregard of the military amenities, to obtain wide publicity for their letter.⁵⁴ Accordingly, copies of the letter found their way to the correspondent of the Associated Press and others. The result was that "This alarming and sensational paper (the 'Round Robin') was published in every important newspaper throughout the United States on the morning of August 4. It struck the White House with the force of a thunderbolt. The President saw it for the first time and was justly indignant."⁵⁵ The

War Department claimed that the decision to move the troops north had already been made prior to the publication of the Round Robin. Unfortunately that decision had not been made public so credit for forcing the move was commonly given to the press.

At any event publication of the Round Robin letter "afflicted the country with a plague of anguish and apprehension"⁵⁶ and completely vilified the already suspect War Department. Secretary of War Alger complained that the people of the United States had been "put in a frame of mind to believe anything adverse with respect to the conditions and proper treatment of the soldiers. . . Every act of the War Department was interpreted from this distorted point of view."⁵⁷ With the return of the Shafter expedition to Montauk Point, the criticism continued. Meanwhile, the undisciplined and inexperienced volunteer regiments had contaminated their southern camps which were none too good at best. Typhoid and dysentery put the Medical Department and the Inspector General's department on the public whipping post. The verdict of the public was well expressed by a minister of the gospel in the course of a Sunday morning service (the Reverend T. S. Hamlin of the Church of the Covenant, Washington, D. C.) who said: "Whether there have been deliberate crimes against the lives of our soldiers or the blunders of ignorance and incompetence that are as bad as crimes, the public does not as yet know. But it does know that in Cuba they were but half clothed, half fed, half sheltered, half doctored when wounded or sick. It does know that in camps in the sight of our great cities, one of them within sight of our national capital, they have been decimated by perfectly preventable diseases and have died untended and uncomforted. It does know that the transports have renewed the horrors of the 'middle passage' and that men have starved while supply ships floated aimlessly for weeks and months upon the ocean and trains loaded with food and medical supplies stood unopened upon the rails. It does know that somehow our soldiers have become objects of public charity. Meanwhile the War Office 'pleads the baby act.'"⁵⁸

CHANGES IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT FROM THE SPANISH WAR EXPERIENCE

Action did not come until it became generally apparent in Washington that the whole country had become convinced that there was something rotten in the War Department and something had to be done about it. The first head to fall was that of Secretary of War Alger. "The system [he inherited] destroyed him as it would have destroyed anybody else when put to the supreme test of war."⁵⁹ A commission of distinguished citizens, headed by General Dodge, was appointed by the

President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain. Its eight-volume report contained these cogent observations and recommendations:

"For many years the divided authority and responsibility in the War Department has produced friction, for which in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. . .

The records of the War Department, which have been laid before us, show that the Secretary of War extended to all chiefs of bureaus cordial and full support, and promptly responded to every proper demand made upon him by commanding officers.

In the judgment of the commission there was lacking in the administration of the War Department during the continuation of the war with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was essential to the highest efficiency and discipline of the Army.

The commission finds that the Inspector General's Department was not as efficient as it ought to have been. There seems to have been question as to the authority by which inspections were to be ordered. On at least one occasion, May 17, the Secretary of War Instructed the Major General Commanding the Army to inspect certain camps, viz, those at Chickamauga, Atlanta, New Orleans, Mobile, Tampa, Miami and Key West. The Major General did not act upon such instructions, stating it to be his place to order inspections. . .

The Quartermaster's Department, a month before war was declared, (War declared April 21, 1898—the Maine was sunk in February—on March 9th Congress appropriated 'for national defense' the sum of \$50,000,000) was neither physically nor financially prepared for the tremendous labor of suddenly equipping and transporting an army over ten times the size of the Regular Army of the United States. . .

There appears to be a lack of system whereby even as late as October, troops in camps and in the field were lacking in some articles of clothing, camp and garrison equipage, and hospitals, at least two important localities in the South—Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Huntsville, Alabama—lacked stores, while at Huntsville fuel was lacking.

There appears to have been lack of executive or administrative ability either on the part of the Quartermaster's Department or the railroad officials, in preventing the great congestion of cars at Tampa and Chickamauga when these camps were first established which congestion caused delay, annoyance, and discomfort to the large bodies of troops concentrating at those places.

There appears to have been a lack of foresight in preparing and promptly having available at some central locality on the seacoast the

necessary fleet of transports which it seemed evident would be required for the movement of troops to a foreign shore, and, finally, when the call came suddenly and the emergency was supreme, the department appears to have not fully comprehended the capacity of the fleet under its command; not to have supplied it with a complete outfit of lighters for the immediate dis-embarkation of troops and supplies; to have accepted without full investigation the statement that the vessels were capable of transporting 25,000 men, while really they could not and did not transport more than 17,000 with their artillery, equipment, ammunition and supplies, and lacked sufficient storage room for the necessary amount of wagon transportation—that very important element in the movement of any army in the face of an enemy.

. . . In the opinion of this commission, there should be a division of the labor now devolving upon the Quartermaster's Department. Whether there should be one great department of supply, covering the Quartermasters' Department except transportation, the Subsistence Department, and the Pay Department and another covering the important problem of transportation . . . is a subject for the serious consideration of a board of officers."

Only after catastrophe and the publicity incident thereto had prepared the ground did it appear likely that the War Department organization would undergo far-reaching changes.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1. See John M. Gaus, *A Study of Research in Public Administration*, page 10, "Still another thread of influence in the development of public administration in the 20th century is the contribution of the cities. It is interesting to note the role of catastrophe here." Courtesy The Brookings Institution.
2. See *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*.
3. William H. Carter, Acting Adjutant General United States Army, "A General Staff for the Army," *North American Review*, October 1902, Volume 175, Number 4, p. 558.
4. Same, p. 559.
5. Frederic L. Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1915), p. 151.
6. Act of July 25, 1866 (14 Statutes 223).
7. 15 Statutes 318.
8. Huidekoper, *op. cit.*, Note 6, p. 633.
9. Act of July 15, 1870 (16 Statutes 318).
10. Huidekoper, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
11. Same, p. 151.
12. Oliver Lyman Spaulding, *The United States Army in Peace and War*. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), p. 378.
13. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, *The Spanish American War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1901), p. 7.
14. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1896*, Vol. I, p. 5.
15. Same.
16. Same.
17. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1897*, p. 110.
18. Sec. 2, Art. II, Constitution of the United States.
19. The Honorable Elihu Root, Secretary of War, in his annual report for 1903 stated:

"Special credit is due Brigadier General William H. Carter for the exceptional ability and untiring industry which he has contributed to the work of devising, bringing about, and putting into operation the general staff law. He brought thorough and patient historical research and wide experience, both in the line and in the staff, to the aid of long-continued, anxious and concentrated thought upon the problem of improving military administration, and if the new system shall prove to be an improvement, the gain to the country will have been largely due to him." *Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1899-1903*, p. 333.

20. *Senate Document 119, 68th Congress, 1st Session*, pp. 18 and 19.

21. Major General J. G. Harbord, U. S. A., "The American General Staff," *The Saturday Evening Post*, March 13, 1926.

22. *Army Regulations, 1895*, par. 187.

23. Same, par. 188.

24. Same, par. 736.

25. Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, "The Coming General Staff," *Journal of the Military Services Institution of the United States*, p. 4.

26. *Army Regulations, 1895*.

27. *Army Regulations, 1895*, par. 972.

28. Same, par. 1226.

29. *Army Regulations, 1895*, par. 857.

30. Same.

31. Luther Gulick, *Notes on the Theory of Organization*, in *Papers on the Science of Administration*, edited by Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, (Institute of Public Administration, Columbia University, New York, 1937) p. 37.

32. *Report of Secretary of War, 1896*, p. 8.

33. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, *The Spanish American War*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1901) p. 7.

34. *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain*. (8 volumes) (*Senate Document 221; 56th Congress, 1st Session*) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899) p. 113.

35. John D. Miley, Aide to General Shafter, *In Cuba with Shafter*, (Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1911) p. 44.

36. Carter, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

37. Alger, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 and 39.

38. Carter, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

39. Captain Charles D. Rhodes, "Experiences of our Army," (*Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, March-April, 1905) pp. 199-200.

40. Testimony of General Shafter in *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President To Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain*, (*Senate Document 221, 56th Congress, 1st Session*) Vol. VII, p. 3192.

41. Alger, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

42. Same, pp. 57-58.

43. Dodge Commission Investigation, *Conduct of War Department in the War with Spain*, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

44. Walter Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1931) pp. 216-217.

45. Same, p. 217.

46. Same, p. 275.

47. *Correspondence, Relating to the War with Spain, April 15 to September 1, 1898*, U. S. Adjutant General's Office, 1902, p. 24.

48. Miley, *op. cit.*, p. 22, 24, 27.

49. The Dodge Commission, *op. cit.*, pp. 2257-2258.

50. Millis, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

51. Same, pp. 326-327.

52. Alger, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

53. Miley, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-223.

54. It is alleged that Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood were responsible for this action. According to General W. C. Brown, at the time a captain, Colonel Roosevelt took him aside and explained: "The War Department authorities . . . might pigeonhole the official views of the division and brigade commanders, but if he could get a statement of the situation into the newspapers he was confident that such pressure would be brought

on the Administration that they would be obliged to take us North." From Millis, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

55. Same.

56. Alger, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

57. Same, p. 429.

58. Same, pp. 432-433.

59. *Report of Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain*, (see Note 34), pp. 11, 43, 44.

Chapter III

The General Staff Emerges

ONE WOULD suspect that as a result of the defects discovered and publicized during the War with Spain, the military organization of the United States would have been given an immediate and thorough overhauling. But only after a long and tedious struggle was it possible to effect a change. Habit and politics both conspired to keep the past upon its throne.

The long continued and violent criticisms of the War Department did result in the forced resignation of Mr. Alger as Secretary of War, but this apparently did not influence President McKinley materially in filling the vacancy. The war was over and the immediate task facing the War Department was the satisfactory solution of the many problems arising out of the occupation of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Many legal questions confronted the War Department and an expert in this field was needed.

Secretary Elihu Root described the circumstances relating to his appointment in the following manner: "Sixteen years ago in the month of July . . . I was called to the telephone and told by one speaking for President McKinley, 'The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to take the position of Secretary of War.' I answered, 'Thank the President for me but say that it is quite absurd, I know nothing about war, I know nothing about the Army.' I was told to hold the wire and in a moment there came back the reply, 'President McKinley directs me to say that he is not looking for anyone who knows anything about the Army; he has got to have a lawyer to direct the government of these Spanish islands, and you are the lawyer he wants.' Of course I had then, on the instant, to determine what kind of a lawyer I wished to be and there was not but one answer to make, and so I went to perform a lawyer's duty upon the call of the greatest of all our clients, the Government of our country."¹

ELIHU ROOT BECOMES SECRETARY OF WAR

It was indeed fortunate that "Secretary Root entered the War Department without any special knowledge of military affairs."² This very lack of military experience strengthened his dispassionate objectivity which, when combined with his keen powers of analysis, made him the brilliant administrator that he proved to be. Details can be mastered but objectivity once lost can seldom be regained.

Root realized that the department which he was asked to take over was a mess. "The war had demonstrated its inefficiency and corruption.

Its red tape was proverbial. Personal jealousies and spite crippled the efficiency of its personnel. Officers long entrenched in sinecures in Washington had been successful only in firmly establishing their political position with congressional and senatorial backers. Root's predecessor, General Alger, was an honest but hopelessly incompetent person who did not even realize that he was officially and personally responsible for the many glaring errors and stupidities which, in the Spanish War, characterized every aspect of the American Army except the courage of the individual soldier and the intelligence of some officers when they were free to act unhampered by fatuous orders from Washington. The public airing of the scandals in the conduct of the war had roused wide general interest in the War Department far beyond anything which usually falls to the lot of that Cabinet position."³ This interest was useful to the new Secretary of War in the measures which he promptly began to initiate for the reform of army organization.

Despite the fact that pressing questions of colonial administration required much of his attention, Secretary Root began to study methodically the situation in the War Department. "He relied much on Adjutant General Corbin but talked with many other officers, including some of the younger men whose ideas had occasionally found their way into print in the military journals but had been buried there. He also drew heavily on an English work, *The Brain of an Army*, by Spenser Wilkinson. He read the long eight-volume report of the Dodge Commission on the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain. The head of that commission, General Grenville Dodge, and another member, General Horace Porter, were old friends of Root's and he talked much with them about their findings and the need for army reorganization. In their report he found details of the scandalous supplying of embalmed beef, the ignorance of the Quartermaster Department which resulted in piling up unusable trainloads of supplies at Tampa where there were no terminal facilities; the lack of knowledge and preparation for landing troops and maintaining them in Cuba. There too, he found recommendations for a change in the traditionally unsatisfactory system under which divided authority had crippled the War Department."⁴

Root's search for material relating to the War Department resulted in an interesting incident which strikingly illustrated the previous lack of interest manifested at the top in writings analyzing or criticizing the War Department and its historical development. Root heard that General Emory Upton had done some work along this line yet found that there were no copies of his studies nor any record of his efforts in the War Department. It was learned that Upton had prepared a report on

"The Armies of Europe and Asia and had had it published privately in 1878. It had been officially ignored for many years."⁵ After considerable search, "Major William H. Carter, one of the younger men on whom Root relied very heavily . . . found a copy of Upton's book in a secondhand book shop and presented it to Root who read it with great interest and profit."⁶ So impressed was Root with Upton's observations that he read Michie's biography of General Upton. This disclosed that Upton had also written on the Army of the United States. Root immediately instituted a search for this treatise. It was found that it had never been published and the search for the manuscript was made difficult by the fact that General Upton had died in 1881. Located at last and edited by officers who had worked with him, Upton's manuscript was published in 1904 at Root's direction. Reprinted four times since that date, this study, known as *The Military Policy of the United States*, has become the most influential and outstanding contribution yet made by an American army officer in the field of military literature and military doctrine. "Upon its publication in January, 1904, [Root] immediately sent copies to thirty-three newspapers and magazine editors. Upton's works became Root's chief reliance."⁷ Root acknowledged his indebtedness to Upton's writings, stating that "they gave me the details on which I could base recommendations and overcome my ignorance as a civilian."⁸

No doubt it was difficult to obtain a clear picture of the War Department situation as it stood. Root's chief advisers were bureau chiefs whose views were all too often distorted by the overpowering urge to preserve their bureaucratic independence. Some idea of the difficulties which he faced and of the way he approached the problem may be gathered from the following remarks of General Carter:

"Secretary Root recognized early in his service that there was need of radical reform, but his advisers were mainly bureau chiefs, each independent in his own sphere, working under the same un-coordinated system that had been the subject of criticism for a century. I had been studying and writing on Army improvement for many years and had come to the serious conviction that we could never go to war as a nation in arms unless we had something in the nature of a board of directors to plan and coordinate the activities incident to carrying on a great war. The Secretary asked me one day what the trouble was in the Army and I began to unfold the ideas which had been in the minds of many young officers, especially those embodied by General Emory Upton in his report on 'The Armies of Europe and Asia.' His interest was immediately aroused but the writing of instructions and preparation of legislation

for the civil governments of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands demanded much of his time.

I made many notes and briefs for the Secretary and had many conversations with him on the subject of the introduction of a General Staff in our Army but there was so little known in Congress about the necessity for such an organization that we felt sure of opposition of a very decisive character. In the Army itself there was very little definite knowledge of General Staff employment other than that of the German Army which was adopted to monarchical government but not entirely suited to ours. The subject of the prize essay (contest) of the Military Service Institution for 1900 was 'The Organization of a Staff Best Adapted for the United States Army' and the board decided that none of the essays were worthy of the prize.

There was an age old controversy between the Commanding General of the Army and the bureau chiefs acting directly under the Secretary of War which many feared would be renewed rather than harmonized by a new staff corps. All of the early plans contemplated the creation of a General Staff of so modest a character that its chief would have been entangled between the Commanding General of the Army and the bureau chiefs from the start.

The only Commanding General of the Army who had managed to get along without friction was one who regarded himself as a Chief of Staff of the President and Secretary of War, rather than a self assertive commanding general. It may be stated . . . that after casting many nets in vain I recommended that the age old controversy should be ended once for all by doing away with the office of commanding general and of the independence of the bureau chiefs and creating the office of Chief of Staff instead of a Chief of the General Staff. In the end this was adopted and proved to be the only possible solution of the administrative situation.

There was not much enthusiasm among the older officers in the War Department concerning proposed Army reforms, and the inertia there reacted unfavorably in Congress. The Secretary of War continually studied the problem and was not devoid of serious experiences of the disadvantages of the many antagonisms between the bureaus, and the line of the Army represented by the Commanding General of the Army.

While endeavoring to spread the information as to the need of a General Staff corps, the Secretary decided upon taking the first step forward by establishing a War College with General Staff powers so far as might be possible."⁹

The main defects in the central mechanism of Army organization

which Root's study and analysis had revealed, has been summarized as follows:¹⁰

"(1) The absence of connection between the staff bureaus and the army proper.

(2) The absence of any central agency for the formulation of a general military policy for working out the details of a military program and for the accumulation of military information.

(3) As one of the causes of the foregoing, the permanent assignment of officers to staff duties.

(4) The lack of coordination between the various staff bureaus.

(5) As an incident of the foregoing, the wastefulness of a decentralized system of purchase and supply."¹¹

Part and parcel of all these defects was the confusion and inefficiency induced by the system of dual command in which the staff bureaus reported to the Secretary of War direct and the line of the Army to the Commanding General. Here, in addition, an interesting paradox had developed. In the War Department the long years of peace had witnessed two conflicting tendencies, centralization and decentralization, carried to the greatest possible extreme. Decentralization of function within the War Department had been carried to the point where bureau chiefs, such as the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General, were virtually sovereign within their functional spheres and oblivious to what occurred outside them. At the same time, under the necessity of reducing expenditures during the long period of peace, centralization within each bureau reached such a peak that minute supervision and operation by the War Department bureau concerned extended to the most distant ramification of the duties performed, even though these were matters of a kind that pertained to the entire army and involved places and personnel far removed from Washington.

Vital as this determination of what was needed was, Root's realization of the importance of the political strategy needed to enact these reforms into law was of vastly greater significance. Many of Root's predecessors had realized the need for reform. Typical was the recommendation made by Secretary of War John B. Floyd in 1857, who in the Report of The Secretary of War for 1857 noted:

"Attention has been repeatedly called to defects in the organization of the Army, and to various details in reference to several of its parts. As these evils increase with time and practice under them, I must again bring them before you . . .

One of the greatest errors of detail is the separate independent char-

acter of our staff corps. This removes them from their proper position as aids or assistants to the commander and constitutes them his equals. It contracts the sphere of observation and experience and thus unfits the officer for change or advancement, and begets an accumulation of precedent and prerogative at war with the vital principle of military organization—the inviolable and undivided authority of the head. He is bound, as they are, by the law, and his construction of it should govern them, not theirs him. . .

A general provision dispensing with the staff bureaus and giving the President authority to regulate the duties on the principles above stated, and to transfer, when necessary officers to and from the line and staff, would restore the institution to its proper effectiveness. Thus the staff near the War Department, representing the authority of the constitutional commander in chief of the army and navy would bear the same relation to him as the staff attached to a corps in the field have to the colonel or general who commands it."¹²

SECRETARY ROOT FAVORS A GENERAL STAFF

What could Secretary Root do to prevent his general staff concept from meeting the same fate as that accorded by Congress to so many of the recommendations of previous Secretaries? Root's reaction was to move slowly and cautiously. An educational campaign not only in Congress but among army officers and the public at large he recognized as necessary in order to prepare the ground lest these new ideas fail to take root. At the same time, it was imperative that action be taken before the memories of the war with Spain had been forgotten.

Root restricted himself in his first report as Secretary of War, made public on November 29, 1899, to a mere mention of the long felt need for reform by stating:

"It is greatly to be desired that at the same time while the lessons drawn from the experience of recent war are fresh in our minds, some improvement should be made in the organization of the Army.

For many years various criticisms of our present organization have been made and discussed, and a number of measures for improvement have been recommended by my predecessors or embodied in bills introduced in Congress. . . As to most of the proposed changes, however, there has not been a sufficient public interest in the subject or a sufficiently strong conviction of the importance of good organization to overcome the diversity of opinions and personal interests desirous of being left undisturbed."¹³

The Secretary of War then proceeded with the task of weakening

anticipated opposition. To this end it was necessary to educate the Army and the public as to the need for staff reform. It was significant that the *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, a professional magazine widely read by Army officers, had designated as the subject for the prize essay contest of 1900, "The Organization of a Staff Best Adapted for the United States Army." This contest revealed that Root's educational campaign had been effective within the Army for there was widespread interest in the prospect of a change in army organization. The fact that no essay was adjudged good enough to be awarded the top prize also showed that there was little or no area of agreement as to what should be done to remedy existing defects.

The publicity campaign was not limited to the Army. Root began to send out material on the Army and the War Department to the principal magazine and newspaper editors throughout the country. One example, already mentioned, was the distribution of copies of Emory Upton's *The Military Policy of the United States* to persons of influence. Root also carried the subject of War Department organization to the country in his speeches. Characteristic were his remarks before the Marquette Club in Chicago on October 7, 1899, in response to the toast, "The American Soldier." After lauding the bravery of the common soldier he subtly noted that:

"The American soldier of today is a part of a great machine which we call military organization; a machine in which, as by electrical converters, the policy of government is transformed into the strategy of the general, into the tactics of the field and into the action of the man behind the gun. Through that machine he is fed, clothed, transported and armed, equipped and housed.

The machine today is defective; it needs improvement; it ought to be improved. Thirty-three years of profound peace have evolved in it some men upon whom the stress of harsh requirement has proved that they are unfit for the positions to which they have attained. Some square pegs have gotten in round holes. Some men who in ordinary days of peace have seemed to be equal to all requirements, in the stern necessities of war have failed to accomplish its purpose. This was inevitable. It could only be avoided by the true Anglo-Saxon method of improvement by experiment. . . It was the machinery that we received through that great generation of men whom we all honor as we look back over a third of a century, and it has required the experience of another war to teach the American people where it needs improvement and change.

It rests with you through the Senators and Representatives in Congress whom you shall elect to determine whether the lessons of this

war shall be learned and the army organization of America shall be put in the front of American progress."¹⁴

The ideas presented in the address at the Marquette Club were reiterated whenever the opportunity presented itself, which was often for Root was not only a prominent member of the Cabinet but a good speaker in great demand. In the meantime, Root, canny lawyer that he was, discovered that a start could be made without waiting for Congressional approval.

On February 19, 1900, the Secretary of War, having decided that a War College with general staff powers could be created by executive order, convened a Board of Officers¹⁵ for the purpose of establishing a War College which could more or less act as a General Staff until such time as Congress could be successfully approached and induced to pass the necessary legislation for the establishment of the kind of General Staff that Root visioned. Some idea of the proper field of action for a General Staff may be gained from the letter of instructions sent to Brigadier General William Ludlow, the President of the Board, which read:

"Sir: Pursuant to the instructions of the Secretary of War, you have been designated as President of a Board which is to meet in this city and take preliminary measures toward the organization of a War College for the Army including the formulation of a project and general regulations and for its future conduct and guidance.

The purpose of this department in establishing this college is to further the higher instruction of the Army, to develop and organize, in accordance with a coherent and unified system, the existing means of professional education and training, and to serve as a coordinating and authoritative agency through which all means of professional military information shall be at any one time at the disposal of the War Department.

The duties of the college in general will be as follows:

. . . To consider and report upon all questions affecting the welfare and efficiency of the Army including organization, methods of administration, armament, equipment, transportation, supplies, mobilization, concentration, distribution, military preparation, plans of campaign, and other professional matters as may be referred to it. . . .

This college will have combined with it, reenforced and enlarged in its scope of effectiveness, the Division of Military Information of the Adjutant General's Office where its records and conclusions will be prepared."¹⁶

The Board of Officers thus established gave the question of a War College long and careful study. They submitted their report on October 31, 1900, after a seven months' study. Included was a memorandum that served as the basis for the Executive Order establishing the Army War College. Apart from their official report, they submitted the following recommendations: "The board, therefore, while convinced that the War College, if established and consistently sustained, can be made to effect valuable results specially urges that the necessary legislative provision for a General Staff, on thoroughly considered and effective lines, be recommended for incorporation in the military service of the United States at the earliest possible time as a permanent feature of the organization of the Army."¹⁷

WAR DEPARTMENT OPPOSITION TO A GENERAL STAFF

The next task was to reduce the opposition that was bound to arise within the Army. This was an important but difficult task, for many times in the past dissension within the War Department had been a sufficient reason for the Congress to ignore or postpone indefinitely the consideration of measures affecting the War Department. This time the opposition within the Army was sure to be voiced by officers in Washington who had been cultivating political friendships for many years.

Root's efforts to bring about reform did arouse the opposition of many officers in high places. General Nelson Miles, the Commanding General of the Army, generally regarded by Congress as our foremost military expert, resisted with all the influence he could muster the changes proposed by Root. In fact, General Miles was a thorn in the side of the Secretary of War much of the time. It would have been impolitic to try to get rid of the old warrior even though Root informed the President that Miles was trying "to promote his own views and undo my plans," saying further that it "acts on the department very much like mixing Seidlitz powder."¹⁸

Equally irritating was the opposition of the bureau chiefs and their subalterns in Washington. Root believed, and there was considerable evidence to support his views, that these bureaucrats, because of their permanent tenure of duty in Washington had lost contact with the rest of the Army with the result that the needs and interests of the armed service outside of Washington were totally ignored. Under the permanent detail system, vacancies in the staff branches were filled by the permanent transfer to Washington of the fortunate line officer applicant who got the job. Thus the Quartermaster, Ordnance, Commissary, Paymaster, and other bureaus in Washington were filled by "officers

who had become entrenched in Washington armchairs.”¹⁹ Naturally, these officers were opposed to any coordination that threatened the sovereign powers they had enjoyed for so many years. During those years they had taken pains to acquire friends in Congress. The Bureau of Pensions, for example, had “acquired enormous political influence by the judicial advancement of cases in which Congressmen’s constituents invoked the American panacea for all weak causes—‘influence’ as Mr. Dooley called it. [Likewise] the Quartermaster General’s Bureau [had] also laid up for itself the treasure of political support by equally judicious allocation of orders for supplies.”²⁰

As an able strategist, Root realized that he had to go cautiously. His first victory was the abolition of future permanent appointments in many of the staff and supply departments, substituting for them the detailing of officers to these departments for four-year periods, at the expiration of which the officer returned to his line branch for duty with troops. In addition, there was eliminated the “old rule which gave an increase of rank and pay with each transfer to the staff, thus eliminating the desire and political pressure for staff assignments.”²¹ All this was instituted by the Act of February 2, 1901, which thus considerably reduced the proprietary interest of future staff officers in the Washington bureau offices. This elimination of future permanent details to staff bureaus was unquestionably accomplished only by the tactful move of making no change that would affect the officers then holding permanent tenure. Thus, officers previously appointed to staff bureaus retained their permanent tenure, but as vacancies occurred the transition would be made and eventually the bureaus would be staffed by officers on temporary detail from the line.

Carter, Root’s principal advisor on staff reorganization, had been anxious to include provisions establishing a General Staff in the 1901 Act, but Root and McKinley decided that this would be premature.²² The greater part of that act related to an increase in the size of the Army. As this was badly needed, it was decided to include in this bill only such matter as met with the entire approval of the Military Committees of the House and the Senate.

In his annual report dated November 27, 1901, Root touched on the subject of the General Staff in a way that illustrated the deftness and the tact with which he pursued his educational campaign to acquaint Congress and the country with the General Staff idea. The General Staff concept was explained with great clarity and for that reason is quoted at length, as follows:

“The creation of the War College Board, and the duties which will

be imposed upon it, as indicated in my report for 1899 is probably as near an approach to the establishment of a general staff as is practicable under existing law. Consideration of the amount of work which that board ought to do, however, in the field of education alone, leads to the conclusion that it cannot adequately perform all the duties of a general staff, and that the whole subject should be treated by Congress in a broader way.

No one can doubt that the general and field officers of our Army have been too exclusively occupied in details of administration, with inadequate opportunity and provision for the study of great questions, the consideration and formation of plans, comprehensive forethought against future contingencies, and coordination of the various branches of the service with a view to harmonious action. A body of competent military experts should be charged with these matters of the highest importance, and to that end I strongly urge the establishment by law of a general staff of which the War College Board shall form a part. This work must be done before the moment of War arrives, because modern wars are so short and decisive that it would be criminal to delay the preparation until the moment of rupture.

The General Staff scheme is not a new proposition because officers of the Army have always been utilized to a certain extent in this business, and in looking over the records for some years past it is observed that a number of officers have always been detailed from the Army to perform such work at the War Department, but they have no legal status. Neither law nor custom places the preparation of plans for national defense in the hands of any particular officer or body of officers, and what is everybody's business is nobody's business. It has usually been that after troops were gotten together in a haphazard fashion that brigades, divisions, and corps have been organized by generals and staff officers who have been designated under the dictates of expedience rather than previous and careful selection. It has usually been because American character rises superior to system, or rather absence of system, that disaster has been avoided.

The result naturally produces much haphazard work and in the end is extremely expensive by reason of frequent changes of orders for mobilization and concentration of troops, as was evinced in the war with Spain. It is realized, however, that no general staff or other system can be made to work properly so long as the present unbusinesslike methods prevail of having a Secretary of War and a Commanding General of the Army to control matters at the War Department. In this country, as in the British Empire, the efforts to conduct the Army with two heads has always failed. Many complications arise from the fact

that the finances of the Army must be administrated according to law by the Secretary of War and are wholly within his jurisdiction and that of the various supply and financial departments, all of which are exempted from the control of the commanding general, whose duties are generally confined to those of army administration and discipline. There must always be great difficulty in fixing responsibility when so many bureau chiefs and the lieutenant general commanding are concerned in the business affairs of the Army, and the Army itself has continually turned toward the general staff scheme as furnishing the most probable solution of the intricate situation. A General Staff added to the Army as a separate corps would be powerless for good unless the abolition of the present functions of the General of the Army is pronounced coincident with the establishment of the new corps. A General Staff possessing the authority of law for its existence could arrange the mass of details for the commanding generals of the various armies and order to depots the proper quantity and character of supplies essential to the success of proposed campaigns so that independent bureaus would not provide transportation for a surplus of one class of stores while a deficiency of another equally necessary existed.

If the expense of the Civil War and the War with Spain, as carried on, could be carefully contrasted with the expense as it should have been, had the military affairs of the Nation been in the hands of a trained General Staff Corps, no further argument would be required to carry conviction that the proposed change is a real reform. The work of such a staff will not be merely that of the comparatively small Regular Army, but will include all of the great military questions which may concern the United States, in the disposition of the greater force to be raised whenever war comes upon us. It will be an agency through which the military operations and civil policies of the country may be harmonized as becomes a republican form of government. Upon every business principle and from every military point of view it commends itself as worthy of the most serious consideration.

It is proposed that the present Lieutenant General of the Army shall be detailed as the first Chief of General Staff and that upon his separation from active service the President shall detail the Chief of General Staff from the general officers of the Army, and thereafter there shall be no more permanent appointments to the grade of lieutenant general. The senior general officer of the Army, if not chosen as Chief of General Staff will be assigned to active command of troops or such other duty as the President may direct. The officer detailed as Chief of General Staff will be detailed for four years unless sooner relieved. He will have charge under the President and the Secretary of War, of executing the

general military policy of the Nation, and he will, with the assistance of carefully selected officers who will not be embarrassed with handling current papers in the War Department, consider all questions of importance, recommend all concentration and movement of troops, assignments to command, and other important matters concerning which the President and Secretary of War require technical and professional advice. Officers of this Corps will be detailed to make all military inspections of the Army and the country, and the Inspector General's Department as now constituted, will gradually be eliminated without interference with the equitable rights of those now holding permanent commissions in that department. The memoranda for all important orders covering the affairs under the jurisdiction of the General Staff Corps will be sent to the adjutant generals at the War Department or at the various geographical headquarters for publication. The adjutant generals will be relieved from the consideration of important questions, as has been necessary heretofore in the absence of a General Staff Corps, and will simply issue the orders as prepared by the General Staff Corps and have charge of the preparation and preservation of the records.

The inspection of money accounts is transferred to the Treasury Department. This commends itself as a business proposition, as the Auditor for the War Department and the Comptroller of the Treasury are the officials who render practically all the decisions governing the financial operations of the Army. . . ."²³

GENERAL STAFF BILL INTRODUCED IN CONGRESS

Early in 1902, Root directed Carter to prepare a bill, embodying his ideas on the General Staff, for presentation to Congress. Mr. Howley introduced the measure on February 14, 1902, and it was laid before the committee as H. R. 11350, 57th Congress, 1st Session. Sections one to three of the bill provided for the consolidation of the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, and Pay Department into a Department of Supply. Sections four to ten related to the creation of the General Staff. In a letter dated March 3, 1902, and sent to the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Root explained and argued in favor of the creation of the General Staff as follows:

"To the Chairman Committee on Military Affairs, The Senate.

Sir: I return you herewith the bill (S. 3917) to increase the efficiency of the Army, with a corrected copy of same. The main features of the proposed bill, which deserve most careful consideration, are the proposed consolidation of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay Departments into a new Department of Supply, making the conduct of

transportation a separate division of the new department; and the provisions creating a General Staff.

The great work performed by the staff departments during the Civil War and the war with Spain is fully recognized, and their proposed consolidation under a single chief is in no sense a condemnation of any particular bureau. The present transport service is part and parcel of the Quartermaster's Department, and, whether justly or not, other bureaus complain that when transportation is insufficient for all, their bureaus are prejudiced by reason of the transportation being under the direct orders of another supply bureau. With all these bureaus under one chief it will not be possible for one to interfere with another in the matter of supplies, and the Army as a whole will reap the benefits arising from this change, and, at the same time, none of the individual bureaus loses anything of its importance. Under the present system it is entirely possible for a bureau chief to work along his own lines in ignorance of what the other bureaus are doing. Economical and business principles seem to justify the bringing together of these bureaus under a single chief, who will have general direction of all and who will be able to decide promptly and on business principles what shall be done by each particular bureau in the mobilization and concentration of troops.

This chief will also be able to perform a great deal of the work now falling directly on the Secretary of War, who is compelled to study the minor details of each question before giving his opinion. This will be a much greater relief to the Secretary of War than would ordinarily be imagined. It is expected under this new system that much of the auditing of accounts and financial work generally of the different bureaus may be consolidated in one financial system similar to that in vogue in great corporations, and ultimately the new system will prove vastly more economical than the present one.

In this consolidation it has not been deemed wise to ask at once a reduction in the number of officers, but it is calculated that in a very few years, when the system has become fully developed a material reduction can be made without serious detriment to the service. At the present, however, an increase of two officers is asked, one chief of the Supply Department and one chief of the Transportation Division, to be detailed from the Army for periods of four years. This legislation is involved in sections 1, 2, and 3.

The next subject, which is embodied in sections 4 to 10, inclusive, involves the introduction into the Army of a General Staff system. No increase of officers is asked for in the establishment of this corps, as all are to be detailed from the line of the Army. There are two considerations involved in this legislation. It has long been apparent to all stu-

dents of the situation that the time has arrived when it has become necessary to have both in the Army and Navy a body of officers trained to consider the military policy of the country and to prepare comprehensive plans for defense and charged specially with those duties. The mobilization of armies and similar operations require time and consideration which can not be given to the subjects by officers who are burdened with current and official work in the Army and Navy Departments."

The letter to the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee continued in the same language used in Secretary Root's annual report for 1901 (see pages 48-51) and then concluded:

"In order to furnish a wider field of selection and some incentive to lieutenants who have shown special aptitude in their profession, it is asked that the few officers of that grade who may be selected for General Staff duty may be given the rank of captain while performing such duty. The expense of this will be very slight.

In general, the provisions of this bill contemplate modifications in the business establishment of the Army of far-reaching consequences to the service and the country. The fact that new officers are not created and the business is to be placed upon a more economical and satisfactory basis should procure for this bill the serious consideration which it deserves.

Very Respectfully,

ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War."

The measure did not have clear sailing. The Commanding General of the Army, General Miles, led off for the opposition. Appearing before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, he condemned the bill severely. The following excerpt from his testimony illustrates the plane of the arguments he advanced and advanced successfully:

"I realize that I am addressing not only a body of Senators but a body of veterans, veterans of the war with Mexico and veterans of the great Civil War; therefore what I have to say falls on military ears.

More than 100 years ago our Army was organized by the genius of Washington, Steuben, Hamilton and others. In all the wars in which we have been engaged it has in the end been victorious. It has withstood intrigue and contaminating influence from without and has absorbed the injurious elements that have been forced upon it, sustaining the honor of the Nation, and the glory of American arms in every campaign and its present organization is best adapted to our great Republic. In my judgment a system that is the fruit of the best thought of the most

eminent patriots and ablest military men that this country has produced should not be destroyed by substituting one that is more adapted to the monarchies of the Old World.

The proposition to consolidate the Pay, Quartermaster's, and Commissary Departments is not advisable, and, in fact, this bill does not accomplish that object. It simply creates an additional bureau, that of transportation, with an additional officer of the rank of major general to do the duty that now should devolve properly upon the Commanding General of the Army; that is, the control of these three departments, the Pay, Quartermaster, and Commissary Departments.

Unlike our Presidents the sovereigns of Spain, Italy, Turkey, Austria, Germany, and Russia are trained from their earliest boyhood with a view to commanding armies when they arrive at the head of the government and a General Staff Corps such as suggested might be better adapted for those countries than for our Republic.

The scheme is revolutionary, casts to the winds the lessons of experience, and abandons methods which successfully carried us through the most memorable epochs of our history.

In fact, the general's authority for initiative is taken away, and he can make no move without the direction or sanction of the all powerful General Staff, which, under the bill is subject to the control of the Secretary of War, whose knowledge of affairs military may be meager or nil. . . .

As every member of this committee has had experience in actual warfare, I trust that the office which Scott and Grant and Sherman held with so much distinction will not be destroyed while any of their comrades and friends who so well knew of their services and responsibilities still survive."²⁴

After General Miles had testified, the Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate informed the War Department that "favorable action on the bill could not be expected during that session."²⁵ Once again sentiment had triumphed over reason.

To overcome the opposition generated by the influence of General Miles, the Secretary of War decided that high ranking and distinguished officers who favored the General Staff Bill should be called to testify before the committee. Lieutenant General Schofield, who prior to his retirement had served for a considerable period as the Commanding General of the Army, and who had also occupied the post of Secretary of War for a short period, testified in favor of the Bill and did much to develop sentiment in favor of it. Likewise, Major General Wesley Merritt (Retired) testified and seconded the views of General Schofield.

There was also presented to the Committee a letter from Brigadier General George W. Davis, then in command of the 7th Brigade in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands. This letter, written by a distinguished officer of long experience who echoed the ideas of the line officers who were removed from strife among Washington staff officers, added its weight in favor of the General Staff idea.

The Secretary of War intensified his publicity campaign and caused the General Staff concept to be explained and popularized at every opportunity. In the Report of the Secretary of War for 1902, issued on December 1, 1902, Root reviewed the General Staff theme in a clear and forceful manner:

"The most important thing to be done now for the Regular Army is the creation of a general staff. I beg to call attention to the remarks made upon this subject under the head of 'Improvement of Army Organization' in the report for 1899 and under the head of 'General Staff' in the report for 1901. Since the report for 1899 was made many of the important measures then recommended for the greater efficiency of the Army have been accomplished or are in course of accomplishment under authority conferred by legislation. Our military system, is, however, still exceedingly defective at the top. We have a personnel unsurpassed anywhere, and a population ready to respond to calls for the increase of personnel in case of need, up to the full limit at which it is possible to transport and subsist an Army. We have wealth and a present willingness to expend it reasonably for the procurement of supplies and material of war as plentiful and as good as can be found in any country. We have the different branches of the military service well organized, each within itself, for the performance of its duties. Our administrative staff and supply departments, as a rule, have at their heads good and competent men, faithful to their duties, each attending assiduously to the business of his department.

But when it comes to the coordination and direction of all these means and agencies of warfare, so that all parts of the machine shall work together, we are weak. Our system makes no adequate provision for the directing brain which every army must have, to work successfully. Common experience has shown that this cannot be furnished by any single man without assistants, and that it requires a body of officers working together under the direction of a chief and entirely separate from and independent of the administrative staff of an army (such as the adjutants, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., each of whom is engrossed in the duties of his own special department). This body of officers, in distinction from the administrative staff, has come to be called a general

staff. There has been much misunderstanding as to the nature and duties of a general staff. Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, in his work on the organization of the German army, describes it as follows:

'In Prussia, at least, the term has been used exclusively and distinctively applied, since about 1789, to a body of officers to whom, as assistants to the commander in chief and of his subordinate generals, is confided such work as is directly connected with the designing and the execution of military operations. That in Germany, as elsewhere, chiefs of special arms, heads of supply departments, judge-advocates, etc., form an important branch of the higher commands goes without saying, but they are not included in the term general staff. Clausewitz's dictum that the general staff is intended to convert the ideas of the commanding general into orders, not only by communicating the former to the troops but rather by working out all matters of detail, and thus relieving the general from a vast amount of unnecessary labor, is not a sufficient definition of general staff duties, according to Von Schellendorf (upon this question certainly the better authority), as it fails to notice the important obligation of the general-staff officer of constantly watching over the effectiveness of the troops which would be impaired by a lack of attention to their material welfare. Out of this obligation grows, he says, the further duty of furnishing to the heads of the supply departments and other officers attached to the headquarters such explanations touching the general military situation, or the effect of a sudden change therein, as will enable them to carry out intelligently what is expected of them. The general staff thus becomes a directing and explaining body, and its chief, therefor, is in some respects the head of the whole staff. It follows, that of the two terms, staff and general staff, the Germans regard the former as the more comprehensive one and as embracing the latter.'

Neither our political nor our military system makes it suitable that we should have a general staff organized like the German general staff or like the French general staff; but the common experience of mankind is that the things which those general staffs do have to be done in every well managed and well directed army, and they have to be done by a body of men especially assigned to do them. We should have such a body of men selected and organized in our own way and in accordance with our own system to do those essential things. The most intelligible way to describe such a body of men, however selected and organized, is by calling it a general staff, because its duties are staff duties and are general in their character.

The duties of such a body of officers can be illustrated by taking for example an invasion of Cuba, such as we were all thinking about a few

years ago. It is easy for a President or a general acting under his direction, to order that 50,000 or 100,000 men proceed to Cuba and capture Havana. To make an order which has any reasonable chance of being executed he must do a great deal more than that. He must determine how many men shall be sent and how they shall be divided among the different arms of the service, and how they shall be armed and equipped, and to do that he must get all the information possible about the defenses of the place to be captured and the strength and character and armament of the forces to be met. He must determine at what points and by what routes the place shall be approached, and at what points his troops shall land in Cuba; and for this purpose he must be informed about the various harbors of the island and the depth of their channels; what classes of vessels can enter them; what the facilities for landing are; how they can be defended; the character of the roads leading from them to the place to be attacked; the character of the intervening country; how far it is healthful or unhealthful; what the climate is liable to be at the season of the proposed movement; the temper and sympathy of the inhabitants; the quantity and kind of supplies that can be obtained, and a great variety of other things which will go to determine whether it is better to make the approach from one point or from another, and to determine what it will be necessary for the Army to carry with it in order to succeed in moving and living and fighting.

All this information it is the business of a general staff to procure and present. It is probable that there would be in such case a number of alternative plans, each having advantages and disadvantages, and these should be worked out each by itself, with the reasons for and against it, and presented to the President or general for his determination. This the general staff should do. This cannot be done in an hour. It requires that the general staff shall have been at work for a long time collecting the information and arranging it and getting it in form to present. Then at home, where the preparation for the expedition is to be made, the order must be based upon a knowledge of the men and material available for its execution; how many men there are who can be devoted to that purpose, from what points they are to be drawn, what bodies of troops ought to be left or sent elsewhere, and what bodies may be included in the proposed expedition; whether there are enough ships to transport them; where they are to be obtained; whether they are properly fitted up; what more should be done to them; what are the available stocks of clothing, arms and ammunition, and engineers' material, and horses and wagons, and all the immediate supplies and munitions necessary for a large expedition; how are the things to be supplied which

are not ready, but which are necessary, and how long a time will be required to supply them.

All this and much more necessary information it is the business of a general staff to supply. When that has been done the order is made with all available knowledge of all the circumstances upon which the movement depends for its success. It is then the business of the General Staff to see that every separate officer upon whose action the success of the movement depends understands his share in it and does not lag behind in the performance of that share; to see that troops and ships and animals and supplies of arms and ammunition and clothing and food, etc., from hundreds of sources come together at the right times and places. It is a laborious, complicated, and difficult work, which requires a considerable number of men whose special business it is and who are charged with no other duties.

It was the lack of such a body of men doing that kind of work which led to the confusion attending the Santiago expedition in the summer of 1898. The confusion at Tampa and elsewhere was the necessary result of having a large number of men, each of them doing his own special work the best he could, but without any adequate force of officers engaged in seeing that they pulled together according to plans made beforehand. Such a body of men doing general staff duty is just as necessary in time of peace as it is in time of war. It is not an executive body; it is not an administrative body; it acts only through the authority of others. It makes intelligent command possible by procuring and arranging information and working out plans in detail, and it makes intelligent and effective execution of commands possible by keeping all separate agents advised of the parts they are to play in the general scheme."²⁶

This lucid description and explanation was given widespread publicity. Unquestionably, this report was widely read in Congress and no doubt it played a very considerable part in allaying hostility to the pending General Staff Bill.

CONGRESS PASSES THE GENERAL STAFF LAW

At long last the General Staff concept succeeded in winning sufficient support in Congress to be enacted into law on February 14, 1903. The original War Department draft had suffered several major alterations at the hands of Congress. Most important was the refusal of Congress to eliminate the Inspector General's Department and transfer its functions. This was due to the political adeptness of the then Inspector General, Brigadier General Joseph Breckinridge. Root realized that

an organization for thought must have facilities which would enable it to perceive what it must think about. Congress, however, decreed that an inspecting service was not necessary to the operation of a General Staff.

Another subtle change, destined to bring future trouble, was what might appear to be a harmless enough modification of the original War Department draft. In the War Department draft it was proposed "the Chief of Staff under the direction of the President and Secretary of War shall have supervision of all the troops of the line and of the several administrative staff and supply departments. A bureau chief, without public hearing, evidently influenced a modification. . . . The change was adroitly accomplished by specifying in detail the bureaus subject to the supervision of the Chief of Staff and omitting the one of which he was the head. Another adroit change was one limiting the Chief of Staff to supervision of military duties not otherwise assigned by law."²⁷ The bureau chief who succeeded in effecting this change in the law was none other than Doctor (later General) Fred Ainsworth, the head of the Bureau of Records and Pensions. This marked his first but by no means his last contact with the General Staff and its Chief. The War Department was not greatly disturbed over this modification for it was believed that after bureau chiefs with permanent appointments had passed from active service there would be little difficulty in securing loyalty and cooperation from chiefs of bureaus who were detailed for a four-year period.

The modification limiting the Chief of Staff to supervision of military duties not otherwise assigned by law "opened the door of opportunity for any bureau chief with influence enough to secure legislation assigning matters definitely to his control."²⁸

There developed during the hearings on the measures a controversy that is of interest because it throws light on the theory behind the general staff. The War Department in its draft used the term "supervise" to denote the relationship of the Chief of Staff and the General Staff to the rest of the War Department and the Army. This term was scrutinized particularly by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, all of whom were veterans of the Civil War. Senator Foraker desired to change the term "supervise," by substituting for it either "command" or "control." The War Department explained that the word "supervision" was used because "in the military sense it indicated the overseeing of affairs in the interest of superior authority"²⁹ whereas the word "command" implied directly "the power of the officer holding such command to issue orders."³⁰

The Congressional sponsors argued that the chief task of the General Staff would be to act as the agent of the commander—in that they would “render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and act as their ‘agents,’ not in any one department, but in informing and coordinating the action of all the different officers in carrying out their orders.”³¹

Perhaps the most succinct statement of the function of the General Staff was made by Elihu Root: “Those are the two great duties of the General Staff—first, to acquire information and to arrange it and fit it into all the possible plans of operation, so that an order can be intelligently made, and second, when the order has been made, to exercise constant supervision that does not mean command but to inform and advise the different persons who must conspire to the execution of the order of how every other one is going on with his work.”³²

THE GENERAL STAFF BILL OF 1903 AS PASSED

The General Staff Bill, after some amendments, finally passed and was approved by the President on February 14, 1903. The text of the bill was as follows:

“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that there is hereby established a General Staff Corps, to be composed of officers detailed from the Army at large, under such rules as may be presented by the President.

Sec. 2. That the duties of the General Staff Corps shall be to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the military efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agent in informing and coordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject under the terms of this act to the supervision of the Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.

Sec. 3. That the General Staff Corps shall consist of one Chief of Staff and two general officers, all to be detailed by the President from officers of the Army at large not below the grade of brigadier general; four colonels, six lieutenant colonels, and twelve majors to be detailed from the corresponding grades in the Army at large, under such rules for selection as the President may prescribe; twenty captains to be

detailed from officers of the Army at large of the grades of captain or first lieutenant, who while so serving shall have the rank and pay of captain mounted. All officers detailed in the General Staff Corps shall be detailed therein for periods of four years unless sooner relieved. While serving in the General Staff Corps, officers may be temporarily assigned to duty with any branch of the Army. Upon being relieved from duty in the General Staff Corps, officers shall return to the branch of the Army in which they hold permanent commissions, and no officer shall be eligible to a further detail in the General Staff Corps until he shall have served two years in the branch in which commissioned, except in case of emergency or in time of war.

Sec. 4. That the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President or of the Secretary of War, shall have supervision of all the troops of the line and of The Adjutant General's, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Quartermaster, Subsistence, Medical, Pay, and Ordnance Departments, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps, and shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned him by the President. Duties now prescribed by statute for the Commanding General of the Army as a member of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and of the Board of Commissioners of the Soldiers Home shall be performed by the Chief of Staff or other officer designated by the President. Acts and parts of acts authorizing aides-de-camp and military secretaries shall not apply to general officers of the General Staff Corps.

Sec. 5. That the Chief of Artillery shall hereafter serve as an additional member of the General Staff and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadier general, and when the next vacancy occurs in the office of brigadier general of the line, it shall be not filled, and thereafter the number of brigadier generals of the line exclusive of the Chief of Artillery shall not exceed fourteen; and the provision of the foregoing sections of the act shall take effect August fifteenth, nineteen hundred and three.

Approved February 14, 1903."³³

Although the act establishing the General Staff was approved on February 14, 1903, the measure specified that it was not to become operative until August 15, 1903. Much had to be accomplished in the interim. A board of officers consisting of Generals Young, Chaffee, Bates, Carter, Bliss, and Randolph, with Major H. A. Greene as recorder, was convened in March to recommend forty-two officers for detail to the General Staff.

The officers to be recommended were to be selected solely on the

basis of their military records. Thereafter vacancies in the General Staff were to be filled by recommendation of a board of officers composed of the Chief of Staff and the three senior officers of the General Staff Corps then on duty in Washington. The general officers designated as the selection board represented the cream of the Army. General Young was the second ranking officer of the Army and apparently already had been informed that he would succeed General Miles on his retirement and would thus become the first Chief of Staff. General Chaffee had distinguished himself as the commander of the United States troops sent to China during the Boxer incident and was generally regarded as a future Chief of Staff, a prediction which was realized. General Bates commanded the Department of the Missouri. General Carter had been Secretary Root's right-hand man in all matters relating to the establishment of the General Staff, and had been engaged in thinking and writing about the General Staff concept for many years. General Bliss was the head of the Army War College, the organization established by Root to substitute for a General Staff until Congress could be persuaded to establish such a body.

The recommendations of the Board approved in their entirety and the officers selected were immediately ordered to Washington. Under General Young who was to be the first Chief of Staff, these officers were "organized as an experimental or provisional General Staff, and directed to work out a permanent organization and distribution of duties for the General Staff, a draft of new regulations and a revision of the old regulations made necessary by the new departure."³⁴

ARMY REGULATIONS ON THE FIRST GENERAL STAFF

Army regulations governing the operation of the General Staff Corps were published on August 3, 1903. The term "General Staff Corps" embraced not only those officers selected for duty on the War Department General Staff, but also included such officers of the General Staff Corps as were assigned to duty with commanders of geographical departments, such as the Department of the East. These General Staff officers on duty outside of Washington were designated as members of "the General Staff serving with troops" and were provided in order to produce in miniature such part of the organization of the War Department General Staff in their particular command or geographical Department as would be necessary to provide coordination and planning. Thus, the General Staff Act, while providing for more effective centralization in the War Department, also laid the foundation for efficient decentralization by giving the commanders of large units a more appropriate organi-

zational instrument for delegating a greater amount of authority and discretion to commanders in the field.

With respect to the relations of the General Staff Corps with the rest of the Army, regulations succinctly prescribed: "The law establishes the General Staff Corps as a separate and distinct staff organization, with supervision under superior authority, over all branches of the military service, line and staff, except such as are exempted therefrom by law or regulations, with a view to their coordination and harmonious cooperation in the execution of authorized military policies."³⁵

In a similar fashion the regulations provided: "The War Department General Staff in its several divisions and sections stands in an advisory relation to the Chief of Staff in the performance of duties herein devolved upon him. The distribution of duties to the several divisions and sections is regulated by the Chief of Staff."³⁶

Throughout the many references in the various regulations and reports of the War Department there was complete agreement not only as to the role which the General Staff was to play but also as to the way in which that role was to be carried out. Briefly stated, the role of the General Staff was restricted to planning and coordinating. This was to be accomplished through the person of the commander acting on recommendations of the General Staff, put forward in its advisory capacity. This emphasis on the advisory nature of the General Staff was genuine and sincere, yet there must have been some reliance on a happy fiction to resolve what must have been an anomalous condition. The task of coordination by a body acting in an advisory capacity was a concept difficult to understand and more difficult to carry out. Was not the essence of coordination authoritative power; the right to correct conflict or confusion and the power to adjust and regulate? The answer was paradoxical. The General Staff by advisory action enlarged the capability and understanding of the commander who insofar as he accepted the conclusions of his General Staff, gave authority to their efforts. Conversely, the fact that the commander had more to handle than could be resolved by one mind was used to justify the creation of the General Staff. Yet this fact could be used to substantiate the belief that inasmuch as the commander must rely on his staff and support their conclusions, the staff in actual practice did exercise control and its advisory position was only a convenient fiction.

THE THEORY OF GENERAL STAFF FUNCTIONS

The question should be raised at this time as to whether or not there was an inherent contradiction in the theory underlying the proposed functioning of the General Staff. Root's writings on the General Staff

revealed that he considered the General Staff to be a body which was to devote its energies to both planning and coordination. For instance, in his Annual Report of 1902, Secretary Root emphasized the planning function of the General Staff by stating that:

"It [the General Staff] is not an executive body; it is not an administrative body; it acts only through the authority of others. It makes intelligent command possible by procuring and arranging information and working out plans in detail, and it makes intelligent and effective execution of commands possible by keeping all the separate agents advised of the parts they are to play in the general scheme."³⁷

Likewise, in his 1903 report Root again emphasized that "the general plan contemplates that every subject requiring investigation and study shall be worked out first by the officers assigned to the appropriate division and section of the staff, and, then if of sufficient importance, shall be considered by a general staff council composed of the three general officers of the Corps and the heads of the three divisions."³⁸ Yet immediately thereafter Root acknowledged the presence of the coordinating function by stating that "this new system of *control* has been accompanied by the most harmonious effort and cheerful good will on the part of the members of the General Staff and his assistants and has resulted in no apparent diminution of the independent authority of other officers."³⁹

Thus, the General Staff was apparently designed to be what Graham Wallas ⁴⁰ has aptly described as an organization for thought. But in addition it was also a will-organization.

Wallas considered "organization" as an arrangement the constituent parts of which are alive without suggesting as "organism" does, that the arrangement itself has a "superlife" or a "super-consciousness" of its own. He grouped Organizations by reference to the psychological facts with which they were mainly concerned. "A conscious human being in carrying out the functions appropriate to membership of any Organization was always simultaneously knowing and feeling and willing, and his knowledge and feeling not only interacted on every other member but were, perhaps, in the ultimate analysis, merely different conscious aspects of one vital process. And yet a particular Organization might be predominantly concerned with one aspect only, and might therefore be rightly classified by a reference to that one. A Royal Commission, for instance, was an Organization predominantly concerned with knowing. The Commissioners were directed to collect evidence and to assist each other to drawn conclusions from that evidence. But the conclusions of individual Commissioners will differ, not only accord-

ing to their industry in studying the evidence and their acuteness in thinking about it, but also according to variations in their desires. Every Royal Commission was therefore, to a certain extent, a Will-Organization, a machine by which persons of different desires are enabled to form compromises and act by the votes of the majority; and some Royal Commissions prove, when they get to work, to be almost exclusively Will-Organizations, and hardly Thought-Organizations at all. A Trade Union is predominantly a Will-Organization, concerned with collecting, welding, and enforcing the desires of its members."⁴¹

This distinction between an organization for thought and a will-organization raises the question as to whether or not an organization can be both without impairing each separate function. The General Staff as a planning agency might be considered as a "thought" organization and in its coordinating and supervisory capacity as a "will" organization.

Some confusion no doubt arose from the fact that the Chief of Staff, although a member of the General Staff, exercised command powers with the remainder of the War Department General Staff standing in an advisory relation to him. The position of the Chief of Staff was prescribed as follows: "Under the act of February 14, 1903, the command of the Army of the United States rests upon its constitutional Commander in Chief, the President. . . . The President's command is exercised through the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff reports to the Secretary of War, acts as his military adviser, receives from him the directions and orders given in behalf of the President and gives effect thereto in the manner hereinafter provided. . . . The Chief of Staff is charged with the duty of supervising under the direction of the Secretary of War all troops of the line, the Adjutant General's, the Inspector General's, the Judge Advocate General's, the Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Medical, Pay and Ordnance Departments, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps. He performs such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President."⁴²

Thus, the Chief of Staff in theory was to function in an advisory relation with respect to the Secretary of War through whom the President exercised command. Actually, the Chief of Staff exercised considerable command responsibilities. This was inevitable, as everything cleared through the office of the Chief of Staff. In addition, the Secretary of War was usually a civilian gravely conscious of his inexperience in military affairs. This circumstance naturally fostered the delegation of authority.

The initial organization of the War Department General Staff was

completed and became operative on August 15, 1903. Lieutenant General S. B. M. Young became the first Chief of Staff. Major General Adna R. Chaffee was designated as First Assistant; Brigadier General William H. Carter was named as Second Assistant; Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss remained as President of the Army War College; Brigadier General Wallace F. Randolph as Chief of Artillery was included; and Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Greene was listed as the Secretary. There was then an inner circle or council of four general officers and a secretary who might well have been designated as a council on National Defense. The rest of the War Department General Staff was organized into three divisions, with each division further subdivided into sections.

ORGANIZATION AND HEADS OF THE FIRST GENERAL STAFF

The First Division had for its chief Colonel E. H. Crowder and was subdivided into three sections covering a very wide range of duties. The First Section was composed of four officers: Major W. P. Duvall, Captain J. T. Dickman, Captain C. H. Muir, and Captain P. C. March. They divided themselves into three sub-committees: sub-committee *a*, dealing with those matters pertaining to the organization, distribution, equipment and armament, and training of the Army of the United States in peace and war, including Regulars, Volunteers, and Militia, which were not the province of the third division; sub-committee *b*, handling the field of mobilization and concentration of the land forces in time of war; and sub-committee *c*, investigating the subject of field maneuvers. The Second Section, consisting of Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Kerr, Major J. S. Mallory, Captain B. Alvord, Captain F. D. Ramsey, Captain F. McIntyre, and Captain J. J. Pershing, functioned as two sub-committees. Sub-committee *a* considered matters relating to administration and discipline, and under this category there was included regulations and orders; drill regulations for cavalry, field artillery, and infantry; firing regulations; revision of Articles of War; consideration of legal enactments affecting the military establishment, including revision of estimates for the support of the Army; efficiency records; examination for appointment and promotion of officers and their details and assignments, exclusive of those belonging to technical staffs and special arms; the consideration of all matters pertaining to special military reward. Sub-committee *b* was charged with the supervision of the War College; general service and staff college; school of application for cavalry and field artillery, and post schools; post libraries; civil institutions of learning at which officers of the Army are detailed as military instructors; and all other matters pertaining to military instruction. The Third Section consisted of only two officers, Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Miller and Cap-

tain H. J. Gallagher, who was also designated as the Secretary for the First Division. Although the Third Section had only two officers, it functioned as three sub-committees. Sub-committee *a* was charged with matters relating to transportation and communication which included transportation by land and water; organization and administration of railways; wheel and pack transportation; transports and supply ships; regulations for systematic loading and unloading; statistics as to carrying capacity of cars, boats, etc.; methods of embarking and debarking, entraining and detraining, and all other matters in connection with the carrying of troops and supplies; utilization of means of communication; visual and electrical signalling, including field telephone and telegraph system, cables, and wireless systems. Sub-committee *b* considered matters relating to posts, camps, depots, hospitals, and quarters, location and character; kind and quantity of quarters; expenditures therefor; water supply, sanitation, and all related matters. Sub-committee *c* concerned itself with the broad question of the character and quantities of supplies of every kind and description for an army in garrison or in the field.

The Second Division, headed by Major W. D. Beach, was organized as two sections. One section, staffed by Captain H. C. Hale, Captain C. T. Menoher, Captain C. D. Rhodes, and Captain J. C. Oakes, had charge of military information to include the collection, arrangement, and publication of historical, statistical, and geographical information. In addition, the War Department Library; system of war maps, American and foreign; general information regarding foreign armies and fortresses; and the preparation from official records of analytical and critical histories of important campaigns was under the supervision of this section. The Second Section, officered by Captain S. A. Cloman, Captain W. G. Haan, Captain H. M. Reeve, and Captain D. E. Nolan, was in charge of military attachés.

The Third Division, under the direction of Colonel A. MacKenzie, was divided into three sections. The First Section, which included all the personnel of the Third Division, consisted of Lieutenant Colonel C. Shaler, Major G. W. Goethals, Major M. M. Macomb, and Major S. Reber, who was also designated as the Secretary of the Third Division. This First Section was charged with studies of all possible theaters of war and with the preparation of plans of campaign, including combined operations of Army and Navy. In addition to being members of the First Section, Lieutenant Colonel Shaler and Major Reber formed the Second Section, which operated as three distinct sub-committees. Sub-committee *a* was charged with the organization, distribution, equipment, armament, and training in peace and war of technical staff and

special arms (Engineers, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Medical Corps, and the Coast Artillery, including Volunteers and Militia). As sub-committee *b*, Lieutenant Colonel Shaler and Major Reber were concerned with manuals for technical staffs and special arms, examinations for appointment and promotion of officers of the same together with matters relating to the details and assignments of such officers, and the supervision of technical schools. As sub-committee *c* they had charge of matters pertaining to the "Board of Ordnance and Fortification." Likewise, Major G. W. Goethals and Major M. M. Macomb, in addition to being members of the First Section, constituted the Third Section, which operated as three sub-committees. Sub-committee *a* considered questions relating to permanent fortifications under headings of positions to be fortified, selection of sites, character of armament, and electrical and other appliances to be used in fortifications. Sub-committee *b* was charged with the study of torpedo systems and other matters pertaining to submarine defense. Combined maneuvers, Army and Navy, occupied the attention of sub-committee *c*.

As initially formed, the General Staff showed no great organizational clarity. Only the Second Division, charged as it was with collection, assembly, compilation, and interpretation of military information, disclosed any sharp functional definition. Likewise, of the three divisions, the Second Division also was the only one which was completely an organization for thought. The First and Third Divisions, in carrying out their manifold duties, had to function as will-organizations as well as organizations for thought.

In addition to the War Department General Staff, there was established The General Staff Serving With Troops. The idea was that the commanding officers of each large geographical area should be furnished with a small general staff so that the War Department General Staff could be reproduced in miniature and to the extent necessary in the various department headquarters. Paragraph 20 of the Army Regulations issued on August 3, 1903, governing the General Staff, prescribed that "General Staff officers serving with troops are employed under the direction of the commanders thereof, upon the duties hereinbefore prescribed for officers of the General Staff Corps as provided by the second section of the act of February 14, 1903, and they shall perform such other duties within the scope of general staff employment as may be directed by such commanders. They will not be assigned to other than general staff duties except by special authority of the Secretary of War."⁴³ The initial designation of officers to serve on The General Staff Serving With Troops was as follows:

Department of California:	Major W. P. Duvall Captain Frank McIntyre
Department of Columbia:	Major Sedgwick Pratt Captain D. D. Gaillard
Department of Colorado:	Lieutenant Colonel J. T. Kerr Captain Charles D. Rhodes
Department of Dakota:	Major J. A. Irons Captain D. E. Nolan
Department of the East:	Colonel T. H. Barry Captain F. D. Ramsey Captain W. G. Haan
Department of the Lakes:	Major J. G. D. Knight Captain B. Alvord
Department of the Missouri:	Major E. J. McClernand Captain C. T. Menoher
Department of Texas:	Lieutenant Colonel F. A. Smith Captain Peyton C. March
Division of the Philippines:	Colonel J. B. Kerr Captain W. W. Gibson
Department of Luzon:	Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Simpson Captain W. C. Rivers
Department of Visayas:	Major W. A. Mann
Department of Mindanao:	Lieutenant Colonel H. P. McCain Captain R. E. L. Michie ⁴⁴

Subsequent changes prior to August, 1903, resulted in the transfer of some of the officers named above to the War Department General Staff and their replacement by other officers.

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND THE GENERAL STAFF

Probably the first task confronting the War Department General Staff was to decide and define the relationship which should exist between the newly created Army War College and the War Department General Staff. As has already been noted, the War College had been established by Secretary Root to initiate the study of matters primarily the function of a General Staff and to substitute for a General Staff until Congress could be persuaded to establish a General Staff. With the inauguration of the War Department General Staff, the War College was charged with the "special duty of assisting the Chief of Staff and the General Staff in the preparation of plans for the national defense."⁴⁵

Brigadier General Tasker Bliss in his 1903 report as President of the Army War College enunciated what he believed should be the rela-

tionship between the Army War College and the General Staff. As a necessary preliminary for a proper understanding of this relationship, the President of the War College reviewed the reasons expressed by the Secretary of War for the establishment of the War College. Referring to the report of the Secretary of War for 1903, General Bliss reaffirmed the soundness of the principles expressed therein. Secretary Root, in analyzing military affairs and army organization, very properly attempted to probe deeply in an effort to discern first principles and to then apply them. He posed the basic question, "What is the real object of having an army?" Consideration of this question revealed "two propositions as being fundamental in the consideration of the subject (of army organization), the first of which was 'that the real object of having an army is to provide for war'."⁴⁶ Secretary Root admitted that this statement "seemed like a truism" and added that "it will probably be received everywhere without conscious denial."⁴⁷ The second proposition was that in spite of the ready acceptance of this basic truism, "the precise contrary was really the theory upon which the entire treatment of our Army proceeded for thirty-three years between the Civil War and the war with Spain. Present utility was really the controlling consideration, and the possibility of war seemed at all times so vague and unreal that it had no formative power in shaping legislation regarding the Army."⁴⁸ In pursuit of this first principle that the real object of having an army is to provide for war, Root inaugurated the Army War College for the "systematic study by responsible officers of plans for action under all contingencies of possible conflict, and with this, study of the larger problems of military science and the most complete information of the state of the art, study of the constant improvements in movements and methods of warfare, and of the adaptability of improvements and inventions for the purpose of carrying out the plans devised, etc."⁴⁹ Root believed that this work could not be done "by the separate study and reflection of single officers, but that it required the contribution of different minds, the correction of discussion, the long continued, laborious, and systematic application of a considerable number of minds of a high order, and with a recognized status giving authority to their conclusions,"⁵⁰ all of which were "needed to produce the desired results."⁵¹ Such a mission was an appropriate one for both the War Department General Staff and the Army War College. General Bliss believed that the War College would function harmoniously with the newly created War Department General Staff. To that end the Chief of Staff, acting on the advice of the War Department General Staff, issued instructions to the War College "as to the problems which it shall take up and the general line of investigation which it shall pursue."⁵² General Bliss

observed that for this task the War College had been aptly named for the word college "in its old Latin sense of collegium" implied a body of men associated together by a community of interest and object for doing something rather than to learn how to do it, or, at the most, the "learning how" is a mere incident to the "doing."⁵³ After the most complete study practicable the War College would render a report to the Chief of Staff setting forth the recommendations of the college. This report was "to be reviewed and criticized by the Chief of Staff and such section of the General Staff as may be directed to do so by him and if necessary will be returned to the college with these criticisms for further study and revision."⁵⁴

There was thus initiated the beginning of the use of scientific methods⁵⁵ in the study of national defense. The General Staff performed the first step by stating the problem precisely and succinctly. Ordinarily the General Staff would also indicate the second step which consisted of either setting a limit to the scope of the investigation or else formulating a working hypothesis which was to be tested. Occasionally the War College would be required to determine this step. Through its military information section and other divisions, the General Staff would be in a position to provide the War College with the data pertaining to the problem. The interpretation, analysis, and inferences or solutions obtained from the data occupied the attention of both the War Department General Staff and the War College, with one checking the results of the other. To the successive War College classes there could be entrusted the task of correcting and bringing up to date the plans evolved. The final step after the plan had been accepted by the General Staff was the filing of the document with the records of the General Staff. Thus, there would be accumulated a gradually increasing number of projects for the guidance of the War Department when the contingencies for which they were severally made occurred. In working out and discussing the multitude of details involved in various plans, the War College as an organization for thought became a laboratory for the General Staff where ideas could be tested.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1. Elihu Root, *Addresses on Government and Citizenship*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916) pp. 503-504.

2. William H. Carter, "Elihu Root, His Services as Secretary of War," *North American Review*, January, 1904, Vol. 178, No. 1, pp. 110-121.

3. Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1938) Vol. I, 1845-1909, p. 220.

4. Same, p. 241.

5. Same, p. 242.

6. Same.

7. Same.

8. Same.

9. *Senate Document 119, 68th Congress, 1st Session*, p. 2.
10. John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1922) p. 255.
11. Same.
12. *Report of the Secretary of War for 1857*. Quoted from William H. Carter, "Elihu Root," *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114.
13. *Report of the Secretary of War for 1899*, (Washington, Government Printing Office) p. 45.
14. Elihu Root, *Addresses on Government and Citizenship*, p. 192.
15. *Special Order 40*, Adjutant General's Office, War Department, February 19, 1900.
16. *Senate Document 119, op. cit.*, p. 3.
17. Same, p. 4.
18. Jessup, *Elihu Root, op. cit.*, p. 244.
19. Same, p. 251.
20. Same, p. 227.
21. Same, p. 251. Jessup quotes a letter received from General William Crozier, December 18, 1933, as authority for this statement.
22. *Senate Document 119, op. cit.*, p. 4.
23. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1901*, p. 165.
24. Same, p. 31, Quoted from hearings on S. 3917, March 2, 1902.
25. Same, p. 35.
26. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1902*.
27. Carter in *Senate Document 119, op. cit.*, p. 45. See also *Congressional Record*, Vol. 36, Part 1, p. 504.
28. Same, p. 45.
29. Same, p. 44.
30. Same.
31. *Congressional Record*, House, Jan. 6, 1903, Vol. 36, Part I, p. 536.
32. Same, p. 538.
33. *32 Statutes*, p. 830.
34. Elihu Root, *Military and Colonial Policy of the United States*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916) p. 428.
35. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1903*, p. 65.
36. Same.
37. *Report of Secretary of War, 1902*, p. 46.
38. *Report of Secretary of War, 1903*, p. 7.
39. Same.
40. Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*. (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1921) p. 235.
41. Same, pp. 236-238.
42. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1903*.
43. *Report of Secretary of War, 1903*, Vol. I, p. 68.
44. *Army and Navy Journal*, June 6, 1903, Vol. 40, p. 995.
45. Report of the President, Army War College, 1903 (*Annual Report of the War Department, 1903*) Vol. IV, p. 89.
46. Same, p. 94.
47. Same.
48. Same, pp. 94-95.
49. Same, p. 95.
50. Same.
51. Same.
52. Same, p. 98.
53. Same, p. 95.
54. Same, p. 98.
55. See "Causal Relationships and Their Measurement," Richard L. Kozelka in *Man and Society*, Edited by E. P. Schmidt. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938) pp. 698-751.

Chapter IV

The Struggle For Existence

1904-1916

THE BIRTH of the General Staff was marked more by hopes and fears than by any expression of jubilation or confidence. Significantly, the forty-five officers detailed from the line as the initial General Staff were not replaced. That is to say, the questions of increasing the number of officers in the Army by forty-five in order to provide for this new agency was deferred until such time as it might justify its existence. Even the most enthusiastic supporters of the General Staff recognized that this latest addition to the War Department's already large family of organizational entities would have tough going.

Some of the fears of General Carter, the officer most intimately connected with drawing up the enabling legislation, were disclosed in a memorandum from him to the Secretary of War:

"In establishing a General Staff Corps it should be recognized that it will, to some extent, curtail the independence of action heretofore possessed by chiefs of bureaus. This will apply most forcefully to the Adjutant General who has in the past performed many of the duties of Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War. . . . The immediate questions which must be considered in inaugurating the General Staff Corps relate entirely to the higher duties of administration and war control, leaving the details of organization, equipment, instruction and collection of information to be gradually worked out under a clearly defined and authoritative system.

It is very desirable, in fact essential, that those staff bureaus most intimately connected with the preparation of the Army and war should be brought into intimate and harmonious relations with the General Staff Corps at the start. It is assumed that details for the General Staff will be made from these departments, but it is essential that the chiefs of bureaus themselves shall be induced to give honest adherence to the new system. If indifferent they can retard development, and if antagonistic they can do infinite harm.

In putting the new law into operation it must be recognized that the General Staff Corps is a separate and distinct organization, and that when an officer is detailed for duty in the new corps he ceases his connection with his own corps or regiment just the same as a detailed adjutant general or quartermaster."¹

The prestige and examples of Secretary Root were invoked to secure favorable acceptance of the new order of things. Carter on October 30,

1903, as second assistant to the Chief of Staff, wrote to the Secretary of War the following letter:

"The Secretary of War. (Through the Chief of Staff)"

Sir: It has occurred to me in watching the operation of the General Staff law that much of its success will depend upon the manner in which the Secretary of War, himself, conducts the business of the department and of the Army. If the Secretary habitually requires bureau officers to consult the Chief of Staff on all matters subject to the supervision of the latter official and permits them to come to the Secretary of War only after consultation with the Chief of Staff and with his concurrence, the system will soon be placed upon a firm and lasting foundation. It will appear at times that a particular case can be more quickly and satisfactorily adjusted by the chief of division or a particular bureau going to the Secretary of War to explain and receive orders direct in the case; this however has the marked advantage of sacrificing a system for a temporary advantage. By reason of the constant changing of public officials, adherence to system in Government administration is more efficacious than success in isolated cases. When a chief of bureau or assistant to chief of bureau finds that he can expedite matters by taking cases direct to the Secretary, the temptation is very great to do all business that way.

Generally speaking, it is better for the Secretary and his administration to adhere to the system intended to be established by the General Staff bill. This will enable all concerned gradually to differentiate the business of the department and draw quite well defined lines between that which should come before the Secretary and that which is authorized to be adjusted direct by the Chief of Staff and the chiefs of bureaus. Where it is possible to establish precedents and give authority to the chief of staff and chiefs of bureaus to act within specified limits, the public business of the department will be much expedited and the Secretary will be saved from giving attention to a mass of petty details which have in the past few years been brought before him."²

Although Congress had passed the General Staff Bill in February, a provision had been intentionally placed in the law which provided that it would not go into effect until August 15, 1903. This was done for the express purpose of circumventing the opposition and hostility of General Miles who was due to retire on August 8 and who had used all the influence he could muster to defeat the measure.

General S. B. M. Young became the first Chief of Staff. Able soldier though he was, his appointment gave heart to the adversaries of the project for he in turn was due to retire in January, 1904, and in the last

five months of his active service he was naturally inclined to avoid unpleasanties. This attitude was evidenced in his Report of the Chief of Staff for 1903 in which he wrote: "The inauguration in the War Department of the new methods of administration incident to the general staff scheme was readily accomplished without friction or delay. Under the provision of the general staff corps act, which makes it the duty of officers of this corps 'to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military questions' and to act as the agents of superior authority in 'coordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject under the terms of this act to the supervision of the Chief of Staff,' a certain amount of routine administrative work has been devolved upon the several sections of the War Department General Staff; but the general practice has been to send to them only such matters as affected more than one department or arm of the service, the consideration of which would be in aid of the coordinating authority the General Staff is expected to exercise. The purpose is to rely mainly upon the existing special staffs for current administration work, and in this way to economize the time of the General Staff in the interest of the more general duties devolved by law and regulations upon that body. . . . The General Staff Corps has been performing its functions only since August 15th last. . . . In the results thus far attained, the wisdom of the authorities in promoting this measure seems fully justified."³

THE FIRST WORK OF THE GENERAL STAFF

The work of the War Department General Staff for the first year was extremely varied. A great part of their time was devoted to assisting the Secretary of War in the administration of current business. In addition, the General Staff revised the regulations, orders, and manuals governing the instruction and administration of the Army. Likewise, the Articles of War, Infantry Drill Regulations, Field Service Regulations, and the orders regarding military education were also revised. Many of these activities were primarily administrative, yet some claim to planning could be justified in that considerations of the future were of primary importance in dictating what changes were to be made. In the sphere of pure planning, work was begun on the preparation of plans for the national defense and for mobilization in case of war. Incident to this work was the expansion and development of the Military Information Division.

Some indication of the initial activity of the General Staff was revealed in the Report of the Secretary of War for 1903. This listed a partial schedule of matters considered and reported upon by the General Staff

and shows how broad and varied, even at the beginning, was the scope of the Staff:

Mounting enlisted men for duty as orderlies.
Additional land at Fort Fremont.
Maneuvers at West Point and Fort Riley.
Detail of retired officers with militia of States.
Distribution of troops returning from the Philippines.
Militia officers attending military schools.
Detail of student officers at General Service and Staff College.
Transfer of land at Allegheny Arsenal.
Purchase of land at Fort Logan.
Military posts in Porto Rico.
Railroad through Vancouver Military Reservation.
Concentration of troops at discharge camp, San Francisco.
Reorganization of field batteries.
Reports for completed batteries.
Extending the powers of the commanding general, Division Philippines.
Commandant of the General Service and Staff College to command the post.
Prevention of cruelty to animals in time of war.
Post schools and prevention of desertions.
Native scouts in the Philippine Islands.
Condemned property.
Continuous-service pay for Philippine Scouts.
Erection of guardhouse at Peking.
Organization of maneuver divisions at West Point and Fort Riley.
Purchase of land adjoining Fort Sheridan.
Army cooperative store.
Missouri regiment for Fort Riley maneuvers.
Organization of section on militia matters.
Revision of Infantry Drill Regulations.
Ammunition for militia at Fort Riley.
Harmonizing Army Regulations.
Instruction of Cuban artillery corps.
Supply of travel rations to militia.
Barrack buildings, etc., for Fort Assinniboine.
Failure in examination of student officers.
Garrisons for certain posts in Texas.
Amendment to Regulations.
Allotments for the construction of post exchanges, etc.
Detail of board on defenses of San Juan.

Issue of swords and other arms to bandsmen.
Estimate of number of militia attending maneuvers, 1903 and 1904.
Publication of "Service of Security and Information."
Porto Rican militia.
Payment of certain expenses of militia encampment.
Military exercises on the map.
Transfer of Fort Yates to Interior Department.
Transfer of retained regimental and company records to the War Department.
Right of way over trans-Alaskan military road.
Transfer of military telegraph line, Fort Yates.
Sale of Fort Porter and establishment of a new post.
Inspection of posts in Department of the East.
Construction of buildings, Fort Monroe.
Organization of militia of Alaska.
Schedule for officers' schools.
Allotments for Fort Meade.
Naval militia, District of Columbia.
Employment of natives in the Philippines for menial service.
Pensions for Macabebe Scouts.
Placing of guns on sites of batteries.
Inspection of posts in Texas.
Changes of stations of cavalry regiments.
Attending post schools, Fort Riley.
Examination of enlisted men at Fort Leavenworth.
Enlargement of Fort Harrison.
Military reservation at Red Bank, N. J.
Distinguished cadets in Army Register.
Improvements at Fort Sam Houston.
Examination and revision of army appropriation estimates.
Increase of garrison for Fort Washakie.
Abandonment of Fort Walla Walla.
Detail of officers for military academy and college.
Establishment of school for army cooks.
Water system for Fort William McKinley, Manila.
Purchase of land, Henry Barracks, Porto Rico.
Increase of garrison for Fort Constitution.
Composition and pay of army bands.
Adoption of system of lighting military posts.
Regulations for muster into service of militia.
Increase of pay for post noncommissioned staff.
Mounted pay of staff officers of artillery.

- Revision of instructions for artillery officers at post schools.
- Examination of candidates for artillery gunners.
- Revision of manual of the Medical Department.
- Changes in circuit regulator, submarine mine system.
- Revision of existing projects for defenses of New Orleans.
- Purchase of Bakers Island for military purposes.
- Retention of Allegheny Arsenal and Columbus Barracks as supply depots.
- Composition, duties, etc., of principal permanent boards in Army.
- Appointment of board to consider fire control, searchlights, etc.
- Report on inspection of Thirteenth Regiment, Heavy Artillery, New York National Guard.
- Selection of Fort Worden instead of Fort Flagler as headquarters artillery district.
- On practicability of placing artillery officers on unassigned list to make them available for duty as post quartermasters, etc.
- Annual estimates of the Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, and the Chief Signal Officer.
- Organization of engineer and signal corps for militia.
- Revised project for the defense of Mobile Bay.
- Inspection of seacoast defenses.
- On the question of the rearrangement of territorial departments.
- The supply of four yawl boats for each military post.
- On the annual inspection report of Major General Chaffee.
- Requisition for cable between Forts Flagler, Worden and Casey.
- On report of the Chief of Ordnance as to difficulty in filling vacancies in Ordnance Department.
- On a memorandum regarding necessities of the personnel of the Signal Corps.
- Supplying type "A" range finder to fort commanders.
- Publication of notes on military interest for 1902.
- Index of special military subjects contained in books, etc., received in the Military Information Division.
- The translation of communications written in foreign languages received from various bureaus of the War Department.
- Officers of the Army, from brigadier general to second lieutenant, requested to translate printed matter in foreign languages, and 200 have volunteered for this purpose.
- Maps of battlefields reproduced and photographic copies made of maps for use of boards for examination of officers.
- Preparation of four-sheet map of the Philippines, 500 to be sent for use of schools in archipelago.

Military information of practical interest obtained in regard to foreign countries.

The Chief of the Military Information Division instructed to confer with the Geological Survey with a view to embodying additional topographical information upon maps prepared by that office.

Map work with monographs on foreign countries.⁴

This list shows a tendency to get involved in administrative details. The volume of work handled indicates a commendable zeal to justify the existence of such a body but also suggests that there must not have been enough time left for the study and contemplation of those larger problems for which the General Staff was primarily created.

The new regime at the War Department brought about a new arrangement of various offices in the War Department building. Very wisely it was realized that in the old days during the rivalry of the Commanding General and the Adjutant General, the Adjutant General had often gained the inside track simply because his office adjoined that of the Secretary of War. This had to be changed. The Chief of Staff decided that his office would guard the portals. On August 8, 1903, the *Army and Navy Journal* announced: "In anticipation of the beginning of the new regime of the General Staff, a new arrangement of rooms has been planned at the War Department. The Chief of the General Staff will occupy the room now occupied by the Adjutant General which is directly next to and south of the office of the Secretary of War. The next two rooms adjacent to this will be placed at the disposal of the office of the Adjutant General's Department and the next room after this to the south will be occupied by Major General H. C. Corbin who is the second ranking officer on the General Staff."⁵ The rooms on the first floor of the War Department known as Army Headquarters will be taken by members of the General Staff but some of them will still be forced to remain in the temporary War College on Jackson Place."⁶

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL AND THE GENERAL STAFF

This ejection of the Adjutant General from the doorstep of the Secretary of War was merely the first of a series of events marking the decline of his bureau. Reporting on this, the *Army and Navy Journal* commented: "Before the creation of the General Staff, the Adjutant General's Department was the most important of the staff departments of the Army, because the Adjutant General and his assistants then discharged many of the important duties that are now discharged by the Chief of Staff and his assistants. In default of officers specially authorized for that purpose they became the principal advisers of the Secretary

of War and of the higher military commanders with regard to the administration and command of the army and in respect to military matters in general. But the establishment of the General Staff has relieved the Adjutant General's Office of substantially all of its advisory and discretionary functions, and the Adjutant General's Office is a bureau of records and correspondence. The head of that bureau is virtually a corresponding secretary for the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, his principal duties being to conduct and record their correspondence, the transmission or publication of orders being a part of such correspondence and to furnish information for their use from the records in his custody."⁷

Taking advantage of this sudden apathy, General Ainsworth, the head of the bureau of Records and Pensions, persuaded Secretary Root to transfer certain sections of the Adjutant General's and the Surgeon General's office to his bureau with the argument that \$25,000 could thus be saved. A warning from General Carter to the Secretary of War was needed here. This matter was not referred to the newly created General Staff for study and recommendation.

The first indication that internal rumblings within the War Department had reached outside ears was the appearance in the *Army and Navy Journal* of this comment: "The work of the General Staff of the Army is progressing to the satisfaction of the Chief of Staff, although it is admitted that there is yet much to be done in the way of smoothing out the many rough places incidental to the change from the old to the new system of administration at the War Department. The transfer of some of the divisions of the Adjutant General's Office to the Record and Pension Office has been the subject of considerable talk at the War Department, especially among the clerks of the divisions affected, many of whom have been attached to the Adjutant General's Office for forty years. It is generally believed at the War Department, however, that the change will be for the best in the end, although it will take some time for the officers and clerks to adapt themselves to the new conditions. . . . Apparently there is much red tape added to the methods of the War Department under the new system, but it is predicted that when the new organization has been perfected the affairs of the Department will run much more smoothly than they have in the past."⁸

EARLY ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFICULTIES

Some of the difficulties which arose in evolving the new War Department organizational structure were illustrated by an incident, picayunish in the extreme. Under the new regime, "instead of business being carried by chiefs of bureaus direct to the Secretary of War, it is now

presented to the Chief of Staff who has authority to act on the greater portion of the business without consultation with the Secretary and the correspondence of the Army continues as before through the Adjutant General. Business reaching the Adjutant General is presented to the Chief of Staff and those matters which he personally determines are executed at once through the proper division of the Adjutant General's office. Matters requiring investigation or involving several bureaus are transmitted to the division of the General Staff to which the particular business is assigned and a report is rendered with a recommendation by the division at the earliest practicable moment consistent with thoroughness."⁹

In the course of his duties as outlined above, the Chief of Staff had occasion to direct a general officer of the Army to perform a task that involved travel. Immediately the question came up as to the right of the Chief of Staff to issue an order direct to any officer. Some government officials "held that the Chief of Staff only has the right to order an officer by direction of the Secretary of War."¹⁰ The officer naturally obeyed the order, thereby precipitating a grave question of minutiae which was reported as follows: "The officer . . . obeyed his orders but the matter of paying the mileage involved has not been settled. It is understood that the question will be submitted to the Comptroller of the Treasury, and his decision will have a far reaching effect upon the administration of military affairs under the General Staff scheme. There are many authorities on military law who claim that the method of issuing special orders adopted by the War Department since August 15, 1903, is illegal. In view of the fact that the Adjutant General's department has not been abolished, it is believed by these authorities that orders to officers can only be legally issued by the Adjutant General and that when the Chief of Staff is involved, the order should read: 'By recommendation of the Chief of Staff . . . is directed, etc.' and the order should be signed: 'By direction of the Secretary of War, W. P. Hall, Acting Adjutant General.' That is, however, only one of the many interesting questions of administration that has arisen under the new system at the War Department."¹¹

It was unfortunate that the two men most closely identified with the General Staff movement could not have remained to guide the infant for a longer period. Secretary Root became engaged in the Alaskan Boundary dispute and left for London in August, 1903. Root had sent in his formal letter of resignation as Secretary of War on August 19, 1903, but it was not until February, 1904, that William Howard Taft arrived from the Philippines to become Secretary of War. General Carter was relieved from the War Department on December 31, 1903,

and was assigned to command troops in the Philippines. Carter's place was taken by Brigadier General Tasker Bliss, who as President of the Army War College, had been particularly well placed to observe the workings of the General Staff and who was thus thoroughly familiar with both the idea and the practice of this new institution. In addition, General Corbin left the War Department to command the Atlantic Division and was succeeded by General G. L. Gillespie. As Adjutant General, General Corbin had been sympathetic toward the General Staff idea and had worked hard in putting the idea across to both Congress and the Army although it meant the eclipse of the department he headed. Thus, the year 1904 brought a complete turnover with a new Secretary of War, a new Chief of Staff, a new first assistant to the Chief of Staff and a new second assistant to the Chief of Staff.

Lieutenant General A. R. Chaffee succeeded General Young as Chief of Staff on January 9, 1904. His promotion to this position had been settled as early as the summer of 1903. To prepare him for the position of Chief of Staff, he had been designated as the first assistant to the Chief of Staff from August until January. During this period, General Chaffee made "many notes of his observations of the methods in vogue and about the War Department, and promptly reached the conclusion that some in authority, who had not agreed entirely with the retiring Secretary of War, Elihu Root, in the reforms introduced during his administration, were determined upon a reactionary campaign. General Chaffee underestimated neither their influence nor their power, but set himself sternly against the current of reaction and aroused much hostility. He was convinced that a small group had planned a course of action that would deprive the nation of the benefits contemplated by the establishment of the General Staff Corps unless their scheming was stopped. The four-year detail system also met determined opposition which boded ill for its survival unless the President and the Secretary of War could be warned and induced to announce their conviction in favor of it. General Chaffee had to fight from the start to the finish of his service as Chief of Staff concerning these and other bureau activities which monopolized much of his time and attention and prevented consideration of the grave questions involved in the development of the General Staff. The fact that the President was known to favor both the General Staff and the detail system is believed to be all that prevented a successful combination of interests against their continuance except in a mutilated and ineffective form."¹²

CONSOLIDATION OF TWO WAR DEPARTMENT BUREAUS

Prior to his departure, Secretary Root had determined that it would

be a wise move to change the name of the Adjutant General's office to that of the office of The Military Secretary. During the many years when the Army was without a General Staff, the Adjutant General's office had to perform many of the duties now assigned to the General Staff. In so doing, the Adjutant General's bureau had acquired a position of importance and prestige that many of its members were reluctant to surrender. Because the name "Adjutant General's Department" had held connotations of power and influence for so many years, it was thought that a continuation of the name would not only be a misnomer but a fatal handicap. The new role which the bureau was to perform was that of a military secretary and it was hoped that by designating it as The Office of the Military Secretary there would be no inclination to aspire to the duties now handled by the new General Staff.

Because there had been some overlapping of duties with respect to the maintenance of records in the Adjutant General's office, the Surgeon General's office, and the office of the Bureau of Records and Pensions, Brigadier General Fred C. Ainsworth persuaded Root to transfer some of the sections of the Adjutant General's office to his Bureau of Records and Pensions. No doubt this was a logical move for it did effect the annual savings of twenty-five thousand dollars. But once General Ainsworth tasted the wine of power brought on by an accretion of functions, he thirsted for more. And he was successful in persuading Root to appoint a board of officers, consisting of himself as head of the Bureau of Records and Pensions, General Bliss representing the General Staff, and Acting Adjutant General Hall, to consider realignment of duties and to further correct the overlapping of work among the various bureaus. Here again was another instance where the new system was not used. The matter was not referred to the General Staff for thorough investigation, ample thought and contemplation, and recommendation. Instead, two bitter partisans, Ainsworth and Hall, vied with one another in an effort to influence the third member, General Bliss, who must have had great difficulty in maintaining any semblance of detached objectivity. In the course of the board's deliberations Ainsworth persuaded Bliss to accept his conviction that in the interests of greater efficiency and economy the Bureau of Records and Pensions and the Office of the Adjutant General should be consolidated under the name of the Office of The Military Secretary. General Hall, the Acting Adjutant General, opposed and condemned the idea but Root accepted the majority report.

The manner in which the board's recommendations were enacted into law is interesting because it provides the background necessary to understand the controversy between General Wood and General Ainsworth which was to come. The proposal to consolidate the Adjutant

General's Office and the Bureau of Records and Pensions into the office of The Military Secretary first became public when a measure to that end was appended to the Army Appropriation Bill for the ensuing year. The measure was so worded that Ainsworth would become the head of the new bureau with the rank of major general whereas all the other bureau chiefs were brigadier generals.

Some degree of the amazement that this proposal created in the Army was revealed in the *Army and Navy Journal* of January 30, 1904, where it was reported:

"The Army finds it impossible to account for the appearance in the Army Appropriation Bill . . . of one of the most radical pieces of legislation concerning the Army which has been submitted during the present administration and still more unaccountable, the fact that this measure has received the approval of the War Department without having been submitted to the judgment of the experienced soldiers of the General Staff. . . .

The whole Army has been distracted, the Senate has been disturbed by the promotion to the rank of major general of an officer without military education, who gained most of his knowledge of the Army in the Medical Department and whose experience in command of troops has been very limited. It is now proposed to promote to the rank of major general an officer who has never commanded troops and whose knowledge of the military service is wholly confined to an experience of less than eight years in the practice of medicine in the Army and twelve years in clerical duty as Chief of the Record and Pension Office in which he has shown great efficiency and rendered a public service that is justly entitled to recognition."¹³

The proposal to consolidate the Adjutant General's department and the Bureau of Records and Pensions into The Office of The Military Secretary was accepted by Congress and became law by act of Congress approved April 23, 1904, being part of an "act making appropriation for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, 1905"¹⁴ and reading as follows:

"That the officers of the Adjutant General's Department, except the Adjutant General, and the officers of the Record and Pension Office shall hereafter constitute one department of the Army, to be known as the Military Secretary's Department; and the Adjutant General's Office and the Record and Pension Office heretofore constituting bureaus of the War Department, shall hereafter constitute a consolidated bureau to be known as the Military Secretary's Office of the War Department. The officers so consolidated shall be borne on one list in the order of

rank held by them, and those of them who hold permanent appointments as officers of the Adjutant General's Department or of the Record and Pension Office shall be entitled to promotion below the grade of brigadier general as now provided by law and in order of their standing on said list. Except as otherwise provided herein, the laws now in force shall continue to govern the appointment, promotion, and detail of all officers of the consolidated department hereby created; Provided that the officers of the said consolidated department shall be subject to the supervision of the Chief of Staff in all matters pertaining to the command, discipline, or administration of the existing military establishment; Provided further that no appointments or details to the grade of assistant adjutant general with the rank of major shall be made until the number of officers of that grade shall be reduced to less than ten; Provided further that of the officers consolidated as hereinbefore provided the senior in rank who shall be chief of the consolidated department and the title of whose office is hereby changed to that of Military Secretary shall hereafter have the rank of major general and the second senior of said offices shall hereafter have the rank of brigadier general; Provided further that when the office of Military Secretary with the rank of major general shall hereafter become vacant, it shall not be filled with said rank, and thereafter the chief of the Military Secretary's Department shall have the rank of a brigadier general with the title of The Military Secretary, and there shall be only one officer above the rank of Colonel in the said department. Except as hereinafter provided, the remaining officers of the consolidated department shall retain the titles that they now bear; Provided further that when the office of Adjutant General shall become vacant the vacancy so created on the active list shall not be filled, and thereafter the several officers now designated by the title, assistant chief of the Record and Pension office shall be designated by the title, Military Secretary; Provided further that the Chief of the Military Secretary's Department shall be a member of the Board of Commissioners of the United States Soldier's Home."¹⁵

GENERAL AINSWORTH'S BACKGROUND

Aside from the consolidation of two War Department bureaus, this law was of interest for the light it cast on General Ainsworth and his rise as a military administrator. During the controversy arising out of the introduction and consideration of this measure there was criticism of General Ainsworth on two counts: that he was a doctor and not a soldier and therefore not competent to head a bureau that handled military affairs, and that he had achieved his present position by political

preferment rather than by the normal but much slower method of promotion in the Army.

General Ainsworth had many staunch supporters who were quick to come to his defense. Typical of the statements which were issued in his defense were the laudatory remarks of Senator Cockrell of Missouri who declared:

"General Ainsworth has done a work which has never been equalled by any executive officer of this Government from 1789 to date; and I challenge any comparison with his record. In 1886 he was taken from the Army where he was commanding in Texas, or in Arizona, Iowa or the Western lands where he had been, and put in charge of the Record and Pension Office in the War Department. That office at that time had control of all the hospital records—over 20,000 books, big, little and indifferent—kept in the field and the hospital. There was unanswered in that office over 10,000 calls from the Pension Office for hospital records. Some of them were six months old, some of them were older to my certain knowledge for I was trying to get the work up to the current business, and had a list of the calls made upon the Record and Pension Office furnished me by the commissioner of Pensions. It was a disgrace to any administration.

Ainsworth took charge in December 1886. By the middle of March he had answered almost 10,000 calls with the same clerks who had been there and who were not allowed by law to do any other kind of business and was answering within three days all calls made.

On the 3rd of March, 1887, a select committee of the Senate was appointed to investigate the methods of business and to ascertain the causes of delay in the transaction of business. I was made chairman of it. . . . We made the investigation and that is how I became familiar with it.

I went to the War Department. I spent days going over the muster rolls. There they were—some of them copies; some of them covered over with tracing paper. The heavy Artillery rolls were as large as the tops of four of the desks with hundreds of names on them. Every time the Pension Office called for the history of any one of those men, all of the rolls had to be taken down and unfolded and the record taken and the rolls folded up and put back again. That was the process, until they were absolutely being worn out and destroyed so that you could not decipher them, 420,000 of them. I appealed in every way I could to the officers then in charge to devise some means by which we could obtain access to the contents of the rolls without having to open them out, all of them—every time we wanted to have a record of a man.

I found in the Record and Pension Office of the Surgeon General's Office, on my investigating their methods there, that card indexes were being made. I asked General Ainsworth (Captain Ainsworth) then: Can not that system which you have adopted in the Record and Pension Office be made applicable to the muster rolls of the Army? He studied a while and said he thought it might be done. I then asked him if he would take the rolls of an entire company, if I would get them from the Adjutant General's office and transcribe their contents onto cards so that we could know and see exactly what would be the result. He did it. It is in the report of the select committee. It is there showing just exactly what it would be.

I then went to the War Department to get that system adopted there. I found very great objection to it. I then recommended to the Secretary of War that he appoint a select committee of his own officers to investigate and see if it was not the best system. He appointed a Committee of three. They made the investigation and reported in favor of the card index system.

It was then referred to the Secretary of War. I had hoped that he would adopt it at once and carry it out; but on the contrary he referred it to the then Adjutant General who made a strong report—just as strong as he could make, against it. There it was. He refused to carry out a system which to my mind was as plain as A B C and since has been demonstrated to be so."

(Cockrell then put legislation through which compelled the adoption of this system.)

"I do not know whether they remember it or not, but I was very much discouraged. . . . I went to Senator Allison of Iowa and Senator Hale of Maine who with me were a subcommittee on the deficiency bill, and asked them to allow me to put a little legislation on the deficiency bill to compel the War Department to carry out this system. They agreed to it. It went through. The change of administration came just as that bill became a law and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Proctor) became Secretary of War. I saw him as a matter of course.

My select committee had gone out of existence. Its term had expired. I did recommend the system and I said to him, 'I do not know who may be able to carry out that system but if you will and can take Captain Ainsworth and will put him in charge of it, I will be personally responsible for its success and guarantee it.' In due time he made the order. I did not know what he could do. But he consolidated eight or ten divisions including the Record and Pension division of the Surgeon General's offices.

Ainsworth had about 300 men under him. Almost 400 odd were transferred with the muster rolls of the army. That was done. In June when an invoice of what was transferred from the Adjutant General's Office was taken, there were 40,000 cases undisposed of. On the 30th day of September following the June when Captain Ainsworth took charge there was not an item of unfinished business. . . .

Not only that but during the time the law of June 27, 1890 was passed, when the Pension Office was deluged with applications for pensions and military records had to be obtained, the Pension Office sent to Ainsworth 10,000 calls for military records in one week. All of them that were received before 12 o'clock were acted on that day; all the rest were acted on the next day. That is the record and it shows for itself.

Now what has been the result? He has discharged from that office clerks whose salaries amounted to \$532,000 in one year. They have been discharged as unnecessary longer to be kept in the service, their services dispensed with for all time to come, an actual discharge for they were no longer needed.

Now he took the muster rolls of the Regular Army. In September they were on work begun 20 months before. In other words they were twenty months behind. With the same clerks that they turned over to him then every one of those cases was disposed of by the 10th of December."¹⁶

Without wishing to cast aspersions on Ainsworth's ability, it should nevertheless be remembered that it was indeed a fortunate coincidence that both General Ainsworth and Senator Proctor, the new Secretary of War, were natives of Vermont.

From 1886 on, General Ainsworth had not only been an able administrator but an astute politician for he had been preeminently successful in establishing profitable relations with members of Congress. Some inkling as to his methods may be gained from the following description by General Johnson Hagood who, as a young captain on duty in Washington as an assistant to the Chief of Artillery, was one of his contemporaries:

"The first three Chiefs of Staff, Generals Young, Chaffee, and Bates, were old fashioned soldiers—fighting men who had won their spurs in Indian wars, in the Philippines, and in China. They cared little for administrative and supply problems of the War Department, and after a short term of office each in turn retired without making much impression upon the organization. In the meantime there had been coming along one of the best administrators in Washington, Captain F. C. Ains-

worth, Medical Corps, who came to Washington for duty in the Record and Pension Office. He brought order out of chaos and as a reward Congress promoted him to major, colonel, brigadier general, and major general. . . . He understood Congress and knew how to get things out of Congress. He was the power behind the throne in securing much of the most beneficial and far reaching legislation ever obtained by the Army, though his name was never mentioned in connection with it. . . . He understood, perhaps better than any other man before or since, that the War Department was not the Army, but something that stood between the Army and Congress; that the way to get legislation for the Army was not to try to educate Congress and the people to Army methods, but to educate the War Department to congressional methods and to get legislation for the Army by following the usual processes established by Congress itself. In other words he did not attempt to play tennis against a football team.

General Ainsworth kept his own counsel and rarely discussed his affairs with anyone, but one day he told me that he made it a practice never to sign an unfavorable endorsement. If anything was to be approved, he approved it. If anything was to be disapproved, the papers were prepared for the signature of the Assistant Secretary of War. This was only one of the stratagems which created in Washington, and especially in Congress, the firm belief that if you could get to Ainsworth you would get quick action and favorable results, but if you ever got into the hands of the Assistant Secretary of War or the General Staff, you were lost."¹⁷

There were many instances attesting to the political sagacity of General Ainsworth, and to his proclivity toward establishing staunch supporters in Congressional circles, and especially with men who occupied strategic positions in the legislative branch. One incident has already been mentioned but will bear reemphasis. During the greater part of the hearings on the General Staff bill there had been little comment and no opposition on the provision which specified that the Chief of Staff was to have supervision over all the troops of the line and over the several administrative staff and supply departments. Between hearings and without explanation the bill was changed so as to prescribe the several administrative staff and supply departments by name and all were so specified except the bureau headed by General Ainsworth which was thus removed from general staff supervision. Another equally adroit exhibition of political skill was shown during the passage of the bill creating the office of the Military Secretary. To begin with, General Ainsworth was able to have the bill worded so as to provide

specifically that he was to be the head of the new bureau. In addition, a proviso was inserted which specified that during the incumbency of General Ainsworth, the Military Secretary would have the rank of a major general, irrespective of the fact that all the other bureau chiefs were brigadier generals. A gesture was made acknowledging future adherence to the rule that bureau chiefs were to be brigadier generals and to forestall efforts of other bureau chiefs to secure an advance in grade by prescribing that after General Ainsworth future Military Secretaries would hold only the ordinary grade of brigadier general. As a final touch General Ainsworth was able to add a subtle but important qualification which restricted materially general staff supervision over the office of the Military Secretary. Originally, the bill establishing the office of the Military Secretary had provided "that the officers of the said consolidated department shall be subject to the supervision of the Chief of Staff."¹⁸ The sub-committee considering the measure was induced to add the restrictive phrase "in all matters relating to the command, discipline, or administration of the existing military establishment."¹⁹ On the surface this change appeared of little consequence. Actually the difference was of great significance. Instead of giving the Chief of Staff blanket authority to supervise the office of the Military Secretary, it restricted him to those matters not prescribed by law. Within the area covered generally by Congressional enactment, the Military Secretary was free to exercise administrative discretion subject to no check but Congress. Here was a reversion to the very conditions which Root had been so anxious to forestall by means of creating a general staff. Significantly, on March 5, 1904, long before any fireworks arose from this change, the *Army and Navy Journal* remarked: "The bill was better as it stood; the proposed amendment is fruitful in suggestions of friction between the Chief of Staff and the Military Secretary, and of a conflict of authority which should never be permitted in a military establishment."²⁰ Despite the fact that the War Department realized this danger, they were unable to squelch the proposed amendment which remained as a part of the bill when it was enacted into law.

THE MILITARY SECRETARY'S AUTHORITY INCREASES

Ainsworth was naturally not content to remain as The Military Secretary in the sense that Elihu Root had intended. Indeed, it would have been strange had an administrator as brilliant and energetic as Ainsworth held himself to the stenographic role which it was contended that the Military Secretary should play. It was inevitable that he should be a contender for a position of real power. Prior to the regime of the General Staff, General H. C. Corbin, as Adjutant General, had been

the real power in the War Department. Perhaps this fact suggested to Ainsworth the idea that a change of name from Military Secretary to Adjutant General would be a move in the proper direction. That he was to be successful in further enlarging his sphere of activities was presaged by the observation that "it is probable that there will be a re-division of work at the War Department to permit Major General J. Franklin Bell, Chief of Staff to devote more of his time to general questions of military policy and less to routine which will be turned over to Major General Fred C. Ainsworth, the Military Secretary."²¹ For his ability as an administrator "General Bell admired Ainsworth, though the feeling was not reciprocated."²² It was therefore natural and proper for the Chief of Staff to delegate to the Military Secretary the performance of routine administrative tasks. Able organizer that he was, General Bell probably realized that the General Staff in its youthful eagerness to be useful and to justify its existence had taken over many routine tasks and duties which never should have been disturbed and which should have been left with the proper administrative bureau. If General Bell did not reach this conclusion himself, it is not difficult to locate the source of this idea. Though General Ainsworth's drive was no doubt motivated by his ambition for power, he was on sound ground in urging the Chief of Staff to divest the General Staff of many of its routine tasks. Whether or not the views of Elihu Root, the founder of the General Staff, were brought forward by General Ainsworth and were used to induce General Bell to make the change cannot be determined. General Ainsworth, however, did take it upon himself to write Elihu Root in order to ascertain his views on the matter.

Root's reply, which strengthened Ainsworth's position, was as follows: "I consider it important to avoid imposing on the General Staff duties of an administrative character. I was opposed to forming a General Staff by a consolidation of the Adjutant General's and Inspector General's Department, because they would carry over to the General Staff a great mass of such duties. The intention was to leave those duties in the Adjutant General's Department, and the main idea of the consolidation of the Adjutant General's Department and the Record and Pension Office in the office of a Military Secretary was to secure a more perfect machine for the performance of administrative duties. I have always thought that one of the dangers to be apprehended in the working out of the General system is the inevitable tendency to overload the staff with duties of this description. That would bring us back again to the position where we were when the assistant adjutant generals in the War Department were each doing a full day's work in administration and at the same time trying to do general staff work with the fag ends of

their time and energy. Of course experience may show that in specific matters there is occasion for reassignment of particular duties in accordance with this principle; but I am not now aware of any occasion for this, and speaking generally, I do not think that any of the duties which were left to the Adjutant General's Department should be imposed upon the General Staff. On the contrary, I think constant watchfulness should be exercised to avoid loading the Staff down with matters which are really administrative."²³

Complying with the views thus voiced by former Secretary Root, General Bell proceeded to intrust more and more duties to the capable Military Secretary. Concurrently with this rejuvenation of the office of the Military Secretary, there began a movement to change the name of this bureau back to its former name, The Adjutant General's Department. Very quietly and with little discussion, an act of Congress, approved March 2, 1907, provided that the Military Secretary's Department would thereafter again be known as the Adjutant General's Department.²⁴

HIGH TIDE OF WAR DEPARTMENT REFORM—1904

High tide for this first move of reform within the War Department, which followed in the wake of the administrative debacle incident to the Spanish-American War, came in the year 1904. The General Staff both in the War Department and with troops was functioning in the planning and coordinating capacity for which it was designed. The Adjutant General's department had been divested of many of its attributes and had had its name changed. To keep the General Staff in touch with the rest of the Army, its members had been restricted to a four-year detail, at the end of which the General Staff officer returned to duty with troops. To make sure that officers in Washington did not lose touch with nor forget the needs of the Army at large, and to prevent those serving in the War Department bureaus (Special Staff) from acquiring political and other special influence incident to long tenure, the detail system had been applied to fill vacancies occurring in the special staff bureaus. Those holding permanent tenure in the Special Staff bureaus were at least in temporary eclipse and destined to be eventually removed as threats to the supremacy of the General Staff.

Likewise, early in 1904 there was affected a general rearrangement of higher commands in the Army. One of the first tasks to engage the attention of the General Staff was the examination of the existing military organization outside of the War Department. As a result of this study, the country was divided into five grand military divisions, each under the command of a major general.²⁵ The Atlantic coast, the Gulf

coast as far as Louisiana, the Canadian frontier as far west as Lake Erie, and the states lying east of the line extending from Erie, Pennsylvania, to Mobile, Alabama, comprised the Atlantic Division which was sub-divided into two departments, the Department of the East and the Department of the Gulf. The great stretch of country drained by the Ohio, the Missouri, and the upper Mississippi valley, and the states along the Canadian frontier from Lake Erie to western Montana were incorporated into the Northern Division, which had as its major sub-divisions the Department of the Lakes, the Department of the Missouri, and the Department of Dakota. The lower Mississippi valley, the southwestern states and territories, the Gulf coast of Louisiana and Texas and the states on the Mexican frontier formed the Southwestern Division which was subdivided into the two departments—the Department of Texas and the Department of the Colorado. The Pacific coastline, embracing the states on the Pacific slope, those drained by the Columbia river, the territory of Alaska, and the Hawaiian Islands were all included in the Pacific Division, which had as its major units the two departments—the Department of California and the Department of the Columbia. The Philippine Division, consisting of all the islands in the Philippine archipelago, had as its major components, the Department of Luzon, the Department of the Visayas, and the Department of Mindanao.

This change had the merit of reducing the number of territorial subdivisions directly accountable to the War Department from twelve to five. Likewise, in this new organization a further decentralization was effected. The Department commanders continued to exercise most of the same functions as before. They were responsible for the discipline, training, and instruction, supply, and shelter of the camps and posts. The Division commanders were to give their main attention to the larger questions. Thus the Division commander was to originate, direct, and approve all military operations in this area. In addition, he was charged with all business relating to the inspection of troops in his Division, including the organizations of the several states and the military colleges. When directed by the War Department, he was to exercise control over all maneuvers in his area. In the realm of planning, the Division commander was to give special attention to a study of the frontier and the preparation of plans for mobilization and concentration of troops, regular, volunteer, and militia.

Root's successor, William Howard Taft, soon became an enthusiastic supporter of the General Staff idea. In his first report as Secretary of War for 1904, Taft described the activity of the General Staff and voiced approval of their work as follows:

"Under the regulations adopted in 1903 for governing the operations of the new corps, a portion of the General Staff has been on duty during the past year with the generals commanding geographical divisions and departments while the other portion known as the War Department General Staff has been stationed in Washington.

The War Department General Staff, besides aiding the Secretary of War as contemplated by law in the administration of current business, has made important revisions during the year of existing regulations and manuals governing the instruction and administration of the Army. In consultation with the chiefs of the staff bureaus (Special Staff) in the War Department, it has completed a revision of the Articles of War to be submitted to Congress for adoption, and of the General Regulations of the Army. It has also revised the drill regulations for infantry and the orders governing military education in the Army and at military colleges, and has now in the course of preparation field service regulations for the government of troops in the field and at peace-time maneuvers.

It has further systematized the Military Information Division to which has been transferred the War Department Library and the distribution of War Department publications. In addition, it has made some progress in advance of the establishment of the War College in the important duty imposed by statute in the General Staff of preparing plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces of the country in time of war. The volume of work done has been very great, and substantially all of the subjects placed by statute on the regulations of the President under the supervision of the General Staff have been considered by it during the year.

I strongly approve the institution of the General Staff. Its work for one year demonstrates its utility. Experience will doubtless suggest useful changes in the details of its operation, and a somewhat more exact definition of its jurisdiction; but no one at all familiar with its advantages will ever think of recommending its abolition."²⁶

COMPLAINTS AGAINST CHANGES IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT

The first avalanche of complaints over the reforms instituted by Secretary Root was started by the bureau chiefs and was directed against the detail system of filling the special staff bureaus, a system that had been inaugurated to replace the evils arising from permanent tenure. As is often the case, remedial reform had created new problems. There had been very substantial ground for the belief that the maladministration in the special staff branches during the Spanish American War had been largely due to the fact that the staff had been removed for so many

years from the operating forces of the line that contact with it had been lost. Secretary Root's remedy had seemed logical. The abolition of permanent details to the administrative staff and the substitution therefor of a four-year detail for line officers to the various special staff bureaus had been hailed as a reform almost as vital as the creation of the General Staff. In fact, it had been held by many as a necessary concomitant to the General Staff system. The proponents of the General Staff had reasoned that if the General Staff was to be effective, there must be a constant refreshing of the body of planners and coordinators by the injection of new blood, officers fresh from the line—the operating forces. For that reason the members of the General Staff had been limited to a four-year tour with the proviso that two years must then elapse before they would be eligible for reappointment. If now the special staff bureaus, such as the Adjutant General, Quartermaster, Subsistence, Pay, Ordnance, and Signal were to be composed of officers with permanent tenure, this would tend to handicap the effectiveness of the General Staff. Experience had amply justified the belief that permanent tenure in Washington for members of the special staff not only caused them to lose touch with the activities and needs of the Army at large, but also that it afforded abundant opportunity for roots to grow and tie onto bulwarks of support in Congress and other political circles. The result, it was feared, would be to so fortify the position of the administrative staff that no improvements could be put through by the constantly changing members of the General Staff. How could inexperienced newcomers presume to scrutinize the considered decisions and methods of operation of the various bureaus with their seasoned personnel whose long tenure qualified them to be the best judges of their own performance? The detail system had consequently been extended to include newly appointed members of the special staff bureaus in Washington. Of course, it had not been possible to root out the members of the special staff whose permanent appointment had already enabled them to intrench. The Root forces had had to content themselves with a Congressional enactment which applied the detail system to future special staff appointments.

But the bureau chiefs had never been converted to a belief in the efficacy of this change. As early as 1903 the Secretary of War in his Annual Report noted: "There are now 79 officers of the line serving in the special staff departments under details pursuant to the act of February 2, 1901. Of these there are in the Adjutant General Department, 20; Inspector General, 11; Quartermaster Department, 20; Subsistence, 4; Pay Department, 9; Ordnance Corps, 5; and Signal Corps, 10. . . . Some criticism has been made upon the detail system as applied

to the Ordnance Department upon the ground that it has failed to secure the requisite number of lieutenants for the ordnance service."²⁷

Even before the Act had had an opportunity to get under way, there were many other bureau chiefs who were convinced that it would not prove successful. The Chief Signal Officer in his report for 1904 voiced the feeling of practically all the bureau chiefs when he declared:

"The detail system is now in the second year of operation. The Chief Signal Officer has struggled loyally to make the service a success under the very difficult conditions in which he has been placed. Only one first lieutenant in the whole Army was willing to demonstrate his fitness for signal corps work by examination and his approaching promotion prevented his detail. Only two lieutenants in the Army have applied for signal duty, and in neither case was favorable action deemed advisable. A system of conscription was resorted to, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army selecting double the number of candidates to that of existing vacancies, personally satisfying himself of the character, ability, and moral standing of the various officers.

From the list submitted to the Chief of Staff these officers were detailed without their knowledge. In this way there have been obtained fourteen officers whose services, with possibly one exception, have demonstrated their fidelity to duty. No less than 28% of the number, however, endeavored to evade the service by personal or political influence after their detail. . . .

It is believed that while the detail service in many respects is valuable, in other ways it is not; in fact it previously failed in the Signal Corps where it was tried for twenty-five years."²⁸

Apparently there was much that could be criticized about the detail system. In the first place, officers were reluctant to volunteer for detail to the special staff. Considerable study was necessary in order to pass the examination. For this there was no reward, for the detail brought no increased rank or pay. Second, there were substantial reasons why officers should not desire four-year details in the special staff branches. In the case of the artillery officer who might be contemplating a detail in the Ordnance Department, there was a strong deterrent that typified practically all cases. Absenting himself from the artillery branch for four years lessened his efficiency as an artillery officer in the eyes of his artillery superiors. Four years' duty with the Ordnance meant that just when he had learned to be a fairly efficient ordnance officer, he was sent back to the artillery where once again he had to study and work overtime to regain familiarity with artillery matters, which he had lost during his absence of four years. In addition, there was a deep rooted

conviction in the minds of high-ranking officers of the line that any duty that took a line officer away from his branch—cavalry, artillery, or infantry—was time wasted and operated to permanently lower an officer's efficiency.

On the other hand, there was evidence that the detail system was successful. Major General Henry C. Corbin, a former Adjutant General who had been the head of the Adjutant General's Department for many years and who was then in command of a territorial division, praised the working of the detail system in his 1904 report, as follows:

"The members of the regular as well as the detailed staff have in every instance met all requirements and their duties have been discharged with zeal and intelligence. All my previous good opinion of the detail system has been more than confirmed. In the Chiefs of the Staff Corps a permanent staff would be much more comfortable but for preparedness to meet all the requirements of a war this education of staff officers by detail is wise, and in the interest of the service should be continued.

The working of the General Staff under my personal observation and experience confirms my opinion—expressed at the time the General Staff law was under consideration, viz, that the adjutants general of divisions and departments should be officers of a division of the General Staff. The position of Chief of Staff and that of Adjutant General of a division or department are analogous. The present practice creates two positions, one of which is wholly unnecessary. Should the chief of staff have more duties than one officer can perform, and often he will, his assistants should be officers of the General Staff, and of course always junior to the chief. The assignment of a chief of staff with rank less than that of the adjutant general is hateful from a military point of view and hurtful to discipline and should in the best interests of the service be discontinued. Both are officers performing under the present conditions duties so nearly akin that the dividing line is often difficult to determine, and there is every reason why the chief should be the senior in rank."²⁹

While General Corbin had praised the performance of the General Staff with troops, he did mention what was proving to be a serious stumbling block. In some cases only one officer had been assigned to a territorial headquarters; in others only two. In the Philippine Division the General Staff with troops early proved its value and won general praise. In many cases the fact that the General Staff officer assigned to a territorial division or department was junior to the special staff officers, such as the Adjutant General, Inspector General, or Ordnance Officer,

proved embarrassing as General Corbin indicated. Generally speaking, there was a universal tendency on the part of the officers commanding the major geographical areas, the Divisions and Departments to use their General Staff officers to carry out purely administrative matters. Even General Corbin, who had been closely associated with Elihu Root and General Carter in the War Department during the period when the General Staff idea had been formulated, had departed from the crux of the General Staff principle, for in his above quoted report he had stated that "the position of Chief of Staff and that of Adjutant General of a Division or Department are analogous."³⁰

THE GENERAL STAFF IN 1905

By the end of 1905 the War Department General Staff had had time to find itself and to correct the kinks always to be found in a new organization. A workable division of duties had been evolved which greatly pleased the Chief of Staff who expressed in his 1905 Report his pleasure over the way the General Staff was functioning. This report gives a clear summary of the work of the General Staff during 1905:

"Since the date of my last annual report the General Staff Corps has again abundantly demonstrated the wisdom of its creation. The amount of work accomplished is so far reaching in its scope that more than a passing comment is necessary to an understanding of it, and as this will be my last report as its chief, as well as Chief of Staff of the Army, I take occasion to present for your information a general outline of what has been done by the War Department General Staff, which constitutes by far the greater part of the corps.

To cover the scope of work this is divided into three divisions—the first, second and third. The first division is charged more particularly with administrative matters; the second division with matters pertaining to information; the third division has charge of military education and matters of a more or less technical nature, and its entire personnel is also a part of the War College.

The first division has been engaged during the past year mainly in making reports, for the information of the Secretary of War, on administrative questions referred to it by the Chief of Staff on matters pertaining to the organization, equipment, and uniform of the Army; amendments of Army Regulations and of the authorized manuals and drill regulations; examinations for appointment and promotion of officers; the issue of medals of honor, certificates of merit, and campaign badges; post and regimental administration; the location and abandonment of military reservations; the supplies for the Army, etc. Reports

have been made on various proposed legal enactments affecting the Army and drafts of bills drawn covering any action recommended. The preparation of many of these reports required exhaustive investigation and study of the matter involved and consultation with the chiefs of various bureaus of the War Department all of whom have heartily cooperated in the work in hand. Suggestions have been drafted for the guidance and instruction of regimental officers of the organized militia upon being called into the service of the United States, with a view to facilitating the solution of various questions of transportation, subsistence, etc., that will arise in such contingency, and similar suggestions drafted for the age of officers charged with the organization of regiments of United States volunteers.

Elaborate data has been collected as to the number of vessels procurable for use as transports at the various seaports of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and the number of troops they will accommodate, the camping and storage facilities at the posts, the railroads leading thereto, and the siding and rolling stock available. This information is filed for use in the study of questions relating to the concentration and embarkation of any given force at any of these ports.

The second division has been engaged in the collection, classification, and preparation of military information for ready reference in case of need, and in the dissemination of non-confidential, professional data, in the form of publications, monographic reports, memoranda, etc., to the bureaus and officers of the War Department, to the Army, to the National Guard, to military schools and colleges, and to individuals.

The character of the military work for military attachés is under the supervision of this division and all instructions to attachés are prepared and all reports from the latter are received by it. Observers with foreign armies in special cases are, generally speaking, under the supervision of this division also.

The duties of this division are divided and grouped into sections as follows: The military attachés, the branch office at Manilla; two libraries, one a military library of foreign technical books and periodicals and the other the general War Department library; a map section; a photographic section; a historical section; a translation section; and a publication section.

The third division, in addition to their duties as the permanent personnel of the Army War College, received during the year the educational system of the Army, and after careful study looking to its improvement, rendered reports which resulted in remodeling the system in some respects, notably that it reduced the hours of recitation in garri-

son schools, thus permitting the younger officers of the service to devote more time to their practical duties.

The orders governing the detail of officers as military professors at civil colleges and other institutions of learning were also reviewed, and reports rendered which resulted in the modification of orders governing the military departments of these institutions and in the adoption of a plan for their inspection which will meet with the wishes of the governing bodies of the schools and tend to a general improvement in the military education of the students.

Studies of problems relating to coast defense were made with special reference to the needs of the Artillery Corps in relation to submarine defense, the care and operation of electrical installations at coast forts, and reports rendered covering these subjects.

Questions as to the proper organization of Field Artillery for a division and the separation of the Field Artillery from the Coast Artillery were also carefully studied.

Plans for combined exercises between the Coast Artillery forts on Chesapeake Bay and the Navy were prepared in cooperation with the representatives of the naval service, with a view to solving problems connected with the attack and defense of our coasts. The exercises contemplated by these plans were held during the month of June with satisfactory, interesting and instructive results."⁸¹

But this official commendation of the work of the General Staff had its counterpart. The General Staff was not meeting with universal approval either within or without the Army. Typical of the strong undercurrent of criticism and of the manner in which it was so often expressed—quoting others to express views of your own—was the following editorial from the February 18, 1905, issue of the *Army and Navy Journal*:

"The New Orleans *Picayune* is greatly concerned about the General Staff of the Army which it declares 'has become very unpopular with a large percentage of the officers of the military service.' The General Staff, our Louisiana contemporary goes on to say 'affords soft assignments for a number of officers of all grades who perform no duty commensurate with the rank and influence they enjoy, but who are able to override their superior officers, embarrass divisional and department commanders and even wield a baneful influence over the freedom of action of generals commanding in the field.'

The *Picayune* also reiterates the peevish complaint of Senator Hale that the General Staff has usurped the functions of the civilian Secretary of War and has reduced that official to a mere figurehead, a pro-

ceeding which is solemnly described as 'a long step toward militarism' and the hint is given that unless the naughty General Staff behaves itself Congress may get angry and put it out of business."³²

THE GENERAL STAFF AND THE CUBAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—1906

The first real test of the value of an organization such as the General Staff came in 1906 when it became necessary to send an expeditionary force to Cuba. Perhaps it cannot be argued that this was a severe test. Undoubtedly, the War Department would have been able to muddle through with almost any sort of organization for the task was well within the capabilities of our peacetime Army. Nevertheless, in making the necessary arrangements for the dispatch of this force, the General Staff acted with such promptness and precision and effected the operation with such an absence of friction as to draw general commendation.

Describing the work of the War Department General Staff in handling the arrangements for the Cuban expedition, the Acting Secretary of War remarked: "We cannot see how we ever did without an Army General Staff. It is an interesting fact that over a year ago, long before there was any indication of an insurrection, the Third Division of the General Staff prepared plans for the military occupation of Cuba by the United States. When the President indicated last August to the War Department that the unsettled condition of affairs in Cuba might lead to the military occupation by this country, it was only necessary for the General Staff to take out of a certain pigeon hole the plans made a year ago for the sending of an army to the island. . . . When it actually developed that this country would have to send an army to Cuba the whole plan was thoroughly discussed, and so well were the details worked out at the time the Third Division had Cuba under consideration that it was not necessary to materially change the scheme outlined over a year ago."³³

And in his Annual Report for 1906 the Secretary of War again praised the General Staff, stating "that the War Department General Staff has rendered efficient service during the past year. In connection with the varied and important duties assigned to this useful organization, a large amount of work has been performed and with a zeal and intelligence that reflects great credit upon its personnel. The work of the General Staff incident to the recent dispatch of the expeditionary force to Cuba was done with such precision, such absence of all friction, and such completeness as in itself amply to justify the existence of this necessary instrumentality for the administration of army affairs, now entering upon the fourth year of its successful operation."³⁴

The period 1906 to 1910 marked an interesting interlude in the existence of the General Staff. The office of Chief of Staff was occupied by Major General J. Franklin Bell, the first Chief of Staff to hold office for the full four-year period. The first three Chiefs of Staff, Generals Young, Chaffee, and Bates, each had had a short term of office and each had retired "without making much impression upon the organization."³⁵

General Bell had been promoted from a captain of cavalry to a brigadier general as a result of the Spanish-American War and the Philippine insurrection. Prior to his appointment as Chief of Staff, General Bell had headed the Fort Leavenworth schools, the most important of which was the Staff College. His success had led to his appointment as Chief of Staff over the heads of many who were senior to him. Coming to Washington as a "young, aggressive, and able general,"³⁶ General Bell brought with him a complete "legislative programme for the Army which he hoped to carry into effect during his four years of office."³⁷ More remarkable, this program was laid before the President, Mr. Roosevelt, who approved it without reference to Secretary of War Taft. President Roosevelt, during the greater part of this period, acted as his own Secretary of War, keeping Secretary of War Taft so busy on political missions that Taft had complained that he wished that "he would be able to take a little more part in the administration of the War Department"³⁸ but that "he had so much outside work to do that he was entirely willing to turn the control over to the Chief of Staff."³⁹

Equally great was the change that took place in the position and function of the General Staff. How seriously could the General Staff be regarded as a planning agency under a Chief of Staff who had brought with him to Washington a complete four-year program of what should be done? On major issues the General Staff had certainly ceased to be a "thought organization" to revert to Graham Wallas' classification.

THE GENERAL STAFF—1906-1910

By and large the period, 1906-1910, was one in which the Army was left alone to work out its own organizational salvation. Under the leadership of General Bell the War Department General Staff appeared to be consolidating its position and authority, establishing itself as a permanent element in the military system. In his report for 1908, the year in which many of the initial four-year details to the General Staff expired and which thus marked the passing of the original personnel, the Chief of Staff observed: "The General Staff has continued to justify its existence. It was to be expected that a new body injected into an old established system, with functions not perfectly defined or gen-

erally understood, would meet with some disfavor. I am convinced that time is bringing a better understanding of the usefulness of this new body, and, being familiar with its work, I am able to testify that its usefulness at present is very great and prospectively promises to be more so."⁴⁰

From the perspective of thirty odd years later, it might be argued that this was not a period of consolidation but one of precipitous retreat from the concepts that had attended the establishment of the General Staff. Likewise there may be observed the beginnings and growth of practices which came to a head during the period when General Wood was Chief of Staff and which in their eruption nearly destroyed the General Staff. To begin with, General Bell had come to the War Department with a complete program which the War Department General Staff had never had a chance to critically examine. Only to the extent to which the General Staff busied itself with relatively unimportant details did it continue as a thought organization, the function for which it was primarily designed. To this circumstance there may be traced the charge levied in later years that the General Staff had degenerated into a propaganda instrument.⁴¹ The first instance of this occurred as a result of the stir created by the publication of Homer Lea's book, *The Valor of Ignorance*. President Roosevelt and General Bell agreed that the time was propitious for airing the inadequacy of our national defense and the President had agreed to submit a special message to Congress on this subject. The task of collecting the data and of framing the report was turned over to the War Department General Staff and the War College. The Chief of Staff did not like the War College report. Like many reports, it was principally a compilation of extracts from General Upton's *Military Policy* and General Bell said it was too dry and statistical.⁴² The report was turned over to General Hagood for rewriting in a more popular style. "After much blue penciling and editing,"⁴³ General Bell finally completed the report and submitted it to the White House. By that time Taft had been elected and Roosevelt pigeon-holed the report, deciding that it would be advisable to let Taft release it for he would be in office long enough to bring about results.

Many of the early reforms instituted by the General Staff were abandoned during this period. In fairness, it should be noted that some of these early reforms could be criticized with justice. As we have seen, to correct the evils of over-centralization that bogged down the War Department in the Spanish-American War, the General Staff shortly after its establishment recommended the creation of five geographical areas, called Divisions, which were intermediate links between the War

Department and the twelve departments. A little more than two years later these Divisions were eliminated except for the Philippine Division, which continued to supervise the three departments into which that archipelago was divided. The nine geographical departments in the United States again functioned directly under the supervision of the War Department. The reasons for the change as given in the Report of the Chief of Staff for 1907 were as follows:

"The system of military administration by subdivision of the territory of the United States into geographical divisions and departments was inaugurated at the close of the Civil War. The United States was divided into five territorial divisions and nineteen departments. All the divisions and departments were commanded by major generals except one department, which was commanded by a brigadier general. As the Army was reduced in size and the number of general officers cut down by successive acts of Congress these divisions and departments were diminished in number and their territorial limits changed. Many divisions and departments on the original list were created by the necessities of postbellum conditions. Every State in the South was a separate department and three of the divisions were in that territory.

As that problem became a thing of the past, departments and divisions were created to meet the exigencies of the Indian situation in the far West. The combination of divisions and departments lasted until July 2, 1891, when the Secretary of War published an order from the President directing 'that the military geographical division be discontinued' and assigning the general officers of the Army to the command of the eight departments. The department system then continued in force with various modifications in the number and geographical extent of the departments until January 15, 1904, when, by direction of the President, a return was made to the division and department system. In the order announcing this change a distinction was made between the functions of division and department commanders. The order stated that the duties of the division commander pertained to the higher functions of command; he was to originate, direct, and approve military operations within his several departments, and was to exercise supervision over all essentially military matters not reserved to other authority, particularly the inspection of troops, supervision over the inspections of the organized militia, the inspections of schools and colleges; he was to give thorough study to the frontier and submit plans for mobilization and concentration of troops in his command with reference to some definitely stated object. There were numerous minor matters assigned to division commanders. The department commander was

primarily charged with the sanitation of posts and camps and with the discipline, supply, shelter, and instruction of troops of his command and to exercise general supervision over all matters of detail connected with or pertaining to routine military administration.

In the last annual report reference was made to this matter as follows:

The establishment of divisions in the United States embracing two or more departments, after an experience of more than two years, is not satisfactory, and administration would be simplified by their abolition. The present arrangement tends to duplication and circumlocution of work. The Philippines Division should be retained. The distance from Washington and the different departments there, embracing separate islands, requires a common head at Manila, and the commanding general should have, as he has now, authority to decide many questions which, for troops in the United States, are referred to the War Department.

During the year careful study was given the subject and it was concluded that the subdivision of the United States into geographical divisions, in time of peace, did not serve to solve satisfactorily the problem of prompt and efficient administration; also that the dividing of duties between division and department commanders led to some confusion. In the division made, division commanders were left little to do and were deprived of the valuable experience to be obtained from the supervision of many classes of important administrative work. After a thorough investigation and consideration of all the recommendations on the subject, the Secretary of War decided to abolish geographical divisions in the United States proper, and they were accordingly discontinued on June 30, 1907. The then existing military departments were continued with headquarters and territorial limits unchanged, except that the State of Missouri was transferred from the Department of Texas to the Department of the Missouri.

The Philippines Division was, however, retained, as the Philippine Islands are far distant, and in the case of war would be practically cut off from the United States. The different departments there embrace separate islands the military administration of which is necessarily centralized under a common head at Manila, and this necessity places the Philippines Division in a different category from the territory of the United States proper. At present the latter is divided into 9 military departments, Alaska being included in the Department of the Columbia. The Philippines Division remains as organized heretofore. A distinct command is temporarily stationed in Cuba."⁴⁴

Perhaps the reform had gone too far in the direction of decentralization. Nevertheless, this change in 1907 marked the beginning of the trend toward centralization that continued until America entered the World War in 1918 when it was discovered that, as in the Spanish-American War of 1898, over-centralization in the War Department once more clogged the military machine.

CONTROVERSY OVER THE FOUR-YEAR DETAIL SYSTEM

Another marked departure from the Root program was the partial abandonment of the detail system in the special staff departments of the War Department. The arguments for the establishment of the detail system and the objections of the bureau chiefs to this system have been presented previously (See pages 95 to 98). By the act of June 25, 1906, the Ordnance Department was exempted from the provisions of the detail system, it being enacted "that details to the Department should be made from the Army at large, from the grade in which the vacancy exists or from the grade below; . . . and that the compulsory interval between details should be diminished from two years to one for officers detailed in grades below that of major, and abolished altogether for the other grades."⁴⁵ This marked the beginning of the return of permanent tenure in all the special staff bureaus, a situation which the sponsors of the General Staff Corps had deemed extremely undesirable. They had argued that the planning and coordinating agency needed to be constantly refreshed by the detail of officers serving with troops and conscious of their needs. That being the case, a constantly changing General Staff would be handicapped in dealing with special staff bureaus whose personnel had become entrenched by permanent appointment. Therefore, the special staff bureaus should adopt the detail system also and, besides, the refreshing would be of great value to them. However, if the basic assumption be changed, the entire analysis changes. The Ordnance Department insisted that the work of their Department demanded permanently detailed personnel because specialists were needed and could only be developed through long years of service in this work. If this argument is accepted then the question may well be raised whether the personnel of the General Staff should not be permanently detailed to the end that long service there would develop specialists in planning and coordination competent to deal with the specialists in the special staff bureaus?

Naturally enough all of the other special staff bureaus clamored for the privilege of being placed on the same status as the Ordnance Department. So strong were their collective pleas that the Chief of Staff was persuaded to accept their views, and in his Report for 1907 he

stated: "Since I have been Chief of Staff, a period of less than two years, necessities have arisen for the services of officers from all of the Staff bureaus which could not be supplied, because there were no staff officers available for the duty. As a consequence, during this period, there being no other recourse, line officers have been detached to perform work pertaining to all the staff departments except the Medical Corps. . . . The Quartermaster's Department has been especially burdened with difficulties because the number of officers therein has been but slightly increased over what it contained when the Army was composed of only 25,000 officers and men. . . . Its present allowance of officers should be increased, and it should be reorganized in such manner as to enable it to meet its obligations more efficiently. Because the law introducing the detail system into the staff corps has not worked as efficiently as it was hoped it might, all need reorganization except the Ordnance Corps, which was reorganized by a later law. That relating to the others should also be revised along lines similar to the Ordnance Corps."⁴⁶

Only the slowness of Congress to take any action at all prevented the complete abandonment of the detail system.

This controversy over the detail system was symptomatic of a disintegrating influence that was becoming more and more pronounced. One of the lessons derived from the Spanish-American War which Elihu Root had realized clearly was the pressing need for greater coordination. Through the General Staff he had hoped to set up the formal machinery of organization to realize this aim. Through the detail system he had hoped to achieve greater coordination by replacing the narrow view that could not see beyond the confines of a particular branch or department with the broader outlook that envisaged the entire army as the unit to be considered. Luther Gulick might well have been thinking of this analysis of Secretary Root when he stated that:

"Experience shows that [coordination] may be achieved in two primary ways. These are:

- (1) By organization, that is, by interrelating the sub-divisions of work by allotting them to men who are placed in a structure of authority, so that the work may be coordinated by orders of superiors to subordinates, reaching from the top to the bottom of the entire enterprise.

- (2) By the dominance of an idea, that is the development of intelligent singleness of purpose in the minds and wills of those who are working together as a group, so that each worker will of his own accord fit his task into the whole with skill and enthusiasm.

These two principles of coordination are not mutually exclusive, in fact, no enterprise is really effective without the extensive utilization of both."⁴⁷

The disintegrating influence present in the Army was the progressive lowering of single-mindedness of purpose from the Army to the branch or bureau level.

The most powerful single factor operating toward this end was the system of promotion in effect. Each branch of the line and each special staff bureau had its own promotion list. That is, all the officers of the Ordnance Department were arranged in order of seniority in an Ordnance promotion list. The same was true of the Cavalry and so on. Promotion, operating on the basis of rigid seniority and place on the list, was slow or fast depending on how rapidly or how slowly the officers at the top died or retired. The great exception to this came when a branch or special staff bureau was increased in size by act of Congress. This, of course, made promotion more rapid because an expansion of, say, ten per cent operated to increase the number of officers in each grade by ten per cent and the vacancies were filled by taking officers in at the bottom. With such an arrangement it was natural that interest in the Army in general should be submerged and subordinated to branch loyalty and that all officers below the rank of brigadier general should work toward increasing the size of their particular branch irrespective of what happened to the army as a whole. This tendency was strengthened by the fact that army reforms and increases were habitually made in a piecemeal manner.

On January 25, 1907, the President signed a bill which provided for the permanent separation of the Coast and Field Artillery branches and which provided substantial increases in both. The basis for splitting the artillery into two independent units was on functional grounds. The Field Artillery, it was argued, was an element of the mobile army and closely related to the other line branches, and the Coast Artillery was responsible for the operations of the fixed defenses of our coast. There was thus adequate reason for this further splitting up of the Army into various branches and bureaus. But a more potent reason in the minds of artillery officers⁴⁸ was the prospect of rapid promotion. The other branches of the Army suspected with considerable justification that this change had been engineered by artillery officers on duty in the War Department for the sole purpose of providing more rapid promotion. The Chief of Staff deemed it advisable in his 1907 Report to call attention to the following facts:

"It is undesirable to continue increasing the Army piecemeal. It is

this method which has resulted in making its present organization so unsatisfactory. Increasing one branch of the service at a time also results in great inequalities in promotion, and, by thus upsetting relative rank, based on length of service, tends to destroy that cordial feeling of good will and comradeship among officers of different branches which has always been peculiarly characteristic of our Army, so characteristic, in fact, as to especially attract the attention of foreign observers. That such a feeling of harmony between officers of all branches of the service is not only valuable, but essential, in bringing about success in operations can be inferred from the following criticism frequently heard of an army which unsuccessfully engaged in a celebrated war:

'The Governor General and the Commander at daggers drawn; each general the foe of every other; each willing to see the enemy triumph rather than have his rival score a success. Each accuses the other of disobeying orders, of delaying action, of deliberately abandoning positions in order to ruin another's plan and all vow vengeance.'

The question of a proper reorganization of the entire Army is one worthy of thorough and systematic study. A comprehensive plan . . . should be prepared and made known to the Army. Opportunity should be afforded all officers to present their views to the War Department upon the subject."⁴⁹

The following year the Chief of Staff recommended increases in the Infantry, the Engineer Corps, and the Signal Corps and stressed the need of complete reorganization for the Cavalry which was held up as the "only branch of the mobile army which has today an antiquated organization."⁵⁰ In part this recommendation was an answer to the clamors coming from these elements throughout the Army. In particular, the Infantry was disgruntled, "Since January 1, 1898, many regiments had spent more than half their time in a tropical climate, and, as a result, insufficient time was given in the United States for the officers and men to recover from one tour of service abroad before another began."⁵¹ The hardships of foreign service, the slowness of promotion, and the spectacle of watching their West Point classmates in the Coast and Field Artillery advancing rapidly naturally irked the Infantry officers.

GENERAL STAFF WORK IN 1907

It was the year 1907 that marked the halfway point in General Ainsworth's struggle for power. Very quietly and apparently without any reference to the General Staff, Congress had, by the act of March 2,

1907,⁵² changed the name of The Military Secretary's Department of the Army back to its former designation, 'The Adjutant General's Department. In itself this change was trivial but its implications were of deep significance. General Ainsworth was now in a position to lay siege to the former position which The Adjutant General's Department had occupied when, in the absence of a General Staff, it had exercised the prerogatives of such a body.

Despite the indications that the position and influence of the General Staff were undergoing a decline, the War Department Staff was busily engaged. Studies made by the General Staff were incorporated into the Secretary of War's Annual Report. In the 1907 Report, the General Staff study on "The Evil of Detached Service and a Bill to Remedy the Matter by Creating Additional Officers of the Regular Army," was submitted as Appendix A. A more exhaustive survey by the General Staff on "The Army as a Life Occupation for Enlisted Men" was included as Appendix B. In the 1908 Report of the Secretary of War there was incorporated the General Staff study on promotion together with an "Elimination Bill" which was designed to correct the sluggishness of Army promotion. The figures and diagrams in this report revealed that the War Department General Staff had made a most exhaustive study on this subject.⁵³

"The first division [of the General Staff] has been engaged almost entirely in the formulating of reports upon the multitudinous administrative matters constantly arising in the line and in the Staff departments of the Army. Suggested amendments of Army Regulations, Drill Regulations, Small-Arms Firing Regulations or of the authorized manuals, here receive careful scrutiny, the views thereon of interested bureau chiefs are obtained, and in case of conflicting views efforts are made to arrive at a solution satisfactory to all concerned. Reports are prepared presenting the subject in concise form to assist the Chief of Staff in arriving at conclusions. Reports of bureau chiefs and department commanders are analyzed, and their recommendations for the betterment of the service are extracted and reported upon for the information of the Chief of Staff in making recommendations to the Secretary of War. Suggestions having for their object increased efficiency of the service are constantly received from within the service, and from outside sources, and these receive careful consideration in order that whatever there is of value in them may be utilized. Examination papers of candidates for appointment as second lieutenants in the Army and of officers found disqualified for promotion are carefully reviewed and reported upon before final action is taken thereon; estimates and allot-

ments for target ranges are revised; consideration is given recommendations for military rewards. Numerous questions relating to uniform and equipments or changes therein; to additions to military reservations, to changes in prescribed blank forms, to issue of campaign badges, to purchase of maneuver sites, to changes of station of troops, to details and assignments of officers, to extra pay for expertness in rifle firing, to participation of regular troops in State camps of the organized militia, to proper organization of the National Guard of States to comply with the provisions of the statutes, etc., have been reported on. In short the duties of the division have been mainly to act as 'agents in informing and coordinating the action of all different officers who are subject . . . to the supervision of the Chief of Staff.' The chiefs of all the bureaus of the War Department have heartily cooperated to this end.

The second division has been engaged in the collection, classification, and preparation of military information for ready reference in case of need, in the form of publications, monographs, reports, memoranda, etc., to the bureaus and officers of the War Department, to the Army, to the National Guard, to military schools and colleges, and to individuals.

This division is also charged with the preparation of instructions for the guidance of officers of the Army serving or traveling abroad or acting as military attachés, and the arrangement and digest of information contained in their reports.

The third division, in addition to its duties as the permanent personnel of the Army War College, supervised under existing regulations the educational system of the Army and the military courses of training at civil institutions of learning at which officers of the Army were detailed as professors of military science and tactics. A number of minor changes found necessary in the system of military education were made, which has resulted in an improvement.

The inspection of civil college and other institutions of learning at which officers of the Army are detailed, made by a board of general staff officers, shows marked improvement during the year and gives reason for the expectation that still further improvements will result from a continuance of the system of inspection.

The study of subjects relating to submarine and seacoast defense was continued, and a number of important questions settled to the mutual satisfaction of the Army and Navy."⁵⁴

On June 27, 1908, the War Department General Staff experienced a minor reorganization. The old First Division was designated as the

First Section with no appreciable change in duties. The old Second and Third Divisions were consolidated under the title of the Second Section, which was assigned offices in the War College Building.⁵⁵

A new entity in the War Department structure came into being on February 12, 1908, when by War Department order a division was created in the office of the Secretary of War and was designated as the Division of Militia affairs.⁵⁶ This new agency was charged with the transaction of business pertaining to the organized and unorganized militia of the United States. A staff agency devoted to the special business of militia matters had been needed badly and with its inception there followed a period of intense activity in changing the militia laws dating from 1898. In the creation of a mobile army, the General Staff gave an important role to the militia.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL INSISTS ON HIS POWERS

There occurred in September of 1909 an incident which illustrated how administrative procedure and organizational questions are interwoven. It also indicated that the Adjutant General had regained a position in the War Department where a test of strength was welcomed. Major Cavanaugh, of the Engineer Corps, who was on leave of absence in Portland, Oregon, had telegraphed the Chief of Engineers that Major McIndoe, of the Engineer Corps, who was in charge of the river and harbor and fortification works of the Portland, Oregon, Engineering District, had been taken ill with typhoid fever and that his immediate relief was imperative. The Chief of the Engineer Corps thereupon telegraphed Major Cavanaugh to temporarily assume charge of Major McIndoe's engineer department duties and funds—and immediately informed the Adjutant General of his action, requesting confirmation of his act by the Secretary of War. A few days later the Adjutant General informed the Chief of Engineers that he had exceeded his authority and that he should have referred the matter to the Adjutant General *prior* to directing Major Cavanaugh to assume the duties of Major McIndoe. Thereupon the Chief of Engineers became extremely incensed and a lengthy war of words followed. The case was trivial but it illustrated several matters of importance. First of all, it gave an opportunity to various members of the War Department to express their views—both practical and legalistic—on how details of administration should be handled. Likewise, the question of administrative discretion was very properly raised. Further, the whole episode revealed the part which the Adjutant General's Department played in the War Department affairs and the extent to which departmentalism had been carried. And finally, it illustrated not only how questions of administrative procedure

involved basic organizational principles, but also the extent to which the whole War Department—the Chief of Staff and the General Staff included—was concerned with administrative details and minutiae. The correspondence, therefore, was of more than passing interest. Taking it as a case in point, one can learn much about the then existing attitudes on organizational and administrative questions. It is, therefore, quoted at length, as follows, but with such omissions as can be made without altering the meaning:

(Fifth Indorsement)

“WAR DEPARTMENT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE

Washington, September 21, 1909.

Respectfully returned to the Chief of Engineers, with remarks that the action of his office in authorizing Maj. Cavanaugh to assume the duties of Maj. McIndoe without first submitting the matter to this office for the action of the Secretary of War, by whose order Maj. McIndoe had been placed in charge of those duties, was wholly unnecessary and unwarranted.

As Maj. Cavanaugh’s telegram was received by the office of the Chief of Engineers at 2:46 p.m., Friday, September 3, there was ample time for the Acting Chief of Engineers to ask for, in the usual manner, and to obtain the issuance by competent authority of the necessary telegraphic orders on that day.

By order of the Secretary of War:

BENJ. ALVORD, Adjutant General.

(Sixth Indorsement)

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS

Washington, October 4, 1909.

1. Respectfully submitted, by his permission, to the Secretary of War.
2. The indorsement of September 21, 1909, on these papers constitutes a reprimand administered to the chief of a bureau of the War Department by The Adjutant General in the name of the Secretary of War.
3. It is believed by the Chief of Engineers that the powers and duties of The Adjutant General in regard to the transaction of routine business in the Name of the Secretary of War do not authorize The Adjutant General to administer such a reprimand without in fact submitting the papers in the case to the Secretary of War and obtaining his express sanction of the contemplated action. The Chief of Engineers is informed that this course was not followed in the present case, and that the Secretary of War had not seen the papers in this case and had not sanctioned the reprimand administered by The Adjutant General when the indorse-

ment of September 21 was written. The Chief of Engineers, therefore, takes exception to this action of The Adjutant General, which is regarded as beyond his authority and power and subversive of discipline, even if the rebuke or reprimand administered were warranted by the facts. No officer should be subject to reprimand by another officer not his commander and without the knowledge of any authority competent to administer a reprimand to an officer of the Army. (Pars. 2 and 3, Army Regulations, Article of War 25.)

4. The rebuke administered to the Chief of Engineers by The Adjutant General in the indorsement of September 21 is based upon the action of the Acting Chief of Engineers in directing Maj. Cavanaugh, on September 3, to temporarily assume charge of the river and harbor and fortification duties in charge of Maj. J. F. McIndoe, Corps of Engineers, and the funds pertaining thereto. On the date mentioned a telegram was received at the office of the Chief of Engineers from Maj. Cavanaugh, then at Portland, Oregon, on leave of absence granted by the Chief of Engineers, stating that Maj. McIndoe, in charge of the river and harbor and fortification works of the Portland engineering district, had been taken ill with typhoid fever and that his immediate relief was imperative. Acting under the general powers granted to the Chief of Engineers by law and regulations, the acting chief at once directed Maj. Cavanaugh by telegraph to temporarily assume charge of Maj. McIndoe's engineer-department duties and funds. In the opinion of the Acting Chief of Engineers a grave emergency was presented. Maj. McIndoe's disbursements average over \$150,000 per month, and in order to avoid delay and confusion it was important that the transfer should be made while Maj. McIndoe's physical condition was such as to enable him to sign the necessary transfer papers. No change of station was involved in the transaction and no expense was incurred.

5. While the above action of the Acting Chief of Engineers was entirely within the limits of the powers, duties, and discretion of the Chief of Engineers, it was nevertheless reported at once by Col. Abbot, the Acting Chief of Engineers, to the Adjutant, both by telephone and by letter, and request was made for confirmation of the action by the Secretary of War. . . .

6. The statement in the indorsement of September 21—that as Maj. McIndoe had been placed in charge of his duties by the order of the Secretary of War, the Chief of Engineers has no power to temporarily relieve him of them—is not in conformity with practice and precedent. . . . By paragraph 745, Army Regulations, the Chief of Engineers is authorized to issue travel orders for necessary journeys on river and harbor fortification duty, and the laws, regulations, and precedents of

nearly 100 years uniformly recognize or specifically express the right and power of the Chief of Engineers to thus regulate the duties of the officers of his corps.

7. The supervision and execution of works of river and harbor improvements and of fortification construction are placed by law under the Engineer Department, and the Chief of Engineers is specifically charged with the administration of these works, under the direction of the Secretary of War. Works of this character are committed by the Secretary of War to the Chief of Engineers and not to individual officers of the corps. The assignment of such works to individual constructing officers is made by the Chief of Engineers. With every river and harbor bill and every fortification bill additional works are intrusted to the Chief of Engineers, and are by him assigned to such officers as he selects, and his right to thus assign these works has never been questioned. Every new project of river and harbor improvement, every preliminary examination and survey, every new item of construction or repair of fortifications or accessories, provided for in the successive appropriation acts is thus assigned to the individual constructing officers by the Chief of Engineers, and the fact of such assignment is not reported to The Adjutant General or to the Secretary of War. The Secretary of War holds the Chief of Engineers responsible for the works; it is the right and duty of the Chief of Engineers to direct his subordinate in its immediate execution.

8. A long line of precedents can be cited in support of the action of the Acting Chief of Engineers in this case, showing similar action without the intervention of The Adjutant General. . . .

* * *

10. The action of the Acting Chief of Engineers in directing Maj. Cavanaugh to temporarily assume charge of Maj. McIndoe's works under the Engineer Department was strictly correct and in accordance with precedent. His only error was in reporting his action to The Adjutant General and in asking a confirmation, which was totally unnecessary. . . . The Chief of Engineers is charged with the execution of many varied and important works, involving the employment of multitudes of men and the expenditure of vast sums of public funds. If his executive acts within the legal sphere of his activities are to be reviewed by The Adjutant General and his discretion in the conduct of the works committed to him is to be questioned by The Adjutant General, the entire principle of executive administration and responsibility in the Engineer Department is or may be paralyzed. The Chief of Engineers can not recognize the right of The Adjutant General to so review his acts, nor can he submit to criticism or reprimand by The Adjutant Gen-

eral based upon the exercise of his discretion in matters which are by law committed to his charge.

11. The Chief of Engineers feels this matter very keenly. He feels that The Adjutant General has used the name of the Secretary of War to obtain from the files of this office official papers pertaining solely to the business of this office, and that he has used these papers as the basis of a reprimand to the Chief of Engineers, administered in the name of the Secretary of War. Such a reprimand, if indeed administered by the Secretary of War, is a punishment which must be keenly felt by any conscientious and high-spirited officer, and which must follow him to the end of his career, if, in accordance with existing regulations relative to all expressions of censure from superiors, it is filed with his record in the War Department. But when such action is taken by The Adjutant General, in the name of the Secretary of War, but without his express sanction, it becomes a wrong and an injustice, which same method may be used to destroy each and every officer's usefulness in the Army.

12. For the various reasons above set forth, the Chief of Engineers requests that the reflections upon the conduct of the Office of the Chief of Engineers in this case contained in the indorsement of September 21, 1909, be expunged from the records of the War Department.

W. L. MARSHALL,

Chief of Engineers, United States Army.

(Seventh Indorsement)

War Department, October 13, 1909.

Respectfully returned to The Adjutant General, inviting attention to preceding indorsement, with direction to submit such report and comment as he may desire to present thereon.

ROBERT SHAW OLIVER,
Acting Secretary of War

(Eighth Indorsement)

To Col. Alvord, for remark.

A.G.O.

Oct. 14, 1909.

(Ninth Indorsement)

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

October 16, 1909.

Respectfully returned to The Adjutant General of the Army.

In the afternoon of September 3 last, at least an hour before the close of office hours, Col. F. V. Abbot, Corps of Engineers, Acting Chief of Engineers, called me by telephone and stated that he had received tele-

graphic notice that Maj. McIndoe, in charge of the Portland (Oreg.) engineering district, was ill with typhoid fever, and that he, Col. Abbot, had telegraphed Maj. Cavanaugh, then on leave of absence in Portland, directing him to relieve Maj. McIndoe temporarily of his duties and to take over his funds. I asked Col. Abbot if he had already telegraphed such an order, and he distinctly answered that he had, and asked me what he should do next. Thereupon I told him that there was nothing for him to do but to make a written report of the matter to The Adjutant General of the Army and ask for confirmation of the action taken.

Under date of September 3, the Acting Chief of Engineers addressed to The Adjutant General the letter hereby returned. In that letter he reported the action taken by him with regard to Maj. McIndoe and Cavanaugh, asked that the instructions given by him to those officers be confirmed, and recommended that inquiry be made of the Department of Commerce and Labor as to whether there was objection to the temporary transfer of Maj. Indoe's duties as lighthouse inspector to Maj. Cavanaugh. This letter was not received in the mail room of The Adjutant General's Office until just at the close of office hours on September 4, and the department was closed on the two following days; but on September 7 the letter reached my desk and I at once submitted it to the Acting Chief of Staff, who directed approval of the action taken and that the necessary letter be written to the Department of Commerce and Labor. I caused such a letter to be prepared and took it to the Acting Secretary of War, who, after hearing a statement of the case from me, signed the letter. I also addressed a letter to the Chief of Engineers, informing him that the Secretary of War had confirmed the action taken in directing temporary relief of Maj. McIndoe by Maj. Cavanaugh.

In this connection it is proper to remark that since June 25, 1908, pursuant to instructions received from the Assistant Secretary of War on that date, unless otherwise specifically directed, all orders depending upon the authority of the Secretary of War for their validity have been given in his name, whether he be present or not, the use of the words "Acting Secretary of War" having been discontinued.

On September 8 I submitted to the Acting Chief of Staff a letter from the Acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor requesting the temporary assignment of Maj. Cavanaugh as engineer of the thirteenth lighthouse district, and by direction of the Acting Chief of Staff an order making the assignment was prepared. On the same day I stated the case to the Acting Secretary of War and submitted to him a telegram, which he signed, informing the Secretary of Commerce and Labor that an order detailing Maj. Cavanaugh temporarily as engineer of the thirteenth

lighthouse district and directing him to report by telegraph to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor had been made. On the same day I also telegraphed Maj. Cavanaugh that this order had been made.

There being no record in this office of the telegraphic correspondence between the Acting Chief of Engineers and Maj. Cavanaugh on which confirmation of the action taken in the case by the Acting Chief of Engineers was asked and given in the name of the Secretary of War, as hereinbefore stated, I called up the Chief of Engineers, in the name of the Secretary of War, on September 8 for copies of that correspondence. This call was made after submission of the matter to the Acting Chief of Staff and by his direction (first indorsement hereon). The copies thus called for having been received it was found that a copy of the telegram from Maj. Cavanaugh to the Chief of Engineers, informing him of the illness of Maj. McIndoe, was deficient in the important particular that it did not show the time of its receipt. It was also found, from a copy of the telegram of the Acting Chief of Engineers to Maj. Cavanaugh, that the Acting Chief of Engineers had been in communication with the Lighthouse Board with regard to the matter. Therefore, I submitted all the papers in the case to the Acting Chief of Staff, and by his direction I called upon the Chief of Engineers, in the name of the Secretary of War, on September 14 (third indorsement hereon) for the original telegram from Maj. Cavanaugh to the Chief of Engineers, also for copies or a statement showing what passed between the Lighthouse Board and the office of the Chief of Engineers with regard to the matter in question.

In connection with these calls upon the Chief of Engineers for information with regard to this case it is proper to remark that both of the calls were made 'By order of the Secretary of War' after submission of the matter to the Acting Chief of Staff and by virtue of the authority vested in the Chief of Staff by paragraph 3 of a published order (E) of the Secretary of War of April 14, 1906. That paragraph is as follows:

'The submission of matters to the Secretary by the Chief of Staff will be in person. Before presentation to either the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary the cases should be completed by obtaining the necessary recommendation, reports, or information from the bureaus of the department, or the military authorities outside of the department, and to this end the Chief of Staff is authorized to call therefor.'

By order of the Secretary of War.

After having fully advised as to all the facts in the case the Acting Chief of Staff decided that the papers should be returned to the Chief of Engineers, whose attention should be called to the improper action

of his office with regard to the case and especially to the fact that there was ample time to make request for proper action in the usual way. Thereupon, I caused the draft of an indorsement conveying that decision (fifth indorsement hereon) to be prepared. On September 21 I submitted that draft to the Acting Chief of Staff, who read it and approved it. I then took it to the Acting Secretary of War, who read it and approved it after I had advised him fully with regard to the case and the action that had been taken by the Acting Chief of Staff with regard to it.

Following is a copy of the record made by me immediately after the submission of this draft and before the fair copy was written:

'Foregoing draft submitted to the Act. Chief of Staff and the Acting Secretary of War this date, and approved by them. B.A. (B. Alvord), A.G. Sept. 21, '09.'

Not a single step has been taken by The Adjutant General's Office in this case, from the beginning up to the present time, without the full knowledge and approval of either the Acting Secretary of War, the Acting Chief of Staff, or both combined. The assertion of the Chief of Engineers that the third indorsement hereon conveys a reprimand to him is without foundation. That indorsement advises him in a very mild way to the effect that the action of his office in directing Maj. Cavanaugh to assume the duties of Maj. McIndoe without first submitting the matter for the action of the Secretary of War, by whom Maj. McIndoe had been placed in charge of those duties, was wholly unnecessary and unwarranted.

The facts in this case are very simple. Maj. McIndoe was placed in charge of certain duties by the express order of the Secretary of War. It required an order of the Secretary of War or the President to relieve him from those duties. The Acting Chief of Engineers undertook to relieve him without invoking the authority or consent of any superior. There was not the slightest necessity for his doing this. He received telegraphic notice of Maj. McIndoe's illness at 2:46 p.m., when both the Acting Chief of Staff and the Acting Secretary were in their offices and would remain there for at least an hour and a half. If he had brought or sent his telegraphic notice to The Adjutant General's Office, as he should have done, the notice would have been acted on by the Acting Chief of Staff and the Acting Secretary of War, and the necessary telegraphic order would have been sent to Maj. Cavanaugh all within 20 minutes at the most and probably within 10 minutes.

That a subordinate may change, even temporarily, the operation of a specific order of a superior when that superior is readily accessible and is in position to act in the matter virtually as quickly and as understand-

ingly as the subordinate could is a proposition that in military affairs is novel, to say the least.

BENJ. ALVORD, Adjutant General.

(Tenth Indorsement)

WAR DEPARTMENT. THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

Washington, October 16, 1909.

Respectfully returned to the Acting Secretary of War.

The burden of the complaints embodied by the Chief of Engineers in his somewhat emotional indorsement (sixth) hereon is that he has been reprimanded and that The Adjutant General did it improperly, on his own responsibility, and by making unauthorized use of the name of the Secretary of War. Neither of these complaints has any foundation other than in the heated imagination of the officer who made them.

To say that informing the Chief of Engineers that certain action taken by his office was wholly unnecessary and unwarranted constitutes a reprimand is equivalent to saying that a reprimand to an officer is involved whenever in the course of official correspondence attention of that officer is directed, no matter how mildly, to any error of procedure on his part or on the part of any of his subordinates. The mere statement of such a contention is sufficient to show its fallacy.

The baselessness of the Chief of Engineer's confident assertion to the effect that The Adjutant General acted in this case on his own responsibility and improperly used the name of the Secretary of War in doing so is conclusively shown by the seventh indorsement hereon, in which it is made clear that every step was taken in the case with the full knowledge and approval of the Acting Chief of Staff, the Acting Secretary of War, or of both of them together, and that in every instance the Secretary of War was properly cited as the source of authority for the action taken. The Adjutant General accepts the entire responsibility for everything that was done in or by his office in this case. He would accept that responsibility without question even if his office had erred in the matter, but he knows that it did not err. He watched the case closely from the beginning, and took care that no step should be taken in it by his office without the full knowledge and assent of competent authority.

It does not seem incumbent upon The Adjutant General to enter into an elaborate defense of the decision, made by authority superior to him in this case, to the effect that, there being ample time to secure the action of such authority, the action of the office of the Chief of Engineers in relieving Maj. McIndoe of duties assigned to him by the Secretary of War was wholly unnecessary and unwarranted. It seems sufficient to say that if the Chief of Engineers can, as he contends, relieve such officers of

duties so assigned to them whenever he sees fit to do so, and without the assent of the Secretary of War, he can at will completely nullify any such assignment of orders of the Secretary of War, and the issuance of such orders by the Secretary is a useless and empty formality. Life is too short to permit the wasting of any portion of it in discussion with, or for the benefit, of anyone whose conception of the underlying principles of military administration is so hazy that he can advocate such a proposition seriously. A proposition of this kind would be regarded as remarkable if advanced by a State militiaman, and it is simply amazing when put forward by an officer of the Regular Army, even though his connection with the military side of that establishment be so remote as to be merely nominal.

Touching the precedents cited by the Chief of Engineers in support of the action of his office in the case in question, it is to be observed that they all appear to have been created in his own office, and to be merely cumulative evidence of the entertainment by that office of erroneous views as to the powers of the Chief of Engineers. It is not doubted that the Chief of Engineers can find in the records of action taken by his office precedents for many irregular and unmilitary procedures, but it does not follow that those procedures were or are right, or that they would have been tolerated, in the past if they had been brought to the attention of the proper authority, as was the procedure that led to this correspondence.

When the Chief of Engineers learns that the principal allegations made by him in the sixth indorsement hereon are without foundation in fact, he must be deeply chagrined over the deplorable recklessness of statement that he displayed in that indorsement. But the predicament that he has placed himself in is one that usually awaits those who hasten to attack others without first making sure that their own weapons are reliable. Perhaps the Chief of Engineers may be brought to realize, too, that to protest with such vehemence that one has been unjustly reprimanded or otherwise outraged by having his attention called officially to an error on his part is an artifice that does not obscure the error, however much it may relieve the chagrin that is naturally due to the discovery of the error and to the notice taken of it.

This incident will not have been entirely devoid of value, to the Chief of Engineers at least, if that officer shall learn from it that he can best protect the interests of his department by taking care that he and it shall be right in their procedure, and that it is never wise and is seldom safe to attack others without first making sure that the attack is justifiable and that the weapons of the attacking party can be depended upon.

F. C. AINSWORTH,
The Adjutant General.

(Eleventh Indorsement)

Respectfully referred to Brig. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, Assistant Chief of Staff, for such comment hereon as he may desire to submit.

ROBERT SHAW OLIVER,
Acting Secretary of War.

(Twelfth Indorsement)

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Washington, October 19, 1909.

Respectfully returned to the Acting Secretary of War.

The facts in this case are fully and accurately set forth in the eighth (ninth) indorsement hereon. When my attention as Acting Chief of Staff was called to the fact that an order had been issued by the Acting Chief of Engineers, without consultation with or the consent of the Acting Secretary of War, assigning an officer of his corps to duty which would keep him away from his regular station for an indefinite time, the question naturally arose, did such an emergency exist or was the necessity so great as to warrant what appeared to be an unusual act? In determining what emergency or urgent necessity existed for this action it was necessary to ascertain whether the date or hour of the receipt of information on which the action was taken was such as to preclude the use of the ordinary methods pursued in the assignment of officers to duty of any kind. When it developed that this information was received at least an hour and a half prior to the time the Acting Secretary of War left his office on the date in question, and that the urgency of the case was not such as to preclude the slight delay of from five to ten minutes which would have resulted had the Acting Chief of Engineers pursued the normal and regular course in bringing the matter to the attention of the Acting Secretary before issuing the order, I deemed the occasion a proper one to invite the attention of the Acting Secretary of War and the Acting Chief of Engineers to what appeared to be the lack of necessity and warrant for such precipitate and unusual action. I therefore approved the draft of the indorsement referred to by the Chief of Engineers and directed that it be submitted to the Acting Secretary of War to see if it met with his approbation. The indorsement was so submitted and approved by him.

In inviting the attention of the Acting Chief of Engineers to the manifest lacking of such urgency or necessity in this case as to warrant such a departure from the ordinary and normal way of transacting business connected with the detail of officers for duty there was no intention of conveying a reprimand to that officer, and it appears to me that it

requires a somewhat strained interpretation to attribute such a meaning to the indorsement complained of.

W. W. WOTHERSPOON,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Assistant to the Chief of Staff.

(Inclosure to the Twelfth Indorsement)
(Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of War)
WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Washington, October 20, 1909.

The following, whilst having no place in my indorsement on the papers connected with the complaint of the Chief of Engineers that he construed a certain indorsement of The Adjutant General of the Army as an unauthorized reprimand, seems to be pertinent to the subject under discussion, for it would appear that the real subject at issue is, Can the Chief of Engineers order officers of his corps on duty without consultation with the Secretary of War, or, at least, without pursuing the same course as is followed by other corps and departments of the Army?

The Chief of Engineers, in the opening sentences of paragraph 10 of his indorsement says:

'The action of the Acting Chief of Engineers in directing Maj. Cavanaugh to temporarily assume charge of Maj. McIndoe's works under the Engineer Department was strictly correct and in accordance with precedent. His only error was in reporting his action to The Adjutant General and in asking a confirmation, which was totally unnecessary.'

Maj. Cavanaugh was assigned to duty in the office of the Chief of Engineers, with station in this city, by paragraph 22, Special Orders No. 215, War Department, 1907. Paragraph 5, Special Orders No. 175, War Department, 1908, detailed him as a member of the Lighthouse board. Maj. McIndoe was assigned to duty at Portland, Oreg., in charge of fortification and river and harbor works and as chief engineer of the Department of the Columbia by paragraph 6, Special Orders No. 119, War Department, 1908. He was assigned to lighthouse duty by paragraph 2, Special Orders No. 127, War Department, 1908. Paragraph 16, Special Orders No. 144, War Department, 1908, revoked so much of the first order as related to duty as chief engineer, Department of the Columbia.

All of the above orders were issued either

'By order of the Acting Secretary of War:

'J. FRANKLIN BELL,
'Major General, Chief of Staff.

'Official:

'HENRY P. MCCAIN, Adjutant General.'

or—

'By order of the Acting Secretary of War:

"WILLIAM P. DUVAL,

'Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.

'Official:

'HENRY P. MCCAIN, Adjutant General.'

From this it will be seen that both of these officers were assigned to duty in the regular and normal way by orders issued from The Adjutant General's Office, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of War's office, and that those orders involved duty in connection with fortification works in addition to work connected with river and harbor work and lighthouse duty. To claim that the change of status of these officers can be made without instructions received through the same channels as those used in the above-cited orders would appear to raise the question whether officers of the Engineer Corps constitute a body in the Army exempt, so far at least as their assignment to river and harbor fortification work is concerned, from that supervision and direction which the Secretary of War holds and exercises through The Adjutant General's office over all other officers of the Army. There is no question but that the Secretary of War can issue such orders or instructions as he deems proper, and may issue them in such manner as seems to him proper. At the same time there seems to be equally no question but that all officers of the Army must comply, unless specially directed otherwise, with such regulations and orders as have been promulgated by the Secretary of War governing methods of procedure in bringing matters which require his official sanction to the Secretary of War's attention. In my opinion the procedure suggested by the Chief of Engineers, in that part of his endorsement above quoted, would not be consistent with regulations and orders now existing.

Very respectfully,

W. W. WOTHERSPOON,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Assistant to the Chief of Staff.

(Thirteenth Indorsement)

War Department, October 20, 1909.

Respectfully referred to the Judge Advocate General, inviting particular attention to the twelfth indorsement hereon and to the accompanying memorandum of the Assistant to the Chief of Staff, dated October 20, 1909.

By the personal direction of the Secretary of War, the Judge Advocate General will render full report upon the following questions, viz:

1. Did the Acting Chief of Engineers act within his rights when directing Maj. Cavanaugh to temporarily relieve Maj. McIndoe?

2. Has the Chief of Engineers authority, without orders from the Secretary of War, to assign to or relieve from duty or order from point to point such officers of his corps as are engaged (a) in river and harbor work; (b) upon fortification work?

ROBERT SHAW OLIVER,
Acting Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Washington, October 30, 1909.

The Acting Secretary of War.

Sir: I beg leave to submit the following report upon the questions referred to this office for opinion in your indorsement of the 20th instant. Before proceeding to the discussion it is proper to say a word in respect to the functions of the several staff departments which have been established from time to time by Congress with a view to assist the Secretary of War in the performance of his duties.

Each of the staff departments which were recognized and continued in the general reorganization act of February 2, 1901 (31 Stat. L., 748), was originally established by statute for the performance of certain specific duties. The duties with which they are charged are indicated in part by the titles of the several departments and in part by the officers created with a view to their performance. The establishment of an adjutant general's department, for example, indicated an intention on the part of Congress to provide an agency or instrumentality for the performance of the duties of an adjutant general which were all known and understood at the date when that department was established. In some cases the Engineer, Quartermaster's, and Subsistence Departments, for example, duties differing from or additional to those indicated by their titles have been expressly imposed by law. The General Regulations of the Army also prescribe duties to be performed by the chief of the several staff departments, and some of these general regulations prescribe, to some extent, the relations that have been established with a view to govern the heads of such departments in their relations to each other and to the Secretary of War.

The duties of The Adjutant General are those indicated as pertaining to that office by its title. Executive regulations in furtherance of the statute have been framed specifying in considerable detail the precise

duties with which The Adjutant General of the Army is charged. These are set forth fully in paragraph 777 of the Army Regulations. . . .

* * *

That the duties so prescribed have continued without change for nearly 75 years is indicated by the corresponding requirements of the Army Regulations of 1835, which provide that:

'The Adjutant General is the channel through which are issued all orders emanating from the headquarters of the Army and all regulations necessary to be communicated to the troops. . . . (Par. 1, Art. XLI, Army Regulations of 1835.)'

It is proper to say, also, that the questions in reference arose in the ordinary administration of the department, a matter which is entirely in the hands of the Secretary of War, as the representative of the President in the conduct of military affairs. As it is practically impossible for a cause of action to arise of a character to require adjudication by the courts in the ordinary and habitual relations between the Secretary of War and the heads of the several staff departments, there are not precedents, in the usual acceptation of that term, which would assist in the determination of the questions referred to this office for opinion; and in passing upon the case decisive weight must be attributed to the approved practice of the department for the last 75 years in respect to the functions of The Adjutant General and his relations to the several staff departments and to the Army at large.

It is an essential incident of departmental administration that there should be some office in which the action of the Secretary of War, in respect to the duty to which officers of the Army are assigned, shall be made a matter of official record; and that office should also be charged with the preparation and submission to the Secretary of War of orders changing the station of officers or appointing them to particular duties. The Adjutant General, from the nature of his office, constitutes the channel of communication between the heads of departments and the Secretary of War in such cases and in his office the record of the action of the Secretary thereon is made a matter of permanent record.

With the disbursement of appropriation and with the relations between the heads of the several staff departments and their subordinates in matters relating to the performance of the duties with which they are charged by law not involving changes of station or affecting other interests than those committed by law to a particular department of the staff for execution, The Adjutant General has nothing to do. The requirements of the regulation in that regard are plain and prescribe that:

'Correspondence between an officer of a staff corps or department and the chief of the War Department bureau in which he is serving,

which does not involve questions of administrative responsibility within the supervision of commanding officers outside that staff corps or department, nor relate to individual interests or status of a military nature requiring the action of authority outside that staff corps or department, and which is concerned exclusively with the business of that staff corps or department, will pass directly. All business emanating from the bureaus of the War Department requiring the action of higher authority will be submitted to the Chief of Staff for his consideration, either orally in person or in writing through the Adjutant General of the Army. In all cases the action of higher authority thereon will be communicated in writing by the Adjutant General of the Army to those concerned. Matters, however, of a purely civil nature will be submitted by chiefs of bureaus directly to the Secretary of War unless otherwise required by their subject matter. (Par. 789, Army Regulations of 1908.)'

The necessity of such a central agency as that described is apparent when the enormous volume of administrative work with which the War Department is charged is considered. As a result of such an orderly disposition of the business of the department as is contemplated in the foregoing extracts from the General Regulations of the Army, it is possible for the Secretary of War to know at all times the exact stations of all officers of the Army and the nature of the duty upon which they are employed. He is also able to call for the entire record of a particular officer from the date of his original appointment to the Army, and in the operation of the existing system of efficiency reports, which are matters of record in The Adjutant General's Office, he is enabled to call for the record showing not only the nature of the duty with which a particular officer is charged but the manner in which that duty is performed, together with an authoritative estimate of the capacity and adaptability of the officer along several lines of professional activity.

It should also be borne in mind that several important enactments of Congress require that the methods of administration above indicated should be adhered to, and that a central bureau of record in respect to the stations, duties, and movements of commissioned officers of the Army should be constantly maintained. Such are the acts of July 29, 1876 (19 Stat. L., 102), and March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. L., 902), regulating the pay status of officers on cumulative leave; the act of March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. L., 903), allowing additional pay for foreign service; sections 1243 and 1244 of the Revised Statutes, and the acts of June 30, 1882 (22 Stat. L., 117), March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. L., 457), February 16, 1891 (26 Stat. L., 763), etc., governing compulsory retirement,

retirement for age and the retirement of officers at fixed ages or after specified periods of service.

* * *

The question presented in your indorsement of the 20th instant can now be discussed. First, an expression of opinion is desired as to the following question: '1. Did the Acting Chief of Engineers act within his rights when directing Maj. Cavanaugh to temporarily relieve Maj. McIndoe?'

The assignment of officers of the several staff departments to stations is ordered by the Secretary of War, upon the application of the heads of the several staff departments which are submitted to the Secretary of War through The Adjutant General in the operation of paragraphs 769, 787, and 789 of the Army Regulations. The orders of the Secretary of War directing such changes, instructions, or assignments are issued through The Adjutant General. In the case in reference Maj. McIndoe was assigned to duty as engineer officer of the Portland district by the Secretary of War on the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers. Maj. Cavanaugh was similarly assigned by the same authority to duty in the office of the Chief of Engineers in this city. As the assignments were made originally by the Secretary of War, changes in such assignments could only be made by the same authority; or, to state the matter in somewhat different language, a change of station or an assignment in the case of a staff officer can only be accomplished in pursuance of an instrument of equal dignity and authority. It is therefore the opinion of this office that the first questions should be answered in the negative, that the Chief of Engineers did not act within his rights in directing Maj. Cavanaugh to take station in Portland, Oreg., and relieve Maj. McIndoe of his duties in charge of the engineer district of Portland.

The second question is: '2. Has the Chief of Engineers authority without orders from the Secretary of War to assign to or relieve from duty, or order from point to point, such officers of his corps as are engaged (a) in river and harbor work; (b) upon fortification work?'

It is the opinion of this office that this question too must be answered in part in the negative. The case presented in the papers in reference involved the relief of one officer who had been assigned to a station of duty by the Secretary of War. It has been seen that, where an officer has been assigned, his relief can only be accomplished in the operation of an order of equal authority and sanction; that is, the relief of Maj. McIndoe and the assignment of Maj. Cavanaugh to duty at Portland, Oreg., could only be accomplished, under the existing and long-established

lished practice of the department, in the operation of instructions issuing in the name of the Secretary of War.

* * *

Very respectfully,

GEO. B. DAVIS,
Judge Advocate General.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, November 4, 1909.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.

The Acting Chief of Engineers, deeming that an emergency existed, issued an order directly and followed it up, in accordance with regulations, by obtaining through The Adjutant General the approval of his action by the Secretary of War.

The Adjutant General, on sending for the necessary papers to complete the files in his office, was of the opinion, in so far as the papers showed, that an emergency did not exist and that the order should have been issued through the proper channel as provided by the regulations.

The matter was submitted to the Acting Chief of Staff and the Acting Secretary of War, and the attention of the Acting Chief of Engineers was called to the fact that his action was, so far as the facts shown were concerned, unwarranted and unnecessary, and it so appeared so far as shown by my papers in the case at that time.

The Chief of Engineers then submitted a statement from the Acting Chief of Engineers, which amplified the record, going to show that the Acting Chief of Engineers had acted for the best in his belief and that it was only a question of judgment as to whether what he had done was not necessary and warranted; and, in view of the facts submitted by him, it seems fair to believe that he acted for the best and that the question was simply a difference of opinion. Had this been the only material in the indorsement of the Chief of Engineers it would have closed the matter, which was of very little consequence. Unfortunately the Chief of Engineers considered the indorsement referred to as a reprimand, which it evidently was not, and submitted a very intemperate and unnecessary statement reflecting upon The Adjutant General and introducing matters that were not germane to the case, the result of which was that The Adjutant General stated his position in a most caustic indorsement, embodying therein much that was unnecessary.

The matter was then submitted to the Acting Chief of Staff, who reported upon the matter most temperately and explained the cause for his action in approving the indorsement in question. No possible benefit to the service can be gained by submitting these indorsements to the Chief

of Engineers and it is recommended that the matter be laid aside, except in so far as the paragraph in which the Chief of Engineers states that he was under no obligation to seek an order through The Adjutant General from the Secretary of War to take the action which he did. This necessitated a decision as to the powers of the Chief of Engineers regarding his subordinate officers. The papers were accordingly submitted to the Judge Advocate General, and he sustains the contention of The Adjutant General entirely in this particular case. It is recommended that no further action be taken, except possibly to issue a regulation defining the powers of the Chief of Engineers as regards his authority as to the issuance of orders to his subordinates. This can be stated, apparently, in a few words as he seems to be limited to the issuance of orders direct to his officers, to those who are engaged on civil work and whose expenses and transportation are paid from the appropriation made for such civil work. In all other cases involving change of station or duty he is subject to the same regulations as those imposed upon other chiefs of bureaus.⁵⁷

(No signature.)

Assistant Secretary of War."

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S AUTHORITY IS REAFFIRMED

The authority of the Adjutant General was thus reaffirmed and in the process the administrative discretion of the Chief of Engineers was curtailed. But that was not all. It was to be expected that the principle would be upheld that there must be one central place in the War Department where orders are made of record and that the Adjutant General's Department was the place for this authentication. But under the concept of the Adjutant General as the Military Secretary, which Root and the founders of the General Staff apparently had in mind, it can be argued that the role of the Adjutant General in this case was to make the orders a matter of record. Theoretically, the General Staff section handling personnel policies should have been consulted by the Adjutant General if there was a question of whether or not the case at point was covered by existing policies. Theoretically, the War Department General Staff should have issued sufficient information on personnel policies so that the Chief of Engineers and his office would have known clearly what was the area of administrative discretion in which they could act. As an operating department the Office of the Chief of Engineers needed the necessary authority to discharge their responsibilities and the right to order personnel changes was probably necessary. Of course, the various bureaus of the War Department could not order military personnel around willy nilly without some guiding policies to insure uniform prac-

tice and without some standard procedure to make the action a matter of record. But nowhere in this discussion is it apparent that there was any common understanding that (a) a War Department General Staff section enunciates personnel policies, stipulates procedures to be followed, and defines areas of administrative discretion; (b) an operating bureau of the War Department takes executive action with considerable administrative discretion but in conformance with established War Department General Staff policies whenever and to the extent executive action or operational instructions are required to carry out assigned tasks and responsibilities; and (c) the Adjutant General's Department does not take a substantive action as a higher authority in deciding on personnel matters, but rather acts as an office of publication and record.

It is interesting to note that this comparatively trivial question received the attention of both the Acting Secretary of War and the Acting Chief of Staff. Here again the General Staff adherents such as Elihu Root or General Carter would have insisted that if the General Staff philosophy had been followed neither the Chief of Staff nor the Secretary of War would have been bothered with this trivial incident. They would have passed on general personnel policies as formulated by the War Department General Staff after consultation with all the bureaus and operating elements of the Army. One of these policies would normally have covered the question of issuing orders in emergencies, the extent to which operating offices could do this in emergencies, and the procedure to be followed after the action had been taken. Had such a policy been in existence, the matter would not have required the attention of either the Acting Secretary of War or the Acting Chief of Staff.

This incident also illustrated other problems which were to be the source of future difficulties. The Chief of Engineers claimed that his department had been given specifically by Congress, in statutory enactments and in appropriation acts, definite operating instructions and responsibilities. In carrying out these duties the Chief of Engineers recognized no authority in the War Department except the Secretary of War in person. On the other hand, the Adjutant General thought of his office as the Secretary of War's coordinating and supervisory agency on all administrative questions. Thus on the bureau chief level in the War Department there was the tendency to stress complete autonomy and to point to Congressional mandate as a charter of independence. In the mind of the Adjutant General there appeared to be developing the view that War Department business could be divided into military command business, to be transacted by the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff, and into administrative business, a convenient catch-all for everything else, to be transacted by the bureau chiefs under the super-

vision of the Adjutant General, who was to act as the Secretary of War's principal executive agent. This idea was bound to raise troublesome questions on what was the not too well defined channels to be followed. Did every bureau chief have the right to take up matters directly with the Secretary of War? Was the General Staff the Secretary of War's coordinating and supervisory staff as well as the Chief of Staff's advisors? With respect to coordination and supervision of the business of the several War Department bureaus, what was the role and the relationship of the Adjutant General vis-a-vis the War Department General Staff? Answers to these questions required an understanding of the philosophy of War Department and General Staff organization and administration which had not yet developed—or which at least had not gained general acceptance.

GENERAL LEONARD WOOD BECOMES CHIEF OF STAFF

Major General J. Franklin Bell's detail as Chief of Staff expired on April 22, 1910, and Major General Leonard Wood was appointed to succeed him. Wood had become the senior general of the line in June, 1909, and Taft selected him to be Chief of Staff because the President knew "that Roosevelt was anxious to have it done."⁵⁸ The appointment was announced in December and met with general approval. Wood was selected to be the special ambassador to represent the United States on the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the independence of the Argentine Republic, and for that reason he did not assume his duties as Chief of Staff until July 19, 1910. General Wood brought to Washington the prestige of many years of success as a military administrator and the intimate friendship of men in high political places. Because of their great confidence in him General Wood, as the new Chief of Staff, could afford to be a man of action and could take steps which others less sure of their political backing would have avoided.

Like General Bell, Leonard Wood arrived in Washington with very definite ideas about the War Department and as to what should be done. When he had been Commanding General of the Philippine Division and when the possibility of war with Japan had arisen as a result of the treatment of the Japanese in California, General Wood received instructions from the War Department concerning war plans that had caused him to write in his diary on September 5, 1907, the following indictment of the War Department: "There seems to be no intelligent cooperation on the part of the different staff departments, no definite knowledge in Washington as to what is to be done. Washington should know if it knows anything, that rations for five months are not on the islands. There is an apparent entire ignorance in the War Department concern-

ing Subic Bay. No topographical maps exist; waiting on them now. Place cannot be properly defended by 10,000 men. . . . The whole project is a foolish one. The torpedo company has arrived, but without any explosives of any kind and so it goes. . . . I believe, without exception, that conditions are worse now than before the Spanish American War."⁵⁹

Later, as the Commanding General of the Department of the East with headquarters at Governors Island, New York, General Wood had been close enough to the War Department to observe how things were going. He observed that "the War Department was still wallowing about, trying to adjust the relations of the new General Staff to a jealous and intrenched bureaucracy and not succeeding very well. A condition of very considerable confusion" (Wood wrote in his diary, May 24, 1909). "The departments [of the War Department] seem to be becoming more and more disorganized. Orders emanate from different sources, and there seems to be little control or centralization, and there is everywhere a desire on the part of the departments [of the War Department] to interfere in the purely military affairs of the territorial departments."⁶⁰

When Wood reached Washington he was met by General Ainsworth, with whom he stayed for a few days. Curiously enough, these two individuals who were soon to lock horns were old friends. "Ainsworth had been almost the first man Wood had met after he entered the Army, for he had been at Fort Whipple that June evening of 1885 when Wood had arrived there."⁶¹ What was more of a coincidence, both were doctors who had deserted the Medical Corps and who had won such success as administrators that they had become the two senior officers of the Army. Likewise both were New Englanders, Wood coming from Massachusetts and Ainsworth from Vermont. The quality that loomed large in the days that followed was the characteristic that neither would tolerate opposition. Forceful men that they were, once they had decided on a course of action that was right, they would tolerate no interference or delay. This trait so characteristic of able administrators seemed to make inevitable the undoing of one. Both believed that within their constellation there could be but one bright star; all others must be satellites if order and coordination were to prevail. Unfortunately, both were convinced that their particular constellation comprised the whole War Department.

At first, honeymoon conditions prevailed. Wood and Ainsworth dined together frequently and spent evenings together talking shop. "General Ainsworth for the first time since the General Staff had been established, came in personally to the Chief of Staff with the baskets of

papers."⁶² Wood reciprocated by going "to Ainsworth's office five and six times a day rather than risk hurting the Adjutant General's feelings by sending for him."⁶³ All of this sweet harmony was too artificial to last. Ainsworth had advised Wood as to what officers Wood should retain in the War Department. "Wood was careful to keep those whom Ainsworth particularly urged him to discard."⁶⁴ As early as August 8, 1910, Wood had written that "it is every day more apparent that we must have more coordinating influence."⁶⁵ In the process of instituting that coordinating influence, Wood infringed more and more on the former dignity and power of the Adjutant General's office until in February, 1911, Ainsworth lost his temper and in the explosion that followed forcefully told Wood that the Adjutant General's Department was not having "its proper influence in the [War] Department."⁶⁶ Wood's answer was that he proposed to treat Ainsworth's office "like any other bureau of the War Department, having no intention either to deprive Ainsworth of any privileges he had rightfully enjoyed or of turning over to him any of the duties of the chief of staff."⁶⁷ From then on the feud was bitter.

GENERAL WOOD'S IDEAS OF THE GENERAL STAFF'S FUNCTIONS

To a man of Wood's temperament the General Staff could have but one important function—that of coordination. Like most men of action, Wood knew what he wanted; he didn't need a General Staff to meditate as a thought organization. He wanted a will organization which would be useful as an instrument to carry out policies announced by him. Concerning this, General Hagood, who as a captain sat in General Wood's office and acted as a glorified private secretary, wrote the following:

"General Wood found the War Department General Staff organized into a lot of committees. These committees worked by making studies and then preparing memoranda setting forth all the facts in the case, all the arguments, pro and con, and finally winding up with a recommendation. After all the members of the committee had O.K.'d this, it was signed by the Chief of Staff and submitted to the Secretary of War for approval. A short time after General Wood arrived, I suggested that he select at random one hundred of these memoranda—a stack about twelve inches high, legal cap size—and predicted that none of them would bear upon any question relating to war and that no more than three of them would bear upon a question of any consequence in relation to either peace or war. He did so and found my prediction true.

General Wood reorganized the General Staff into three groups, the Mobile Army Division, the Coast Artillery Division, and the War College Division, each of which was headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff.

The memorandum system was broken up and *each assistant was authorized to take direct action upon the questions at issue* without recording the mental processes by which he arrived at his conclusion."⁶⁸

The names of the divisions indicated the character of their work. The War College Division was designed to be the chief planning agency and had charge of the collection and distribution of military information and the study and preparation of plans as well as the supervision and instruction of the students attending the War College. The Chief of Coast Artillery, ex officio member of the General Staff, headed the Coast Artillery Division. The Mobile Army Division was divided into the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Miscellaneous Sections. The Division of Military Affairs was transferred from the office of the Secretary of War to the office of the Chief of Staff by the Army Bill of March 3, 1911, and thus became another division of the General Staff. The Chief of Staff in his 1911 Report advanced as the principal feature of this change in organization the fact that the Assistant to the Chief of Staff "in charge of each of the several divisions can handle purely routine matters without bringing them to the personal attention of the Chief of Staff who is given much more time for the consideration of the larger questions of policy, organization, etc."

This change emphasized the role which the General Staff was expected to play—that of a coordinating element. At the same time it opened the door to meddling in administrative details and to acts which actually came within the operating rather than the staff sphere.

Wood had been preaching on the need for more adequate preparedness for years and felt so strongly on the matter that he had all the zeal of a religious crusader. The fact that his estimate of the situation was correct is beside the point in this analysis. What is important is the problem which he posed. What can or what should a responsible career administrative official do about matters of policy? To what extent can or should an administrative chief exert pressure on Congress by appealing to the people or by publicity or propaganda methods? All these and many other questions arose many times during Wood's regime.

Prior to the time General Wood arrived in Washington for duty as Chief of Staff, President Taft had advised Congress that he would shortly submit a special message on this subject. Considerable delay ensued, and before the report had been prepared the House of Representatives adopted a resolution⁶⁹ calling upon the Secretary of War to report on the question of national defense. Wood assumed office as Chief of Staff just in time to take charge of the preparation of the report. The McLachlan resolution was just the vehicle Wood wanted.

In fact, McLachlan was a great friend of the Army and offered the resolution "at the instigation of some infantry officers"⁷⁰ who were anxious to have the country learn the true state of our defense preparations.

Secretary of War Dickinson fully approved the War Department approach and the answer to the McLachlan Resolution revealed bluntly how deficient "the regular army was in numbers, in reserves of field guns, supplies, and projectiles for the coast artillery, in the organization of the quartermaster's department and the commissary. It lacked the various arms; it was not organized into brigades and divisions essential in case of war. The militia was in even worse condition, deficient in training and physical stamina, lacking arms and numbers and proper organization. 'It is apparent that we are almost wholly unprepared for war . . . that the things we most need will take longest to supply.' The Answer ended with an appendix of devastating statistics."⁷¹

General Wood did not rest with the mere presentation of a forceful answer. He personally took a copy of the Answer of the Resolution to the White House, giving it to the President's Secretary with the suggestion that the President read it before preparing his annual message to Congress. As the "envelope had been marked *Important* and as the Secretary to the President had assured Wood that it would reach the President's eye,"⁷² General Wood, hearing no reverberations three days later, "secured permission from the Secretary of War to have copies sent to the leading press associations, so that the newspapers would have the Answer to the Resolution in complete form for publication the day after it was presented to Congress, and would not be dependent merely on the brief excerpts that would be sent over the wires."⁷³ Unfortunately for Wood's plans Representative Tauney, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, heard about the contents of the Answer and immediately got in touch with the White House to see if the President had approved this "conspiracy on the part of the Army to create a flurry in Congress and secure larger appropriations"⁷³ by frightening the country. The upshot of the matter was that President Taft knew nothing about the contents of the Answer. On reading it he vetoed the whole project because it was politically inexpedient. The copies for the press were recalled and the whole affair was subsequently soft-pedalled after Taft had rebuked both Wood and the Secretary of War. Wood had believed that if the people of the country could only have known the true state of our national defense their reaction would have insured the adoption of the War Department's defense program. Where Wood had erred was in his failure to keep in tune with the times. The mid-term elections had gone against the White House and the high cost of living had made the people of the country conscious of their pocket-

books. One might allege that Wood saw the situation only in its narrowest sense and that he had failed to understand the political and economic setting which necessarily conditioned the problem.

One consequence of this attempt to focus nationwide attention on national defense was an increased antipathy to Wood in many political circles. When this opposition was added to that of the Congressional supporters of Ainsworth and the other bureau chiefs, the sum total presented an obstacle which was to hamper Wood throughout his stay at the War Department.

Squelched in his effort to obtain a large increase in appropriation, General Wood brought his tremendous energy into the task of making the allotted funds go farther. This brought on the search for economies and reforms that roused the ire of many bureau chiefs and which finally brought the conflict with Ainsworth to a head. In connection with the Efficiency Commission ordered by President Taft, the War Department convened a board of officers to examine War Department procedure with a view to effecting economies. Wood realized early in December, 1910, that no appreciable administrative economies could be made unless the Adjutant General's office could be invaded, for the "principle source of administrative difficulty (was) the immense amount of paper work and the cumbersome and heavy methods of making our returns."⁷⁴ But this presented immediate difficulties because the enmity between Wood and Ainsworth had developed to the point where all necessary relations between the two men were carried out by means of official letters although they occupied offices a few doors apart in the same building.

Wood believed that a more adequate national defense program could be achieved if the period of enlistment was reduced from three to two years and re-enlistments discouraged, but that a reserve of former soldiers should be established by paying these men a small sum for attending infrequent maneuver exercises over a period of seven or eight years. When General Wood appeared before the Military Affairs Committee of the House to recommend such a change, he found that General Ainsworth and others had countered by urging that the three-year enlistment period be raised to five years. Wood fumed "that the Army's worst enemies are within itself. The stupid fools who argue for perpetual re-enlistment; If their plan were carried out, it would give us a veteran army, whose losses were due only to death, retirement, or disability, and we would have no instructed reserve in the population." The Adjutant General's Department was in charge of recruiting and the recruit depots and was able to show that the per capita cost would be decreased if the enlistment period be raised to five years. Representa-

tive James Hay, Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs and an intimate friend of General Ainsworth, adopted the democratic process of circularizing four hundred officers of the Army. The replies indicated that from the officers then in command of troops the five-year enlistment was favored by a two to one margin.⁷⁵ With such a division of opinion existing in the Army and the War Department, Congress could not be expected to take any action.

General Wood was considering the broad long run view whereas the advocates of the five-year enlistment were swayed by the narrow short-time view. The longer the enlistment, the easier became the administrative task for the Adjutant General's Department. Likewise company, troop, and battery commanders could have better trained organizations, involving less work if their men stayed with them for five years instead of but two. In other words, the problem as to the proper length of an enlistment had different answers, depending upon the administrative level from which it was viewed. On the surface the action of Congressional Committees in hearing this welter of conflicting testimony was perhaps to be commended as a proper extension of the democratic process. But from an administrator's point of view, did not General Wood have the right to expect a loyalty that would not seek to thwart a carefully considered War Department recommendation? Congress rarely acted where there was departmental controversy over a measure. General Wood realized this and proceeded to bring the section of the Adjutant General's Department dealing with recruiting under closer personal scrutiny.

THE CLASH BETWEEN GENERALS WOOD AND AINSWORTH

On August 30, 1911, General Wood sent the Adjutant General a memorandum in which he listed the officers which the General Staff had selected as available for duty in command of recruit depots and requested the Adjutant General to indicate his wishes in the matter. General Ainsworth regarded this as an infringement of his private domain and asked that his reply be referred to the Secretary of War. The clash of views and the different philosophies presented warrant a complete investigation into the correspondence:

*(Memorandum relative to the assignment of officers
to command the five general recruit depots.)*

War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office.

Inasmuch as the subject of this memorandum is one of great importance, involving as it does grave questions of policy on the part of

the War Department, and the interests of the whole Army as affected by the general recruiting service, The Adjutant General deems it incumbent upon him to present the subject somewhat fully in this paper and to request, as he hereby does, that the paper be submitted to the Secretary of War himself for decision of the question at issue.

Following is a copy of the communication that raised the subject to which this memorandum relates:

'(Memorandum for The Adjutant General.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Washington, August 30, 1911.

It is necessary to provide for the assignment of some of the additional colonels at the present time on the Army Register.

The Secretary of War directs that Col. E. P. Andrus remain at present in command of the recruiting depot at Fort Logan, and that colonels from the accompanying list be selected to command Fort Slocum, Columbus Barracks, Jefferson Barracks, and Fort McDowell.

For the five recruiting depots it is desired that selections be made from the following list, so that two of the depots will be commanded by colonels of Cavalry, one by a colonel of Field Artillery, and two by colonels of Infantry. A list of the available colonels from which these selections are to be made:

Cavalry: Hatfield, Bishop, Day, Steever, Dodd, Hunter.

Field Artillery: Foster, Van Deusen.

Infantry: Pitcher, T. F. Davis, Booth, Paulding, Reynolds, Williams, Chubb, Wilson, Lassiter, Getty, Terrett, Jackson.

Col. William T. Wood, heretofore ordered home from the Philippines for duty as commanding officer, recruit depot, Jefferson Barracks, will be assigned to duty with a regiment, owing to his long detached service.

An early recommendation from The Adjutant General for these details is desired.

LEONARD WOOD,
Major General, Chief of Staff.'

It will be seen that in order to provide for some of the colonels that were rendered superfluous by the legislation that was embodied in the last Army appropriation bill in response to repeated and persistent appeals made to Congress for additional officers and for a rearrangement of rank it is now proposed to assign four colonels to command an equal number of general recruit depots, and that these four shall be selected

from a very restricted list of colonels who are said to be 'available.' Undoubtedly it is desired and certainly it will be prudent to afford some reasonable employment for officers of all grades who have become or may hereafter become supernumerary by this so assiduously sought legislation, but it is submitted that this purpose should not be accomplished by any measure that is likely to decrease the efficiency of the general recruiting service that is of such vital importance to the Army.

From the earliest times The Adjutant General's Office has been charged with the management of the general recruiting service and it doubtless will be admitted that The Adjutant General and his office are more fully advised as to the needs of that Service and the difficulties that beset it than others can possibly be. It may be said without fear of successful contradiction that there is no ordinary military duty, including that of service in the General Staff Corps, that is of greater importance than the command of one of the big depots at which recruits are received from many different stations, enlisted or rejected, examined, clothed, and otherwise prepared for service, instructed in accordance with a uniform method adopted after conference with and approved by depot commanders, the Inspector General, and the present Chief of Staff, again examined by medical officers and inspected by the depot commander, and finally, if found qualified, shipped to the organization in which they are to serve.

To insure the faithful and efficient discharge of the many and varied duties that are essential to the successful operation of a modern recruit depot, there is required on the part of the commander a combination of qualities of mind and heart that is not often found in one man either in military or civil life. He should be energetic, alert, ready to devote time and attention to the smallest as well as the largest details of the work under his charge, fond of that work, possessed of much self-control, patient, but firm, just, a good judge of men, sympathetic where sympathy may well be bestowed but a strict disciplinarian when occasion requires, and, last but not least, in person, bearing, and dress he should be a soldierly exemplar not only for the commissioned officers and enlisted men who form the permanent garrison of the depot, but also for the multitude of young soldiers who come under his command at the formative and most critical period of their Army service. It is no disparagement to the many excellent colonels in the line of the Army to say that but very few of them can be expected to measure up to such a standard, and that far fewer, if any, who even approximate to it are to be found on any such restricted list as that which has been offered or suggested by the Chief of Staff. It will not be easy to find the men best

fitted to command these depots even if the whole commissioned list of the Army is thrown open to selection, and it will be simply impossible if the choice is restricted, as is now proposed, to a few colonels for whom employment has not been found elsewhere or whom it is not desired to employ elsewhere.

The officers whom it is now proposed to remove from or to supersede in the command of depots are Col. Murray, at Columbus Barracks; Maj. Dugan, at Fort Slocum; and Maj. McGlachlin, at Fort McDowell. These officers have made their depots models of what recruit depots should be and have demonstrated that they possess in a high degree that rare combination of qualifications that marks the efficient and successful depot commander and administrator. To say nothing of the consideration that they have earned by their enthusiastic devotion to their work and the ability with which they have performed it, it is not believed to be in the interest of the public good to relieve or supersede them at the present time in the manner proposed or for the reason given for the proposal.

None of those depot commanders appears on the long list recently prepared of officers who have had an excessive amount of detached service, but, on the contrary, the official records show that all of them have had long service with troops.

Col. Murray has been about four years at Columbus Barracks, but he is an unassigned colonel, and to replace him by the detail of another officer of the same rank, whether assigned or unassigned, would not at all diminish the number of superfluous or unemployed colonels, so that some other reason for displacing him must be sought. It can not be urged as such a reason that he has had an excessive amount of detached service, for he has not. In his entire commissioned service of over 34 years he had been detached from his regiment considerably less than 10 years, but he has been with his regiment or in command of troops elsewhere for over 28 years. It may be well to compare this record of service with certain other similar records that are given elsewhere in this paper.

Maj. Dugan has been less than four years at Fort Slocum, and Maj. McGlachlin has only been about two years at Fort McDowell. After the splendid work that they have done in building up those depots as commanders of them it would be as unjust to them as it would be unnecessary to retain them in subordinate positions. In fairness to them they should be relieved, if officers senior to them in rank are to be assigned to those depots. But while such a procedure, if followed by the

assignment of colonels by two, it would increase by one the number of unassigned majors for whom employment would have to be sought.

Col. Murray and Maj. Dugan were so unfortunate as to be compelled not long ago to appear before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives for examination with regard to a bill that proposed to increase the enlistment period of the Army to five years. In response to questions addressed to them by the committee, they expressed views that were at variance with views subsequently expressed to the same committee by the Chief of Staff. Considerable publicity, for which Col. Murray and Maj. Dugan were in no wise responsible, was given by the press to this difference of opinion. And doubtless there are those who, not knowing or not believing that the Chief of Staff is too high-minded and conscientious to permit his official action to be influenced by such a matter, will be swift to conclude, if these two officers are relieved or superseded now, that the Chief of Staff is endeavoring to punish them because they gave testimony that may be regarded as damaging to his own, and that the solicitude now manifested in behalf of a few superfluous colonels, with none manifested in behalf of superfluous lieutenant colonels, is merely a pretext for a movement whose object is to annoy or humiliate certain officers connected with the recruiting service and to discredit the management of that service.

Additional ground for such a conclusion is to be found in a recent newspaper announcement, likely to be regarded as inspired, in which the proposed assignments of colonels to command recruit depots is coupled with a statement that a special effort is to be made to recruit regiments in the Philippines up to their authorized strength, thus suggesting that the vacancies in the ranks of those regiments are chargeable to the present management of the recruiting service, and suppressing the well-known fact that those vacancies are almost entirely due to the policy adopted without consulting The Adjutant General and since reported by the commanding general of the Maneuver Division to have been ill-advised, under which for many weeks all obtainable infantry recruits, many hundred in number, and all without any preliminary training whatever, were rushed to the Mexican border to fill certain regiments far beyond their normal strength, with the inevitable result that vacancies occurring in other regiments stationed in the Philippines and elsewhere could not then be filled, although in the ordinary course of events they soon will be filled now that the abnormal diversion of recruits before mentioned has ceased.

Of course, any such conclusion as that referred to here would be er-

roneous, but it is believed to be the part of wisdom not to give Congress, the public at large, or the Army any ground upon which to base it, at least at the present time.

* * *

It will be impossible to obtain the men best suited for the highly important duty of commanding the recruit depots if selection is to be restricted to any such limited list as that presented by the Chief of Staff, or even if the entire list of colonels is to be open to selection. And there is no good reason why selection should be limited to either of those lists. It is just as desirable to provide suitable employment for additional or detached lieutenant colonels as it is to provide places for additional or detached colonels. A general recruit depot affords a much more appropriate command for a lieutenant colonel than for a colonel, and suitable commanders are much more likely to be found among the younger men in the lower grade than among the older men in the higher grade.

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, The Adjutant General requests that the memorandum of the Chief of Staff of August 30, 1911, be reconsidered and recommends [that the four officers stay where they are and] that hereafter commanders of the general recruit depots be selected from among the colonels of the mobile army.

F. C. AINSWORTH,
The Adjutant General

To the Chief of Staff.
September 5, 1911.

(Memorandum for the Secretary of War.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Washington, September 8, 1911.

Subject: The attitude of The Adjutant General in the matter of assigning officers to recruit depots.

1. It is specifically provided in law that the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the Secretary of War, shall have supervision over The Adjutant General's Department and over all troops of the line and staff corps. This includes the recruiting service and recruit depots. The Adjutant General is a subordinate officer of the War Department, to whom, by orders and regulations, certain duties are assigned, among them the recruiting service. He is expected to perform these duties conscientiously and loyally in accordance with the policy and wishes of his superiors. For him to set up standards of his own and to insist upon working for them without regard to the policy and wishes of his superior is contrary to good order and military discipline. It was to

prevent this that, through the efforts of Mr. Root, Congress created the General Staff and made the office of the Chief of Staff the coordinating and supervisory bureau of the War Department.*

2. The memorandum of The Adjutant General is an arraignment and criticism of the action of his superiors, on three principal counts: first, certain legislation enacted at the last session of Congress; second, the length of detached service of certain officers now on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff; and, third, the failure of the Chief of Staff to consult him in the matter of sending recruits to the Maneuver Division and of relieving Col. Mann from recruiting duty. None of these have any connection with the question of the detail of colonels to command recruit depots, which was the only matter referred to The Adjutant General for remark.

3. The legislation referred to is the so-called additional or extra officers' bill and the provision for the readjustment of rank.

4. With reference to the first bill:

The Adjutant General states that the bill was enacted 'in response to repeated and persistent appeals made to Congress.' This is true. Legislation to provide extra officers for detached service has been agitated since the beginning of the Army.

Washington in 1780, President Adams in 1798, and John C. Calhoun (Secretary of War in 1820) addressed communications to Congress upon this subject. On February 13, 1837, and 72 years later, January 7, 1909, the House of Representatives passed resolutions calling upon the Secretary of War for information as to the number of officers on detached service.

*Secretary Root in his statement to the House Military Committee in the hearing on the bill (S 4300, 56th Cong.) which is now the law respecting the constitution of various staff departments, said:

'It is not in human nature that the men in each permanent staff corps should not regard their own work and their own powers as being of the greatest importance. They are all here in Washington; they are all in immediate contact with Senators, with Members of the House, with members of the Cabinet, and with the President. Year by year, little by little, a line here in this law and a paragraph there in that law, the power of these staff corps has been built up and the power of the line of the Army has been decreased until the evil of multiple command in our Army, taking away responsibility and power from the men in command of the geographical and tactical organizations, taking away power from them and therefore relieving them from responsibility, is producing a system which is not of the highest efficiency and is not such as we ought to have when we come to the test of war. And that will go on in years to come as it has gone on in the past, unless you take the step which seems to be fundamental, to lie at the bottom of all improvements in the efficiency of the organization—break up this separation between the staff corps here in Washington (who are the only ones heard by the Members of Congress) and the part of the Army on the frontier and in the Philippines and far away doing the work; break up the separation between them and we have but one interest coming to Congress, and that the interest of the Army as a whole and its general efficiency.'

'I believe this provision is fundamental and essential, not simply to improve the organization as it stands, but to prevent the constant tendency in the wrong direction continuing in years to come.'

The present agitation for extra officers began in 1904, when Mr. Root tried to secure legislation authorizing the employment of retired officers in certain kinds of duty and limiting the use of active officers on detached service. The extra officers bill in its final form was urged by Mr. Taft when he was Secretary of War. In this he was supported by President Roosevelt. Each Secretary of War in turn since Mr. Taft has urged the bill. It was enacted March 3, 1911, Congress reducing the number of extra officers from the 612 asked for to 200. In order to have a sufficient number of officers on duty with troops, and at the same time meet the proper demands made upon the War Department for the detail of officers at institutions of learning, for duty with the militia, etc., it will be necessary to have at least the 612 asked for.

5. With reference to the second bill (readjustment of rank):

This measure was recommended to Congress by the preceding Chief of Staff, Gen. Bell, in March, 1908, and by the Secretary of War, Mr. Taft. Subsequently the bill was not made a War Department measure, but an officer personally interested in the bill (Maj. W. C. Brown) was given permission to advocate it. The bill being referred to the War Department for report, Secretary Dickinson, upon my recommendation, returned it saying he had no objection to its passage, provided its benefits were limited to the active list.

6. The Adjutant General states that the enactment of the additional or extra officers bill rendered certain colonels "supernumerary" or superfluous. This is true, but not in the sense implied by The Adjutant General. The purpose of the bill was to provide extra or supernumerary officers who in time of peace would perform the detached service required of the Army by law and regulations and who, in time of war, would be available for service with Volunteers or with the Regular Establishment.

When the report was made to Congress in 1837 there were 183 officers detached. When Mr. Root complained of it in 1904 there were 423 detached. When the report was made to Congress in 1909 there were 734 detached. No better illustration can be given of the growth of the detached-service list than that the number of officers upon recruiting duty (under The Adjutant General) has increased from 58 active and 1 retired officer in 1904 to 119 active and 18 retired officers in 1910, although the strength of the Army fixed by Congress has remained practically the same.

7. The drain upon the line of the Army to furnish all of these details was very great, and yet in seeking relief it was essential that nothing should be done to further retard the already slow promotion to the upper grades of the Army. Presidents Roosevelt and Taft and Secre-

tarries Root, Taft, Wright, and Dickinson have urged upon Congress the enactment of a bill known as the elimination bill, the principal purpose of which is to accelerate promotion in the Army.

At the present time the Navy has, proportionately, twice as many officers in the higher grades as the Army; yet there continued to be a demand for younger officers in command rank, and there is now before Congress a bill, heartily indorsed by the President in a special message, the purpose of which is further to accelerate Navy promotion.

The Adjutant General himself in his memorandum complains that the colonels are too old as a class to form good material from which to select recruit-depot commanders.

8. In order not to retard promotion, it was provided that the 200 extra officers should be distributed in the several grades in the same proportion as was now provided by law for the whole Army. They were divided as follows: Eight colonels, nine lieutenant colonels, twenty-seven majors, seventy-nine captains, seventy-seven first lieutenants. It is true that there was not so great a demand for extra colonels and lieutenant colonels as there was for extra captains, but still there were in fact more officers of the grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel on detached service prior to the passage of the extra officers bill than were authorized by that bill. The only cause for an excess of colonels and lieutenant colonels is the provision for the readjustment of rank, and this measure, as is above indicated, was not a War Department measure. All of this we fully set forth in reports and in hearings upon the legislation. The fact that this procedure did not have the sympathy or support of The Adjutant General was well known both before and after the legislation was secured.

9. Assuming, however, that for the purpose of carrying out the plans of the President and the Secretary in this matter, it was necessary to find places for so-called extra or supernumerary colonels, what more appropriate duty could be found than the command of a large recruiting depot? The Adjutant General himself has selected two colonels. Why should he not select all colonels, when officers of that grade are available? Why should he not conform himself to the general policy of his superiors and to the restriction placed by them upon other bureau chiefs? The recruit depots are important commands in time of peace and entirely appropriate to the rank of colonel; in time of war they would be of still greater importance.

Heretofore the troops have had to stand the loss of their field officer to provide the recruit depots with commanding officers. Now, when Congress has specifically provided 200 extra officers for detached service, and among them 8 colonels, why should not 5 of these colonels be

assigned to these depots? In order, however, that The Adjutant General might not be limited to the list of unassigned colonels, all unassigned colonels who were considered to be in any way unfitted for service were eliminated from the list presented to him, and to the list were added a considerable number of the best colonels on the active list.

10. While it is admitted that qualifications required of an officer to command successfully a large recruit depot are those of an efficient officer, they are not greater than those required of a regimental commander, who is charged with one of the most important duties in the service, namely, the training and preparation of a regiment for war, whereas the duties of a commander of a recruit depot are largely limited to the preliminary training of recruits, and are not to be compared in importance with those of a regimental commander.

It is a commendable spirit in all bureau chiefs that they want to get the best men in the Army to perform their own particular work, and it is an excusable trait that they set themselves up as the judge of who these best men are. But it does not follow that each bureau chief should have an unlimited pick over the whole Army for his own purposes in total disregard of the interests of others.

11. Passing to the second question, namely, the excessive detached service of some of the officers on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff.

It is an unfortunate thing, yet a fact, that the tendency pointed out in the preceeding paragraph for bureau chiefs and general officers to pick over the Army in selecting their assistants has resulted in many of the best officers being constantly on detached service. There is nothing discreditable in this either to the officers themselves or to those who wish their services. The detached service list is a necessary and an unavoidable evil. It has always been recognized as an evil, and ever since the time of Washington and Adams, as above pointed out, efforts have been made to eradicate or reduce it. There is a constant conflict between regimental commanders on the one hand and those who control the detached service on the other. As bad as it is in time of peace, it is worse in time of war. Washington complained of it from the battlefield, and Gen. Upton in his work on military policy records instance of a second lieutenant, graduate of West Point, who was wanted by the State of Ohio during the Civil War to command a volunteer regiment as its colonel. The application was turned down by the War Department, because of the excessive number of officers on detached service.

Congress has once or twice attempted to investigate the matter. Many bills to regulate it have been introduced, and some have been supported

by the War Department. There was one pending when the last regular session of Congress closed.

12. The officers of the General Staff Corps are not selected by the Chief of Staff, but by a board of general officers, who are sworn to base their selection solely upon the records of efficiency established by the officers concerned. The fact that some of the officers so selected had already had "excessive detached service" is a matter over which the board has no control; nor would it be fair to the General Staff Corps or to the officers concerned if the previous good work of these officers, resulting in their assignments to important detached duty, should be used to discriminate against their selection for the General Staff Corps. Moreover, a General Staff detail takes precedence over all other classes of duty, and General Staff officers are selected without regard to the particular duty being performed at the date of selection. However, the General Staff Corps is the only staff corps which is protected by law in every grade from excessive detached service and against perpetuation in office. It is provided by law that no officer of whatever grade, including the Chief of Staff, shall serve more than four years continuously on the General Staff, and no such officer shall be redetailed without an intermission of two years. In the other staff corps this law is not applicable above the grade of major. Every officer now serving in the General Staff Corps has been properly selected in accordance with the law and the regulations to serve a tour of four years.

13. The principal objection to having officers on duty in the War Department who have been long separated from duty with troops is that such officers become hidebound, wholly unfamiliar with the needs of the Army, and regard the situation from the narrow standpoint of their own little sphere. There is no possible danger of this in the office of the Chief of Staff or among the officers of the General Staff, since such officers are selected from those serving on every class of duty and cannot possibly remain in office more than four years continuously. But in the case of the permanent officers of the Staff Corps it is different, especially so in the case of The Adjutant General. The present incumbent came to Washington in December, 1886, and for 18 years was engaged in carding and indexing the dead records of the Civil War, a work which was most thoroughly and efficiently done. In 1904 he became The Military Secretary, and in this capacity took up the work formerly performed by The Adjutant General of the Army. In 1907 his title was changed to The Adjutant General. During this entire period he has not been in direct contact with troops. I am reliably informed that he has never even visited one of the large recruit depots since they have been established. He is, in my opinion, wholly

unfamiliar, from the standpoint of the experience and knowledge which comes from service with troops, with the needs or requirements of the Army.

14. With reference to the third count, namely, the failure of the Chief of Staff to confer with him upon matters affecting the recruiting service.

It is true that he has not been consulted—that is, recently. Every bureau chief in the War Department is freely consulted upon every matter affecting his respective department except The Adjutant General. The reason that he has not been consulted is that he has made it impossible for the Chief of Staff to have any relations with him other than in writing. The last interview was of such a character as to render this course necessary unless severe disciplinary measures were to be resorted to. Since the establishment of the General Staff friction between The Adjutant General and the Chief of Staff has been almost constant.

Knowing the relations which had existed in the past between the Office of the Chief of Staff and the Office of The Adjutant General, I made every effort to go out of my way to concede to his views and to consult him upon every matter that could possibly be construed as coming within his province. I soon found that this was of no avail; that he was absolutely unyielding; and that it would be his way or no way with him. Under these circumstances, for the past several months such business as I have had to transact with The Adjutant General himself I have transacted in writing, often times to the embarrassment of this office and to the hindrance of the expeditious handling of public business.

15. In conclusion I would respectfully invite the attention of the Secretary of War to the character of this communication, which constitutes, in my opinion, an act of gross official insubordination and discourtesy, and shows a lack of that high character and soldierly spirit which should be the distinguishing qualities of any officer holding the important position of The Adjutant General.⁷⁶

Very respectfully,

LEONARD WOOD

Major General, Chief of Staff."

Secretary of War Stimson, who apparently had sought refuge from these warring spirits by going to Long Island, mildly remonstrated with the Adjutant General by sending him the following letter in which, although he sided with the Chief of Staff, he tried to let the irate Adjutant General down gently:

"Maj. Gen. F. C. Ainsworth,
The Adjutant General, U. S. Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

Dear Gen. Ainsworth: On the receipt of your letter of August 30 I directed that the case of Col. Wood's assignment to Jefferson be suspended until I could speak to the Chief of Staff personally on the subject, which I have since done. I have since directed the Chief of Staff to communicate with Col. Wood and find out what his own personal preferences were, and I shall be guided somewhat in making the assignment by that.

I find that Col. Wood had been assigned to a regiment in the Philippines only a year or less ago, and that he accepted the assignment with a good deal of personal satisfaction. In view of his record for efficiency, I am not surprised at your desire to get the benefit of such a good officer in the recruiting service. But on the other hand, I do not think that the usual rule that an officer should serve the full two years in the Philippines should have been departed from in this case, particularly in view of the officer's apparent eagerness to perform that service. What you say as to Col. Wood's deafness will also be given weight in the final decision.

I have also read your memorandum to the Chief of Staff, a copy of which you sent me with your letter of September 5. I have directed that the other assignments recommended by the Chief of Staff be carried out. I find that while there are a number of unassigned colonels in the line, there is an actual shortage of majors, and this seems to me a sufficient reason why majors should not remain assigned at the recruiting depots. I also find that the list of colonels submitted to you by the General Staff for selection to the recruiting service was twice as large as the usual number submitted by the other bureaus for similar nominations. Under all of these circumstances, while I appreciate your zeal and anxiety to make the recruiting service as efficient as possible, I do not deem it proper to change in these respects the proposal of the Chief of Staff.

I only wish to add that I greatly regret and reprobate certain passages of your memorandum and of the letter which you sent me. Nothing is gained by suspecting or intimating ulterior motives on the part of those with whom we have to act in association. In an organization as large and complex as the War Department it is impossible that every action taken shall seem the wisest possible to all the members of that department. Many orders must be given and steps taken which to some bureau or some individual seem ill advised and unfortunate. But in such cases and in all cases the President has a right to expect that all

of the officers of the department will act as a unit, with faith in each other's motives even if they differ as to judgments. In no other way can the morale of the Army or its organization be maintained for a moment.

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON"

Certainly this correspondence brought into the open a very pressing question. On controversial questions and even on staid administrative matters there was a very small area of agreement and a relatively large area of disagreement vouchsafed a healthy situation. Complete agreement could only have meant an organization sterile of ideas and uninterested in progress or one so completely dominated that no ideas were permitted to seep up from below. Obviously neither extreme would be healthy; complete regimentation from the top down would only be a shade worse than the disorganization resulting from the various subdivisions holding tenaciously to many discordant views. Secretary of War Stimson undoubtedly wished to retain the services of both Wood and Ainsworth and therefore handled the problem diplomatically. However, the sharpness of the clash between Ainsworth and Wood indicated that a definite solution was needed. Perhaps Secretary of War Stimson was willing to tolerate disagreement at any level below that of the Secretary of War. There was a strong presumption, however, that a more efficient War Department would emerge if the area of disagreement had been pushed further down the scalar chain of command.

THE MUSTER ROLL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN GENERALS WOOD AND AINSWORTH

In March, 1911, President Taft appointed a Commission on Efficiency and Economy under the chairmanship of Frederick A. Cleveland, an expert in public administration, to make a careful and detailed investigation of all governmental operations in order to discover ways of affecting economies and of promoting greater efficiency. William F. Willoughby and Frank J. Goodnow, both outstanding in the same field, were also members of the commission. As an outgrowth of this commission, a War Department Board on Business Methods was formed. The board consisted of Major General Ainsworth, The Adjutant General, President of the Board; Brigadier General E. A. Garlington, The Inspector General; Brigadier General W. W. Wotherspoon, President of the Army War College; and Mr. John C. Scofield, Chief Clerk of the War Department. With the board thus constituted there was opportunity for all the views of the diverse parts of the Army to be fo-

cused and discussed. The views of the General Staff and the War College would be submitted by General Wotherspoon. The Adjutant General and Inspector General transmitted the considered opinion of their bureaus. Mr. Scofield's long service and experience equipped him with expert knowledge of all ramifications of War Department activities. In general, the work of this War Department Board on Business Methods supplemented "the efforts which the General Staff and the different bureaus are constantly making."⁷⁷

At this particular time routine administrative reports required from all troop units had become particularly tedious. Particularly annoying was the muster roll, a report having many years of tradition behind it. When news of the drive to simplify administration became known, the War Department Board on Business Methods was deluged with bright ideas. Likewise, the General Staff was intrigued and devoted much attention to the subject. The report of the Board was of interest for it indicated a paradoxical situation. The special staff department evinced a strong prejudice that no better methods could be found than those in use and used all manner of legalistic arguments to prevent desirable change. They likewise were inclined to view as rank amateurs with no professional standing the General Staff officers on temporary detail. In some cases the attitude showed clearly that only the technical specialist's opinion was worthy of examination and that the specialist was often so wedded to the past as to be horrified at the thought of innovations. On the other hand, there was evinced a slight contempt on the part of the General Staff innovators who barged into the special fields in the course of their investigation and who made the easy assumption that a brief study would make them thoroughly conversant and competent to judge the efficacy of any phase of War Department activity. The significant parts of the report were as follows:

"War Department Board on Business Methods,
Washington, May 3, 1911

Subject: Paper work in the Army.

The board met, pursuant to the call of its president, at 3 p.m., April 22, 1911, and took up the consideration of a memorandum submitted by its subcommittee 'Relative to recommendations concerning paper work in the Army,' which memorandum is hereto attached as Appendix A, which consists of Memorandum No. I and Memorandum No. II, dated, respectively, March 25 and April 15, 1911.

The recommendations and suggestions concerning paper work in the Army covered in the memoranda referred to were made in a great

number of communications from the heads of bureaus of the War Department, department commanders, and officers of the Army in response to call for such suggestions by the War Department.

* * *

A careful examination of the various suggestions made by the bureaus, the department commanders, and officers of the Army, embodied in the appendix and considered in this report, seems to indicate that in a large majority of cases there would be neither an increase in the efficiency of the Army nor a reduction of paper work connected with administration if they were carried out, for a very large number of these suggestions would simply involve the transfer of paper work from places where it is now being done to other places, and in some cases would, whilst relieving officers of a task, necessitate the employment of additional civilian clerks. The suggestions made appear to be, to a degree, based upon insufficient knowledge, on the part of the persons making them, of the administrative details connected with the operation of the great departments and bureaus of the War Department. Some of them, indeed, indicate a lack of knowledge of existing laws, and others of the purposes of Congress in calling for and requiring certain reports to be rendered for its use. The board invites attention to the fact that with very few exceptions the officers making recommendations and suggestions for changes in reports or methods of conducting the paper work of the Army either give no reasons or very insufficient ones for the line of action they propose.

While the board believes that it has recommended in this report a considerable reduction in the paper work of the Army, without materially injuring administrative efficiency, it is of the opinion that it can not at this time, without injury to the efficient administration of the Army, proceed further in this direction or go to the extent in the reduction of paper work which appears to seem desirable to the officers making the suggestions upon which it has acted. One of the reasons for this conclusion, which may not have been apparent to them, is that by reason of the long-continued efforts of the War Department in this direction, extending over many years, very material reductions in the paper work of the Army have already been made. These reductions have been brought about as a result of studies undertaken by other boards convened previous to the creation of this board, and as the results of constant efforts to reduce clerical work by the several chiefs of the bureaus of the War Department, who are charged with the maintenance of a system of records which, whilst being kept in accord-

ance with the law would be suitable for any conditions and available for quick and ready reference.

F. C. AINSWORTH,
Major General, United States Army, President,
The Adjutant General of the Army.

E. A. GARLINGTON,
Brigadier General, United States Army,
The Inspector General, Member.

W. W. WOTHERSPOON,
Brigadier General, United States Army, Member

JOHN C. SCOFIELD,
Assistant and Chief Clerk, War Department, Member

(Memorandum No. 1.—Relative to recommendations concerning paper work in the Army.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

It is to be observed that the recommendations to which this memorandum relate are, in general, for an abbreviated or informal method of correspondence with a minimum record thereof and for a reduction in the number of returns, rolls, and reports now required. The officers making these recommendations naturally deal with their own point of view, especial weight being given to the consideration of personal convenience. But little or no consideration is given by them to the needs of the War Department, and, in fact, such needs probably are not known or are only imperfectly understood by the majority of officers.

It should also be observed that any bureau of the War Department that is charged by law or regulations with the obtaining and keeping of certain information, and that alone knows just what demands are likely to be made upon it from all sources for such information, is the best judge, and the only competent judge, of the form in which and the extent in which such information should be furnished to it. Therefore it may be fairly stated as a general principle that the judgment of a chief of bureau as to the necessity for any particular report or return or for any particular item of information required to be embodied therein, should have much greater weight than the views of officers who have little or no knowledge of the purposes for which the reports, returns, or information in question are used in the War Department.

It is proper to remark that, with a view to reducing the paper work of the Army to the lowest possible limit that is consistent with efficiency and accuracy, the Adjutant General's Office has been engaged for the past seven years upon a continuous and systematic study of the blank forms issued by it to the Army and of the reports and returns received

by it from the Army. Careful consideration has been given to all suggestions of change from whatever source received, and it has been the uniform practice not to order a new supply of any form without first ascertaining whether there is reason to believe that the form can be amended in any way with benefit to the service. As a result of all this many radical changes in forms have been made, with a view to convenience and economy of time and labor on the part of those using them. It will be readily understood therefore that almost all the changes that are now recommended and that are the basis of this memorandum have heretofore received full consideration and that but very few of the recommendations now under consideration present anything that combines the three all-important elements of practicability, utility, and safety. It is needless to say that any proposed measure that lacks any one of those elements is not a measure that should be adopted in the public service.

* * *

Returns, muster rolls, and pay rolls:

(41) Recommendations: That some or all of the present returns, muster rolls, and pay rolls be abolished, consolidated, curtailed, rendered at less frequent intervals, or changed in form. (A.G.O. 1746488; 1741192; 1739762; 1735753; 1746995; 1739645; 1743543-B; 1735849; 1743543; 1746940; 1740815; 1746995; 1738794; 1746488; 1732283; 1749060; 1747817; 1740740; 1745770).

All these recommendations are disapproved, with the few relatively unimportant exceptions hereinafter noted. Almost all of them show, on the part of those making them, a deplorable ignorance of or indifference to the requirements of law with regard to the rendition of these returns and rolls and the purpose for which they are rendered. Such ill-considered and impracticable recommendations afford convincing proof of the futility of calling upon officers of the Army generally for an expression of their views with regard to the paper work that they are required to perform. The files of this office are full of similar responses to similar calls previously made, and it is safe to say that very few of those responses were ever of any value to the Department in its repeated investigations of the perennially recurring question of paper work in the Army.

The return in its various forms is one of the most ancient as well as most important of all military papers. . . . No other form of report ever has taken or ever can take, the place of the return in this respect.

The muster roll is primarily and chiefly the historical record of the individual soldier, giving once in two months a detailed account of the service of that soldier during the period covered by the roll. It is the

chief source upon which the department must rely in order to make the numberless demands that are made upon it for information. . . .

The pay roll is a financial and not a military record. Its form and substance are subject by law to determination by the Comptroller of the Treasury, and its destination is the office of the Auditor for the War Department, there to be filed as a voucher to a paymaster's account. Pay rolls never reach The Adjutant General's Office, and as compared with the muster rolls they are relatively valueless as sources of information as to the military status and service of present or former soldiers. For these reasons, and especially because the form and substance of the pay roll are not subject to the control of the War Department, no further consideration need be given to that roll in connection with the subject of this memorandum.

* * *

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, it is evident that no serious consideration should be given to the recommendations and suggestions that have been made with a view to abolishing, curtailing, or consolidating returns or muster rolls, in whole or in part. . . .

With regard to the frequency with which these reports shall be tendered, it is sufficient to say that long experience has demonstrated conclusively that, in order to serve even reasonably well the purpose for which they are intended, the returns must be rendered at periods of not more than a month and the rolls at periods of not more than two months. It goes without saying that those who must make use of the information that is furnished by them should have that information as of the latest practicable date. . . . The injury that the public service would suffer through any additional delay in rendering these reports would nowise be compensated for by the relatively trifling amount of labor that those who prepare and render the reports would escape.⁷⁸

F. C. AINSWORTH,
The Adjutant General.

March 25, 1911."

General Wood, persistent and strong character that he was, could not very well let the matter drop. The issue was considerably larger than whether or not an Army administrative form was obsolete. Had the Chief of Staff wished to overlook what might have been labelled as an idiosyncrasy peculiar to Ainsworth, the question of the relative roles and position of the Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General would rise again unless the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff wished to retreat and admit the independent status of bureau chiefs and the dominant position of the Adjutant General. In the controversy over

the muster roll General Wood, apparently, was convinced that he had a good test case. Captain James A. Moss, who was to become well known as an authority on Army paper work, had submitted a proposal in which a descriptive list was to take the place of the time honored muster roll. The General Staff approved it⁷⁹ and General Wood sent the proposal to the Adjutant General for his approval. In a memorandum dated December 15, 1911, the Chief of Staff informed the Adjutant General that "The Secretary of War directs that you submit for the consideration of this office your opinion concerning the following proposition to abolish the present muster roll and to adopt as a part of this plan the descriptive list herewith. Should any feature or features of the proposition be, in your opinion, inadvisable or impracticable, a statement will be given in every case showing in detail wherein the matter is considered inadvisable or impracticable.

"Proposition.

"It is proposed to abolish the muster roll placing the information now contained on that roll on the descriptive list and company return. At the same time the descriptive list will be so modified as to give a complete military record of the soldier. . . ."⁸⁰

The memorandum went on to enumerate the purpose of the muster roll, some of the advantages of the proposed plan, and what would happen in case a Descriptive List was lost. The form of the memorandum reflected the procedure used by the General Staff in that it stated a proposition and then went on to analyze it much in the same way that a geometric theorem would be stated and proved.

The memorandum remained unanswered and on January 8, 1912, the Chief of Staff again sent a written message stating that the Secretary of War directed an early reply to the request of December 15, 1911. Still no reply was forthcoming and on January 31, 1912, another letter was sent directing a reply "with the least practicable delay"⁸¹ and stating "that the matter has been under consideration for a long time, and final action (was) being delayed solely with a view to receiving your reply."⁸²

GENERAL AINSWORTH ATTACKS THE GENERAL STAFF IDEA

Finally, on February 3, 1912, Ainsworth's reply was submitted. It was a classic for although it exceeded the bounds of propriety, it impugned in forceful language the whole theory of a *general* planning agency being competent to render judgment in the field of the technician specialist. The memorandum was as follows:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

"In the accompanying memorandum of the Chief of Staff, dated December 15, 1911, The Adjutant General is called upon, first, for his

opinion concerning a proposal to abolish the present muster roll and 'to adopt as part of this plan the descriptive list herewith'; and, second, to furnish a statement showing in detail wherein he considers any feature or features of the proposed plan to be inadvisable or impracticable.

In compliance with the first part of this call, The Adjutant General expresses the opinion that the entire plan is both impracticable and inadvisable, and that the formulation of it is a forcible illustration of the un wisdom of intrusting the preparation or amendment of the forms of Army reports to those who have no practical knowledge of the uses to which those reports are to be put.

In this connection it is deemed proper to remark that it is understood, perhaps incorrectly, that the plan now under consideration, was formulated by two relatively young officers, neither of whom has any practical knowledge of the purposes for which muster rolls are used in the War Department. One of these officers, out of a total commissioned service of 14 years and 8 months, has served but 2 years with the regiments to which he had belonged, and but 1 year and 1 month in command of a troop therein. The other, out of a total commissioned service of 17 years and 8 months, has served 7 years and 9 months with the regiments to which he has belonged, and but 1 year and 2 months in command of a company therein, exercising that command for only 4 months as a captain, 8 months as a first lieutenant, and 2 months as a second lieutenant. Inasmuch as the total service of these officers as company commanders only amounts to about a year for each of them, their ability to deal with the subject in question, even on the company commander's side of it, is by no means apparent.

Neither of these officers, nor any other officer in or out of the General Staff, no matter how long he may have been in service, is qualified to prepare forms of any kind for use in the Adjutant General's Office, unless, through actual service in that office, he has acquired a practical knowledge of the manner in which and the purpose for which the information recorded on these forms is used.

It is a self-evident proposition that any bureau of the War Department that is charged by law or regulations with the obtaining and keeping of certain information, and that alone knows just what demands are likely to be made upon it from all sources for such information, is the best judge, and the only competent judge, of the form in which and the extent to which such information should be furnished to it. Therefore, it may be fairly stated as a general principle necessity for any particular report or return, or for any particular item of information required to be embodied thereon, should have much greater weight than the views of

officers who have little or no knowledge of the purpose for which the reports, returns, or information in question are used in the War Department.

The muster roll is one of the most ancient and most important of our military reports. In nearly its present form it was in use in the American colonies long before their separation from Great Britain. It has stood the test of practical use for more than 150 years, both in peace and war, and on its pages, preserved in the archives of this office, is recorded the history of the American soldier from 1775 to the present time.

Thousands of millions of dollars have been disbursed, and more than \$150,000,000 are now being disbursed annually for pensions alone, and almost all of that enormous expenditure has depended, and much of it still depends, primarily upon the showing of the muster rolls as to military service and military status, because upon that showing depends every other question of title under the pension laws, regardless of whether the claims be based upon wounds, injuries, disease, age, or any other ground. And upon this showing of the muster rolls many other millions have been disbursed, and are still to be disbursed for back pay, bounty, and other allowances, to say nothing of the claims of soldiers, their widows, and orphans, under local and other laws conferring rights, privileges, and benefits upon them on account of honorable military service.

The experience of much more than a century of both peace and war has demonstrated conclusively that, with but a few exceptions, all of the items of information that are now recorded on muster rolls that are forwarded to the War Department at frequent intervals, there to be examined, corrected, and preserved, are indispensable in the conduct of the current business of the department and are absolutely essential to the future protection of the interests of the Government and of a myriad of claimants against it. And now it is lightly proposed to abolish this time-honored, time-tried, and invaluable record, examined and corrected as each part of it is received in the War Department and all of it preserved there in safety, and to substitute for it a curtailed form of individual record that shall not reach the department until after the soldier is separated from the service, and that shall not be subjected to any expert scrutiny until it is impossible to discover or correct serious errors or omissions, and that in many cases in time of peace, and in multitude of cases in time of war, must inevitably be lost or destroyed before reaching the department, thus leaving a void in the military histories of the soldiers concerned, no part of which can be filled without the expenditure of much time and labor, and much of which can never be filled at all.

In compliance with the second part of the accompanying call, the fol-

lowing statement is submitted, although it is recognized that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to formulate any statement that will carry conviction to anyone who is so unmindful of consequences, or so uninformed as to the needs of the Government and the public with regard to the matter in question, as seriously to propose to abolish one of the most important, if not the most important, of all the records of the War Department. However, the statement is submitted in the confident expectation that when other, if not wiser, counsels shall prevail, and after experience with the proposed plan or any similar plan shall have shown the inevitable evil effects thereof, this statement will receive the consideration that may not be given to it now.

The principal reasons for regarding the proposed plan as inadvisable and impracticable are as follows:

The proposed plan is plainly unlawful.

The 12th Article of War . . . requires the rendition of muster rolls . . .

* * *

It is proposed in the accompanying memorandum of the Chief of Staff to evade this requirement of law by calling the pay rolls of June 30 and December 31 'muster and pay rolls,' entering thereon the data required by article 12, yet maintaining the monthly ceremony of muster. But the adoption of this proposal could hardly fail to be regarded generally as a mere subterfuge of a kind that would be scorned by honorable men in any of the relations of private life, and that would be most discreditable to a great department of the Government in its management of the affairs of the Nation.

. . . The adoption of the plan proposed in the accompanying memorandum, aside from being liable to criticism as being an indefensible and discreditable subterfuge, would be a plain violation of both the letter and the spirit of the law.

It ought to go without saying that The Adjutant General's Office should be constantly in possession of the latest obtainable information as to the whereabouts and status of every officer and enlisted man of the Army, and that this information should be in the shape of direct, positive, and affirmative reports, leaving nothing to be assumed, or inferred from the mere absence of such reports.

Under the proposed plan of abolishing the muster rolls, keeping the record of soldiers on individual descriptive lists that shall be forwarded to the department only at the expiration of the soldier's service, and requiring the monthly returns to show only transfers, deaths, and desertions by name, The Adjutant General's Office would have, except in case of transfer, death, and desertion, no positive information whatever with regard to any soldier in the Army between the dates of his enlist-

ment and assignment to an organization and the date of his separation from the service, a period which in the cases of men serving their full terms in an organization, as the majority of them do, would now be a period of three years. During all this time the department would be in entire ignorance as to the status and conduct of the soldier, and would not even know whether he was a private or a sergeant major.

In responding to requests and appeals from official and private sources, averaging more than 100 a day, relative to the whereabouts, present status, transfer, or discharge of soldiers, and to many other kindred subjects relating to them, this office would be unable, for periods ranging from one month to three years, to give any information whatever with regard to the soldiers concerned beyond the mere fact that they had been assigned to certain organizations at certain more or less remote dates. . . .

The department owes a duty to the public in this very important matter of proper inquiries, and if it can not discharge that duty with reasonable promptness it will subject itself to well-merited reproach. . . .

The Adjutant General's Office is frequently called upon to furnish, under paragraph 124, Army Regulations, complete descriptive lists of surrendered or apprehended deserters from organizations serving in Alaska or beyond the continental limits of the United States; also to furnish at the earliest practicable moment descriptive lists of soldiers separated by transfer or otherwise, from organizations at remote stations in the United States or beyond the continental limits thereof. . . .

* * *

The proponents of the truly remarkable plan under discussion have betrayed a lamentable lack of knowledge of the nature and uses of our so-called descriptive list, of which it is proposed that there shall be made but a single copy, which shall follow the soldier throughout his entire enlistment. If they had had, or had profited by, even a little service as company commanders in recent years, they would have learned that our descriptive list is primarily an organization record and the only approach to a complete record of its men that any organization has.

* * *

The plan of committing the entire military record of a soldier to a single document that is likely to pass through many hands, and is expected to land in The Adjutant General's Office after no one in the Army has any further use for it, contemplates in this respect putting all our eggs in one basket beyond recovery. It is noted that in the accompanying memorandum it is stated that losses of this kind in the Navy and Marine Corps are negligible; but even admitting the accuracy of that statement, concerning which further inquiry might well be made if

it were worth while to make it, it is sufficient to say that the experience of The Adjutant General's Office with a similar record is entirely to the contrary. The descriptive and assignment cards of soldiers, which are only required to pass from places of enlistment to the organizations to which the men are to be assigned, and thence to The Adjutant General's Office, are very frequently lost in transit, so that a great many of them fail to reach their final destination.

One does not need prophetic vision to see clearly that with armies in the field in time of war the loss of descriptive lists must inevitably be great, and that in the rush of business incident to such periods these losses might not, and probably would not, be discovered until long after their occurrence. In the meantime the records of the War Department would be incomplete. The robust assertion in the accompanying memorandum that 'should a descriptive list be lost a new one could easily be prepared,' is not quite as convincing as assurance of Holy Writ. On the contrary, it is certain that even the few relatively unimportant items of record that the memorandum specifies as obtainable from one source or another, could only be obtained by the expenditure of an amount of time and labor that would be poorly repaid by the meager data that could be collected.

The cool assurance with which it is asserted in the memorandum that 'it would make no difference' if other data could not be obtained, 'such as a complete record of extra duty, special duty, detached service, etc.,' evidences such ignorance of the vital bearing that many of the data so lightly spoken of, but which, if lost, could never be supplied from any record source, have upon a multitude of pension and other claims that it would be a loss of time and effort to discuss the subject further here.

There are other grave objections to the proposed plan that might be stated, but if those that have been pointed out are not sufficient to carry to the minds of those with whom the decision of this matter now rests the conviction not only that the proposed plan is both illegal and impracticable, but that it is most inadvisable ever to intrust to incompetent amateurs the management of business that is of nation-wide importance, and that can only be managed prudently, safely, and efficiently by those whom long service has made experts with regard to it, then it will be worse than useless to present further facts or arguments here.

F. C. AINSWORTH,
The Adjutant General."⁸³

GENERAL WOOD WINS THE CONTROVERSY

This memorandum, although dated February 3, did not reach the Chief of Staff until February 9, 1912. When General Wood read the

report wherein the proposed plan was labelled as "a subterfuge" such as "would be scorned by honorable men" and which showed the folly of entrusting to "incompetent amateurs" the management of important business, he naturally felt that a show-down was of paramount importance. The matter was laid before Secretary of War Stimson and also President Taft. They decided that disciplinary action would be taken and on February 14, 1912, the Secretary of War wrote General Ainsworth a long letter itemizing the many similar instances which had occurred in the past and which concluded:

"Your present action, which, because of the prior warning received and the length of time consumed in the preparation of your present memorandum, must be deemed deliberate, is therefore but the culmination of a series of outbreaks evidencing such intolerance of subordination and such readiness to impugn either the motives or the intelligence of those with whom it is your duty to work in association as, if uncorrected, to destroy your usefulness in your present office. It is impossible that the business of the Government shall be properly conducted if official communications are made the occasion for contemptuous comments and aspersions upon fellow officers and for insolence to superiors. Under such circumstances self-respect would forbid that cooperation which is necessary to effective service. This is especially true in the military service, where due subordination and respect to superior officers is essential to the maintenance of discipline.

As I am myself apparently included in your latest attack, I have preferred to deem myself disqualified from judicial action thereon and have laid the matter before the President as Commander in Chief. He directs that, pending consideration of the disciplinary measures to be taken, you be forthwith relieved from duty in your present office. You will therefore upon receipt of this order stand relieved of your duties in the office of The Adjutant General and will await further orders in this city. Col. H. P. McCain, adjutant general, has been directed to assume the duties surrendered by you.

Very respectfully,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War."⁸⁴

The incident stirred not only the War Department but all of Washington. "The day following Ainsworth's suspension the President was called from a meeting of the Cabinet by Senator Warren on the plea of most urgent business. He returned chuckling. Warren had brought Ainsworth's request to be allowed to retire from the Army . . . Taft approved his request."⁸⁵

The immediate outcome was of course a victory for General Wood, but its consequences were such as to make it a Pyrrhic victory in every sense. The House of Representatives by House Resolution 415 of February 23, 1912, requested the Secretary of War to submit all the papers on General Ainsworth's case. This brought up a very interesting problem. The Secretary of War submitted the papers although he "denied the right of the House of Representatives to call for the papers"—on the ground that they were related "to a matter of military discipline and executive action which, by the Constitution, [was] confided exclusively to the President" and that the President himself had directed him to assert this principle. Chairman Hay, in presenting the majority report of Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, stated: "A careful examination of the Constitution has failed to disclose any authority vested in the President which would justify him in withholding from the Congress, or either House thereof, information of a public nature regarding his acts as Commander in Chief of the Army. . . . Certainly, in time of peace, the acts of the President with reference to discipline of the Army are a matter which Congress has the right to inquire about, and to demand public papers with reference thereto. . . . *The Secretary of War, in the opinion of your committee, has a very erroneous idea as to what his relation is to the Congress of the United States. His office is not a constitutional one. He derives no power from the Executive. He is the creature of the Congress of the United States, and as such is amenable to it. He has no power which the Congress does not confer.*"⁸⁶

The majority report then stated that it had "gone very fully into an examination"⁸⁷ of the facts in the case and that in the opinion of the majority of the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives General Ainsworth had "been guilty of no act which justified the letter of The Secretary of War and the action which resulted in the country's loss of his activities when they were most needed."⁸⁸ The minority submitted a report in which the action of the Secretary of War was upheld."⁸⁹ This action on the part of Congress raised a very important question. In our system of government is it not inevitable that Congress, either through individual members or through committees, will have lines of control which extend down through the administrative framework and which short-circuit the theoretical scalar chain? To what extent can administrative agencies be insulated from Congressional interference—or are Congressional contacts directly between administrative subdivisions and appropriate Congressional committees desirable? At any rate, the existence of such contacts complicates the organizational picture for it threatens to make each department hydra-headed with the

President and Congress very much in the same position as the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the Army were prior to 1903.

In an effort to bridge this gap the Secretary of War renewed his recommendation "for the establishment of a Council of National Defense, containing representatives from both the War and Navy Departments, the Army and Navy, and from both Houses of Congress."⁹⁰ Mr. Stimson added that "such a bill has been favorably reported to Congress and its passage repeatedly urged by both departments,"⁹¹ and concluded with the statement that passage of such a bill would "tend to bring the Executive and the Legislature into more harmonious and intelligent relations on the vital and technical questions which underlie our national defense, and that the recommendations of such a council would thus greatly facilitate the work of Congress on this subject."⁹² Unfortunately, the Council of National Defense was not called into being until the World War period and even then with a quite different organizational base.

The dispute between Wood and Ainsworth was basically a conflict in ideology on how the War Department should be managed. The Adjutant General believed strongly that his department should exercise what might be called the managerial function. His philosophy probably ran along the lines that inasmuch as the Adjutant General handled all correspondence coming into and going out of the War Department, it was inconceivable that the Adjutant General's Department should not take whatever steps were necessary to insure that orders and actions conformed to law, Army regulations, and policy. Ainsworth undoubtedly deeply resented any idea that officers of the Adjutant General's Department were to be unthinking automatons who published what they were directed to with no concern over the contents. It was proper that the Adjutant General's Department apply all possible intelligence to make sure that newly published regulations did not conflict with those already in existence and that orders were in conformity with general policy. Any Adjutant General would undoubtedly argue that this coordinating and supervisory task had to be done by someone and that his department was the only one competent to do it. The War Department General Staff probably insisted that while the Adjutant General was correct in scrutinizing and even in questioning the validity of business handled, he did not have the right to determine these questions, and that when the correctness of an order or regulation was in doubt the issue should be resolved by the War Department General Staff and not by the Adjutant General. Ainsworth and others probably believed that while this might have been all right in theory, such a procedure was not workable in practice. The crux of the problem, of course, was where to draw the line. Consult the General Staff on every detail and you get it deeply involved

in details. Leave the General Staff to plan undisturbed in its ivory tower and it soon loses that intimate knowledge of the problem that is necessary to insure expertness. Ainsworth did not believe in asking others to solve what he regarded as his business. Consequently, when the War Department General Staff did become interested in specific details, he contended that it did not possess sufficient expert knowledge to qualify it to act.

Here again the issue between the specialist and the generalist was raised. Ainsworth contended that an officer must have served several years with the Adjutant General's Department before his opinion on continuance of the muster roll was worth anything. The War Department General Staff view was that officers of wide experience and high ability could come in and study a situation or a procedure and say to the technician, "This needs to be improved; it is out of date." It was too early to expect in Ainsworth's time this appreciation of the relative roles of the War Department General Staff generalist and the War Department Bureau technical specialist. It is evident that both must appreciate the contribution each can make.

The idea of the War Department General Staff in a supervisory role impinged on the Adjutant General's concept that he was the administrator of the War Department. Command—administer—manage—these are terms which have always been sources of controversy and confusion in the War Department. In theory, the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, with the assistance of the War Department General Staff, exercised the command function; the Adjutant General carried out the administrative function—which supplemented and added the necessary details and refinements to the command phase. Some in the Army have argued that you can and must separate command and administration; others contend that if you do, then the administrator commands. Managerial function is a term which the Army has not used but which in its usual application includes both the command and the administrative functions.

WAR DEPARTMENT CHANGES—1911-1912

The Secretary of War recommended to Congress a number of measures which would alter the organizational structure of the Army. In 1911 a bill was introduced which provided for the consolidation of the Quartermaster, Subsistence and Pay Department. In commenting on this proposal the Secretary of War stated that "such a consolidation would result in the saving of half a million dollars annually in actual expenditures, without taking into account the very much greater saving due to increased efficiency."⁹³ The Secretary of War hastened to add "that

under the former organization of the War Department, with its bureaus there was much fear lest the creation of such a great department might give undue influence and power to a single permanent staff officer,"⁹⁴ but that "the subsequent creation of the General Staff and the introduction into the bureaus of the War Department of the detail system minimizes, if it does not entirely eliminate, that danger."⁹⁵ Congress accepted this recommendation, and the Army Appropriation Act, passed on August 24, 1912, provided for the consolidation of the office establishments of the Quartermaster General, the Commissary General, and the Paymaster General of the Army into one bureau of the War Department, to be known as the Quartermaster Corps, and the consolidation of the Quartermaster's, the Subsistence, and Pay Departments of the Army into a single department, to be known as the Quartermaster Corps of the Army.

The forward mindedness of General Wood together with the disturbances on the Mexican border now caused much attention to and study on the problem of Army organization. It will be recalled that during General Bell's tenure as Chief of Staff the newly adopted territorial division organization was abandoned and the departments were again constituted as the organizational layer immediately below the War Department. General Bell had made efforts to improve the organization below the department level. During the development of the West, the Army had been scattered in many small posts much like constabulary. An organizational gap had been left between these scattered posts and the territorial Departments. For purely administrative purposes a number of posts could be grouped together into a geographical area designated as a Department. But there also existed a tactical organization which too often was nebulous. Each post was garrisoned by a tactical unit, such as a company, battalion, or regiment of Infantry, a troop, squadron, or regiment of Cavalry, or a battery, battalion, or regiment of Field Artillery. A regiment whose battalions or smaller units were scattered at several posts presented a problem. The regimental commander was in theory responsible for the training and discipline of his whole regiment, yet in practice he had little or no control over those units of his regiment not stationed on the post which he commanded. In the old Army and during the period when the special staff bureaus were supreme, the only organization that was important was that formed of the Army posts, the territorial Departments, and the War Department. General Bell placed more emphasis on the military organization and attempted to organize the Army tactically. Brigade organization with brigade commanders was prescribed but little could be done in actually forming these higher units because of the way the Army was scattered and because of the lack of funds with which to have large temporary concentrations.

General Wood's interest in a mobile army and a complete integration of all tactical units into their proper place was apparent almost as soon as he became Chief of Staff. Shortly thereafter he created the Mobile Army Division of the General Staff which was charged with the task of working out the necessary plans to perfect a tactical organization.

On May 19, 1911, the War Department directed that effective July 1, 1911, the territorial Divisions be reestablished. The order was as follows:

"GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 64.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, May 19, 1911.

By direction of the President, the following order is issued to take effect July 1, 1911:

For military purposes the territory of the United States and its possessions are organized into geographical divisions and departments as follows, the arrangement heretofore existing being hereby discontinued:

(a) Divisions.

1. The Eastern Division to embrace
 The Department of the East.
 The Department of the Gulf.
 Headquarters at Governors Island, N. Y.
2. The Central Division to embrace
 The Department of the Lakes.
 The Department of the Missouri.
 The Department of Texas.
 The military reservations of Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.; Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; and Fort Riley, Kans.
 Headquarters at Chicago, Ill.
3. The Western Division to embrace
 The Department of California.
 The Department of the Columbia.
 Headquarters at San Francisco, Cal.
4. The Philippines Division to embrace
 The Department of Luzon.
 The Department of the Visayas.
 The Department of Mindanao.
 Headquarters at Manila, P. I.

(b) Departments.

1. The Department of the East to embrace the New England States, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, the Island of Porto Rico and

the islands and keys adjacent thereto. Headquarters at Fort Totten, N. Y.

2. The Department of the Gulf to embrace the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and the Artillery Districts of New Orleans and Galveston. Headquarters at Atlanta, Ga.

3. The Department of the Lakes to embrace the States of Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota. Headquarters at St. Paul, Minn.

4. The Department of the Missouri to embrace the States of Iowa, Missouri, Kansas (except that part included in the military reservations of Fort Leavenworth and Fort Riley), Nebraska, South Dakota, Wyoming, (except that part included in the Yellowstone National Park and the military reservation of Fort D. A. Russell), and Colorado. Headquarters at Omaha, Nebr.

5. The Department of Texas to embrace the States of Texas (except that part included in the Artillery District of Galveston), Louisiana (except that part included in the Artillery District of New Orleans), Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico Territory. Headquarters at San Antonio, Tex.

6. The Department of California to embrace the States of California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona Territory, and the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies. Headquarters at San Francisco, Cal.

7. The Department of the Columbia to embrace the States of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, so much of Wyoming as is included in the Yellowstone National Park, and Alaska. Headquarters at Vancouver Barracks, Wash.

8. The Department of Luzon to embrace all that portion of the Philippine Archipelago lying north of a line passing southeastwardly through the West Pass of Apo, or Mindoro Strait, to the twelfth parallel of north latitude; thence east along said parallel to longitude $124^{\circ} 10'$ east of Greenwich, but including the island of Palawan and adjacent small islands and the island of Masbate; thence northerly to and through San Bernardino Straits. Headquarters at Manila, P. I.

9. The Department of the Visayas to embrace all islands of the Philippine Archipelago lying south of the southern boundary line of the Department of Luzon and east of longitude $121^{\circ} 45'$ east of Greenwich and north of the ninth parallel of latitude, except the islands of Mindanao, Palawan and all islands east of the Straits of Surigao. Headquarters at Iloilo, P. I.

10. The Department of Mindanao to embrace all islands of the

Philippine Archipelago not included in other departments. Headquarters at Zamboanga, P. I.

By order of the Secretary of War:

LEONARD WOOD,
Major General, Chief of Staff."⁹⁶

The Senate immediately became interested, and by a resolution adopted on June 1, 1911, called upon the Secretary of War to furnish the Senate with a statement of reasons for the proposed reestablishment of Division headquarters in the Army.⁹⁷ This produced a very fine study from the General Staff which was printed as Senate Document 42 of the 62nd Congress, 1st Session. This report exemplified well the planning activity which the General Staff was brought into existence to do. A substantial part of it was devoted to tracing the history of the Army's territorial organization. The reasons for the proposed change were given and the economies to be effected were outlined in specific terms and in dollars and cents. A map was prepared showing graphically the effect of the changes, and a survey was included showing the probable effect of the new territorial organization and its bearing upon cities in which department headquarters were located. The report stated that "history shows that territorial Divisions, not considering the Philippines Division, have been in existence and discontinued during six periods since they were first created in 1815; that of the 95 years from 1815 to 1910 Divisions in the United States have been in existence 52 years and discontinued during 43."⁹⁸

Under this new arrangement the Division commanders were charged "with all matters relating to supply and general administration within their divisions and were provided with complete administrative staffs,"⁹⁹ while the Department commanders were charged "with matters relating only to the discipline and instruction of their commands."¹⁰⁰ Department commanders were not to be burdened with administrative tasks and toward that end all purely administrative correspondence was to be routed directly to the Division headquarters without passing through the Departments.

GENERAL STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS ON ARMY POST REDUCTION

As an outgrowth of the effort to establish a mobile army organization, the Secretary of War petitioned Congress for authority to abandon obsolete small-sized Army posts and to plan for the concentration of the Army on a few large posts. Here the General Staff planners ran afoul of politics. The House of Representatives again intervened, calling for a complete report.¹⁰¹ The report submitted demonstrated once

more the ability of the General Staff. This study¹⁰² of the distribution of the mobile Army of the United States and of the posts which had been established in localities for reasons which were by then obsolete revealed how haphazardly Army stations had been selected and maintained. The plan presented a long-term program in which certain stations were earmarked for abandonment as soon as adequate facilities could be provided in localities for which there existed military justification for the location of troops. Here was sound long-time planning. Unfortunately Congress had other ideas as to how funds should be apportioned for the construction and maintenance of the Army. Congressmen and Senators were generally unwilling to see appropriations reduced for posts within their own constituencies, much less assent to their abandonment. Singularly, this General Staff study discussed the failure of the Army to adopt an intelligent housing program and attributed this to lack of appreciation on the part of the Army itself, the necessity of housing troops returning from the Philippines, and local and political conditions which it traced in considerable detail. The study included a recommendation of posts to be abandoned, some eighteen being listed for early abandonment and seven more for eventual elimination. Senator Warren of Wyoming was Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. Of the eighteen posts listed for early abandonment two, whose total cost to date had been slightly over two million dollars, were in Wyoming. Of the seven listed for eventual disposal, one, Fort D. A. Russell at Cheyenne, Wyoming, had had \$4,925,486.15 showered on it for construction purposes. This report naturally antagonized Senator Warren against Wood and the whole General Staff. After the Ainsworth incident, Warren and Hay, the Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee and a close friend of Ainsworth, collaborated, and in the conference between the House and Senate on the Army Appropriation Bill added two provisions. "The first created a commission of five retired Army officers, named in the bill, and two members from each House of Congress, to report upon the location and distribution of Army posts and forbade the President meanwhile to make any changes whatsoever in the existing posts. The second provided that after March 5, 1913, no officer should be permitted to serve as Chief of Staff unless he should have served at least ten years as a commissioned officer of the line of the Army in grades below that of brigadier general. As Root pointed out in the Senate, this provision 'could not better accomplish its purpose if it read that after the 5th of March no man whose initials were L. W. shall be Chief of Staff.' "¹⁰³

The Appropriation Bill with these riders was passed only two weeks

before the beginning of the new fiscal year when the funds would be required. Despite the fact that the Republican Convention was pending and the President was threatened with the loss of delegates by the interested Congressmen, President Taft vetoed the bill in June of 1912 and in so doing widened the split that was to cause his defeat in the November, 1912 elections.

Here certainly was a case which planners might well contemplate. What factors were relative to the General Staff study on the question of where military posts were to be located? No doubt General Wood and the General Staff had prided themselves on the complete objectivity with which they viewed the problem. Only considerations of economy and military strategy were accepted as determinants. Such a viewpoint was admirable and no doubt to be expected of a politically neutral career service. Yet it can be condemned. Planning cannot take place in a vacuum. Political expediency proved to be perhaps the vital conditioning factor and it was ignored. This failure to consider political realities was important because of its consequences. The veto of the riders on the Appropriation Bill passed in June, 1912, signalized the beginning of evil days for the General Staff. Congress proceeded to clip its wings almost to the point of doing away with it, and viewed with suspicion and hostility any recommendations that bore the General Staff imprint.

The Army geographical Divisions and Departments remained but the program to concentrate the Army in a few large posts never even got started. Of the twenty-five posts slated for eventual abandonment in 1911, seventeen were still occupied in January, 1940. The concept of a mobile army did remain. The Secretary of War in his 1912 report observed that one of the "most important fruits of the efforts of the past year has been the production of a general scheme of Army reorganization by the War College Division of the General Staff."¹⁰⁴

Continuing, the Secretary observed: "In this connection it should be remembered that until after the Spanish War there was no provision in our military establishment for anybody whose duty it should be to study the organization of the Army or to make plans for war. The careful system of post-graduate education carried on now at the service schools at Leavenworth and Fort Monroe, and the War College at Washington, was incomplete and rudimentary. The work of its completion and coordination has been developed by the General Staff, and it is only within the last few years that the system has gained sufficient headway to bear fruit in the shape of consistent and harmonious military doctrines. This plan of reorganization is the latest product of this educational system. It does not aim to go into too specific details, but is a study of the broad principles which must govern any successful mili-

tary policy of this country. It constitutes a broad chart for present guidance and for future progress. The first draft of this plan was thoroughly discussed last summer at the series of conferences held by the Secretary of War and attended by representatives from all branches of the Army and by some Members of Congress. Subsequently, in printed form, it has been distributed not only to Members of Congress and throughout the Army and the National Guard, but very widely through institutions of learning elsewhere in the United States. In general scope and purpose, the plan is a constructive application to modern American conditions of the principles of military policy carefully worked out by Gen. Upton in his exhaustive studies of military policy soon after the Civil War. I annex a copy of this plan as Appendix A to this report."¹⁰⁵

By general orders dated February 6, 1913, "a tactical organization of the troops of the mobile Army into divisions and brigades was established, and for purposes of military administration the territory of the United States and its possessions was reorganized into six geographical commands—the Philippine Department, the Hawaiian Department, and four Departments in the United States, known as the Eastern, Western, Central, and Southern Departments."¹⁰⁶ This did not materially change the distribution of troops among the various posts but it placed "together in a division—in one man's mind, under one man's eye—the things which belonged together"¹⁰⁷ without physically disturbing any Congressman's vested right to continue the military post in his district.

REDUCTION OF THE GENERAL STAFF

In 1911 the War Department had indicated its approval of a plan to have the General Staff absorb the Adjutant General's and the Inspector General's Departments. It will be recalled when the General Staff Bill was discussed in 1903 that Elihu Root had favored the proposal for the General Staff to absorb the Inspector General's Department. A bill providing for this change was introduced into Congress but at the hands of Congress this bill was changed so that it in effect brought the General Staff under the control of the Adjutant General. General Wood, in his Report of the Chief of Staff for 1911, pointed out the effects of such a course:

"With reference to the consolidation of The Adjutant General's and Inspector General's Departments with the General Staff Corps: If carried out as proposed in the bill, this will, in my opinion, result in serious injury to the military service.

The principles on which the General Staff is founded, and on which its usefulness principally depends, would be destroyed, and the present

detail system, the maintenance of which is vital to the Army, would be seriously menaced. I believe that such consolidations properly made would increase the efficiency and decrease the expense of the Army. I think also that in consolidating The Adjutant General's and Inspector General's Departments with the General Staff Corps and transferring to that corps the duties now performed by these departments, care should be taken to preserve intact the detail feature of the General Staff and to prevent any individual or number of individuals from becoming permanent members of that corps. One of the essential features of the General Staff Corps organization as advocated upon its establishment is the fact that no officer of the General Staff, the Chief of Staff included, can serve for more than four years continuously, or can be redetailed without an interim of two years except in case of emergency or in time of war. This feature, so vital to the maintenance of an efficient General Staff, should be preserved, and in my judgment it would be much better to have no consolidation at all than to sacrifice it."

The consolidation was not effected, but legislation was passed which reduced the number of officers on General Staff duty by eight so that by 1913 the 45 General Staff Officers were reduced to 36 by relieving eight captains and a general.¹⁰⁸

The Chief of Staff observed sadly:

"The consolidation of the Adjutant General's and Inspector General's Departments with the General Staff was not made, but the reduction in the General Staff was. This I believe to be a step in the wrong direction. The General Staff was barely sufficient in numbers to perform the duties properly belonging to it, and its reduction, especially in the number of captains, will seriously interfere with its work.

I am of the opinion that it would be for the best interests of the service to transfer all the personnel of the staff corps—excepting engineers, medical officers, and chaplains—to the line, increasing the number of general officers in the different grades accordingly; this alone, in my opinion, will terminate the constant struggle between line and staff, a struggle which is as old as the Army and one which promises to continue. A number of officers equal to those transferred would have to be immediately detailed to perform the various staff duties, but they would all belong to one common body, and the efforts of the permanent Staff Corps to continue their individuality would disappear. The law which permits the detail of officers above the grade of major would secure sufficient permanency in the heads of the various corps to insure efficiency. There would be no interference with promotion, nor would the members of the present Staff Corps lose any of their present ad-

vantages; in fact, a wider field would be open to them. The Staff Corps would be composed of men much more closely in touch with the sentiments and needs of the line. There would be more cooperation and greater efficiency."¹⁰⁹

THE DETAIL SYSTEM IS STRENGTHENED

The detail system under which officers were detailed from the line to special staff jobs for a four-year period still commended itself to those in authority. Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison in his 1913 Report noted: "So far as I have been able to observe, the detail system put into effect in 1901 has worked most satisfactorily. It has been indorsed by every Secretary of War since that time. Under that system, instead of having a permanent Staff Corps, officers from the line of the Army are from time to time detailed with the result that the Staff Corps officers are so recently from the line as to know the sentiment and needs of he line, and when they go back into the line they are so recently from the staff so as to be able to use the knowledge acquired therein advantageously in the line."¹¹⁰

Congress proceeded to put teeth into a law which compelled strict observance of the four-year detail proviso. By act of August 24, 1912, commonly known to the Army as the "Manchu Law," Congress provided:

"That hereafter in time of peace whenever any officer holding a permanent commission in the line of the Army with rank below that of major shall not have been actually present for duty for at least two of the last preceding six years with a troop, battery, or company of that branch of the Army in which he shall hold said commission, such officer shall not be detached nor permitted to remain detached from such troop, battery, or company for duty of any kind; and all pay and allowances shall be forfeited by any superior for any period during which, by his order or his permission or by reason to be issued the proper order or instructions at the proper time, any officer shall be detached or permitted to remain detached in violation of any of the terms of this proviso; but nothing in this proviso shall be held to apply in the case of any officer for such period as shall be actually necessary for him, after having been relieved from detached service, to join the troop, battery, or company to which he shall belong in that branch in which he shall hold a permanent commission, nor shall anything in this proviso be held to apply to the detachment or detail of officers for duty in the Judge Advocate General's Department or in the Ordnance Department, or in connection with the construction of the Panama Canal until after such canal shall have been formally opened, or in the Philippine Constabulary until

the first day of January, nineteen hundred and fourteen, or to any officer detailed, or who may be hereafter detailed, for aviation duty. And hereafter no officer holding a permanent commission in the Army with rank below that of major shall be detailed as commanding officer of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, or as chief or assistant chief (director or assistant director) of the Philippine Constabulary, and no other officers of the Army shall hereafter be detailed for duty with the said constabulary except as specifically provided by law."¹¹¹

This law went into effect on December 15, 1912, and caused a certain amount of confusion because it necessitated wholesale transfers and changes in assignment. Legislation extending the provisions of the detached service law to field officers (majors and above) was included in the Army Appropriation Bill of April 27, 1915.

Although the General Staff was suspect and its existence threatened by Congress from 1912 on, it continued to function with increased effectiveness as a planning and coordinating agency. Perhaps the best illustration of the type of work in the field of planning for which an organization such as the General Staff was needed was the report on the "Organization of the Land Forces of the United States"¹¹² which formulated the broad outlines of a comprehensive military policy. By considering such factors as the traditional military policy of the United States, the distribution of the mobile army and its relation to tactical organization and administration, the requirements and need of a reserve system, the relation of promotion to organization, the raising and organizing of the national volunteer force, and considerations affecting the strength, composition, and organization of the land forces of the United States, this study brought together the many elements of the problem of national defense in a way that invited intelligent consideration by Congress and the interested citizenry of the country to whom the study was made available by being printed in pamphlet form and widely distributed. Doubtless Congress did not pay too much attention to this sixty-three page study in fine print for no immediate action followed its release. In a sense the study might have been labelled as propaganda and no doubt it was so called in many quarters inasmuch as the report followed in the wake of General Wood's campaign for preparedness. However, none of the common propaganda devices appeared in the study. In fact, the greater part of the report was devoted to a consideration of matters that merited attention if the problem of national defense was to be approached objectively. While the report did contain substantial legislative recommendations, its chief service was educational.

There were instances when the General Staff did engage in propaganda. The Report of the Secretary of War for 1912¹¹³ contained a large illustration in which men of various sizes were used to effectively portray the size of our Army as compared to the armies of Mexico, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Austria, France, Germany and Russia. This same chart was repeated on exactly the same form, the following year, in the Report for 1913.¹¹⁴

GENERAL STAFF STUDY ON MILITARY POLICY—1915

Two years later, in September, 1915, another General Staff study, entitled, "A Statement of Proper Military Policy"¹¹⁵ was released. This report was prepared by the War College Division of the General Staff in response to a directive from the Secretary of War which read "to make a complete and exhaustive study of a proper military policy for the United States, and to prepare a clearly and succinctly expressed statement of the policy basing it, in a general way, upon the 'Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, 1912,' eliminating everything that is not necessary for the easy and quick comprehension of the military policy, and adding anything which may be necessary to afford such comprehension."¹¹⁶ Nearly six months was spent preparing the study which covered the following points:

- I. The Military Problem Confronting the United States.
 1. The evolution of national military policies.
 2. Our abiding national policies.
 3. Coordinate relationship of Army and Navy.
 4. Coordinate relationship of statesman and soldier.
 5. Preparedness of the world powers for oversea expeditions.
 6. Statement of the military problem.
- II. The Regular Army.
 1. General functions.
 2. Mobile and Coast Artillery troops and their functions.
 3. Relation between home and oversea garrisons.
- III. General Requirement of Oversea Service.
 1. The Philippines.
 2. Oahu, Hawaiian Islands.
 3. The Panama Canal.
 4. Guantanamo.
 5. Alaska.
 6. Porto Rico.
- IV. General Requirements of Home Service.
 1. General distribution of Coast Artillery troops in fortified areas.

2. General distribution of mobile troops in strategic areas—
Puget Sound—California—Atlantic—Middle West.
- V. Necessary Strength of Mobile troops for Overseas Service.
 1. The Philippines.
 2. Oahu.
 3. Panama.
 4. Guantanamo.
 5. Alaska.
 6. Porto Rico.
 7. Tabular statement.
- VI. Necessary Strength of Mobile Troops for Home Service.
 1. Tabular statement showing distribution of administrative units of mobile troops in strategic areas.
 2. Formation of higher tactical units and their distribution in strategic areas.
 3. Necessary strength of Coast Artillery troops for service overseas and at home.
 4. Total strength of the Regular force required for all service.
 5. Organization.
- VII. The Organized Militia.
 1. Constitutional functions.
 2. Some uses as a federal force.
 3. Limitations.
 4. Recommendations.
- VIII. Reserves.
 1. The Regular Army reserve.
 2. Citizen soldiery.
 3. Reserve officers.
- IX. The Volunteers.
- X. Reserve Material and Supplies.
- XI. Estimate Cost of project recommended."¹¹⁷

The above outline emphasizes the contrast in the approach to a problem under the General Staff regime as against that in vogue before its existence. In this study, the entire problem of national defense was brought forward and discussed in general terms, to which was added an estimate of cost. Presumably, Congress or the Administration could study the matter and then indicate to what extent approval would be given. The problem would be viewed in its entirety. Contrast this with the practice of Congress of nibbling piecemeal at a problem through scrutiny of individual appropriation items. Successive Secretaries of War had protested against the Congressional practice in legislating in

a piecemeal fashion for the Army, and General Bell, as a Chief of Staff, had requested in an Annual Report that Congress abstain from Army reform until it could consider the whole problem. Before the existence of the General Staff, the request for Congressional appropriations emanated from many independent bureaus. How could Congress or the Army or anyone else ever put them together so that the whole would mean anything? Such a study as this 1915 General Staff report might also be considered as a necessary forerunner of lump-sum budgeting.

How effective or how useful were these General Staff reports? A conclusive answer cannot be given for the evidence is contradictory. There were many who believed the General Staff was merely following the trend toward preparedness, not leading it or paving the way for it. These men believed that the trouble with Mexico and the beginning of the First World War in 1914 were responsible for the Congressional action taken. However, the majority of informed observers were of the opinion that the General Staff played the major role in bringing into existence the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920. The legislation bore a very close family resemblance to the 1912 General Staff study on the "Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" and the 1915 General Staff Report on "A Statement of Proper Military Policy."

At any rate, the Act of June 3, 1916,¹¹⁸ was the "first comprehensive legislation for national defense"¹¹⁹ ever enacted in our history. Congress had materially reduced the General Staff estimates on numbers needed but accepted the general structure proposed by the General Staff. Under this plan the Army of the United States was to consist of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve, which was to be supplemented by a Volunteer Army in time of war. The Regular Army was to be greatly increased but the increments were to be absorbed over a period of five years, extending from July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1920. An organizational structure was set up for the Regular Army which was divided into an overseas garrison aggregating three divisions eventually and distributed among the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska and a home garrison composed of coast defense troops and a mobile force consisting of four Infantry divisions and two Cavalry divisions. Each Infantry division was to consist of three Infantry brigades, each of three regiments, one regiment of Cavalry, one brigade of Field Artillery consisting of three regiments, one regiment of Engineers, one Field Signal battalion, one aero squadron, and the ammunition, supply, engineer, and sanitary trains. Each Cavalry division included three Cavalry brigades, each of three regiments, one regiment of Horse Artillery, one battalion of Mounted Engineers, one

Field Signal battalion, one aero squadron, and ammunition, supply, engineer and sanitary trains.¹²⁰

This organizational arrangement of tactical units has been summarized because of its bearing on the "span of control."¹²¹ As far as can be determined, the General Staff did not attempt to work out or did not succeed in working out any theoretical analysis of how many individuals or units could be supervised effectively by one individual or unit. Curiously enough, the span of control in the 1916 organizational arrangement rarely exceeded four, a number, arrived at empirically, which was verified logically by A. V. Graicunas of Paris who showed that "an individual who is coordinating the work of others whose duties interconnect must take into account in his decisions, not only the reactions of each person concerned as an individual, but also his reactions as a member of any possible grouping of persons which may arise. . . . The psychological conception of the 'span of attention' places strict limits on the number of separate factors which the human mind can grasp simultaneously. It has its administrative counterpart in what may be described as the 'span of control.' A supervisor with five subordinates reporting directly to him, who adds a sixth, increases his available human resources by 20 percent. But he adds approximately 100 percent to the complexity and difficulty of his task of co-ordination. The number of relationships which he must consider increases not by arithmetical but by geometrical progression. . . . Neglect of the limitations imposed by the 'span of control' creates insoluble problems in coordination."¹²² The logical deduction of this principle is given in the illustration appearing on page 181.

SUMMARY ON THE GENERAL STAFF—1904-1916

Perhaps a fair judgment of the General Staff during the period 1904-1916 can be made by describing it as useful but unappreciated. Practically every Secretary of War and every Chief of Staff during this period attested to its great value and commended its activities in their annual reports. The individuals coordinated, namely the bureau chiefs, did not appreciate its usefulness and the struggle between Adjutant General Ainsworth and the Chief of Staff, General Wood, nearly wrecked the entire structure. The distinction between coordinating and meddling in administrative details was too fine to be observed. Likewise, planning on the administrative level led to legislative suspicion. In 1912, this Congressional resentment led to a reduction in the General Staff from 45 to 36. Efforts were made each year by the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff to persuade Congress to restore this cut. In 1914, the Secretary of War in his annual report stated forcefully that "the number of officers taken from the General Staff by recent legislation should be re-

THE SPAN OF CONTROL - GRAICUNAS' THEORY

If Tom supervises two persons, Dick and Harry, he can speak to each of them individually, or he can speak to them as a pair.

Thus, even in this extremely simple unit of organization, Tom must hold four to six relationships within his span of 'attention'.

Direct Single Relationships.

Tom to Dick and Tom to Harry..... 2

Direct Group Relationships.

Tom to Dick with Harry and Tom to Harry with Dick..... 2

Cross Relationships.

Harry with Dick and Dick with Harry.... 2

Total Relationships..... 6


The effect of these distinctions as brought out in the accompanying tables should be read as follows:

- n— number of persons supervised;
- a— number of direct single relationships;
- b— number of cross relationships;
- c— number of direct group relationships;
- d— $a+b$;
- e— $a+c$;
- f— $a+b+c$,


computed on the maximum basis.

Illustrations of Direct and Cross Relationships


direct single relationship



cross relationship



direct group relationship



Direct and Cross Relationships

Computed on Maximum Basis

relationship	formulae								
direct single	$a = n$	=	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
cross	$b = n(n-1)$	=	0	2	6	12	20	30	42
direct group	$c = n(\frac{2n-1}{2})$	=	0	2	9	28	75	186	441
total direct									
single and cross	$d = a + b = n^2$	=	1	4	9	16	25	36	49
total direct	$e = a + c = n\frac{2n}{2}$	=	1	4	12	32	80	192	448
total direct and cross	$f = a + b + c = n(\frac{2n}{2} + n - 1)$	=	1	6	18	44	100	222	490

Chart Showing Direct Group Relationships

Number of members per group

1	1 Subordinate	A
1	2 Subordinates	A B
2	3 Subordinates	A B C
2		AB AC BC
3		ABC
1	4 Subordinates	A B C D
2		AB AC AD BC BD CD
3		ABC ABD ACD BCD
4		ABCD
1	5 Subordinates	A B C D E
2		AB AC AD AE BC BD BE CD CE DE
3		ABC ABD ABE ACD ACE ADE BCD BCE BDE CDE
4		ABCD ABCE ABDE ACDE BCDE
5		ABCDE
1	6 Subordinates	A B C D E F
2		AB AC AD AE AF BC BD BE BF CD CE CF DE EF
3		ABC ABD ABE ABF ACD ACE ACF ADE ADF BCD BCE BCF BDE BDF BEF CDE CDF CEF DEF
4		ABCD ABCE ABCF ABDF ABEF ACDE ACDF ACEF ADEF BCDE BCDF BCEF BDEF CDEF
5		ABCDE ABCDF ABCEF ABDEF ACDEF BCDEF
6		ABCDEF

stored. The work of this body of officers is without question, of the greatest value to the service and exercises the strongest influence in increasing the efficiency of the Army. We can ill afford in any way to embarrass the work of the General Staff through a shortage of officers. The work of the General Staff has done more to make an army than any other influence in our service in recent years."¹²³

Despite this commendation, the following year, 1915, witnessed the creation of a Board of Review, consisting of the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Mobile Army Division of the General Staff, the Chief of the War College Division of the General Staff, the Chief of Coast Artillery, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of Ordnance. Charged with consideration of all questions on new or modified projects of coast fortifications and with originating consideration of matters in the coast defense field, the Board of Review exemplified the trend away from the General Staff.

And finally, the National Defense Act of 1916, had it been narrowly construed, issued what amounted to a death sentence for the General Staff. Despite the fact that the General Staff studies, "The Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" in 1912 and "A Statement of Proper Military Policy" in 1915, set the stage and provided the framework on which the National Defense Act of 1916 was based, Congress was unappreciative and suspicious of the General Staff. The War Department General Staff recommended to Congress in the hearings on the 1916 law that the General Staff be increased from 36 to 92.¹²⁴ However, when this measure was enacted into law the General Staff, aside from its general officers, was increased by 18 officers to come by annual increments in the next five years. However, the law stipulated that "not more than one-half of the officers detailed in said corps shall be stationed or assigned to or employed upon any duty in or near the District of Columbia."¹²⁵ In effect, this brought about an immediate reduction in the War Department General Staff, changing its size from 36 to 20.

Thus when war was declared on April 6, 1917, there were only nine officers on the War Department General Staff available for coordination and supervision of the whole military establishment and only eleven officers to study military problems, prepare plans for the national defense and the utilization of our military forces in time of war.¹²⁶ Worse than this, Section 5 of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, prescribed: "All officers detailed in said corps shall be exclusively employed in the study of military problems, the preparation of plans for the national defense, and the utilization of the military forces in time of war, in investigating and reporting upon the efficiency and state of pre-

paredness of such forces for service in peace or war, or on appropriate general-staff duties in connection with troops, including the National Guard, or as military attachés in foreign countries, or on other duties, not of an administrative nature, on which they can be lawfully and properly employed."¹²⁷

The act abolished the Mobile Army Division of the General Staff transferring, subject to the exercise of the supervising, coordinating, and informing powers conferred upon the General Staff by act of Congress, the business of this agency to the Adjutant General's Department.¹²⁸ Likewise, the Coast Artillery Division of the General Staff was made into a War Department bureau under the Chief of Coast Artillery, who remained an additional member of the General Staff.¹²⁹ To further limit the General Staff the act then provided: "*That hereafter members of the General Staff Corps shall be confined strictly to the discharge of the duties of the general nature of those specified for them in this section and in the organic act of Congress last hereinbefore cited, and they shall not be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus or offices of the War Department, or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the General Staff Corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices, or would cause injurious or unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.*"¹³⁰

No doubt there were many critics of the General Staff who in August 1916 heartily approved the Congressional action of June 3, 1916. Throughout the Army and in the General Staff itself there were many who felt that in the struggle for existence that had lasted from 1904 to 1916, the General Staff had failed. One member, General Hagood, wrote: "The Fourteen years, 1903 to 1917, during which the General Staff had been in existence had not been spent in making plans for war, the purpose for which it was created, but in squabbling over the control of the routine peacetime administration and supply of the Regular Army and in attempts to place the blame for unpreparedness upon Congress. The General Staff wanted more money, and Congress—the people—would not give it. They wanted more soldiers and a little smattering of reserve supplies. But our unpreparedness did not come from lack of money, lack of soldiers, or lack of supplies. It came from lack of brains, or perhaps it would be fairer to say, lack of genius. . . . Pages could be written upon what the General Staff should have been doing between 1903 and 1917. . . . The whole General Staff and War Department organization, generally, fell like a house of cards and a new organization had to be created during the process of the war. . . . As I was on duty in the War Department for seven of the fourteen years

of misspent energy, it might be asked why, seeing these things, did I not do something to correct them. The answer is that I did not see them or, seeing them, did not understand. Hindsight is better than foresight, and I, like all the rest, did not have the brains—or the genius—to see preparedness in its true light.”¹³¹

At any event, the General Staff came dangerously near passing out of the picture in 1916. Only a rare combination of fortuitous circumstances saved it—the indication that the country was drifting rapidly into war and the arrival of a Secretary of War who not only caught the vision Elihu Root had in mind when he proposed the General Staff idea, but who was also brilliant enough as a lawyer to look beyond narrow interpretations of the law in search of the spirit of the statute.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1. Carter in *Senate Document 119, 68th Congress, 1st Session*, p. 51.
2. Same, pp. 55-56.
3. *Report of the Chief of Staff, 1903, Annual Report of the War Department, 1903*, Vol. I, pp. 136-137.
4. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1903*, Vol. I, pp. 69-72.
5. This is an error. Major General A. R. Chaffee was the first Assistant to the Chief of Staff. Major General H. C. Corbin was not a member of the General Staff but was the Adjutant General, a part of the special staff.
6. *Army and Navy Journal*, Vol. 41, Aug. 8, 1903, p. 1239.
7. Same, Jan. 16, 1904, p. 518.
8. Same, Sept. 5, 1903, Vol. 41, p. 13.
9. Same, August 22, 1903, p. 1290.
10. Same, Sept. 12, 1903, p. 27.
11. Same, Sept. 12, 1903, p. 27.
12. William H. Carter, *The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917) p. 268.
13. *Army and Navy Journal*, Jan. 30, 1904, p. 570.
14. Act of Congress approved April 23, 1904.
15. Same.
16. *Army and Navy Journal*, March 19, 1904, p. 750.
17. General Johnson Hagood, *The Services of Supply* (Boston: The Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1927) pp. 15-19.
18. *The Army and Navy Journal*, March 5, 1904, p. 707.
19. Same.
20. Same.
21. *Army and Navy Journal*, Jan. 12, 1907, p. 539.
22. Hagood, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
23. Jessup, *Elihu Root*. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938) Vol. I, p. 262.
24. General Order 46, War Department, dated March 7, 1907, amended existing orders and pursuant to Act of Congress, approved March 2, 1907 (Public 170) prescribed that hereafter the Military Secretary's Department shall be known as the Adjutant General's Department.
25. *Report of the Chief of Staff for 1904* (p. 219 ff) and the *Army and Navy Journal* for 1904 have been used as sources for the above description of army reorganization in 1904.
26. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1904*, pp. 18-19.
27. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1903*, p. 37.
28. *Report of the Chief Signal Officer, 1904*, p. 402.
29. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1904*, p. 14.
30. Same.
31. *Report of the Chief of Staff, 1905, Annual Report of the War Department, 1905*, Vol. I, pp. 369-371.
32. *Army and Navy Journal*, February 18, 1905, p. 656.
33. *Army and Navy Journal*, October 13, 1906, p. 179.

34. *Report of the Secretary of War, 1906*, p. 40.
35. Hagood, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
36. Same.
37. Same.
38. Letter of Taft to C. P. Taft, quoted in *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, copyright 1939 by Henry Pringle, and reprinted by permission of Rinehart & Company, Inc., publishers.
39. Same.
40. *War Department Annual Reports, 1908*, Vol. I, Report of Chief of Staff, p. 359.
41. See Mary T. Reynolds, "The General Staff as a Propaganda Agency," 1908-1914. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, July, 1939.
42. Hagood, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
43. Same.
44. *War Department Annual Reports, 1907*, Vol. I, pp. 173-175.
45. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1906*. Vol. VI, Report of the Chief of Ordnance, p. 3.
46. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1907*, Vol. I, p. 197.
47. Luther Gulick, *Notes on the Theory of Organization in Papers on the Science of Administration*, Luther Gulick and L. Urwick. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937) p. 6.
48. One army officer, now a major general, retired, and then a junior artillery officer, stated that the motivating force was the prospect of increased rank.
49. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1907*, Vol. I, p. 197.
50. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1908*, Vol. I, p. 356.
51. Same.
52. 34 Statutes L. 1158.
53. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1908*, Vol. I, pp. 78-90.
54. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1907*, Vol. I, p. 184.
55. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1908*, Vol. I, p. 358.
56. Same, p. 145.
57. *House Reports (Public) 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, December 4, 1911, to August 26, 1912* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912) Vol. 3, pp. 29-49.
58. From *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, copyright 1939 by Henry Pringle, and reprinted by permission of Rinehart & Company, Inc., publishers.
59. Herman Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood, a Biography*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931) Vol. II, p. 81.
60. Same, p. 86.
61. Same, p. 95.
62. Hagood, *The Services of Supply*. (Boston: The Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1927) p. 18.
63. Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 96.
64. Same, p. 97. See Hagood, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
65. Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
66. Quoted from the Diary of Leonard Wood in Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
67. Same.
68. Hagood, *op. cit.*, p. 21. The italics are the author's.
69. House Resolution, No. 707, 61st Congress, 2nd Session.
70. Hagood, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
71. Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, p. 101-102.
72. Same, p. 102.
73. Same.
74. Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
75. *Army Appropriation Bill Hearings, December 15, 1911*, p. 719.
76. 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1911-1912. *House of Representatives, Report No. 508, House Reports*, Vol. 3, pp. 15-22.
77. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1911*. Report of Secretary of War, Vol. I, p. 28.
78. 62nd Congress, 2nd Session, *House of Representatives, Report No. 508*, pp. 25-28.
79. Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 171.
80. Report No. 508, 62nd Congress, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.
81. Same, p. 6.
82. Same.
83. Same, pp. 6-13.
84. Same.
85. Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

86. Report No. 508, *op. cit.*, p. 2 (underlining added).
87. Same, p. 48.
88. Same.
89. Report No. 508, Part II, House of Representatives, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session.
90. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1912*, Report of the Secretary of War, Vol. I, p. 28.
91. Same, p. 28.
92. Same.
93. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1911*. Report of Secretary of War, Vol. I, p. 29.
94. Same.
95. Same.
96. 62nd Congress, 1st Session, 1911, *Senate Documents, Vol. 28. Document 42*, pp. 44-45.
97. Same, p. 3.
98. Same, p. 4.
99. Same, p. 10.
100. Same.
101. House Resolution 343, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session.
102. House Document 490, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session.
103. Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
104. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1912*. Report of Secretary of War, Vol. I, p. 15.
105. Same.
106. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1913*. Report of Secretary of War, Vol. I, p. 27.
107. Hagedorn, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
108. 37 U. S. Statutes at Large, 1912, p. 599, prescribed: "Section 5, That hereafter the General Staff shall consist of two general officers, one of whom shall be the Chief of Staff, four colonels, six lieutenant colonels, twelve majors, and twelve captains or first lieutenants all of whom shall be detailed from the Army at large in the manner and for the periods prescribed by law."
109. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1912*. Report of Chief of Staff, Vol. I, p. 243.
110. *Report of Secretary of War, 1913*, Vol. 1, p. 25.
111. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1912*, Vol. I, p. 283.
112. Published as Appendix A to *Report of the Secretary of War for 1912*, pp. 65-128.
113. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1912*, Vol. I, p. 299.
114. Same, opp. p. 298.
115. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1915*, Vol. I.
116. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1915*, Vol. I, p. 113.
117. Same, p. 111-112.
118. 39 Statutes at Large, p. 166.
119. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1916*, Report of Secretary of War, p. 163.
120. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1916*, Report of Chief of Staff, pp. 163-164.
121. L. Gulick, *Notes on the Theory of Organization in Papers on the Science of Administration*. L. Gulick and L. Urwick. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937) p. 52.
122. Same. Note also Relationship in Organization, V. A. Graicunas, *Papers on the Science of Administration*, Edited by Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, (New York: Institute of Public Administration, Columbia University, 1937) pp. 183-187.
123. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1914*, Report of Secretary of War, Vol. I, p. 78.
124. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1916*, Report of the Chief of Staff, Vol. I, p. 168.
125. Same.
126. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1917*, Report of Chief of Staff, Vol. I, p. 128.
127. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1916*, p. 70.
128. Same, p. 71.
129. Same.
130. Same.
131. Hagood, *The Services of Supply*. (Boston: The Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1927) pp. 22-27.

Chapter V

The Test Of World War I—1916-1919

NINETEEN SIXTEEN was an important year in the annals of the War Department for it marked the accession to office of a great Secretary of War, one who proved to be of the Elihu Root type. Lindley M. Garrison resigned as Secretary of War in protest over President Wilson's rejection of the Continental Army plan. The Assistant Secretary of War, Henry Breckinridge, also resigned to demonstrate how strongly he agreed with his chief. Their views on preparedness, gained from intimate contact with the Army's problems, were so strong that they could not compromise. In resigning they sacrificed a career for the courage of their conviction, and by so doing they dramatized the problem. This played no small part in the increases granted the Army by the Act of June 3, 1916. After almost a month's delay, the President appointed Newton D. Baker as the new Secretary of War. This appointment was a surprise for it had been predicted that either David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture, or Senator George E. Chamberlain, Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, would be named.¹

Prior to his appointment as Secretary of War, Baker had had relatively little training as an administrator. He had been private secretary to the Postmaster General, Mr. W. L. Wilson during President Cleveland's second term and Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, for two years beginning in 1913.² Besides, Baker was an avowed Pacifist, holding membership in three Pacifist societies.³ But like Elihu Root, Newton D. Baker was to prove that critical mental faculties were much more important than experience or an intimate knowledge of the field.

When his appointment was announced, Baker was described by the press as a man who was "possessed of a clear analytical mind which has been called one of the most intellectual in the country."⁴

What was indeed unique was that "the student who had taken Professor Wilson's course in the theory of administration at Johns Hopkins"⁵ should become the Secretary of War and the instructor become President. Some critics would no doubt claim that the student had received more practical good from the course than the instructor.

SECRETARY BAKER TACKLES THE STAFF PROBLEMS

Although the Mexican troubles loomed large and occupied much of the Secretary's time, as soon as he had been sworn in, administrative problems kept reasserting themselves. The National Defense Act of

June 3, 1916, with its strictures against the General Staff forced Secretary Baker to review the whole organizational and administrative structure of the War Department and to evolve a satisfactory solution.

The problem which had been considered by Congress was the difficult question "as to just how far the functions of the Chief of Staff invaded the administrative independence of various bureau chiefs."⁶ The Act of June 3, 1916, and particularly section five of that act, was the Congressional solution for the settling of this controversy. The solution, unfortunately, had been corrupted by the entrance of political and personal factors. When the law reached the War Department, it was necessary to examine it not only to ascertain the true intent of Congress, but also to see how it impinged on the whole administrative structure and what changes would be necessary. The first step in the problem was to send the law to the Judge Advocate General's Department, the legal division of the Army, and to ascertain their legal opinion. Their scrutiny of the problem was primarily legalistic, but the report included some consideration and discussion of general administrative philosophy:

"July 24, 1916.

From: The Office of the Judge Advocate General.

To: The Chief of Staff.

Subject: The lawful duties of the General Staff Corps.

1. The question of duties of this corps with reference to their relation to the duties of the several bureaus of the department doubtless presents perhaps less difficulty in its legal than in its practical solution. Practical delimitation of adjacent jurisdiction lying within a single field of executive authority, definition of the jurisdictional boundary between the functions of the General Staff upon the one hand and each of the several established administrative bureaus of the War Department upon the other, must, from the very nature of the subject, involve some doubt and difficulty. Fortunately, at the threshold the statute establishes a guiding rule, which, though a rule of legal construction, is at the same time a practical guide for the government of superior authority, who should be mindful to apply it in every doubtful case. The recent statute establishing and defining for the second time the duties of the General Staff Corps is, like the antecedent and original act of 1903, organic in nature, and, in addition, is remedial and corrective in its purpose. It gives clearest evidence of the conviction of Congress that the General Staff has heretofore been employed not altogether on its own proper duties, but has been diverted from them, leaving them to some extent unperformed, and has invaded and interfered with the

long-established jurisdiction of the several bureaus of the department, to the consequent impairment of such bureau administration and to the detriment of general military efficiency. The primary purpose of the legislation was clearly to correct what was deemed to be a departure from established organic functions, to reestablish such functions, and to prevent future encroachments. Being corrective primarily, the statute must be construed so as fully to effect its remedial purpose. Insofar as the statute invests officers of the General Staff with power and duties in an independent field of military activity, it should be liberally construed; but whenever their powers and duties lie close to, or become such as may impinge upon, or affect those of an established bureau, the opposite rule of interpretation must be the one to govern. The statute must be so construed, and it ought to be so executed.

2. The duties must be found in the meaning of the language of the statute measured by that rule. The recent statute (section 5, National Defense Act) has to be read in comparison with section 2 of the original act of 1903 (32 Stat., 831). Both sections contain an enumeration of General Staff duties, and the later organic expression is connected with the former by a general reference to some of the general duties prescribed in the former act. The enumeration of duties in the recent act is impressively qualified by limitations and prohibitions contained in the same section, which serve to give an accuracy of definition to the enumeration which the old act never had. Said section 5 provides that—

All officers detailed in said corps shall be exclusively employed:

- (a) In the study of military problems.
- (b) The preparation of plans for the national defense and the utilization of military forces in time of war.
- (c) In investigating and reporting upon the efficiency and state of preparedness of such forces for service in peace or war.
- (d) Or on appropriate General Staff duties in connection with troops, including the National Guard.
- (e) Or as military attaches in foreign countries.
- (f) Or on other duties, not of an administrative nature, on which they can be lawfully and properly employed.

All the above classes of duties are described with sufficient definiteness except the concluding one. What are the other duties "on which they can be lawfully and properly employed"? Omitting for the moment all consideration of the limitations upon the quality and character of the duties thus enumerated, these other unspecified duties are to be found by reference to the enumeration of duties in section 2 of the original act. The duties enumerated in said section 2 are not brought

forward and specifically enumerated in the recent section 5 and to which therefore the general provision of the later section makes reference, will be found to be these:

(ff) To render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject under the terms of this act to the supervision of the Chief of Staff;

(fff) And to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.

This enumeration, then, completed by expressing what section 5 adopts by relation out of the original act, is a full enumeration of General Staff duties except as to a few detached instances not affecting this question and therefore not here considered. But the duties thus enumerated are substantially modified and qualified by the express limitation and prohibition found in the section prescribing the General Staff duties. Those qualifications are to the effect—

(1) That General Staff duties must not be of an administrative character.

(2) Specifically, they must not consist of work of an administrative nature pertaining to established bureaus or offices of the department.

(3) They must be general in character.

(4) If they are not specifically enumerated, they must be of the same general nature of those that are enumerated.

(5) They must be such as are not assigned by law, custom, or regulation to other bureaus and officers.

(6) They must not be such as would, if performed by the General Staff, involve impairment of responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices or cause injurious or unnecessary duplication or delay in the work itself.

Restating the duties of the General Staff, for the purpose of clarity, they may be said to consist specifically—

(1) In the study of military problems.

(2) In the preparation of plans for the national defense and the utilization of the military forces in time of war.

(3) In the investigation and reporting upon the efficiency and state of preparedness of such forces for service in peace or war.

(4) Appropriate General Staff duties in connection with troops, including the National Guard.

(5) Duty as military attache in foreign countries.

The duties thus far specifically enumerated seem to me to be essentially such as lie beyond the domain of bureau administration, and,

therefore, as to them, there would seem to be little field of application of the qualifications mentioned. If, however, those executing this act should have a different view, they will be restrained in the assignment and performance of those duties by these same limitations; and if these specific duties can be conceived to come into contact with bureau administration, then the qualifications will mark the delimiting line.

Proceeding now, by continuing the enumeration, to those duties which by nature are such that, if not restrained by the limitations, might in the future, as they have done in the past, encroach upon and invade the field of bureau administration, they are seen to be—

(6) Rendering professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders and to act as their agents in supervising, coordinating, and informing the action of the different officers who are subject under the terms of this act to the supervision of the Chief of Staff.

(7) And to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.

Applying to these last two general classes the qualifications just mentioned, the rule is deduced that the General Staff may not render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War, to general officers, and other superior commanders, nor act as their agents in supervising, coordinating, and informing the action of the different bureaus, nor perform any other duty by special assignment unless these duties be of a nonadministrative character, not pertaining to any established bureau or office of the War Department, general in their nature, of the same general kind as those duties which have been specifically enumerated, and such as if performed by the General Staff would not involve any impairment of the initiative or responsibility of bureaus.

3. The meaning of these limitations and qualifications is not difficult to determine. The General Staff must not perform administrative duties. The term "administrative" is not one always having a fixed significance, but its meaning when used with reference to War Department affairs is one which those conversant with such affairs well understand. Those duties which by law, regulation, and established custom are, or heretofore were, habitually performed in the several bureaus or offices of the department, commonly known as administrative bureaus or offices, or at the various subordinate headquarters in the same administrative field under the general direction and supervision of, and with accountability to, the head of the bureau, are duties of an administrative nature to which the statute refers, administrative duties as distinguished from those which are essentially and more intimately connected with military power of command. It may be remembered in passing that in addition to

what is commonly understood by the term "administrative duties" the several administrative bureaus may have duties conferred upon them by statute which by reason thereof pertain to said bureau, and these duties may not be performed or interfered with by the General Staff by virtue of the express provision of the statute to that effect. Of course, the General Staff Corps is in a very real sense a superior bureau of the War Department. It has duties of the utmost importance prescribed for it by statute. The performance of those duties will render necessary considerable intrabureau administration. Such administrative duties are a necessary incident of the exercise of their own power. But beyond such administrative duties I perceive none that the corps can perform.

Duties performed by the General Staff of whatever nature must be general in character. So the statute expressly provides. If the matter be of special rather than of general interest and concern; if it be limited rather than general in its effect; if it be a matter falling within and confined to the special jurisdiction of a bureau and not reaching directly other bureaus or the Army as a whole; if it be routine rather than of far-reaching consequence and importance; if it deal with details and specifics rather than generalities, with particular performance rather than general policy; then it is entirely clear that it is not a subject for General Staff consideration and functions.

All duties performed by special assignment or otherwise must be of the same general nature as those that are specifically enumerated. New jurisdictions and new activities may not be created for General Staff functions except in the field of general duties of the same nature as those by the statute specified, not of an administrative character, not pertaining to established bureaus or offices, not descending into detail, and not such as by their nature could be beneficially or more expeditiously performed by established bureaus or offices.

Unmistakably, whether wisely or not, Congress has sought to preserve untouched the special jurisdiction of each of the several bureaus of the War Department. It has spared no pains in limiting the powers and duties of the General Staff to matters of policy, of general concern, not falling within or directly affecting bureau jurisdiction. This it does by a reiteration which could be justified only by the apprehension that with less insistence the purpose of Congress would not be heeded, and that purpose is sealed with a drastic penalty. If, however, notwithstanding the effort of Congress to delimit clearly the boundaries of adjacent jurisdiction, there should be by reason of the nature of the subject zones of uncertainty in which the dividing line is obscure—a twilight zone in which, unaided, it could not be clearly said whether the duties fall upon one side or the other—then in such cases, as heretofore said, the statute

establishes for us a guiding role, which is in effect that in case of doubt the presumption is conclusive against General Staff jurisdiction.

4. It may be well to look on the affirmative side of those General Staff duties lying adjacent to bureau administration. The General Staff relation of rendering professional aid to the Secretary of War and superior military commanders, and of acting as their agents in supervising, coordinating, and informing the action of the different officers subject to the supervision of the General Staff, becomes limited, if not by the original act certainly by the express requirement of the recent statute, to matters of a nonadministrative character, not pertaining to a particular bureau, and involving only general policies. Such a relation or capacity does not confer the right to command or to administer an established bureau or office, or to control its details or its methods of administration. The power may be only generally exercised.

It is pertinent at this point to note the opinion of the committee of the War College Division, as expressed in an accompanying memorandum, as follows:

'It is the opinion of the committee that the organic act giving to the General Staff "supervising, coordinating, and informing powers," vests in the Chief of Staff the responsibility, power, and authority to prescribe and dictate the policy that will govern all bureaus of the War Department in their methods of administration.

The General Staff passes upon such questions of policy as are referred to it by proper authority for investigation, report, and recommendation.

The recommendation, when approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, becomes settled policy which then governs all bureaus concerned.'

This War College opinion will not stand analysis when tested by the law. By statute General Staff officers, including the chief, are made special agents in informing, supervising, and coordinating the action of the different bureaus, within the limitations flowing from the original act and especially within those expressed in the recent corrective legislation. This General Staff power is nevertheless but a staff power of duty, and, like all staff duty, has no inherent strength of its own. Neither can it gather aught by representation of superior authority that can enlarge its functions beyond the limitations of the statute, but must remain confined in scope and character by the express limitations of the recent act. The General Staff is not and can not be a source of military command. Its duties do not involve the power to command, but they rather establish a connection between commander and commanded, a power conduit leading from and to the source. To inform, to supervise,

to coordinate, is not to command, not to "dictate." To hold otherwise would deprive commanders of their inherent functions. Because of the generality of its position, the General Staff is generally informed of the operations that may be of general effect occurring within the special and limited spheres of bureau action; from its general vantage point it oversees all such operations, and, observing any lack of harmony in the general action of such limited authority which may affect general military efficiency, may devise means of coordination, and, in their capacity as professional advisors to military superiors, may address the power of command and the discretion of superior authority to secure such coordination. Neither the General Staff nor any officer thereof, including its chief, can lawfully exercise power to dictate.

Neither can General Staff power be used to govern all bureaus of the War Department in their methods of administration. The power is concerned not with intradepartmental methods, but rather with action, the result of activity-results, and what is more, results of a general effect. General policy confined within its proper purpose can not be concerned with mere administrative methods; and to adopt the view announced by the War College Division would be to permit the General Staff to control bureau administration of every character, to depart from and neglect their own general functions, and thus nullify the law and postpone the reform which Congress intended to inaugurate. It is the effect of the language, and must therefore have been the real purpose of the act, to reestablish the relation of the several bureau chiefs as special aids and advisors to the Secretary of War upon matters which fall within their special jurisdiction, uninterfered with by an outside agency. As a matter of organic law established or recognized by Congress, such from the beginning of the Government has been the special purpose and function of the administrative bureaus. I am well aware that bureau chiefs have in times past gone beyond these limited functions, and equally aware that in the old days of the commanding general and in the later days of the General Staff control chiefs of bureau have had their jurisdiction unlawfully restricted and partially absorbed by agencies having no warrant of law for their action. Whether the establishment of such special bureau control is necessary or wise is immaterial, if it can be said upon a fair consideration of the statute that it is the organic system which Congress has prescribed and which it has so recently sought to preserve; but both candor and intellectual integrity require me to say that I can see nothing helpful to be achieved by subjecting the action of a bureau chief within the sphere of his special jurisdiction to the review of another officer of the Army whose position alone upon the General Staff is that which serves to endow him with a special knowl-

edge of the subject which Congress has exclusively intrusted to a bureau chief, and success can hardly be expected from such incongruity. The original statute, as well as the recent one, contemplated, of course, what ordinary intelligence must appreciate, that the administrative efforts of the several bureaus must be coordinated, and must be supervised for that purpose. Such a coordination lies of necessity beyond the power and jurisdiction of any particular bureau, and must therefore be regulated by agencies outside of those bureaus. But that regulation must be achieved without absorbing any of the bureau duties, and it must be of a general kind, and have regard to matters involving policies. The coordinating, supervising, and informing powers conferred upon the General Staff must be exercised with this principle in view.

5. Coming now to the duties of the Chief of Staff: I do not believe that by virtue of any authority he has, either in his capacity as a member of the General Staff Corps or as chief of said corps, he can lawfully exercise his power so as to stand between a bureau head and the Secretary of War himself upon matters assigned by law, regulation, and custom to the administrative bureau except by laying down rules of policy and general rules designed to coordinate the efforts of the various bureaus; nor is he ever justified in substituting in such matters his judgment for theirs. I know that the practice under the law as it existed up to the passage of the National Defense Act did not accord with this view. Whatever may have been said in justification of that practice heretofore, in view of the unmistakable purpose of Congress to reestablish bureau jurisdiction absorbed by the General Staff and the Chief of Staff, as is so clearly enunciated in the recent act, the practice ought not to be continued. The Chief of Staff is but a member of the General Staff Corps, whose duties are the duties of that corps, except in so far as they may be found to be otherwise by section 4 of the original act, read in the light of the recent act, which establishes for him a special relation to the President and to the Secretary of War. That section is as follows:

That the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, shall have supervision of all troops of the line and of the Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, Judge Advocate's, Quartermaster's Subsistence, Medical, Pay and Ordnance Departments, Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps, and shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President.

He is here given supervision of the line and of the staff departments. Supervision is a word of broad meaning. It may mean a direct control or it may mean a general power of overseeing, with a view to regulation

through a power drawn from some other source. Supervision does not, as a legal concept, when applied to matters military, carry the idea of command. The abolition of the old office of commanding general was to bring departmental organization more in harmony with the constitutional precepts that the Secretary of War, as the constitutional mouthpiece of the President, was himself the commander of the Army. Operating upon the same subject and for the same purpose as does the supervisory powers of that corps, the supervision specially conferred upon the Chief of Staff must be the kind of supervision which is conferred upon other members of the General Staff, who are in a sense the assistants of the Chief of Staff in the performance of his duties, though, of course, his supervisory power is of a much higher degree.

The supervisory power of the Chief of Staff to be exercised under the direction of the Secretary of War is of a general kind, does not extend to the invasion or absorption of duties of a special bureau, but is to be exercised upon general subjects in a general manner, seeking a general effect, with a general policy in view. It does not relate to particular and routine performance, it does not descend to an overseeing of minor or detailed operations. It concerns only the higher functions of command and administration and must relate to general results rather than to particular means and particular activities. I see nothing in the statute which substitutes the Chief of Staff for the several bureau chiefs as an aid and advisor to the Secretary of War concerning those matters which are committed by Congress to their special jurisdiction and control. But, on the other hand, the statute expressly provides to the contrary. Indeed, the organic act, notwithstanding the practice which grew up under it, in the very section devoted to the duties of the Chief of Staff indicates clearly that it was never the intention to confer upon him powers and duties already assigned to the administrative bureaus, for, as one of several reasons, in a general clause following an enumeration, it is prescribed that the Chief of Staff shall "perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President." And the recent National Defense Act represcribes with emphasis and particularity the same relation and enjoins that hereafter it shall be observed.

I think the true view is this, that under the statute the jurisdiction of the Chief of Staff does not absorb that of the several bureaus nor subject their action or their views upon particular matters falling within their special jurisdiction to his review and modifying judgment, but that his function is limited to that of general supervision, going no farther than to secure by the exercise of general power under the direction of the Secretary of War to insure harmonious cooperation and successful

general results. Likewise it is only in respect to such matters and for such purposes that he is the special superior adviser of the Secretary of War.

I am well aware that those matters which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bureau chiefs must usually, in their finality, require executive action, and that it would be absurd to hold that the Secretary of War or the Assistant Secretary must personally dictate or prescribe that action in the myriad of matters. To my mind, this gives rise to no difficulty. Certainly it ought not to be urged to enlarge the duties of the Chief of Staff by requiring him, unlawfully, I think, to act ministerially and without discretion in numerous matters to the neglect of his own higher functions. If the matters are minor matters of routine or if they are minor matters subject to government by an established general policy which has already been established for their government, it would be unwise administration to require the discretion of the Secretary of War to be addressed in the execution of such details, and in such matters only his order evidenced ministerially by the signature of The Adjutant General or other appropriate bureau chief is needed to give formal authenticity to his action. If the subject be of more than routine importance and yet not of general effect nor involving general policy, such an exceptional case is to be considered by the head of the department upon the advice of the bureau chief. In all matters falling within the special jurisdiction of the several bureaus, Congress has said in effect the view of the particular bureau chiefs shall govern the Secretary so far as his own judgment is to be advised; and if the Secretary of War respects not the advice of his lawful advisers but subjects it to the extra-legal review, he to that extent dispenses with the statute and the lawful medium of control, and moreover destroys the distribution of departmental organic powers ordained by law.

E. H. CROWDER,
Judge Advocate General.”⁷

When General Scott, the Chief of Staff, received the above opinion from the Judge Advocate General, his intimate knowledge of and long experience in the War Department told him that such an interpretation of the law could not be right. Of course, the Chief of Staff viewed the problem as an administrative question rather than a legal one. He knew that General Crowder's interpretation “would operate to destroy the power of the General Staff and send us backward to conditions prevailing before the Spanish War.”⁸ He therefore determined to fight this view “as long as [he] could stand on his feet.”⁹ In submitting his own brief and that of the Judge Advocate General's Department, together

with a copy of the law to the Secretary of War Baker, General Scott said: "Mr. Secretary: I am handing you a case that will be the most important decision that you will ever have to make in that chair. Your verdict may spell victory or defeat for our armies. You are a lawyer yourself and are accustomed to interpreting the law. There it is, and there are the interpretations—I submit them both to you. I am not going to argue with you or to nag you about them. I leave them with you in the hope that you will realize the significance of your decision to the Army and to the country."¹⁰

SECRETARY BAKER DECIDES THE GENERAL STAFF POSITION

Fortunately, Baker was not only a lawyer but a student of administrative theory as well. The Secretary of War took the two opinions and the copy of the law "home with him and kept them for more than a month."¹¹ Secretary Baker realized that the problem required "a careful historical study of Army legislation covering a long period of years."¹² This he proceeded to do. But this was only part of the problem. Perhaps it was the influence of his study of administrative theory at Johns Hopkins under Wilson. Whatever the underlying cause might have been, Baker wisely reviewed the whole administrative theory behind the General Staff. The excellence and the subsequent importance of his decision, his opinion and his reasons for such a decision are indisputable:

"Decision of the Secretary of War on the Effect of Section 5 of the National Defense Act.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 13, 1916.

The provisions of section 5 of "An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes," approved June 3, 1916, relating to the General Staff Corps, call for an opinion from the Secretary of War as to their effect upon the transaction of the business of the department and the relations to exist in the future between the Chief of the General Staff and the heads of various bureaus of the War Department.

Section 5, provides that the General Staff Corps shall consist of one Chief of Staff, detailed in time of peace from major generals of the line, and various other officers, for some of whom specific duties are provided, as, for instance, that one of them is required to be president of the Army War College. The General Staff Corps is made a detailed corps, with the result that upon being relieved from duty in that corps officers return to the branch of the Army in which they were perman-

ently commissioned, and no officer detailed to the General Staff Corps is eligible to a further detail therein until he shall have served two years with the branch of the Army in which commissioned, except in time of actual or threatened hostilities. Thus the General Staff Corps is made to consist of a constantly changing detail of officers brought from the line of the Army and returned thereto, with the apparent purpose of having this corps represent and embody the opinion of the Army upon technical military subjects, as that opinion is matured and developed from time to time by actual experience, and careful provision is made against the General Staff Corps becoming a permanent body disassociated from the actual military forces of the Nation, and therefore, to a greater or less extent, out of touch with the opinion of the active Army.

So far as the duties assigned to the General Staff Corps by section 5 of the National Defense Act are concerned, they are covered by the following language: 'All officers detailed in said corps shall be exclusively employed in the study of military problems, the preparation of plans for the national defense, and the utilization of the military forces in time of war, in investigating and reporting upon the efficiency and state of preparedness of such forces for service in peace or war, or on appropriate general-staff duties in connection with troops, including the National Guard, or as military attaches in foreign countries, or on other duties, not of an administrative nature, on which they can be lawfully and properly employed.'

Certain redistribution of functions are made by the act, the most notable being the abolition of the Mobile Army Division and Coast Artillery Division, the latter of which is created into a bureau of the War Department, and the business of the former is committed to the office of The Adjutant General. But scattered through this section there are statements of this import:

'That the War College shall remain fully subject to the supervising, coordinating, and informing powers conferred by law upon members of the General Staff Corps.

'That the bureau of The Adjutant General shall, "subject to the exercise of the supervising, coordinating, and informing powers conferred upon members of the General Staff Corps by act of Congress last hereinbefore cited," perform the business theretofore performed by the Mobile Army Division, and that "the Chief of Coast Artillery shall be an additional member of the General Staff Corps and shall also be adviser to and informant of the Chief of Staff in respect to the business under his charge."'

And then follows certain restrictive language which calls for this opinion. The language is as follows: 'Provided further, That here-

after members of the General Staff Corps shall be confined strictly to the discharge of the duties of the general nature of those specified for them in this section and in the organic act of Congress last hereinbefore cited, and they shall not be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus or offices of the War Department, or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the General Staff Corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices, or would cause injurious or unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.'

It will be observed that the section under review does not negative the survival of the 'supervising, coordinating, and informing powers' conferred by law upon members of the General Staff Corps, but, on the contrary, reiterates those powers, and in the transfer of certain business in the War Department from divisions abolished by the act expressly subjects those powers in the hands of the new donees to the General Staff powers either enumerated in this section or incorporated into it by reference to the act approved February 14, 1903 which created the General Staff Corps no part of which act is in express terms repealed. It seems clear, therefore, that the new part of this legislation, namely, that restricting the work to be done by members of the General Staff Corps to work of a nonadministrative nature is the only phase of it calling for interpretation, and it is equally clear that this interpretation must proceed upon the foundation established by an understanding of the intention of Congress, as expressed in the act of February 14, 1903, which is not only the act by which the General Staff was established, but is plainly the act assumed by Congress as the fundamental and organic basis of whatever modifications are intended by section 5 of the act of June 3, 1916.

The development of a general scheme of systematic instruction in the Army, leading to the original War College Board, undoubtedly directed the attention of the Secretary of War to the general subject of Army organization. In the Report for 1901, Secretary Root said:

'The creation of the War College Board and the duties which will be imposed upon it, as indicated in my report of 1899, is probably as near an approach to the establishment of a General Staff as is practicable under existing law. . . .

'No one can doubt that the general and field officers of our Army have been too exclusively occupied in details of administration, with inadequate opportunity and provision for the study of great questions, and consideration and formation of plans, comprehensive forethought against future contingencies, and coordination of the various branches of the service with a view to harmonious action. A body of competent

military experts should be charged with these matters of the highest importance, and to that end I strongly urge the establishment by law of a General Staff, of which the War College Board shall form a part.'

In the Annual Report for 1902 Secretary Root returns to this subject and argues it at considerable length, showing continuous improvement in Army organization, by saying:

'Our military system is, however, still exceedingly defective at the top. We have the different branches of the military service well organized, each within itself, for the performance of its duties. Our administrative staff and supply departments, as a rule, have at their heads good and competent men, faithful to their duties, each attending assiduously to the business of his department.

'But when we come to the coordination and direction of all these means and agencies of warfare, so that all parts of the machine shall work true together, we are weak. Our system makes no adequate provision for the directing brain which every army must have, to work successfully. Common experience has shown that this can not be furnished by any single man without assistants, and that it requires a body of officers working together under the direction of a chief and entirely separate from and independent of the administrative staff of an army. . . . This body of officers, in distinction from the administrative staff, has come to be called a general staff.'

The whole discussion of this subject by Secretary Root is informing, and in order to get an understanding of the full weight of the argument made all that is said on that subject in his report should be examined. The following sentences, however, are indicative of the thought in his mind: 'Such a body of men doing general staff duty is just as necessary to prepare an army properly for war in time of peace as it is in time of war. It is not an executive body; it is not an administrative body; it acts only through the authority of others. It makes intelligent command possible by procuring and arranging information and working out plans in detail, and makes intelligent and effective execution of commands possible by keeping all the separate agents advised of the parts they are to play in the general scheme. . . .

'The title of Chief of Staff, on the other hand, denotes a duty to advise, inform and assist a superior officer who has command and to represent him, acting in his name and by his authority in carrying out his policies and securing the execution of his commands. The officer who accepts the position assumes the highest obligation to be perfectly loyal to his commander, to exclude all personal interest from his advice and representation, and to try, in the most whole-hearted way, to help him to right conclusions, and to successful execution of his policies, even

though his conclusion may not agree with the advice given. For the successful performance of his duties the Chief of Staff must have the entire confidence of his commander. . . .

"The Constitution requires the President to be the commander of the Army, and a great variety of laws require the Secretary of War, who directly represents the President, to supervise and direct the expenditure of the vast sums of money appropriated annually by Congress for the support of the Army. As every important movement requires the use of money, so long as the Secretary of War performs this duty faithfully he must practically control the operations of the Army in time of peace, and there can not be any independent command of the Army, except that which the President himself exercises over the Secretary of War and everybody else in the military establishment. It is because Congress has always looked to the civilian Secretary at the head of the War Department to hold the purse strings, that the laws require all the great departments which build fortifications and furnish the arms, supplies, and munitions of war, and actually expend the money for those purposes, such as the Engineer, Ordnance, Quartermaster's, and Subsistence Departments, to act under the direction of the Secretary, and withhold from the officer who is called "Commanding General of the Army" all control over those departments.'

Continuing the argument thus made Secretary Root shows that the office of Commanding General of the Army and the powers conferred upon that officer were entirely inconsistent with and inadequate for the duty contemplated for the Chief of Staff, which office he sought to have established. For the latter office he desired powers of coordination, supervision, and control, in the name of the Secretary of War and under the direction of the Secretary of War, wholly different from and greater than those previously intrusted to the Commanding General of the Army.

In his report for 1903, after the passage of the Act of February 14, 1903, Secretary Root says: 'The important military event of the year affecting the Regular Army has been the reorganization of the system of military control under the general staff act approved February 14, 1903. . . . This act abolished the separate office of Commanding General of the Army, provided for a military Chief of Staff to the President, who acting under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of War representing him, should have supervision not only of all troops of the line but of the special staff and supply departments which had theretofore reported directly to the Secretary of War; and it created for the assistance of the Chief of Staff a corps of 44 officers, who were relieved from all other duties.'

After describing the mode of organization of the first General Staff Corps, Secretary Root says: 'The tenth article of the regulations relating to the Chief of Staff states explicitly the new theory of control inaugurated by the General Staff act.'

That new theory he quotes from the regulations to be as follows: '10. Under the act of February 14, 1903, the command of the army of the United States rests with the constitutional Commander in Chief, the President. The President will place parts of the Army, and separate armies whenever constituted, under commanders subordinate to his general command; and, in case of exigency seeming to him to require it, he may place the whole Army under a single commander subordinate to him; but in time of peace and under ordinary conditions the administration and control of the Army are effected without any second in command.

'The President's command is exercised through the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. The Secretary of War is charged with carrying out the policies of the President in military affairs. He directly represents the President and is bound always to act in conformity to the President's instructions. Under the law and the decisions of the Supreme Court his acts are the President's acts, and his directions and orders are the President's directions and orders.

'The Chief of Staff reports to the Secretary of War, acts as his military adviser, receives from him the directions and orders given in behalf of the President, and gives effect thereto in the manner hereinafter provided.'

Secretary Root then says, with his customary clarity and decision of expression: 'It will be perceived that we are here providing for civilian control over the military arm, but for civilian control to be exercised through a single military expert of high rank, who is provided with an adequate corps of professional assistants to aid him in the performance of his duties, and who is bound to use all his professional skill and knowledge in giving effect to the purposes and general directions of his civilian superior, or make way for another expert who will do so.'

Commenting upon the effect of the inauguration of the system, Secretary Root says: 'In some cases the intervention of the Chief of Staff and his assistants has resulted in an apparent diminution of the independent authority of other officers. This has been received almost universally with a cheerful readiness to subordinate personal considerations to the good of the service.'

The act of February 14, 1903, is universally regarded as the most important piece of Army legislation adopted in recent years. It was recognized at the time as a thoroughgoing and radical change in the

theory of Army control. Not unnaturally this act received very earnest consideration in Congress prior to its passage. The hearings on it were extensive, and Secretary Root, one of the foremost lawyers of the country, and one of the great Secretaries of War of modern times, in his appearance before committees illustrated and reiterated the purpose and meaning of the measure advocated by him. I have examined these hearings with some care, and I find that, without exception, witnesses and members of both House and Senate understood the purpose of the act to be as gathered from the previous quotations from the annual reports of Mr. Root, as Secretary of War. Thus, in his hearing before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Secretary Root says: 'You have imposed by law upon the Secretary of War the responsibility for the expenditure of great sums of money which you appropriate every year, and you have established a great number of corps, bureaus and departments which the Secretary is bound to supervise. Now, I have doubt whether it is competent for the Secretary of War to do that through the intermediation of a Chief of Staff or a General Staff unless there is some statutory authority. I do not know whether in the face of the statute which makes the Quartermaster General and the Commissary General and the Chief of Ordnance directly responsible to the Secretary of War I can order them to report to a Chief of Staff.

'I do not want you to relieve the Secretary of War of responsibility, but I want you to enable him to discharge this responsibility through a military officer who will gather together in the performance of staff duties all the considerations affecting the decision that the Secretary has to make, and do it with military knowledge, instead of the Secretary having to dig around and gather them himself and collate the advice and requests that come from the heads of these different departments that are all overlapping and interwoven in their action.'

In short, I think nothing can be clearer from the written opinions of the Secretary of War, whose suggestions are responsible for the creation of the General Staff, and from the hearings before the committees of Congress and the debates in the Congress upon the passage of the General Staff bill, than that it was intended to supply to the Secretary of War a lawfully authorized military adviser to whom all other heads of departments and bureaus should report, and through whom the Secretary of War should be constantly kept advised and informed; that it should be the duty of this officer, aided by the General Staff Corps created by the act, so to advise himself of all operations of military departments and bureaus of the War Department as to inform the judgment of the Secretary upon any question submitted for his decision, and by correlating, coordinating, and supervising the judgments of the

various heads of bureaus and subdepartments be able to prevent a civilian Secretary of War from inadvertent error, due either to a lack of familiarity with military matters or to the vast pressure of business of many and diverse characters which too far absorb the time of the Secretary of War to permit him, personally, to undertake the detailed study necessary in each case.

It was out of this atmosphere and with this intention that the act of February, 1903, was passed, and the language adopted to meet this situation seems most apt and adequate. I quote from the statute:

'There is hereby established a General Staff Corps, to be composed of officers detailed from the Army at large under such rules as may be prescribed by the President.

'Sec. 2. That the duties of the General Staff Corps shall be to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the different officers who are subject under the terms of this act to the supervision of the Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.

* * *

'Sec. 4. That the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President or of the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, shall have supervision of all troops of the line and of The Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, Judge Advocate's, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Medical, Pay, and Ordnance Departments, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps, and shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President. Duties now prescribed by statute for the Commanding General of the Army as a member of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and of the Board of Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home shall be performed by the Chief of Staff or other officer designated by the President.'

If this act means anything, it means that in large and general terms the Chief of Staff thereby authorized has supervision of the corps, bureaus, and departments therein enumerated, and the large and generous terms employed indicate the plain intention of Congress to empower the Chief of Staff to stand in the relation of military aide and adviser to the Secretary of War, and, acting in his name, so to direct the activities

of the heads of bureaus and subdepartments to coordinate and harmonize their activities.

If the large and general purpose outlined in the foregoing paragraph has been changed by the language of section 5 of the National Defense Act, that change must result from these words: 'All officers detailed in said corps shall be exclusively employed . . . on other duties, not of an administrative nature,' or from these words in the proviso: "and they shall not be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus or offices of the War Department, or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the General Staff Corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices or would cause injurious or unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.'

The weighty part of this language apparently is the prohibition upon members of the General Staff from performing duties of an administrative nature, and we are called upon, therefore, to determine what was meant by the words 'administrative duties' in this act.

At the outset it would seem obvious that no such glancing blow as this could have been intended as an implied repeal of the whole fundamental theory of the reorganization act whereby the General Staff was created. It is fair to assume that Congress did not intend to inaugurate a race for power among bureau chiefs or to erect the bureaus of the War Department into a system of coordinated impediments to one another. It must not be forgotten that the Army is a whole—divided, for the purpose of administration, into many parts—but each action by any of the parts must be consistent with the healthy action of the whole. A realization of this was the moving cause to the creation of the General Staff; and if the Congress has come to believe that its efforts to correct the evils sought to be redressed by the creation of the General Staff was a failure and that no such supervision and coordination as was then aimed at had resulted from the General Staff, and so believing desired to abandon the experiment, it would not have been done by this tentative, obscure, and admonitory sentence. In other words, an evil of large proportions and menacing character had presented itself in 1903. Congress erected a new system to deal with that evil. If the system has failed and Congress is disillusioned with it as an experiment, the whole structure will be swept aside and some new corrective of the old evils attempted. But it is quite inconceivable that the Congress in any such frame of mind would merely paralyze without removing the corrective agency it had created and provide no substitute for it—restoring the old system with all of its evils and the added encumbrance of a paralyzed and inoperative machine originally designed as a corrective.

I have read the extremely able arguments which have been prepared for my consideration on this subject by the Judge Advocate General and others. To the extent that I am now disagreeing with the view therein expressed, it seems to me that my disagreement is rather one of assumptions than of logic. If it be assumed that a lot of promiscuous interferences, duplications, and losses of time had grown up in the operation of the General Staff system, then the language adopted by Congress would seem to be an admonition to the Secretary of War to correct those difficulties; and, to the Chief of the General Staff, recalling to his attention the primary purposes for which the General Staff was created, in order to prevent a practice growing up which would involve the operations of the General Staff in masses of detail, and so far absorb its mind as to leave no leisure for the consideration of general policy questions, which are, of course, of great moment to be considered. It seems to me that the Judge Advocate General does assume that the Congress had in mind the existence of those duplications, interferences, and losses of time, and that therefore the Congress by the use of the word "administrative" must have intended to provide a rule which would exclude the General Staff practically from every other concern except the consideration of large policy questions. I admit that where an evil exists and a legislative enactment is addressed to it, the rule of interpretation seeks to expand the proposed remedy to accomplish the purpose for which it was designed. But the Congress had before it no catalogue of evils. No complaints were made to the Congress by the Secretary of War—who speaks with authority for the War Department—that he found himself unable to secure an adequate consideration of major policy problems from the General Staff because Congress had imposed conflicting duties upon the General Staff. Individual officers of the Army may have undertaken to express their opinions to Members of the Congress about the exercise of the coordinating functions of the General Staff. But all such opinions are necessarily partisan and partial, so that we must limit our assumption to the facts, and in so doing we find no system of facts adequate as a predicate for action by Congress which would destroy the power of the General Staff, bind the Secretary of War to rely upon the uncoordinated advice of individual bureau chiefs, and while giving the Chief of the General Staff the duty of coordinating the functions of the military bureaus of the department at the same time prohibit that degree of supervision over the affairs of those bureaus which in his judgment is necessary to equip him with qualifying information.

As a matter of fact, the word 'administrative' is one of extremely doubtful import. Legally it perhaps means, when applied to duties,

such duties as involve no exercise of discretion. That is to say, if an officer is directed by statute to pay a dollar a day to each of 10 persons, no discretion is involved in his payments—his duty is administrative. If such an officer is authorized to pay a dollar a day to so many of a group of 10 persons as shall have lived up to a certain standard of performance in duties assigned them day by day, then the discretion of determining the merit of applicants for the pay is non-administrative, because a discretionary duty. I doubt very much, however, whether this word was used in any such technical sense. The rule of construction in such cases is that unless there is something in the context to determine that a technical meaning is attached to a term, it will be assumed to be used in the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of the word. Now, the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of this term in this context obviously is that the Chief of the General Staff and the members of the General Staff Corps shall not administer the offices of the bureau chiefs. That is to say, that the Chief of the General Staff shall give no order to a subordinate of the Chief of Ordnance or The Adjutant General, for that would be the administration of that department, and such administration must proceed from the head of the department. Indeed, it seems to me entirely likely that the statute under examination provides its own definition of the meaning of the word 'administrative,' for it says, in effect, that these administrative duties are such as those which pertain—to established bureaus or offices of the War Department, or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the General Staff Corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices, or would cause injurious or unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.

These words last quoted supply all the guide necessary for a working definition of the word 'administrative,' and they enumerate the kind of acts which the Congress does not intend the General Staff to undertake. They are exactly the kind of acts which the original act creating the General Staff did not intend to assign to the General Staff. Secretary Root said the proposed duties are not administrative, are not executive, but are correlating, informing, supervising, so that we in effect have in this latest legislative expression a reiteration of the intentions of the Congress in the earlier act as defined and explained by the authority of the act and the policy which it embodied.

It seems to me, therefore, entirely clear that the structure erected by the act of 1903 remains as then created, except for the explicit modifications provided in the act of 1916 and not affecting the current of this argument; that the Chief of the General Staff is charged with the supervision of the various departments, bureaus, and offices of the War De-

partment for the purpose of coordinating their activities and for the purpose of so informing the judgment of the Secretary of War that he may not, by inadvertence or unfamiliarity with military practice, take action which would be prejudicial to harmonious results in the military service. Finding the intention of the act to be as here set forth, it is my opinion that the Chief of the General Staff is the primary adviser of the Secretary of War in all matters having to do with the Military Establishment; that in order properly to inform himself, the Chief of the General Staff must know of the proceedings in the various bureaus, departments, and offices; that, to as large an extent as possible, the action of these bureaus, departments, and offices should be regulated by large policies laid down by the Secretary of War, the carrying out of which would involve merely administrative activity; but that in order to make sure that these policies are not being departed from or ought not to be changed, in order properly to harmonize the relations of several bureaus, it is not only appropriate but necessary for the Chief of the General Staff to pursue, with as great detail as his judgment dictates, the execution of these policies through the several bureaus.

It is easy to imagine a case in which the chief of a bureau or an officer would feel that some policy provided by the Chief of Staff in an effort to coordinate the work of several bureaus unduly restrained his activities, and that such a bureau chief would desire to argue personally for his point of view before the Secretary of War. In any such cases the Chief of Staff should secure a hearing for the bureau chief before the Secretary, and I have no doubt that any Chief of Staff or any Secretary of War would be very zealous to see that opinions earnestly entertained by officers were considered thoroughly, for, after all, we are all of us common servants with a common purpose in a common cause, and our zeal for particular branches of that service is merely a specialization of our zeal for the welfare and success of the larger whole which includes it. A recognition of this fact produced the spirit which Secretary Root referred to with so much pleasure immediately after the creation of the General Staff, in which slight irritations, due to the unaccustomed machinery, easily gave way and harmonious relations arose. This fine spirit for the public service is no less present now and will work with as excellent results.

The policy of the War Department, therefore, will remain as heretofore; the Chief of Staff, speaking in the name of the Secretary of War, will coordinate and supervise the various bureaus, offices, and departments of the War Department; he will advise the Secretary of War; he will inform himself in as great detail as in his judgment seems necessary to qualify him adequately to advise the Secretary of War. Should

any regulations or orders be necessary to place the determination herein made in proper form, the Chief of the General Staff will prepare them for my signature.

NEWTON D. BAKER."¹³

GENERAL HUGH L. SCOTT'S VIEWS ON THE GENERAL STAFF

Major General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff, was wholeheartedly in sympathy with the views of Mr. Baker. In his last report as Chief of Staff, which he made shortly before retiring, General Scott stated his philosophy concerning the place of the General Staff as follows:

"This act made it possible for the Secretary of War, had he decided upon such an interpretation, to make The Adjutant General his organ of command for all business concerning the mobile Army, and the Chief of Coast Artillery his organ of command for all concerning that branch of the service, thus eliminating the Chief of Staff from commanding or being an organ of command, and restricting him to duties of 'super-vision and coordination.' These duties, in the absence of direct or delegated power to command the mobile Army and the Coast Artillery (that is, the whole line) might readily have become vague and finally nominal only.

Whatever may have been the changes in the method of commanding the Army which this legislation was intended to bring about, I believe that its passage by Congress was based upon a misconception of the true role of a General Staff and a Chief of Staff. Its effect has not as yet been considerable, but it indicates a tendency to revert to a system which we have tried in a small Army and found wanting even there, and which if now applied to our larger Army would present a grave danger.

I can not imagine why this seeming suspicion should exist as to the honesty of purpose toward the Government and disinterested loyalty toward the whole military service of the Chief of Staff and his assistants, that ever-changing body of officers known as the General Staff.

Since, in any scheme of decentralized yet converging authority, power must be delegated to somebody, there is no reason whatever why there should be any hesitation in conferring it upon the Chief of Staff and his legally appointed subordinates. These men are simply Army officers of exactly the same antecedents, principles, and motives as all other officers of the Army; they are intentionally drawn from all grades and branches, the sole effort being to choose the ablest; they are powerless to select or perpetuate their own members and their own interests are those of the service at large. They do not constitute a permanent body,

and there is no reason why they should be animated by a dangerous desire to advance the interests of the General Staff, since this body is less closely and permanently constituted than any other corps.

I therefore urge that not only should no further narrowing of the field of responsibility of the Chief of Staff be undertaken, but that Congress be asked to formally reverse the tendency in that direction indicated in the act of June 3, 1916. This I hope it will do by passing legislation which will sanctify by law the true powers of the Chief of Staff and remove all impediments to his command, subject to the Secretary's orders, of the line of the Army, and to his duty of coordinating the work of all the staff departments.

The reasons which make this useful are to my mind quite evident and are not based upon any prejudice, or desire for power, or any lack of confidence in other corps and their chiefs, but solely upon elementary principles of military organization. These principles are becoming every day more clearly understood by all our people, due to their intense interest in the war and especially in all that concerns our share in it. This interest begets a discussion and study, and it is for this reason that the time seems opportune to bring this matter to the attention of a Congress which has shown the most liberal and sympathetic as well as earnest attitude toward every military problem presented to it.

In any army unity of command is absolutely essential to secure prompt decisions and rapid execution of them. This unity of command exists only imperfectly in our Army, and the chief reason for this unfortunate condition lies in the fact that parallel and not convergent lines lead to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. Now, countries whose very existence has long depended upon keeping up an efficient army have discovered that this convergence is best secured by a general staff whose functions are to aid the person who commands and to coordinate all efforts toward the success of such operations as this person is undertaking. These may be the assembling, equipping and instructing of troops, or they may be operations of any army against an enemy. In either case the brain of the person in command, whether a general or a secretary of war, must be left free to calmly study and decide upon the larger questions for which he alone is responsible. This freedom, whether in a great business or a great army (and war is merely a very great business), is secured by means of a properly organized staff, whose members must be trained in the same conceptions, must be imbued with the ideas of their chief, and must enjoy his entire confidence. Mutual confidence must be the basis of staff organization.

In all military establishments there are conflicting interests. Each department, as it strives to attain the best results as it sees them, is likely

to conflict with the efforts of some other department animated by that same worthy intention. Only a limited amount of money, men, material, etc., is usually obtainable, and the demands of all can not be fully satisfied. It is one of the most important functions of a general staff to aid in apportioning available resources amongst these claimants and to authoritatively establish the order or priority amongst them in such a way as to best accomplish the results which the war secretary or general may have in mind.

The staff is the repository of its chief's intentions, and its members, having consulted his confidence and knowing his plans, must, in his name and frequently without consulting him, give decisions which will accomplish his purposes. If staff officers consult their chief on all matters he no longer has a staff but only clerks. Now, this high function of coordination which belongs to the Chief of Staff and his assistants implies authority, emanating from one source, converging to it.

And that is the present weakness of our organization. Our Chief of Staff has never been frankly and openly accorded the power necessary to fulfill the functions for which his office with its organized assistance was created. This power, this right to command in the Secretary's name, which in the French and German armies is so clearly expressed and fully acceded to, is implied in phrases such as 'coordinating functions,' 'supervisory capacity,' etc., but there has existed and there still seems to exist, a shirking from saying quite boldly that, under the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff commands the Army and has all the power and responsibility which this situation implies.

It may be well to recall here that when the war broke out in Europe Marshal Joffre was, and had been for some years, Chief of Staff of the French Army. Under French law the chief of staff is the officer who will command in the field in case of war, and to fit him for this duty he commands the army in time of peace. As the French put it, the man who is to use the instrument in war must shape and sharpen it in peace."¹⁴

These three viewpoints contained the best thought on the subject and focused attention on organizational and administrative theory at a very crucial time. Furthermore, the majority opinion, that of Mr. Baker and General Scott, should be borne in mind and evaluated as events of World War I brought great expansion in the War Department and as the wartime grant of powers permitted organizational changes to be made as the need dictated.

The dictum of Baker that "the policy of the War Department . . . will remain as heretofore; the Chief of Staff speaking in the name of

the Secretary of War will coordinate and supervise the various bureaus, offices, and departments; he will advise the Secretary of War; he will inform himself in as great detail as in his judgment seems necessary to qualify him adequately to advise the Secretary of War"¹⁵ was reassuring. There was nothing in the summer of 1916 that Baker could do to avoid carrying out the Congressional mandate that only one-half of the General Staff could be on duty in Washington. With the War Department General Staff thus reduced to twenty, the pressing problem was not one of expanding the General Staff's jurisdiction but rather one of eliminating all superfluous activities.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF RECOMMENDS ADDITIONAL CHIEFS OF BRANCHES

Out of this necessity grew the demand for additional War Department entities. The Chief of Staff in his 1916 Report stated:

"It is a fundamental military principle that the entire Military Establishment, and each of its various components, should have a military head (chief) superior in rank to all under his control, who directly supervises and may be held responsible for its training, efficiency of personnel, and other correlated matters. All staff corps and departments as well as the Coast Artillery now have such a chief. The Cavalry, Infantry, and the Field Artillery have not. Correct military principles and consequently military efficiency require that each of these arms should have a chief and this chief while so serving should have one grade higher rank than any officer of his arm. This chief should be charged with the inspection of his arm and should supervise its training and equipment and all such chiefs should have the same status. If any arm be given an advantage over another, either in the matter of having a chief or in the matter of the official standing of such chief, unequal consideration and treatment and unbalanced military development of these arms will naturally result. For the reasons stated, chiefs of Cavalry, Infantry, and Field Artillery should be provided for those arms as are now authorized by law for the Coast Artillery. During the Civil War when American Cavalry was being developed along lines that have influenced all nations in the use of this arm, it became necessary to establish a bureau of Cavalry at the War Department and appoint chiefs of Cavalry, also of Artillery of the various large commands.

The developments of modern war have made it equally necessary that we should have chiefs of Field Artillery and Infantry. For Field Artillery there are the many questions incident to personnel, organization, training, equipment, arm, etc., which demand the direct and con-

stant attention of a single head or chief. The same is true for Infantry. It is generally admitted that in any final show-down the mobile army must be the main defense of the country. It is, therefore, important that all branches be maintained on the highest plane of efficiency, and this will be only possible when they are given exactly the same status, viz., a chief directly responsible to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. This accords with the recommendation made by the General Staff as well as the views of the line of the Army."¹⁶

This recommendation was again repeated in 1917. In his 1917 Report the Chief of Staff illustrated how the proposed chiefs of the line branches would fit into the War Department General Staff structure:

"Suppose that the question is the adoption of a new Infantry rifle. The Infantry arm would have a chief with immediate access to ample means of study and experiment. This is furnished by the Infantry School of Musketry. Here rifles of all countries and makes are tried out; here are sent all weapons offered by inventors. Suppose something wholly superior to the regulation arm is announced from this school. From the Infantry point of view it ought to be adopted. What would happen?

The Chief of Infantry presents the case to the Chief of Staff; regarding such an important matter there would be conferences called by the Secretary of War, including the Chiefs of Infantry, of Ordnance, and of the General Staff; after this the Secretary must consult the law-making authorities, since a great expenditure is involved and no public discussion is wise unless the matter can be carried through. Suppose finally it is decided to adopt the new rifle. A date is fixed when it should be put in the hands of troops, and after that the Secretary and the Chief of Staff should have no more concern over the matter unless very important questions arise later which require decision.

The Chief of Ordnance proceeds in his own way to manufacture the rifle. But new equipment to go with it and new drill regulations are probably necessary. The Chief of Infantry, through constituted organs subject to his orders or those of the Chief of Staff prepares these and has them approved. The Chief of Staff then issues the orders for the adoption of the new rifle, equipment, and regulations. But during all this time various questions will constantly arise; delay or difficulty of manufacture, a new sight invented, a greater need of money for some other implement. These will be discussed with the Chief of Infantry, and only with the Chief of Staff or the Secretary in case a grave decision is required. Until a few years ago no such system could possibly have been applied in our service. In the old days the Ordnance Department

would have decided upon a weapon, necessarily from a technical point of view, received the approval of the Secretary, and proceeded to make it.

Did the problem consist in the defense of a harbor, with all the intricate and interdependent matters to adjust between many agencies of execution, the case presented to the General Staff is far from being as simple as the one above. Here political and local questions arise, the work involves the Engineers, Coast Artillery, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Quartermaster and Navy Departments, and to suppose that a Secretary of War, whatever his genius, or a Chief of Staff unaided or deprived of real authority, could decide plans and adjust difficulties as they arise, is to deny all human experience carefully trained organs of study and decision as well as of execution are absolutely necessary, and these in all armies are furnished by a well-organized General Staff.

Let us take another case: Suppose that after conferring with his advisers, the Secretary of War decided to organize, equip, and send to France five regiments of Field Artillery of a special description. The time which he has given to the study and decision of the question itself is all that should be expected of him regarding it. In a well-organized war office the execution of this decision would be naturally given first to the Chief of Staff, since it requires the coordination of several departments; but he would depute to the Chief of Field Artillery the immediate supervision of the arrangements, since it concerns his arm. This officer would make general but not detailed studies and turn them over to the various supply departments for execution, and he would see to this execution, coordinate it as to time and place, seek to adjust inevitable clashings of interests, or present them with his opinion to his chief.

The Quartermaster Department would be called upon for vehicles, animals, and clothing, the Ordnance Department for the guns and equipment, the recruiting division for men, and finally the transportation division would be asked to deliver the batteries in France at the time decided upon. The Chief of Field Artillery would himself have prepared, through the agencies of his own office, the special drill regulations required for the new weapons.

To give another illustration, it will be recalled that I have related above that the War College division had prepared a large number of pamphlets of instruction, information, and drill, embodying the most recent and secret ideas and practice concerning each arm of the service. These were furnished us by the allied countries after we entered the war. To give practical effect to this information required a selection of what was needed in each branch of the service and an order putting into

effect the new system, drill, etc. This is a matter of the greatest delicacy and importance to any arm and requires, on the part of the person deciding technical knowledge and experience, time for study and selection, authority to decide.

As regards the Engineers, the Medical Department, or the Coast Artillery, the matter was exceedingly simple, their respective chiefs having all the necessary elements for rapid and wise decision; but for the Infantry and Machine Guns, the Cavalry and the Field Artillery, there was no general officer to whom this decision legally, or, as a matter of routine, pertained, except Gen. Bliss, Gen. Kuhn, Gen. McCain, or myself. Not one of us could pretend to the technical knowledge necessary to select new drill regulations for three arms; not one of us could possibly devote the needful time to the study of the question. All that any one did have was the prestige and authority that belonged to the office he held.

Had there been chiefs of arms with suitably organized assistants, the excellent work of the War College division would have been followed by rapid examination and authoritative selection and application, coming from an acknowledged, qualified source, of the things most necessary and applicable to each arm.

Imagine the Coast Artillery today without a chief and its officers dependent directly upon The Adjutant General and the Chief of Staff for the transaction of all the business pertaining to that arm! And yet the outbreak of war has affected the Coast Artillery only in the smallest degree as compared with tremendous expansion, changes of weapons, and other great problems which have to be met by the Field Artillery and the Infantry."¹⁷

This proposed change indicated a desire for the representation in the War Department organization of all functional entities. The illustration further evidenced an appreciation of keeping the various specialists "on tap rather than on top."

Secretary Baker followed one policy which was quite the opposite of that adopted by Elihu Root. It will be recalled that shortly after the General Staff was established General Carter had written a very strong argument on the necessity of forcing the bureau chiefs to bow to the authority of the Chief of Staff by denying to them easy access to the Secretary of War. In the main Root followed this procedure. Baker on the other hand was extremely anxious to make himself available to his subordinates, stating that "it will not be possible for me to be of as much use to the Government and the Army as I desire to be . . . unless I can have the expression of frank opinions from my associates

in the service."¹⁸ He encouraged a bureau chief to "argue personally from his point of view before the Secretary of War."¹⁹ The only restriction was that the hearing was to be arranged through the Chief of Staff. A precedent was established as early as May, 1916, "when Brigadier General E. M. Weaver, Chief of the Coast Artillery, had sent him a memorandum expressing loyalty to the staff but criticizing its methods. The Secretary's office was an open court."²⁰

THE GENERAL STAFF AS U. S. PARTICIPATION IN WORLD WAR I BEGAN

Prior to the entrance of the United States in the World War in 1917, the War Department General Staff had been ineffective and almost nonexistent. "On April 6, 1917, the date of the declaration of war, the General Staff, which was organized under the provisions of the act of June 3, 1916, had an authorized strength of 41 officers, the first annual increment only having been added. Under the limitations imposed by this act, the General Staff, on the date referred to, consisted of 19 officers stationed in Washington and 22 stationed elsewhere. The task of preparing the plans for creating, mobilizing, organizing, training, equipping, transporting to Europe, and of maintaining and supplying there the future Army of the United States accordingly devolved upon a group of 19 officers, who constituted the General Staff, authorized by law to be stationed in the city of Washington. This personnel was, of course, ridiculously inadequate, not only for the gigantic task confronting it, but for any General Staff work commensurate with the responsibilities of that corps. It is of interest in this connection to note that at the beginning of the war the strength of the general staffs of Germany, France, and England were, respectively, approximately 650, 644, and 232. The low ebb to which the General Staff had been brought at the time of the beginning of the war by restrictive legislation is indicated by the fact that on the signing of the armistice of the 1,072 officers on duty with the War Department General Staff but 4 had had previous General Staff experience; these 4 were general officers."²¹

Indeed, had the War Department General Staff been adequately staffed, one might well doubt whether or not conditions would have been different. President Wilson's devotion to neutrality was such that he condemned any deviation from that path. The extent to which the President invoked compliance to his ideal of neutrality was related by General Bliss in a memorandum in his own handwriting:

"It was early in the autumn of 1915. I was Acting Chief of Staff. Mr. Breckinridge was, for a day or two, Acting Secretary of War. He came into my office early one morning and said that the President had sum-

moned him a few minutes before. He found him holding a copy of the *Baltimore Sun* in his hand, 'trembling and white with passion.' The President pointed to a little paragraph of two lines in an out-of-the-way part of a sheet, evidently put in just to fill space. It read something like this: 'It is understood that the General Staff is preparing a plan in the event of war with Germany.'

The President asked Mr. Breckinridge if he supposed that was true. Mr. Breckinridge said that he did not know. The President directed him to make an immediate investigation and, if it proved true, to relieve at once every officer of the General Staff and order him out of Washington. Mr. Breckinridge put the investigation up to me.

I told him that the law creating the General Staff made it its duty 'to prepare plans for the national defense'; that I was President of the War College when the General Staff was organized in 1903; that from that time till then the College had studied over and over again plans for war with Germany, England, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico, etc. I said that if the President took the action threatened, it would only make patent to everybody what pretty much everybody already knew and would create a great political row, and, finally, it would be absurd.

I think the President realized this in a cooler moment. Nothing further was said to him about the matter, nor did he again mention it. But Mr. Breckinridge directed me to caution the War College to 'camouflage' its work. It resulted in practically no further official studies."²²

Had the General Staff been adequate and had the administration been more forward minded, there would still exist grave doubts as to how well the General Staff could have planned the American war effort. The great obstacle was the lack of a proper directive. For what should America have planned? Major General Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff at the time, noted that "the General Staff felt in 1916 that the nation was drifting rapidly into war and Congress was asked for a million men which action caused much hilarity. 'What do you want with a million men?' they demanded. 'The United States will never be at war with anybody!' Six months later the same Congress passed the act declaring the United States to be in a state of war."²³ How could the General Staff have planned with such a change of pace as exhibited by the directing voice of the nation? Even when the war became imminent Congress temporized over basic decisions without an answer to which there could be little planning. General Scott attested to the difficulty and delay over the question of whether armies should be raised by conscription. "A large element of Congress tried in every way to

avoid conscription, wishing to send us into war with the same old political mistakes as were made in our previous wars. The Speaker of the House threw the weight of his office and personal prestige against the measure. . . . Conscription was the policy of the Democratic President, yet the Speaker of the House, the floor leader and the chairman of the Military Committee, all Democrats, would have none of it, leaving the policy of the Democratic President to be carried through the House mainly by the patriotic efforts of a Republican Jew born in Germany, Mr. Julius Kahn, the member from California, for whom no honor can be too great."²⁴

Whereas war had been declared on April 6, the Draft Act was not approved until May 19, 1917, and until April 30 there was no assurance that it would pass. Secretary Baker was anxious to expedite the matter and have the registration follow close after the approval of the bill. Some ten million forms were required and the necessary preliminary work cost around a quarter of a million dollars and involved extensive planning. General Hugh Johnson, at that time a major, handled all the preliminary details. Here action was taken on a huge scale on the presumption that Congress would enact the measure sponsored by the administration. Such preliminary planning can perhaps be done in wartime but neither Congress nor the people would be apt to tolerate such a procedure in time of peace. As General Peyton March, who became Chief of Staff in March, 1918, wrote later: "When we first entered the war, the Administration was not entirely clear in its own mind what our part in the struggle should be. Obviously, our entrance placed at the service of the Allied cause a practically unlimited supply of money and material. And many military men, even, supposed that our assistance, as far as men were concerned, would be limited to a show of the flag by a small force. This was largely based on the fact that we had no ships to transport and supply any considerable number of men at such a distance from their home base. And building ships takes time.

* * *

"It is clear from the limitation of the capacity of the original cantonments that the War Department, including the General Staff, had no conception of what we were entering upon. Nor has it ever seemed to me clear that anyone then in authority completely grasped the fact."²⁵

General March's testimony showed that the uncertainties in the way of analysis and prognosis of American policy were such that detailed prior planning by the General Staff was impossible or, if it had been possible, would very likely have proven useless.

In this respect the War Department General Staff faced a quandary

for which there was no satisfactory solution. During the period when General Wood was Chief of Staff, the War Department General Staff in its planning activities had tried to tell Congress what to do. The General Staff wanted a preparedness program which would have cost huge sums; the people were sensitive to the high cost of living and Congress, with its ears very properly to the ground, would have no part of a more expensive national defense. The result was that Congress not only ignored the General Staff, it almost eliminated it as an institution. The General Staff was roundly criticized for not confining its attention to its proper level—planning within the confines set by Congress. Between 1916 and America's entrance into the War, the General Staff did hold back, its lack of personnel forced it to. Conceivably, it did work within the area directed by Congress and the pursuit by Wilson of a policy of neutrality in thought as well as in deed virtually closed the door to any comprehensive planning. Yet when war came the General Staff was roundly criticized for its failure to anticipate the situation and to properly plan. Thus was posed a particularly perplexing question which appeared to be insoluble. Administrative planning, to be effective, must rest on the foundation of sound decisions and directives enunciated by the legislative branch and arrived at by political processes. The attempt of administrative planners to cajole Congress and the people into adopting directives desired by the planners had proved disastrous. The spectacle of administrative planners sitting back while Congress temporized or pursued policies dictated by day-to-day expediency and subject to complete reversal was everywhere condemned. The cards seemed to be stacked against the General Staff; it was a case of damned if you do and damned if you don't.

The expansion of the War Department General Staff during the World War came about as the result of many reorganizations and changes incident to the tremendous expansion that occurred throughout the entire structure.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT AS WE ENTERED WORLD WAR I

As a necessary preliminary to the changes that occurred after the outbreak of war, one needs to scrutinize the War Department and Army organization as it existed just prior to the war. At the base a dual system persisted. Still scattered throughout a large number of posts, elements of the Army were organized tactically into companies, batteries, troops, battalions, and squadrons, regiments, brigades, and divisions. Prior to its abolition in 1916 the Mobile Army Division of the General Staff had concerned itself with this tactical organization. The Coast Artillery Districts into which the coastline was divided were the imme-

diate concern of the Coast Artillery Division of the War Department General Staff. With the assemblage of troops from all over the country on the Mexican border which began in 1913 and continued until 1917, the tactical organizational set-up became increasingly important. With the concentration of Army units into relatively large commands on the border, the War Department, as was natural, began to deal directly with these units in more and more matters. However, the post, territorial Department, War Department organizational structure still existed. It will be recalled that General Wood in 1911²⁶ had established an administrative structure based on army posts, territorial Departments, territorial Divisions, and the War Department. This arrangement had been discontinued in February, 1913, the territorial divisions being eliminated. "By General Orders No. 9, War Department, February 6, 1913, the territory of the United States and its possessions was reorganized into geographical commands, as follows: The Eastern Department . . ., the Central Department . . ., the Southern Department . . ., the Western Department . . ., the Philippine Department . . ., and the Hawaiian Department."²⁷ Under General Orders No. 28, War Department, April 2, 1917, as amended by General Orders No. 51, War Department, May 1, 1917, the Coast Artillery Districts were incorporated into and became a part of the geographical Departments in which they were located. In addition the Eastern Department was made into three separate departments, the Northeastern Department, the Southeastern Department, and the Eastern Department which was reduced from its former size to an area which included the states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Porto Rico. By Section VI of General Orders No. 76, War Department, June 26, 1917, the Canal Zone was constituted as a separate department. No change was made in the Philippine or Hawaiian Departments. Thus during the war there were nine geographical Departments reporting to the War Department. General Wood, who had been in command of the Eastern Division in 1917, believed that its subdivision into three Departments was dictated by the desire of the War Department and the Democratic administration to get rid of this Republican firebrand and cohort of Theodore Roosevelt.²⁸ The War Department's justification was that the change had been recommended by the War College Division of the War Department General Staff.²⁹ With the great movement of troops to France through the ports of the Eastern seaboard, the wisdom of this change became apparent. Due regard to the "span of control" amply justified the change.

The War Department was organized into thirteen distinct bureaus: the Ordnance Department, the Office of Engineers, the Surgeon Gen-

eral's Office, the Quartermaster General's Office, the Adjutant General's Office, the Inspector General's Department, the Judge Advocate General's Department, the Office of the Chief of Coast Artillery, the Militia Bureau, the Office of the Provost Marshal General, the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, and the Office in charge of the Panama Canal and Railroad. The Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff and the War College existed, but after the act of June 3, 1916, they could exercise but exceedingly limited influence. By the terms of the act of June 3, 1916, each of these bureaus reported directly to the Secretary of War. The War Department General Staff was not lifted out of the impotency to which it had been reduced by the act of June 3, 1916, until May of 1917 when its strength was raised by the act of May 12, 1917, to ninety-one officers. Prior to the passage of the act of June 3, 1916, the War College Division of the General Staff, consisting of 21 officers, had been organized into the following committees: military preparation and policy; war plans; organization; equipment and training; regular troops; militia; military education; military information and monographs; history; library and map room; legislation; and miscellaneous correspondence.³⁰ As a result of the restrictions placed on the General Staff by the act of June 3, 1916, the personnel of the War College Division of the War Department General Staff was reduced to the point where there were but 11 officers on duty there on the outbreak of war on April 6, 1917. "This number was so small as to prevent any definite organization into committees. A certain specialization in duties was maintained, but a large part of the work was assigned more or less promiscuously."³¹

Despite the skeletonized arrangement, the Chief of Staff commended the work of this body: "In spite of this small personnel it is worthy of note that a large amount of work was done in drafting regulations for and in putting into effect such provisions of the national defense act as those increasing the Regular Army and creating the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, Officers' Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and citizens' training camps. At the same time there was prepared a study of a system of national defense based upon universal liability to military training and service, which formed the basis for the actual organization of the National Army, under the provisions of the act of May 18, 1917, into 16 divisional areas with a cantonment for each area, the exact location of the cantonments being determined by a study of strategic, transportation, and local conditions. Another important result of the studies made during this period was the establishment in May, 1917, of the 16 officers' training camps."³² Thus, the War Department General Staff, reduced though it was, continued to exercise the important




CHART 3

duties of planning and coordination throughout the period when the restrictive provisions of the act of June 3, 1916, were in effect.

When the act of May 12, 1917, increased the number of General Staff officers to 91, the officers on duty with the War College Division of the War Department General Staff were increased to 50. The War College Division was then organized into the following standing committees: recruitment and organization; military operations; equipment; training; legislation and regulations; and military intelligence section.³³ A little less than a week later, the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, removed all legislative restrictions on the size or duties of the War Department General Staff by authorizing the President to provide all necessary officers for the line and the staff.³⁴ Thus, the organization of the War Department and the War Department General Staff was fixed in the spring of 1917 by Congressional enactments—but thereafter was freed to take whatever form and size the pressure of events dictated. Thus was set the stage for a most interesting experiment in administration and organization.

The chart³⁵ shown on page 223 depicts the organization of the War Department at the outbreak of the war in 1917 and as it continued to operate during the summer and fall of 1917. "During this period the important work of the (War College) division of the War Department General Staff included plans for the reception of the first draft, the organization of the first 38 divisions, the training of the Army, the transport of troops overseas, and production and supply of the necessary arms, equipment, clothing, etc. It was due in no small measure, to the plans and studies of this division that the initial organization and training of the first increment of the new Army was effected."³⁶

The war expansion subjected the War Department General Staff and all the other War Department bureaus to as severe a test as can be imagined. Yet it was a test that was peculiarly fitted to disclose administrative and organizational flaws. In the first place, the expansion was so tremendous and the pressure of events so great that no previous inhibitions and prejudices could long block changes required by the necessity of the situation. Secondly, the desire of everyone for service in France and the policy of sending the more experienced officers to France emphasized the importance of the organization rather than the individual. Thus, the office of Chief of Staff was occupied by four different incumbents; "Major General Hugh L. Scott, from the outbreak of the war until his retirement on September 22, 1917, General Tasker H. Bliss, from that date until May, 1918, Major General John Biddle, Acting Chief of Staff at periods during the absence of General Bliss in France, from October 29, 1917 to December 16, 1917, and from Jan-

uary 9, 1918 to March 3, 1918."³⁷ General Peyton March assumed the duties of Acting Chief of Staff on March 4, 1918, became Chief of Staff on March 20, 1918, and continued in that position until after the war. Likewise, out of the 1,072 officers on duty with the War Department General Staff at the signing of the armistice in November, 1918, but four had had previous General Staff experience and these four were generals.³⁸ Likewise, the clerical force increased from 107 clerks to 2,884.³⁹ Secretary Baker was forced to spend considerable time away from Washington and even made a prolonged visit to France. All of these influences corroborated the belief that whatever effectiveness was attained, was due to organizational and administrative devices rather than individual brilliance.

COMMENTS BY GENERALS BULLARD, PERSHING AND HARBORD

There were, of course, many instances when individual traits speeded up or slowed down the administration process. Brigadier General Robert Lee Bullard, who stopped at the War Department on his way to France and who later commanded the Second Army in France, made an interesting observation: "June 1st to 5th. In Washington. There I studied and learned all I could about the orders and plans for the expedition on which I was detailed to go to France. Of my stay in Washington, the great impression is that *if we really have a great war*, our War Department *will quickly break down*. To me it appeared fearfully weak and complicated and centralized. . . . I remained for some time in the office of General Bliss while he was giving a number of orders by memoranda to the different departments of the staff. As I listened, I thought that for a Chief of Staff of an Army that was destined to become very great, an immense amount of detail was falling to him. The thought worried me because no one man could carry the details for a great Army which this man was then taking up."⁴⁰

General Pershing, when summoned to Washington to receive his instructions as commander of the Expeditionary Forces, recorded his impressions as follows: "I was really more chagrined than astonished to realize that so little had been done in the way of preparation when there were so many things that might have been done long before. . . . The War Department seemed to be suffering from a kind of inertia, for which it was not altogether responsible. . . . Until a few weeks before the declaration of war neither the General Staff nor the War College had received any hint or direction to be ready with recommendations. . . . The truth is that the General Staff had not yet been properly organized. It was too much the inarticulate instrument of the Chief of Staff, who often erroneously assumed the role of Commanding Gen-

eral of the Army. *There were many senior officers on the General Staff who understood little or nothing of its duties.*"⁴¹

General Harbord, who was to become the Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Force in France, related the following incident which illustrated his impression of the War Department: "Anyone worried or humiliated by the charge that ours is a militaristic nation might find its complete refutation by considering the circumstances in which General Pershing departed for Europe with two authoritative letters of instruction. . . . The Secretary of War called on the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff to prepare the letter of instructions for the newly appointed Commanding General going abroad in our greatest military adventure, and appears not to have mentioned it to the Acting Chief of Staff that he was doing so. With any clear sense of coordination and teamwork, how could General Kernan engage in such a duty without letting his immediate chief, also the Chief of Staff of the Army, its responsible head, know of it? How could the Acting Chief of Staff fail to think early and long of the necessity of preparing such instructions? That combination of sins of omission and commission acquits the War Department of that time of being militaristic, or even very military. Hearing nothing from General Bliss on the subject or from anyone else, although in daily contact with both Bliss and Kernan, General Pershing . . . prepared a suggested letter of instructions. It closed with the conventional 'By Order of the Secretary of War,' and was signed by General Bliss, who certainly would not have done so had he known that one covering the same purpose was being prepared. . . . When General Pershing and I, on May 27th, called to say good-bye to Secretary Baker . . . , he handed the General the letter presumably prepared for the Secretary's signature by General Kernan. There were thus two letters of instruction taken to France by General Pershing, both equally legal and binding, except of the two letters, the one signed by Secretary Baker, himself, was supreme."⁴²

THE NEED FOR DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

Secretary Baker recognized the necessity of delegation of duties but increased delegation brought new problems. Baker "was holding twenty major conferences a day . . ."⁴³ The Chief of Staff brought in at 2:00 in the afternoon the daily baskets of papers requiring signature. "Of these Baker might sign as many as two hundred in the next two hours. A friend protested that this was very perilous in view of possible Congressional investigation of the conduct of the War. 'If I should take the time to read every paper that I must sign, the Germans would be in Paris before I had read the first batch of documents!' Baker replied.

'I am obliged to depend on somebody else!'"⁴⁴ Baker followed this policy and attempted to persuade his chief assistants to follow him. Frederick Palmer described the incident of how Baker on his way home at 2:00 in the morning entered the office of a bureau chief who was busily engaged with a pile of charts and was making out computations on a pad. "He could not bring himself to delegate details for which he himself was responsible. 'You ought not to do that,' said Baker. 'Your part is to do the thinking.'"⁴⁵

With 13 administrative bureaus, all of whom had access to the Secretary of War, delegation of authority was essential. With the great expansion of business, it became more and more impossible for the Secretary of War and the General Staff to keep informed and apply the necessary coordination. "Each production bureau in its own province of industry became virtually a sovereign potentate, unchecked, uncontrolled. They knew their work only too well, and that work was to produce the supplies for which each was charged with responsibility, and to get those supplies to France. In that direction lay success. And since it became evident that the industry and transportation of the country were not going to be sufficient to allow every bureau to satisfy its ambitions to the full, the proper tactics for the bureau chief were to get his program through first and let the others look out for themselves."⁴⁶ Where the rub came was that there were five such competing bureaus at first and a little later there were eight, all of whom were each doing a greater business than the entire War Department in peacetime days. General March, Chief of Staff, in his 1919 Report described the conditions as follows:

"The supply system of the Army of the United States was, prior to the present war, organized along lines of decentralization and consisted of a number of semi-independent bureaus but loosely coordinated either with the organizations of the line or with the staff of the Army and having practically no relations in common. The absence of correlation was further accentuated by decentralization of activities within the bureaus. Thus, within the Quartermaster Corps, by far the largest agency of this kind, operations were conducted by means of a considerable field force centering around the depot quartermaster, over whom the Office of the Quartermaster General in Washington had general supervision.

At the outbreak of war the supply bureaus of the Army were as follows: Quartermaster Corps, Ordnance Department, Medical Department, Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps.

The expansion of the War Department during the war to meet the need for new services led to the creation of several new bureaus, among

which the following served as important supply bureaus: Construction Division, Chemical Warfare Service, Bureau of Aircraft Production. (Most of the purchasing for the Division of Military Aeronautics was done by the Bureau of Aircraft Production.)

A comprehensive statement of the duties and functions of the original supply bureaus, is probably not to be found anywhere. It is safe to say that even the statement of their duties as defined in United States Army Regulations is not complete and that there was considerable overlapping in regard to the procurement of supplies. The following, however, is a general indication of the supply functions of the five bureaus at the outbreak of the war:

1. The Quartermaster Corps: Subsistence, transportation, animals and vehicles, forage, camp and garrison equipage, clothing, construction of buildings, roads, bridges, ships, etc., retail stores at posts, pay of the Army.

2. Medical Department: Medical and hospital supplies.

3. Corps of Engineers: Certain construction, electrical supplies, engineering problems of supply routes.

4. Ordnance Department: Procured ordnance and ordnance stores, cannon and artillery vehicles, equipment and ammunition, personal and horse equipment and harness, ordnance tools, machinery, and materials, maintained arsenals and depots.

5. Signal Corps: All supplies connected with signalling, telephones, telegraph, balloons, airplanes.

The supplies needed for the support of the Army during the war were very much larger in amount than for the Navy, the Fleet Corporation, and all other agencies concerned, and the system of Army supply by bureaus was responsible in large degree for the difficult problems of coordination which faced the Government in its task of mobilizing the national resources.

The declaration of war immediately induced the greatest activity in the five supply bureaus and put them under tremendous pressure for the adequate performance of their respective functions on the scale called for by the magnitude of the war. Their personnel was increased with great rapidity. Their structure underwent considerable changes made imperative by the great increase in their tasks. Each bureau felt keenly the duty imposed upon it of obtaining with the greatest speed possible the enormous mass of supplies and material needed for the conduct of military operations. They naturally proceeded along established lines, that is to say, as they were independently constituted, each bureau had its own duties to perform and set about those duties in the

main without any adequate coordination with the other bureaus or with other governmental purchasing agencies.

The war, therefore, began with the supply system of the Army organized on the bureau plan, the bureaus being five separate purchasing agencies with separate systems of finance, storage, and distribution, each feeling itself largely independent within its own sphere of action, and accustomed by long habit and tradition to perform its various functions without reference to the activities of the others or of other departments of the Government. Accordingly, when the Army went into the Nation's markets to buy the vast body of supplies needed for the war, it went not as a single agency, seeing the problem of supply as a whole, but as five separate bureaus competing with each other, as well as with the other great agencies of the Government and of the Allies, for manufactured articles, raw materials, industrial facilities, labor, fuel, power, and transportation. Plants and real estate were commandeered or purchased by individual bureaus without consideration of the effect upon the requirements of other bureaus, and no standardized contract procedure obtained to protect either the manufacturers and owners or the United States. The total lack of standardized specifications resulted in a delay in manufacture, a lack of interchangeability, and an increased cost. Nine independent and different systems for estimating requirements were in operation, with a consequent lack of balance in the military program and inefficient utilization of the available manufacturing plants. There were five different sources of supplies for organizations to be equipped and five different and complicated systems of property accountability for the officers charged with equipping these organizations. There were 10 different agencies for handling money accounts in the War Department, with at least 5 different systems of fiscal accounts, with no adequate supervision of expenditures."⁴⁷

RESULTS OF LACK OF COORDINATION IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT

By December, 1917, this lack of coordination was beginning to reap its reward. Worse than that, the whole supply system was endangered and threatened to collapse.⁴⁸ Benedict Crowell, the Assistant Secretary of War from 1917 to 1920, blamed the crisis on the War Department organizational structure, writing: "That was what the original organization of the War Department did to the war program. That was the factory trying to run itself without overhead direction and control. The War Department went along in this fashion for about eight months after the declaration of war, and then it found that one or two things had to happen: either its whole industrial program would go to smash and it would stand forth as a confessed and notorious failure or it must

reorganize. It chose to reorganize and it began to reorganize only in the nick of time. That reorganization was the profoundest change in the War Department in modern times."⁴⁹

General Orders No. 14 of February 5, 1918, reorganized the General Staff into five main divisions, namely, the Executive, the War Plans, the Purchase and Supply, the Storage and Traffic, and the Operation Division. It charged the Chief of Staff with "the planning and development of the Army program" and it provided that the chief of the Purchase and Supply should "have cognizance and supervision of the purchase and production of all munitions and other supplies" and should be charged with the supervision and direction of all purchases, procurement, and production activities of the several bureaus, corps, and other agencies of the War Department.⁵⁰

The reorganization which began in January, 1918, was merely the forerunner of additional changes. General Peyton C. March was brought back from France and became Chief of Staff in March, 1918. Aware that the situation in France demanded troops and supplies in greater number, March came into the War Department very much like a lion. His methods were ruthless but effective. A contemporary, General Snow, stated that "General March was the ablest and most efficient man I have ever served under. He accomplished miracles in the War Department. He brought that lifeless institution to life with the rudeness and suddenness characteristic of an electric shock. For getting results at that critical time in our history he was exactly the right man in the right place. It was said of him all during the war (while he was Chief of Staff) that the test of whether you were doing satisfactory work was whether you continued on your job or were relieved. Make a break and off went your head. . . . I heard Secretary Baker some years after the war, pay high tribute to General March's ability. He then added, 'But I had to follow him up, figuratively, with a bottle of arnica in one hand and bandages in the other to assuage the wounds he made! To which I would like to add that no human being could accomplish the results that March did, without causing wounds.'"⁵¹ It was to be expected that a new broom with such characteristics would sweep clean and such was the case. This fact plus the increasing congestion of traffic and supplies at the ports and along the main arteries of traffic leading thereto brought many additional changes. General March related:

"Experience had shown that the interior organization of the various bureaus was such as to render an effective supervision of their activities by the General Staff, as contemplated by General Orders, No. 14, im-

possible. As the result of a careful consideration of the matter I became convinced that a consolidation of procurement, except of certain specialized equipment, of storage, of finance, and of transportation, together with a positive and direct central control of these activities by the General Staff, was essential to the elimination of the unsatisfactory conditions existing and to the rapid, efficient, and economical utilization of the resources of the country to the development of the Army program as a whole. The magnitude of the task, the diversity of conflicting interests, and the intimate correlation required by the different agencies involved permitted no division of responsibility or of effort if the War Department machine was to function with that degree of efficiency which was essential if the urgent and constantly changing needs of our Army were to be met."

On August 26, 1918, . . . General Orders, No. 80, was issued. This order provided:

"The Chief of the General Staff is the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the Army program. The Chief of Staff by law (Act of May 12, 1917) takes rank and precedence over all officers of the Army, and by virtue of that position and by authority of and in the name of the Secretary of War he issues such orders as will insure that the policies of the War Department are harmoniously executed by the several corps, bureaus, and other agencies of the Military Establishment and that the Army program is carried out speedily and efficiently."

This order definitely charged the Chief of Staff with the responsibility for the execution of the Army program and delegated to him the authority commensurate with this responsibility.

It further consolidated the previously existing Purchase and Supply Division and the Storage and Traffic Division into the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division, under the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, who was specifically charged with the "control of the . . . procurement and productive activities, including real estate, of the several bureaus, corps, and other agencies of the War Department, . . . the storing and warehousing of property for all departments, bureaus, and corps of the Army, . . . the movement of all property of the War Department, . . . and the transportation of troops and supplies overseas, . . ."

Under the general authority contained in the Overman Act, which had been approved May 20, the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic was immediately upon the issue of General Orders, No. 80, author-

ized by me to effect a consolidation of the procurement (except in the case of the procurement of certain technical or specialized equipment pertaining to the technical corps) and of the storage functions of the various bureaus and services. The details of the procedure followed in this connection are given elsewhere in this report. In effect the result was to transfer these functions to the Quartermaster Department, already handling about 80 per cent of the procurement and storage activities of the Army, the Quartermaster General, who was designated as the Director of Purchase and Storage, reporting direct to the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. The transfer of storage functions had, however, progressed much further on June 30, 1919, than had the transfer of procurement functions. The consolidation of procurement rendered necessary a consolidation of financial activities under a director of Finance, who, together with the chiefs of the previously existing Embarkation and Inland Transportation branches, also reported direct to the Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic.

Another important change in the organization of the General Staff effected by General Orders, No. 80, was the establishment of the Military Intelligence Division, which had previously been a branch first of the War Plans Division and later of the Executive Division, as a separate and coordinate division of the General Staff. This was necessary in view of the extent and scope of the responsibilities of this division.

A subsequent and important amendment was made in General Orders, No. 80, when, by General Orders, No. 86, dated September 18, 1918, there was established, in the Operations Division, the Personnel Branch, in which there has been effected a consolidation of the handling of the appointments, assignments, and promotions of all commissioned personnel in the Army. This action became necessary as the result of the condition which arose due to the competition among bureaus and services for commissioned personnel and in order that officers might be assigned in accordance with their special qualifications to the arm in which their services could be most useful.⁵² The charts illustrating the organization adopted in 1918 appear on page 233.


Among the organizational changes of February, 1917, was one which partially accomplished the recommendations of the Chief of Staff in 1916 and 1917 for the establishment of chiefs of the line branches. Colonel William J. Snow was brought to the War Department and designated as Chief of Field Artillery. The bureau which he was to head was made immediately subordinate to the Chief of Staff. The immediate task was to train and prepare the field artillery for overseas service and to answer technical questions concerning the field artillery.⁵³

Likewise, under the provisions of the Overman Act of May 20, 1918.

THE REORGANIZATION
OF AUGUST 1918

THE PRESIDENT
Secretary of War

Chief Staff and General Staff
War Department Section
War College Division



STORAGE AND
TRANSPORTATION

THE ARMY

CHART 4

which granted a "temporary interregnum in the existing laws governing the bureaus by giving the President powers to coordinate and consolidate bureaus as the nature of the emergency demanded,"⁵⁴ other new bureaus and arms were created. The Air Service, which had started as a division of the Signal Corps, was now made a separate and distinct arm with its own chief and staff and operating personnel. The Air Service not only operated as a tactical line arm, but it developed its own procurement organization. The Tank Corps became another separate and distinct arm of the Army. Curiously enough, the Tank Corps restricted its development to purely tactical ends, leaving the manufacture and development of tanks to the Ordnance Department. There was no particular reason why, on the basis of functional organization, the Ordnance Department should not also have handled the manufacture of airplanes. Evidently the airplane was so much the special article of the Air Service that its development and manufacture could not be entrusted to anyone else. Other new branches were the Chemical Warfare Service, Embarkation Service, Finance Department, Motor Transport Corps, and Construction Corps. This brought the number of War Department bureaus and line branches up to twenty-four. Curiously enough, this increase in organizational entities seemed to come in part as a solution to lack of coordination. Greatly increasing as they did the span of control, these new bureaus and arms were not grouped in a manner calculated to reduce the increased difficulties of coordinating their independent activities.

CAUSES OF WAR DEPARTMENT BREAKDOWN IN WORLD WAR I

Before we examine and analyze the operation of the War Department General Staff in World War I, several questions may well be asked about the period just before the reorganization for that war:

- (1) What organizational and administrative defects caused the supply bureaus to break down?
- (2) Wherein did the coordinating function of the War Department General Staff fail?
- (3) What advantage did the changes possess?

The answers are admittedly difficult for there had never been an organizational problem on such a grand scale. In addition, the problem had so many aspects that each man who participated has been inclined to see one particular facet so closely that it blinded his perception of the many others. The following is admittedly oversimplified but it is an attempt to present an objective over-all view.

In dealing with the question, "What organizational and administra-

tive defects caused the supply bureaus to break down?" we shall consider the Quartermaster Department in some detail because its experiences were typical.

Prior to the outbreak of the war, the office of the Quartermaster General had five main sub-divisions: Administrative, Finance and Accounting, Construction and Repair, Transportation, and Supplies.⁵⁵ These divisions were engaged in the main in the settlement of policy, the compilation of estimates, and the management of personnel. Operations were so decentralized that little or no coordinating action was necessary. The operating Quartermaster units were the various field offices of which there were three main classes: the department quartermasters, the depot quartermasters, and (third) the camp, post, and other subsidiary quartermasters. The department quartermasters, who were on the staff of the commanding general of a territorial department, were responsible for the supply of troops within their areas and to that end approved or disapproved the requisitions of camp and post quartermasters. The depot quartermasters procured and stored supplies and issued them on requisitions approved by the department quartermasters. In March, 1917, seven such general depots served the entire Army. There was a degree of "centralized decentralization" in that certain general depots handled only certain supplies. Thus, the Philadelphia depot handled clothing and the Jeffersonville depot wagons and harness. The depots were general storing and issuing points and operated independently of one another. The camp and post Quartermasters acted as the distributing offices, providing supplies for the units they served by drawing on the depots for depot supplies or by purchasing articles locally, which was the usual method for the procurement of food, especially perishable food items.

This organizational pattern had been adopted as the result of the lessons learned in the Spanish-American War when a high degree of centralization in the War Department caused paralysis. In itself there was nothing wrong with this organization.

When similar independent bureaus went on a war footing in April, 1917, there was nothing in the War Department's organization that put an effective curb upon energies which were individually praiseworthy but which collectively brought chaos. With the huge expansion that came with the war, the tendency was to further multiply the already too numerous separate bureaus. Thus, the Cantonment Division which was created in May, 1917, as a separate unit reporting direct to the Secretary of War absorbed the work formerly allotted to the Construction and Repair Division of the Office of the Quartermaster General, which was abolished. The work of the Cantonment Division

extended all over the country yet it was highly centralized in Washington. Local commanders were directed to keep hands off the construction of cantonments. The Embarkation Service was created in August of 1917, which took over the duties and led to the abolishment of transportation section of the Quartermaster's office.

The great change in the Quartermaster's Office came as a result of the growth of the industrial mobilization movement. This is a huge field in itself, but some mention of its work is necessary here as background.

During the years from 1909 to 1916 the Quartermaster Department had tried to obtain a wartime reserve of needed supplies. Some appropriations were made but the Mexican border trouble of 1914-1916 had exhausted all the surplus stocks. When war clouds were gathering, the Quartermaster Department was naturally bending every effort to get ready to play its designated part. The question as to how the large problem of over-all coordination was to be effected had not been settled by Congress, and without such authority the Quartermaster General could not proceed very far. The first thought on the subject was that the United States Chamber of Commerce would act as the medium to organize industry and would establish an organization that would parallel for industry the decentralized organization of the Quartermaster's Department. However, the development did not follow this line.

NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD AND COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Instead, a more centralized organization resulted from the efforts started by the Council of National Defense. In 1916 when the Navy became engaged in a large building program, a Naval Consulting Board was established with Thomas Edison as the head and with two members appointed from each of the great scientific societies. This Naval Consulting Board appointed a Committee on Industrial Preparedness with Howard Coffin as Chairman. Supported by private contributions, this committee by appointing a sub-committee in each state compiled an inventory of the manufacturing plants capable of making munitions. Appropriating \$200,000 for industrial preparedness, the Army Appropriation Act passed August, 1916,⁵⁶ established a Council of National Defense which was to consist of the Secretary of War as Chairman, and the Secretaries of Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The Council was to study the problem of industrial mobilization and present their recommendations to Congress as the basis for legislation. The law provided for the creation of an Advisory Commission of not to exceed seven men having special knowledge of industry or natural resources, who were to advise the Council of Na-

tional Defense. The War Department had previously urged that a council on national defense be created but had envisaged one composed of appropriate Committee Chairman of Congress, high military and Naval officers and the Secretaries of War and Navy. The work of the Council of National Defense was aided by the provisions of Section 121 of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, which provided that the Secretary of War appoint a board of three Army officers and two civilians to investigate and report to Congress by January 1, 1917, the feasibility, desirability and practicability of the Government manufacturing arms and munitions and equipment.

WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD

While the Advisory Commission had no powers, some of its interested members did survey the railroad problem and the steel industries. When the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany in February, 1917, the Advisory Commission was spurred into action. Incident to conferences with the leading men in each branch of industry of importance in case of war, the Council of National Defense asked that a committee of not more than three men be designated to represent each phase of industry. This was the genesis of the Commodity Sections and War Service Committees which were to function later under the War Industries Board. On February 28, 1917, the Council of National Defense appointed a Munitions Standards Board, composed of technically qualified individuals, who were to cooperate with the War and Navy Departments in establishing standards for the manufacture of war supplies. A month later a General Munitions Board was appointed to organize and coordinate the purchases of the War and Navy Departments and to assist in the development of plants for the manufacture of war supplies and of facilities for providing necessary raw materials. The new Board included the members of the Munitions Standards Board and representatives of the Army and Navy. With a membership of twenty-two, this Board was unwieldy. Because it attempted to function by means of various sub-committees its action was lethargic. On July 8, 1917, the Council of National Defense dissolved the General Munitions Board of twenty-two members and established a War Industries Board of seven members who functioned collectively as a policy-determining committee and who as individuals headed such activities as Raw Materials, Finished Products, Priority, Labor, etc. On March 4, 1918, President Wilson removed the War Industries Board from the jurisdiction of the Council of National Defense and gave to its chairman, Bernard Baruch, the authority to control and regulate industry as the war needs dictated. The War Industries Board, acting

as a legislative body, laid down the general measures of control. The members of the War Industries Board as individuals became executives who carried out functional duties through a series of committees of which the War Industries Board members were chairmen. The committees were Price Fixing, Purchasing Commission for the Allies, Explosives, Labor, Planning and Statistics, Requirements, Chemical, Facilities, Priorities, Finished Products, Steel, Textile, and Conservation. Under these committees were the appropriate Commodity Sections who furnished all the information on their particular commodity and who transmitted to their branch of industry the decisions or instructions of the War Industries Board or its committees. For each Commodity Section there was a parallel War Service Committee acting as the representatives of the business firms in that field. In theory, the process had been well thought out. The Requirements Division of the War Industries Board was supposed to compile the total requirements of the government agencies by getting the amounts needed at given dates from all the various purchasing agencies of the government and of the Allies. Also, the needs of the civilian population were computed. Here then would emerge a master schedule that measured the demand of all the wartime agencies and the country itself for all products. This information was transmitted to the War Industries Board who broke it down and sent the necessary figures to each of the 66 Commodity Sections. This then was the process of ascertaining the demand side of the picture.

Going to the supply side of the matter, a similar arrangement operated. Each commodity section, knowing the total demands to be made on the commodity over which they exercised supervision, then made a study to see how this quota could be supplied. If the requirements could be met, the problem was merely to apportion the orders through the War Service Committee to the various firms in the particular trade. If the facilities were inadequate to supply the amounts needed, the appropriate commodity section informed the Clearance Division, the Conservation Division, and the Conversion and Resources Division of the War Industries Board, whose job it was to augment the supply of articles of which there was a shortage. In back of the power of suggestion, though not often used, were the effective controls of priority, clearance arrangements, and even commandeering. It should be remembered, however, that this general scheme did not attain a high degree of working perfection until just before the armistice.

The office of the Quartermaster must have been nonplused over these external aids to its own organization for they were slow in taking shape and began to function only after trouble had arisen. As the War In-

dustries Board began to assume shape, the Council of National Defense directed that certain items be purchased exclusively through its organization. Thus the Quartermaster Department had to centralize its decentralized depot system so as to buy certain items through the War Industries Board. The procurement of food for the huge Army continued to be operated by the depot and camp quartermasters with the maximum amount of decentralization.

With such pressing problems on their own hands and with considerable uncertainty over whether coordination was to be effected by the War Industries Board or by the War Department General Staff, each supply bureau turned to its own particular task and hoped that things would work out for the best. The internal organization of both the Quartermaster Department and the Ordnance Department were well adapted for their internal needs. There was, of course, considerable confusion resulting from their rapid expansion and the absorption of many inexperienced individuals. Likewise, the War Department bureaus all suffered from the transfer of their ablest people to duties in France. Rapid promotion and fame lay elsewhere and it was natural for all to seek relief from the important but commonplace duties in the War Department. If there was any single structural or administrative defect within the several War Department bureaus, it centered in the difficulty of maintaining a decentralized operating system at the same time that a system of centralized control was being attempted.

The difficulties of the supply bureaus arose primarily from the general shortages in material, facilities and transportation for the economy of the United States as a whole. These shortages made priorities and allocations extremely necessary and these had to be established for the Army, the Navy, the Shipping Board and all other agencies on an overall basis with the national war economy considered as a whole. This was eventually accomplished by the War Production Board, whose primary duties were to aid the war supply program by augmenting the sources of supply of raw materials and facilities and by effecting orderly distribution in accordance with the war needs by priority and allocation controls.

The questions as to wherein the coordinating functions of the General Staff failed and as to how these defects were corrected by reorganizational changes will be considered together. A consideration of the great mass of evidence leads to the conclusion that coordination comes only after difficulties, crisis, and reorganization. Because of a failure to carry out planning, and because of a lack of appreciation that such planning was a necessary forerunner of coordination, the early War Department actions to secure coordination were largely abortive.

In the years just before 1917 the War Department General Staff had given little thought to the problems of supply and the separate bureaus of the War Department were thinking only in terms of their own specialized activities. The War Department General Staff had been greatly reduced and its sphere of activity restricted by Congress. Then, too, there was the attitude commonly accepted that if Congress would just make the necessary funds available, everything would work out automatically. This assumed an economy with a very elastic ability to expand. While this lack of foresight by the War Department can be explained and justified, it cannot be wholly excused.

Benedict Crowell, Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Munitions from 1917 to 1920, made the following indictment of the planlessness of the War Department: "The lack of foresight in the administration of the War Department during the critical prewar months can scarcely be overemphasized. There seems to have been an utter disregard of the danger of America's position, an unconcern for the future that seems incredible. The direction of effort seems not to have viewed actual war, on the modern scale, as among the possibilities for America. We have noted the lamentable ignorance of the science of aviation in the Army in 1917; but for that there was at least the excuse that the science was entirely new, having been developed almost exclusively within the war zone in Europe. What, though, can be said for an almost equal ignorance of the business of supplying to a modern army such things as uniforms, food, rifles, and ammunition—things which American troops had used and consumed since America was a nation at all? The War in Europe had scrapped and rendered valueless all previous experience in the consumption of such supplies by armies, for war had entered a new era of destructiveness. Yet our War College, the body upon which the nation relied for its study of warfare, evidently came right up to the declaration of war without having received any instructions to procure the indispensable information about the consumption of the commoner supplies by large bodies of troops—the very information upon which manufacturing programs had to be based. When Mr. Frank A. Scott in April, 1917, immediately after the declaration of war, organized the General Munitions Board, one of his first acts was to send to the General Staff for its studies in supply problems. In return he received a few pamphlets of no practical value whatsoever."⁵⁷

Mr. Crowell's criticism was probably correct and this focuses attention on an area in which there was considerable disagreement and confusion over what constituted the proper scope of General Staff planning and coordination. Failure to plan and coordinate activities relat-

ing to supply was the greatest single indictment made against the War Department General Staff in World War I. In answering this charge General Staff officers of World War I would assert that the supply difficulties arose primarily in the civilian industrial economy, a field in which the General Staff had no jurisdiction. At the same time that Crowell criticized the General Staff for the supply troubles, he was asserting that the wartime production and distribution of supplies had to be directed by civilians. Army officers had no competence and civilian industrial experts had to run this end of the war effort. Undoubtedly most General Staff Officers agreed with this theory. And yet the General Staff was blamed for its neglect of industrial mobilization planning in the prewar years and for its lack of interest in the organization and coordination of the supply bureaus during the early part of the war. It appeared that Army officers were not too well qualified for this industrial and business task. And yet, who else could have been expected to do this planning work in peacetime if the War Department and the War Department General Staff showed no interest?

CIVILIAN AND GENERAL STAFF PARTS IN SUPPLY REORGANIZATION

There is considerable justification for the assertion that the General Staff was not the driving force or the brains behind the reorganization of the supply bureaus to obtain greater efficiency and coordination. In this field Secretary Baker and his civilian advisors did most of the work and it appears that the General Staff exercised little influence. This is the view of one civilian advisor who worked with Baker and Crowell during World War I and who, stressing the picking of key men and then developing the reorganization around them, commented as follows:

"Men should be selected to fit into a theoretically sound organizational plan rather than a plan of organization be built to fit particular men. As a practical matter, however, where there is a going concern it is surprising the extent to which the particular form a reorganization takes is molded by the characteristics of the men available to be used in it. That was certainly true in the War Department in 1917-18 in its supply activities and the relation of Crowell and Goethals to them.

The acquaintance which Secretary Baker had in Cleveland was naturally drawn on by him in his work in the War Department, particularly in munitions matters. Baker later became a "business lawyer," but when he became Secretary he had as little familiarity with the background of the industrial tasks of war as with the military. The National Defense Act of 1916 required that a study be made and a report to Congress as to the practicability of supplying artillery and certain

other munitions in event of war from government owned and operated facilities. In the fall of 1916 the Secretary appointed a Board, headed by General Kernan who later became head of the first Services of Supply organization in France, and asked Benedict Crowell of Cleveland to serve as a member of that Board. That Board surveyed the situation and reported at the end of 1916.

Crowell was a mining and metallurgical engineer who had had a long connection with the metallurgical industries, particularly iron, and also had had considerable construction experience. In the fall of 1916 he had felt that we were bound to get into war and disassociated himself from all his business interests so that he might be free to devote his whole time to the war in some capacity. He obtained a reserve commission originally in the Quartermaster Corps. His work on the Kernan Board gave him an initial acquaintance with the potential requirements of war from the metallurgical industries and the inadequacy of governmental and private plant capacities to meet those requirements. This also broadened his already wide acquaintance among the men who would have to be relied on to create a munitions industry. He continued throughout the early part of 1917 to work informally on initial preparation for what was to come; among others with Frank Scott of Cleveland who was to be head of the Munitions Board which preceded the War Industries Board.

When the war came he went on active duty. After working in Washington on certain of the ordnance programs he was detailed as a Major of Engineers to the Panama Canal Zone to deal with certain matters which the Secretary regarded as of importance there. He was ordered back to duty in Washington in the late summer of 1917. By reason of the work he had done on the Kernan Board in the previous spring and his acquaintance he was in position to get the industrial viewpoint as to the way things were going on the munitions front. The task imposed by the war on the supply organizations was of course a terrific one. The head of the Quartermaster Corps was not up to it. The Chief of Ordnance was a fine soldier and a magnificent technician but too much of a perfectionist for the quantity problems with which he had to deal. The head of the Signal Corps again was a fine technician but completely beyond his depth in endeavoring to meet the problems of building up an air force which was at that time part of the Signal Corps job. Baker elicited from Crowell a picture of the particular difficulties which were being encountered and which Crowell pointed out to him with such complete frankness that it ended by Baker's turning to him and asking him to come into his office as Assistant Secretary and see what he could do to help him make things

go. William M. Ingraham, his previous Assistant, was an estimable person, but with no background of experience or ability to make him of help to Baker who was confronted not only with a job of colossal proportions but with the rising tides of criticism from Congress and the public.

Congressional criticism was particularly directed to Ordnance. [Brigadier General Charles] Wheeler looked at the time like a good selection to replace [Major General William] Crozier, and under the guidance of a group of efficiency engineers Wheeler effected a radical reorganization of the Ordnance Department which looked good on paper but broke down in operation. [Brigadier General Clarence C.] Williams was brought back from overseas early in 1918 to replace Wheeler and did an outstanding job of organization along lines that suited his methods of work and of administration. He worked particularly closely and well with Crowell.

The Quartermaster Corps in the fall of 1917 obviously needed new leadership. General Goethals had had an outstanding career in the Panama Canal as an effective organizer of a large civil undertaking. He and [William I.] Denman had gotten at cross purposes on the U. S. Shipping Board. Baker and Crowell saw his great possibilities for usefulness on the supply side of the War Department and put him in as Acting Quartermaster General. They also selected [Edward R.] Stettinius, [II], largely at Mr. Crowell's urging and on the basis of his outstanding success in supply for England and France, first as Surveyor General of Supplies and then as Assistant Secretary in charge of Supply. This selection did not work out. The conditions in the war were so different from those to which he had been accustomed that Stettinius found it irksome and he never could bring his powers effectively to bear on the problems and was much relieved when he was transferred to France to work on problems of procurement for the AEF from the Allies.

Goethals meanwhile was reorganizing the Quartermaster General's Department and it was felt by Baker and Crowell that a much more extended use of him could be made in tying together the various aspects of procurement. At this time study was being made of the reorganization of the General Staff and there was considerable discussion of the matter in Crowell's office and a good deal of work done on it by Colonel [Chester C.] Bolton, an extraordinarily able young business man, also from Cleveland, part of whose work at the same time was with the War Industries Board. The need for centralized direction and operation of procurement in the War Department was apparent. Goethals seemed to be the man for the job. It was before the Over-

man Act had been passed and it seemed advisable to take advantage of the provisions of the General Staff Law to effect this direction by making General Goethals Director of Purchase and Supplies and Assistant Chief of Staff and also to set up a centralized direction of the operations of transportations and storage by creating a Director of Storage and Transportation. This was effected February 8, 1918. Unquestionably the Acting Chief of Staff [Brigadier General John] Biddle, was consulted with regard to these changes but the initiative in the matter appears to have come from Crowell and with Stettinius and his assistant Nelson Perkins and probably General Goethals himself having a hand in the matter. General Goethals, it was determined shortly after General March became Chief of Staff, should also take over the direction of storage and traffic. His title was changed to Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic. . . .

With the passage of the Overman Act in May it became easier to create new formal War Department organizations for new services such as Air, Chemical Warfare and Finance.

The final setup as to supply arrived at before the Armistice involved the appointment of Crowell as Director of Munitions charged with the responsibility of over all Army supply in the United States, except aircraft procurement which was under the direction of [John D.] Ryan [II], as an Assistant Secretary, and with immediate direction of supply in General Goethals as Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic and Assistant Chief of Staff but reporting directly on supply matters to the Director of Munitions. Mr. Crowell devoted most of his personal attention to Ordnance."⁵⁸

Under General Goethals' supervision the Directors of Purchase, of Storage, of Transportation, and the Fiscal Director all headed operating organizations. Ordnance, the Signal Corps, Chemical Warfare, Engineers and the Surgeon General's Office retained procurement operating functions on technical items of procurement (as well as their military field functions).

DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM RAPIDITY OF CHANGES

The lack of initial planning was not the only serious handicap. The problem was further complicated by the many changes that made what planning was done futile in many respects. Of particular interest were the crucial changes in the war program as a whole. In the spring of 1917 the War Department General Staff adopted a tentative program⁵⁹ based on the situation as it then existed. In view of the heavy shipping losses suffered by Allied shipping and the absence of an adequate

American merchant marine, it was planned to send overseas only a small force consisting of one tactical division with some additional elements to form the nucleus for higher headquarters and supply echelons. Available tonnage was to be used in the main to carry supplies and food to the Allies who already had their own purchasing organization in this country. Shortly thereafter the French authorities requested the United States to "undertake a tremendous part in aerial warfare sending 4,500 American aviators, and a corresponding great amount of material to France within a year."⁶⁰ There were then but thirty-five officers who could fly training planes and no aviation industry existed. Reviewing the action taken in response to the French plea and benefitting from the experience that followed, the Chief of Staff stated in his 1919 Report: "Urged by popular enthusiasm, the Aviation section of the Signal Corps undertook an air program entirely disproportionate to a properly balanced Army and, as events showed, impossible of execution. The history of this transcendental program, which was adopted and undertaken by the Signal Corps practically independently of the rest of the Army, affords an early and a striking example of the necessity for a General Staff to formulate the military program and to coordinate the activities of the various agencies concerned. Such coordination was not, in the case of the air program, effected during the first year of the war."⁶¹

Hindsight, of course, can easily detect flaws that were not apparent to a contemporaneous observer. The airplane was new; it evoked popular enthusiasm and support; and it was inevitable that an ambitious program be undertaken even though from a supply point of view the critical materials, the facilities, and the manpower requirements could not be met. The problem here invoked delicate judgment to determine how far to go in exploiting a new development in a situation where general shortages existed and where coordination thus meant restricting the production of standard articles for known military requirements in order to gamble on something new.

MEETING GENERAL PERSHING'S DEMANDS

The coordinating function of the War Department General Staff during 1917 and 1918 was made more difficult by the necessity to make drastic changes in plans in response to General Pershing's wishes. These changes often were "last minute" alterations, and the cry of the production and supply people was "If you are going to make changes, you must do it sufficiently in advance to give us time to do it; otherwise, you cannot make changes without wrecking orderly procedures and precipitating confusion." What was not appreciated at

times in Washington was that changes in the war situation forced General Pershing to insist on changes in plans. What was undoubtedly ignored at times in France by Pershing's staff officers was the difficulty in making last minute changes in the United States in supply and other arrangements. This can be illustrated by several examples.

The War Department General Staff in its planning had determined that an army division would consist of some 12,000 men which was the approximate size of the French, British, and German divisions. Pershing's General Staff in France made a study of what the proper organization of the American infantry divisions should be and reached the conclusion that it should be fixed at around 40,000 men counting the supply troops and 27,000 if only combatant troops were counted.⁶² The War Department General Staff accepted this largely because Secretary Baker was determined that the officer who was to command the force in battle should have the size of division he wanted⁶³ although no European nation had changed the size of its division either during or after the war. This occasioned much work and no little confusion. New tables of organization and equipment had to be prepared. Personnel had to be reallocated and plans had to be reconstructed in all training schools from artillery and medical units to motor trucks. "The effects upon the cantonment arrangements were much the same as if, after all the plans had been made and material ordered for constructing a high office building, the owner had suddenly decided to add ten stories, put the elevators in different places and reduced the height of the ceilings by a foot."⁶⁴ When someone unacquainted with the circumstances saw three buildings used for two companies of the enlarged size at a cantonment, the appearance indicated that there had been no planning at all. In many cantonments no one knew that each building had originally been designed to house one company but that under the new tables of organization for a division one and a half buildings were necessary. The popular belief was that the men who built the camp did not know what they were doing.

In May, 1917, General Pershing recommended a program which contemplated sending overseas during 1917 and 1918 thirty infantry divisions. In March of 1918 studies were initiated with a view to increasing the expeditionary forces to eighty divisions. General Pershing in the summer of 1918 recommended that the eighty-division program be upped to one hundred divisions and began to send in his supply estimates for that number although the War Department General Staff recommended and the Secretary of War approved the eighty-division plan and decided that a larger force was impracticable.

OPPOSING VIEWS OF GENERAL MARCH AND GENERAL PERSHING

General March, Chief of Staff, reflected the Washington viewpoint and observed "that the cables from Pershing were requesting the shipment of troops and supplies for the one hundred-division program just the same."⁶⁵ The information that the eighty-division program would be adhered to was given the AEF several times. Finally General March preemptorily advised Pershing that "the eighty-division in France Program is the official program and you will give instructions that rate of shipment and requirements be worked out to correspond therewith."⁶⁶ General Pershing, reacting to what was considered by him and his staff as arbitrary and uninformed action by officers in Washington who were not in close touch with the war, wrote the following confidential letter to Secretary of War Baker:

"France, Aug. 18, 1918

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Inasmuch as you asked me to speak frankly I know you will permit me to refer to the subject of cooperation between here and the General Staff at Washington. I do so only to give you my point of view and possibly aid you in getting over some difficult places which I am sure you must encounter and which are beginning to affect us here. There is an impression here that our cablegrams are not being carefully studied and thoroughly coordinated. There seems to be energy enough behind things, but, perhaps, it is not as well directed by the Staff as it might be. It may possibly be due to faulty General Staff organization, which as nearly as I can learn, has not yet reached that point of perfection which would enable all these matters to be handled systematically. In any event, there is not the satisfactory teamwork with us over here that should exist. It is not easy for me, at this distance, to understand all the reasons, but it may be due to a disinclination to accept our views.

I fully realize that it may be difficult to get the perfection that you should have and that there may be some of the personnel that is not entirely satisfactory. In order to have full cooperation, there must, of course, be entire sympathy and unity of purpose. The system should be one thoroughly tested out, such as is in operation here, and upon which every successful army organization must depend. I have at times doubted whether you will get it going smoothly without taking someone who has actually gone through this organization here from beginning to end, as you know this is the only general staff organization that our army has ever had. All this comes to my mind following the idea of an

occasional change, of which you spoke when here as being your intention.

* * *

With very high personal and official regard, I am,

Faithfully yours,
JOHN J. PERSHING."⁶⁷

Of this letter General March wrote: "As the AEF increased in size, General Pershing's inability to function in teamwork with his legal and authorized superiors increased, until it reached a point where he refused to obey Foch's orders abroad; and on August 18, 1918, wrote a letter to Secretary Baker, behind my back, in which he said, in substance, that while we seemed to have sufficient energy it was badly directed, and better results would be obtained, if an officer from his own staff were put in charge of the War Department General Staff. He wanted a rubber stamp for Chief of Staff at home, so he could be entirely independent of any supervision or control. . . . I did not know about this particular letter until after the war. There certainly would have been a showdown if I had."⁶⁸

Had General March been Chief of Staff earlier, it is probable that less freedom of action would have been accorded the AEF in matters of supply and organization for the many delays occasioned by the change of minds in the AEF General Staff infuriated him.⁶⁹ At the same time that Pershing was complaining that home activities were badly directed, March felt that the greatest trouble was at Pershing's headquarters where there was much "waste of motion in changes of plan" and "that these changes of plan were made without the slightest knowledge of, or at least a complete disregard for, the effect they had on production and procurement at home or the limitations of shipping."⁷⁰ Typical of General March's attitude was his full statement: "Reverting to the many changes recommended by General Pershing in his cables and reports from France, his custom was to appoint a board of officers to consider and determine for him the details concerning any foreign implement of war which he was told was necessary for the AEF. These boards were often a living exemplification of the old army saying that 'a board is long, narrow, and wooden!' General Pershing himself knew nothing about airplanes, and so he approved and forwarded the report of a board which, from time to time, did not suggest a few changes in a standard type of airplane, previously recommended by it and him, for adoption and manufacture by the United States, but literally hundreds and hundreds of changes, including complete changes in the plane itself in favor of some other model. The

wretched manufacturer at home would have to discard all his work and begin again on something else, only to find, later, that Pershing and Company had changed their collective mind again in favor of the first recommendation since discarded. . . . Even the Liberty motor was interfered with by Pershing. . . . These changes of plan were made without the slightest knowledge of, or at least a complete disregard for the effect they had on production or procurement at home or the limitations of shipping."⁷¹

The solution which General March urged on the Secretary of War to end the disagreement between Washington and France on supply matters was to place General Goethals in entire charge of all supply. Thus he would have had coordinate authority with General Pershing and would have been in charge of supplies from their sources in the United States, thence across the Atlantic and up to the Zone of the Army. Like General Pershing he would be directly under orders from Washington.

Secretary Baker proposed the scheme in a letter to Pershing which was as follows: "The President and I have had several conferences about your situation in France, both of us desiring in every possible way to relieve you of unnecessary burdens, but of course to leave you with all the authority necessary to secure the best results from your forces and to supply all the support and assistance we possibly can. As the American troops in France become more and more numerous and the battle initiative on some parts of the front passes to you, the purely military part of your task will necessarily take more and more of your time, and both the President and I want to feel that the planning and executing of military undertakings has your personal consideration and that your mind is free for that as far as possible. The American people think of you as their 'fighting General,' and I want them to have that idea more and more brought home to them. For these reasons, it seems to me that if some plan could be devised by which you would be free from any necessity of giving attention to services of supply it would help, and one plan in that direction which suggested itself was to send General Goethals over to take charge of the services of supply, establishing a direct relationship between him and Washington and allowing you to rely upon him just as you would rely upon the supply departments of the War Department if your military operations were being conducted in America, instead of in France. Such a plan would place General Goethals rather in a coordinate than a subordinate relationship to you, but of course it would transfer all of the supply responsibilities from you to him and you could then forget about docks,

railroads, storage houses, and all the other vast industrial undertakings to which you up to now have given a good deal of your time and, as you know, we all think with superb success. I would be very glad to know what you think about this suggestion."⁷²

Pershing's reply was illuminating: "On the subject of General Goethals, I have about covered it in my cablegram of today. I thank you very much for referring this matter to me. Mr. Secretary, our organization here is working well. It is founded upon sound principles. May I not emphasize again the principle of unity of command and responsibility. It has always been my understanding that you believed that full power should be given to the man on the spot and responsible for results. I would say this regardless of the person in command. Our organization here is so bound up with operations, and training, and supply, and transportation of troops, that it would be impossible to make it function if the control of our service of the rear were placed in Washington. Please let us not make the mistake of handicapping our army here by attempting to control these things from Washington, or by introducing any coordinate authority. All matters pertaining to these forces, after their arrival in France, should be under the General Staff here where they are being and can be handled satisfactorily."⁷³

This difference of opinion focused attention on an organizational and administrative problem that had evidently no one solution. The man on the operating end wanted complete freedom; he believed that he could see the problem better than anyone else, and any curtailment of his freedom of action irked him. The coordinating authority believed that he had the larger view and could thus see the problem in its proper perspective.

General Pershing and General March also disagreed on the efficacy of solving problems by the use of boards of officers. General Pershing, as had been noted, used boards of officers frequently. General March had little use for boards. In the course of his reorganization of the War Department he found that he was a member of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification. After attending one meeting he concluded that the Board was a sheer waste of time and he accordingly abolished it.⁷⁴ Likewise, when March took over the job of Chief of Staff, he found that there existed in the War Department a War Council which consisted of the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Coast Artillery, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Provost Marshal General.⁷⁵ Secretary of War Baker created this body to permit him to confer regularly with the heads or chiefs of major activities and offices. General March expressed "vigorous objection to the interposition of any such body, extra

legal in fact, into the deliberations of the War Department. If the Chief of Staff and the General Staff were not competent to give the Secretary of War all necessary advice on military matters . . . the fault must be in the individuals composing it and not in the General Staff system."⁷⁶

Although it was dissolved on General March's recommendation, the War Council did play a useful part and contributed at least one improvement to the War Department General Staff. When the supply program began to break down the War Council was created as "a temporary expedient to bridge over the time required for the reorganization of the General Staff."⁷⁷ At the first meeting of the War Council which was held on December 19, 1917, the Secretary of War outlined the functions of the War Council in substance as follows: "The most important contribution toward the victorious completion of the war was brains in the conduct of it. . . . The members of the War Council were expected to keep in close touch with the situation in Europe, and for that purpose at least one member of the Council should be constantly absent in Europe getting information for its guidance. . . . It was essential for the Council to be a thinking body, and for this purpose to keep itself free of detail. . . . It should give special attention to the question of coordination of matters relating to the supplies for the Expeditionary Forces in France. . . . Consideration should be given each day to General Pershing's cablegrams. . . . Broad questions relating to the ports of embarkation should be considered. . . . The Secretary of War invited from the Council the freest initiative in the suggestion of fresh ideas. . . . He hoped and expected to receive from the Council any suggestions that tended toward securing final success. . . . For all these reasons he considered the Council the most important body in the War Department. . . . All information in the War Department and in other governmental departments would be given to the War Council. (Digested from the minutes of the War Council)."⁷⁸

These remarks of Secretary Baker sounded reminiscently like Elihu Root's description of the duties which a General Staff would perform. Indirectly there is the insinuation that such duties were not being carried out by the War Department General Staff. Instead, circumstances indicated that the War Department General Staff and everyone were so involved in details and special phases of problems that the over-all big picture was not discernible. Typical of the general criticism that adequate statistical data and progress reports were not available in a form to permit the coordinators to know the situation accurately was

the following comment in the *New York Times Magazine* of February 3, 1918, which was captioned "*America's Hit-Or-Miss War Methods—Criticism of the System Continues at Washington, But It Has Shifted to a Broader Basis—Lack of Real Coordination on Scientific Lines*":

"Military preparation, industrial preparation, rail transportation, ship tonnage, coal production, and so on, have never marched in step with each other for a moment since the beginning of the war, and at this moment the country is suffering from an industrial jam. The jam has been growing since last summer, and even in its early stages it was sufficient to account for a large part of the delay in having soldiers properly equipped.

* * *

To be more specific, we need, literally, a quantity-production chart in the War Department that will enable some man to see every day and every hour just where we are in every activity, and that man must have authority to say, "Hold back there"; "Speed up here." We have no such chart anywhere in the War Department or any other department.

The Government, through its War Department, should assemble in front of that chart a board consisting of its Quartermaster General, its Chief of Ordnance, its Chief of Aviation, its Chief Engineer Officer, the Director General of Railroads, the Chief of Embarkation, a chief in control of labor supply, the head of the Shipping Board, the Fuel Administrator—in short, every chief executive who has control of the production of a commodity or a force that is vital to the prosecution of the war. . . ."⁷⁹

As a matter of fact, the War Council, consisting as it did of the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and such bureau chiefs as Generals Crozier, Weaver, Crowder, Sharpe, Goethals, Pierce and Mr. Day and Mr. Stettinius was proceeding along this line. At its second meeting on December 20, 1917, the War Council considered the question of collecting and presenting the mass of information which would be needed to keep the members of the War Council oriented⁸⁰ and from which a coordinated military program could be planned. The discussion on this theme led to the prompt creation in February and March, 1918, of the Statistics Branch of the General Staff.

General March, Chief of Staff, indicated how important the services of this agency became and noted: "Another section of the General Staff which was organized and which is not a part of the usual General Staff set-up in most armies was the Statistics Branch of the General

Staff. This branch was headed by Leonard P. Ayres. . . . Later on, at the urgent request of General Pershing, after the Statistical Branch of the War Department General Staff was found to be of greatest value to the rapid and proper decision of problems in the War Department, I sent Colonel Ayres to France to establish for the AEF a similar branch. After that was completed, I loaned Ayres to Assistant Secretary Stettinius, who had been sent abroad in connection with the supply of munitions. The statistics prepared by Colonel Ayres presented to the Chief of Staff in compact form all essential data concerning every phase of the production of every single element used by the Army in the prosecution of the war, together with similar data concerning enlistment, disease, training, camps, etc.; so that by simply referring to the appropriate charts I could have set before me every phase of the war program."⁸¹

Here then was a tool which greatly facilitated the process of analysis and coordination. It was surprising that although the War Department General Staff had been a section devoted to the task of collecting military information, this division had restricted its energies to a collection of data regarding other countries who might become involved in a war with the United States.

THE POWERS OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN WORLD WAR I


Incident to the reorganization of the War Department General Staff, there was an interesting question which arose and which was but partially answered. The question, simply stated, was whether or not the entire war organization should be supervised by the War Department General Staff. Thus, even during the World War, the War Department was plagued by the same basic controversy that had always been with it since its beginning—the problem of jurisdiction and the setting up of jurisdictional limits. General March, General Pershing, and Mr. Benedict Crowell, Assistant Secretary of War and Director of Munitions, all had somewhat different viewpoints and their views were influenced to a marked degree by the job each held. Basically the difference was over the level at which over-all coordination should be instituted. There was complete agreement as to where the highest level of control should function. General March echoed the common belief that "some super-agency had to be evolved, to which should be given the power to allocate all kinds of supplies produced by the United States and that such an agency should not belong to the Army or to the Navy, but should be a board or commission of business men with a wide acquaintance with every phase of production and procurement of supplies, which would report direct to the President of the United States,

and act by his authority."⁸² In practice the War Industries Board became the super-agency although the "War Cabinet," composed as it was of the regular Cabinet members, the fuel and food administrators and the Chairman of the War Industries Board, and the Shipping Board, might have claimed first place had it not functioned solely as a general conference medium. Assistant Secretary of War Crowell believed that operating at the next lower level to the super-agency the military establishment should be divided into two coordinate divisions, one dealing with military matters and the other handling military supplies and equipment, and that General Staff control should not include supervision of the supply bureaus. Arguing for his position and explaining the theory of the wartime organization, Mr. Crowell stated:

"The original reorganization of the War Department (February and May, 1918) persisted for a year and a half after the armistice, the Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic—still attached to the General Staff—dealing with the numerous industrial problems that arose. . . . The Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic was not brought formally into existence until April, 1918. . . . It should be remembered that the (reorganization was) largely carried out before the passage of the Overman Act which gave the President blanket powers to rearrange the Government. . . . Had the Overman Act antedated the reorganization of the War Department, it is possible that the overhead business office of the Department would have been made a civilian agency through and through. But there was no Overman Act; the only War Department branch which had any legal right to coordinate and control the activities of the other branches was the General Staff; and therefore to the General Staff the new control agency, the Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic, was attached. This necessity gave to the General Staff an appearance of power which it did not actually possess. . . . The General Staff through its Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic . . . apparently became the great procuring agency of the War Department, in addition to its purely military functions. This, however, was only an arrangement pro forma to give authenticity to the acts of the Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic. Actually a different arrangement was in effect. . . . In November, 1917 (the Secretary of War) called to the (position of Assistant Secretary of War) a man whose training had been entirely in the industrial field and turned over to his administration all the industrial activities of the War Department. . . . The Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic was thereupon plotted as the agency through which the Assistant Secretary . . . could gain control. . . . Thereafter the Assistant Secretary of War was the industrial head of

ORGANIZATION OF WAR DEPARTMENT

IN 1918



Asst. Secretary Crowell's view of War Department.
From "Armies of Industry," Crowell and Wilson

CHART 5

the War Department. But since this arrangement was one of agreement rather than law, the executive decisions of the Assistant Secretary went down to the Division of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic as from the Secretary of War, through the technically legal channel of the General Staff. . . . From the standpoint of good organization, any assumption by the General Staff of control over the production of supplies is fundamentally wrong. . . . When the War Department approaches industry with demands for production on a modern war time scale, to be effective it must deal with industry on a practical industrial basis. It must speak the language of the tribe. This the General Staff officer is not fitted to do. His whole training has been in another field. A Chief of Staff must be a man of great military experience one who has spent his life in military affairs. To expect him to be also a successful administrator of war industry is to expect too much. . . . To be sure, the General Staff is concerned with the production of supplies, and vitally so as much concerned as it is with the problems of personnel. The General Staff is the Army's great advisory and coordinating agency, and therefore the supply problems properly fall within its jurisdiction. Its interest in these problems, however, is military rather than industrial—a distinction which many staff officers were unable to grasp. The range of supplies to be produced, the quantities of them and the distribution of the finished supplies are affairs in which the General Staff should be supreme. It should even dictate specifications with the understanding that the specifications are military specifications. It can if it likes call for the production of airplanes with a speed of 200 miles an hour, or of field guns that can shoot 50 miles, but the moment it attempts to design these materials and to procure their manufacture, then it trespasses in a field not properly its own."⁸³

The views of Mr. Crowell were influential in the postwar reorganization of the War Department. During the war, General Pershing and General March probably agreed with most of Mr. Crowell's views but disagreed that there should be two channels leading to the Secretary of War. General March took the view that there could be only one door to the sanctum of the Secretary of War and that door had to be guarded by the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff to the end that all War Department policies might be coordinated and to free the Secretary from a multiplicity of detail. General March, as Chief of Staff, incorporated into General Orders No. 80 of 1918, which reorganized the General Staff, the proviso that "the Chief of the General Staff is the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on *all* matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary

of War with the planning, development, and execution of the Army program."⁸⁴ What was more to the point, he carried out that dictum without compromise by taking personal control of the cables the War Department sent to France and by throwing out all cables which conflicted with his interpretation of our military policy. In so doing, General March came into conflicts with both of the civilian Assistant Secretaries of War. The Chief of Staff directed that cables emanating from the offices of the Assistant Secretaries of War be brought to him prior to being sent. He related that "when these cables were in fact either contrary to the approved War Department policy or referred to a matter concerning which the sender had no concern, I either tore them up or directed they be not sent. Assistant Secretary of War Keppel, or his office, was one of the principal offenders in this respect and I simply stopped such cables. In the case of Secretary Baker himself, at first there were some such cables which were sent under his name which possibly had come from some civilian assistant in his office. Those cables I took to him personally, and went over the subject with him, with the result that he tore them up himself without any comment."⁸⁵ General March also related stories of conflicts with Assistant Secretary Crowell over personnel problems and stated that Secretary Baker had confirmed his right to exercise supervision over and check upon the Assistant Secretary.⁸⁶

The Chief of Staff, however, approved of the idea of a division of function immediately below the War Department General Staff and approved the proposal to restrict General Pershing's jurisdiction to purely military matters. Thus General March supported the plan to place General Bliss in charge of diplomatic matters in France and General Goethals in charge of all supply matters both in the United States and France, which would have placed both of those officers in a co-ordinate position with General Pershing and which would narrow Pershing's task to carrying out the strictly military functions. General Pershing, as we have seen, opposed any differentiation of function which would have deprived him of complete control over any activity overseas. He made a sharp distinction in the AEF between strictly military matters and matters of supply having a separate General Staff for each but he insisted that they clear through him. Likewise, General Pershing in numerous cables permitted members of his staff to prescribe or alter the technical specifications of materiel insisting that the military who use the weapons and equipment should have the right to dictate specifically the kind of equipment they wanted. A reasonable view of the problem is that Pershing and Crowell represented ex-

tremes, neither of which was right. Pershing failed to see the whole problem whenever he permitted his subordinates to lay down technical specifications and insist on them regardless of the problems thus created in the industrial production sphere. However, there were other factors which perhaps justified Pershing's desire for complete independence.

In writing of General March's claim for over-all jurisdiction for the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff, General Harbord, Chief of Staff of the AEF, commented as follows: "General Pershing commanded the American Expeditionary Forces directly under the President and Secretary of War, as the President's *alter ego*. No military person or power was interposed between them. The President himself recognized this relationship. . . . After America reached France it came under General Pershing's command. No successful war has ever been fought commanded by a staff officer in a distant capital. Only once has it been attempted in our country, when Major General Henry W. Halleck tried unsuccessfully to interpose himself between President Lincoln and Lieutenant General Grant. No attempt to repeat that unhappy experience was made in the World War. The organization effected in our War Department after the World War scrupulously preserves the historic principle actually followed during the war, so that the line of authority runs directly from the highest in the land to the highest in the field."⁸⁷

Crowell saw only part of the problem when he declared himself in favor of an organization which permitted the production and supply end to say to the military that while your desires are known, production and supply dictate that you accept the solution adopted because of technical and supply considerations. Likewise, the Secretary of War should not be called upon to settle all conflicts between disputing jurisdictions. Perhaps a solution would have been the establishment of a higher General Staff which would have exercised planning and coordinating functions on a level above that of a general staff for supply and industrial production and a general staff for all military operations.

In this controversy over jurisdiction, there arose a principle quite as important as that of control—pride of position. Span of control tends to increase functional specialization and in so doing sets up of a necessity many rungs in the ladder of command and authority. Pride of position works to step over these subordinate rungs and insists that no coordinating or controlling restrictions emanate from any authority except the supreme heads and then only from the chief in person. The doctrine was well stated by General Harbord in his previously quoted comment.

THE AEF GENERAL STAFF

The General Staff in France, developed in the American Expeditionary Force, played an important part in influencing the postwar reorganization of the War Department General Staff. General Harbord, Pershing's Chief of Staff, related that the first duty of General Pershing "was to plan for planning,"⁸⁸ to effect an organization of a General Staff to conform to the needs of the situation and to enable the Commander-in-Chief to proceed with his planning. After a study of the British and French General Staff organization in France, the AEF General Staff was organized and divided into five main divisions: Administrative Policy, Intelligence, Operations, Coordination, and Training.⁸⁹

The Administrative Section "dealt with general matters of administrative policy and organization"⁹⁰ and supervised the allotment of ocean tonnage, priority of overseas shipments, replacements of men and animals, organization and types of equipment for troops and such other diverse tasks as exercising general control over military police, billeting, prisoners of war, welfare work, amusements, leaves and leave areas.

The Intelligence Section, closely patterned after the British and French organization, was responsible for the collection and interpretation of enemy information—which included the collection of information on the enemy troop locations, strength, and order of battle; the economic resources and war trade of the enemy; enemy strategical movements and plans, etc. This involved a multiplicity of detail—from counter espionage to censorship of mail and the press.

The Operations Section first worked out the tactical organization of the combat units, and supervised troop movements, locations of camps and billets and training areas, and established priority of troop shipment. Later this section made the strategical studies from which came the plans, instructions, and orders for combat operations and their supervision.

To the Coordination Section was assigned the inter-meshing of staff work on administrative policies, and the supervision of the application of such policies throughout the command. The compilation of information on the current and prospective supply, construction, and transport in the AEF, and of the execution of administrative policies as well as the settlement of details affecting administration were among its responsibilities. The compilation of charts and statistics showing the state of supply, construction, and transport was another duty of this section.

The Training Section drew up training schedules and manuals,

established different schools and made training and tactical inspections.

In addition, the office of Secretary of the General Staff was established. Important changes were made from time to time. At the time of the armistice, the chiefs of the operating supply services who formed the Technical Staff and who had previously been under the Coordination of Supply Section of the General Staff reported to the Commanding General, Service of Supply of the AEF. A Deputy Chief of Staff was installed by General Pershing and served as Assistant to the Chief of Staff.

Some idea of the task which confronted the General Staff may be gained by a reference to the units operating under its coordinating and planning control. On the administrative level immediately below the General Staff were the special administrative and technical staffs and services. Thus, the Adjutant General's Department, Inspector General's Department, and the Judge Advocate General's Department performed far-flung administrative services. Their chiefs constituted the administrative special staffs and operated under the control of the General Staff of the AEF. The Quartermaster Service, the Medical Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Ordnance Department, the Signal Corps, the Air Service, the General Purchasing Board, the Gas Service, the Transportation Service, the Provost Marshal Service and the Motor Transport Corps operated on a vast scale in France. The head of each of these technical services was a member of the special staff at the General Headquarters of the AEF and operated under the appropriate section of the General Staff of the AEF which carried out the directives and exercised the planning and coordinating controls which magnified and gave effect to the decisions of the Commanding General. On the operating side the General Staff in carrying out the will of the commander exercised planning and coordinating supervision and control over combat troops numbering over one and a quarter million men organized into three armies consisting of a varying number of army corps and divisions with appropriate supply services. Likewise, there was the task of coordinating with the Service of Supply, consisting of around 275,000 men and operating in innumerable villages and areas scattered all over France south of the latitude of Paris. In outlining the functions of his General Staff, General Pershing praised its work as follows: "The General Staff at my headquarters . . . concerned itself with the broader phases of control. Under my general supervision and pursuant to clearly determined policies, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, coordinated by the Chief of Staff, issued instructions and gave general direction to the great combat units and to the Services of Supply, keep-

ing always in close touch with the manner and promptness of their fulfillment. . . . For the proper direction and coordination of the details of administration, intelligence, operations, supply, and training, a General Staff was an indispensable part of the Army."⁹¹

The War Department General Staff in existence at the signing of the armistice in November, 1918, was the product of much thought and many reorganizations. Born of necessity and unfettered by legal strait-jackets after the passage of the Overman Act in May, 1918, the War Department General Staff of November, 1918, is deserving of analysis. For that reason, its organization and its administrative arrangements will be summarized.

GENERAL STAFF ORGANIZATION AT THE END OF WORLD WAR I

When the War ended, the War Department General Staff was divided into four main divisions which were termed:⁹²

- (1) Operations,
- (2) Military Intelligence,
- (3) Purchase, Storage, and Traffic,
- (4) War Plans.

In addition, the office of the Chief of Staff served to coordinate the coordinators. This alone required the work of fifty-one officers and eighty civilians. The following summary will indicate the scope of service performed and the personnel employed:⁹³

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

<i>Organization title or sub- title</i>	<i>Duties</i>	<i>Nature of work</i>	<i>Officers employed</i>
Office of Chief of Staff.	Immediate advisor of the Secretary of War in military matters; plans, develops, and executes Army program. Responsible for harmonious execution of policies of War Department by the several corps, bureaus and other agencies of the Military Establishment.	Advisory and administrative.	3
Liaison officer.	Intermediary between foreign military missions and the War Department on military matters.	Liaison.	1
Office of Secretary, General Staff.	Receipt, assignment and distribution of all papers acted upon by the General Staff Corps; assignment and supervision of the clerical force of the General Staff; supervision of records of the personnel, General Staff.	Supervisory administrative and coordinating.	4

<i>Organization title or sub- title</i>	<i>Duties</i>	<i>Nature of work</i>	<i>Officers employed</i>
Office of executive assistant to Chief of Staff (immediate office).	Takes final action on matters where subject is not of sufficient importance to bring to attention of Chief of Staff or Secretary of War; considers cases involving minor disciplinary matters affecting officers, extension of clemency to prisoners, and review of alleged injustices.	Indication of general policies; advisor to the Chief of Staff.	4
Emergency discharge section.	Consideration of requests for return of officers and enlisted men from overseas due to urgent private reasons.	Advisory.	3
Coordination section.	Studies organization of all subdivisions of the War Department, with a view to securing compliance with regulations and policies of the Secretary of War; checks all orders and instructions issued by bureaus and corps of the War Department; acts as representative of the executive assistant to the Chief of Staff in the adjustment of administrative difficulties.	Coordinating.	5
Cable section.	Coordinates all outgoing cablegrams, preventing unnecessary messages, errors, duplications, and messages conflicting with the policy of the War Department; codes and decodes all confidential and secret cablegrams sent or received by the War Department.	Supervision of all cable and radio business of the War Department.	9
Statistics branch.	Collection for the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the General Staff of statistical information from the several bureaus, corps, or other agencies of the Military Establishment, both as to troops and supplies, and from outside sources relating to the war program.	Statistical.	— (not known)

The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff was charged with the following principal duties:⁹⁴

(a) The recruitment and mobilization of the Army, including the assignment and distribution of the draft; matters of troop personnel; troop movements and distribution; and the determination of all overseas priorities.

(b) The appointment, assignment, promotion, and transfer of officers of all branches of the Army.

(c) Supervision of selection of camp sites, cantonments, hospitals, and other construction projects except for harbor terminal facilities.

(d) The preparation of Tables of Equipment for all branches of

the army. This included the determination of types and the general basis of distribution of all types and quantities of equipment and supplies.

(e) The standardization of the design and the reception, storage, maintenance, and replacement of all motor vehicles.

From this list of duties it was evident that the Operations Division came into contact with almost every special staff and technical and administrative service as well as with the combat troops, the operating part of the Army. The personnel employed on August 31, 1919, in this division was as follows:

OPERATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF

<i>Organization title or sub- title</i>	<i>Duties</i>	<i>Nature of work</i>	<i>Officers employed</i>
Office of Director of Operations.	Assistant to Chief of Staff; act for Secretary of War and Chief of Staff in matters pertaining to Operations Division.	General supervision of Operations Division.	3
Operations branch.	Advises the Director of Operations in matters pertaining to operations branch; acts for Director of Operations in matters pertaining to operations branch not involving new policy.	Military programs; recruitment; mobilization; overseas priorities; movement of troops.	26
Equipment branch.	Advises the Director of Operations in matters pertaining to equipment branch; acts for Director of Operations in matters pertaining to operations branch not involving new policy.	Types and distribution of equipment; construction; camp sites and cantonments; permits; inventions.	20
Personnel branch; Executive and administration section.	Advises the Director of Operations in matters pertaining to personnel branch; acts for Director of Operations in matters pertaining to operations branch not involving new policy.	General supervision of personnel branch.	7
Promotions and assignments section.		Appointment, promotion, transfer, and assignment of commissioned officers.	33
Procurement and discharge section.		Demobilization of commissioned personnel, appointment in Officers Reserve Corps; receives applications for appointment in Regular Army.	25

The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff was assigned duties by General Orders No. 80, War Department, August 26, 1918: "This division shall have the cognizance and control of military intelligence, both positive and negative, and shall be in charge of an officer designated as the Director of Military Intelligence, who will be an assistant to the Chief of Staff. He is also the Chief Military Censor. The duties of this division are to maintain estimates revised daily of the military situation, the economic situation, and of such other matters as the Chief of Staff may direct, and to collect, collate, and disseminate military intelligence. It will cooperate with the intelligence section of the general staffs of allied countries in connection with military intelligence; prepare instructions in military intelligence work for the use of our forces; supervise the training of personnel for intelligence work; organize, direct, and coordinate the intelligence service; supervise the duties of military attaches; communicate direct with department intelligence officers and intelligence officers at posts, camps, and stations, and with commands in the field in matters relating to military intelligence; obtain, reproduce, and issue maps; translate foreign documents; disburse and account for intelligence funds; cooperate with the censorship board and with intelligence agencies of other departments of the Government."⁹⁵

To perform the above duties, the Military Intelligence Division was organized into an Administrative Section and three branches with subdivisions as follows:

Military Intelligence Division Administrative Section (M.I. 1)

- (a) Records, Accounts, and General Section.
- (b) Interpreters and intelligence police sections.
- (c) Publication (Daily Intelligence Summary, Weekly Summary, Activities Report).

The Positive Branch.

(a) Information Section (M.I. 2. Prepared the strategic estimate which attempted to answer the questions, "What is the situation today?" and "What will it be tomorrow?" by analyzing the situation in each country under the military political, economic, and psychological headings.)

(b) Collection Section (M.I. 5. Administered the military attaché system.)

(c) Translation Section (M.I. 6).

(d) Code and Cipher Section (M.I. 8).

(e) Shorthand Bureau.

(f) Secret Ink Bureau.

- (g) Code Instruction Bureau.
- (h) Code Compilation Bureau.
- (i) Communication Bureau.
- (j) Combat Intelligence Instruction Section (M.I. 9).

The Geographic Branch (maps and military monographs of all countries).

- (a) Map Section (M.I. 7)
- (b) Monograph and Handbook Section (M.I. 9).

The Negative Branch (collects and disseminates information upon which may be based measures of prevention against activities or influences tending to harm military efficiency by methods other than armed force).

- (a) Foreign Influence Section (M.I. 4).
- (b) Army Section (M.I. 3).
- (c) News Section (M.I. 10).
- (d) Travel Section (M.I. 11).
- (e) Fraud Section (M.I. 13).

The relationship between military intelligence and planning was indicated by Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, who was in charge of this division during the World War, in the following statement: "At present the Military Intelligence Division is one of the four coordinate divisions of the General Staff and the Director of Military Intelligence is an Assistant Chief of Staff. This staff organization is essential to success. It is especially vital in intelligent administration. . . . Our military plans are formulated in general by the Joint Army and Navy Board, and in detail by the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee. National strategy must be based upon national policy. It is obvious that national policy must depend upon correct predictions concerning the international future, and that, after the national policy and strategy have been determined upon, war plans can never be satisfactory unless they are based on correct detailed information. There is hardly an officer who does not recognize that at a GHQ and at the headquarters of every army, corps, division and similar unit, G-3 cannot make good plans unless G-2 furnish good information. We take that truth for granted, but what is less often emphasized is the fact that there must be a G-2 in the War Department performing a similar function, not only with the War Plans Division in the initiation and perfection of plans, but also concurrently with the State Department in the work of prediction upon which national policy is based."⁹⁶

In August, 1919, there were 88 officers and 143 civilians employed in

the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff.

The Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the War Department General Staff represented an extension of the duties of the War Department General Staff under the necessity of war circumstances far beyond anything contemplated in the theory of General Staff supervision. In fact, many believed that the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division represented a distinct departure from correct General Staff principles and that this defection into operating phases came about because no other solution appeared practicable at the time. The problem demonstrated a very real weakness in the theory of General Staff supervision and coordination.

This particular problem was most complex but the principles can be traced by examining the situation during three different phases, by noting the solutions attempted, and by studying the considered opinion of the War Department on the effectiveness of the different solutions. The first phase has already been commented upon and we need only to note further that the spectacle of five and later eight supply or service bureaus pursuing their independent ways was a reflection upon the General Staff as a planning agency, for without the necessary prior planning, effective coordination was impossible. The second phase was an attempt to reorganize the General Staff so that effective coordination would be accomplished within the framework of the General Staff theory—supervision which stopped far short of actual operation. Of this solution the Chief of Staff commented: "It is true that an organization of the General Staff had been set up to coordinate the work of the bureaus, and that it had accomplished some good in this field. Its powers were, in the main, supervisory only, and, as has been pointed out, the organization did not lend itself readily to supervision. Furthermore, supervision tends to envelop and duplicate executive control and to create conflict of authority and divided responsibility, especially where the supervisory organization has administrative powers. It is naturally much weaker than single responsibility and executive control."⁹⁷

The third phase which represented the War Department General Staff's idea of the approved solution was initiated by General Orders No. 80, War Department, August 28, 1918, and supply Bulletin No. 29, November 7, 1918. The philosophy of this reorganization was stated as follows: "At the head of the organization is a Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic, whose function is executive and not supervisory. He receives the Army program from another division of the General Staff, and his is the responsibility for meeting that pro-

gram and filling these requirements. He is in command of the supply organization and relieves the Chief of Staff from all detail and of responsibility for supply.

The fundamental idea of this reorganization is first, the consolidation in one department of the purchase of all standard articles of merchandise, leaving in the bureaus the purchase, production, and inspection of highly technical material such as ordnance, aircraft, etc., and second the storage, distribution, and issue within the United States, and their storage prior to shipment abroad of all War Department supplies, whether standard or special (including those excepted from procurement)."⁹⁸

At the time of the armistice in 1918 the organization outline of this division was as follows:

Purchases, Storage, and Traffic Division, War Department General Staff.

1. Supervising units:

- (a) Statistics and Requirements Branch.
- (b) External Relations Branch.
- (c) Purchase Branch.
- (d) Production Branch.
- (e) Executive Branch.
- (f) Inspection Branch.
- (g) Research Branch.

2. Operating departments:

- (a) Embarkation Service.
- (b) Inland Traffic Service.
- (c) Office of the Director of Purchase and Storage and Acting Quartermaster General.
- (d) Facilities Department.
- (e) Finance Department.
- (f) Primary Ports of Embarkation.
- (g) Transportation Service, (April, 1919).

If this invasion on the part of the War Department General Staff into operating activities was based on any reasons except those of expediency and necessity, the theory of and justification for the existence of the War Department General Staff could to that extent be attacked. The justification for the reorganization as stated by the War Department was in part that "supervision tends to envelop and duplicate executive control—and is naturally weaker than single responsibility and executive control."⁹⁹ This was an admission against interest, for such an argument leads to the conclusion that the General Staff theory should be abandoned in favor of operating agencies coordinated solely by a

War Council composed of representatives of operating agencies. It was interesting to note that after the armistice the operating sections of this division were constituted into independent services with the subsection chiefs becoming the bureau heads. This was done principally because of the expiration of the blanket powers given to the President by the Overman Act which held only for the period of hostilities. The Armistice forced the War Department General Staff to reorganize in conformance with peacetime legislative restrictions.

The War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff grew out of the old War College Division and by the provisions of General Orders No. 14, War Department of February 9, 1918, was organized to include a War Plans branch; a Training and Instruction Branch; a Legislation, Regulations, and Rules Branch; and an Historical Branch. By General Orders No. 48, War Department, 1920, the ROTC Branch, the Education and Recreation Branch, and the Morale Branch were established in the War Plans Division. This division was the major planning agency, in the War Department General Staff and was responsible for the following:

- (a) Plans for the organization of all branches of the Army.
- (b) The study and determination of the types and the quantities of equipment and the approval of design and types of equipment submitted by the several bureaus; supervision of research and invention by the several bureaus or other agencies of the Military Establishment in connection with equipment.
- (c) Projects for national defense.
- (d) Training for all branches of the Army, the tactics and methods of warfare to be employed, together with all publications having relation thereto, and the supervision of military schools.
- (e) The translation and compilation of foreign documents relating to military affairs.
- (f) Collection, compilation, and maintenance of complete military records.
- (g) Proposed legislation and the preparation of regulations and rules for the Military Establishment.¹⁰⁰

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BOARD—WORLD WAR I

Through the joint agreement between the War and Navy Secretaries in 1919, a Joint Army and Navy Board, composed of the Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans Division, and Chief of the Operations Division of the General Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and the Director of the

Plans Division, Naval Operations of the Navy, was reorganized for the consideration of matters of general policy. Subsidiary to this body was the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee which worked out the details. All members of the War Plans Division of the General Staff were members of the planning committee. The duties of the Legislation, Regulations, and Rules Branch were of special significance for this sub-section was charged with the drafting of bills for the consideration of Congress designed to carry out recommendations of the War Department General Staff operated on the policy determining level. True, their plans could take the form of recommendations only; nevertheless, here was administrative planning enjoying free reign. In drawing up details in conformance with announced policies, the planners were working on the normal administrative level. In the War Plans Branch of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff, the administrative planners enjoyed a most unusual privilege. Because of the secrecy necessarily involved in this type of work, plans involving tremendous decisions were worked out with a relatively free hand. Congress exercised no immediate interest in this work. Of course the plans were based on future contingencies and would then be accepted or rejected by Congress before being placed in operation. However, dependence on some such carefully worked out plan would be necessary and would operate to commit Congress and force it to adopt the plans prepared on the administrative level. The operation of the War Plans Division illustrates the many different forms that planning does take and provides an instance of how administrative technical planning can be policy determining or on an over-all basis which circumstances will tend to force the Congress to accept. The personnel employed in this division in August, 1919, was as follows:

WAR PLANS DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF

	<i>Duties</i>	<i>Nature of work</i>	<i>Officers employed</i>
Director, assistant director and executive officer.	Director is Assistant Chief of Staff and is authorized to issue instructions in the name of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff on matters within his control. This division makes a study of and submits reports on all matters referred to it by the Chief of Staff.	3
Training branch.	Makes study of and submits reports on all matters referred to it by the director of the division; powers advisory only.	Military training tactics, methods of warfare publications; military schools.	10

<i>Title or designation</i>	<i>Duties</i>	<i>Nature of work</i>	<i>Officers employed</i>
Legislation, regulations, and rules branch.	Same.	Proposed legislation and the preparation of regulations and rules for the Military Establishment and decision on such regulations and rules; proposed conventions with foreign powers relative to penal military jurisdiction.	6
War plans branch.	Same.	Projects for national defense; plans for organization of all branches of the Army; policy affecting above matters.	12
Historical branch.	Same.	Collection and maintenance of historical records; matters relating to above.	29
Morale branch.	Same.	Maintenance and stimulation of Army morale.	8
Education and special training.	Makes study of and submits reports on all matters referred to it by the director of the division; powers advisory only; the committee to be divided and form two branches of the War Plans Division as follows: (1) Reserve Officers' Training Corps, branch, supervision, direction, and control R.O.T.C. affairs, (2) education and recreation, educational and vocational training, training camp activities, moral training.	15

Certainly the World War period of 1917-1918 was a crucible in which the whole General Staff idea was severely tested. The comments of the men who closely observed the experiment indicated the general result. All expressed the opinion that the General Staff was an indispensable instrument for planning and coordination. Likewise, without its capacity to extend the capabilities of the commander no man could have handled the immense tasks and responsibilities which of necessity converged on those in high commands or offices. General Pershing and General Harbord praised the AEF General Staff. General Peyton March, Chief of Staff of the War Department General Staff, said: "I

am convinced that without a properly organized and efficient General Staff charged with the responsibility for, and empowered with the authority to formulate and to execute, the Army program, it will, in any future war, as in this and in every other war in our history, be impossible for the activities of the various agencies, services, and bureaus of the War Department to be controlled and directed, with promptness and effectiveness, to the attainment of the common end. It can be stated without qualification that the success of an army in modern war is impossible without such a General Staff."¹⁰¹

And Secretary of War Baker wrote: "The War has developed the need for new technical services in the Army . . . , and the scale of military operations has led to the establishment of a Division of Statistics and Information, which ought to become a permanent part of our military organization. . . . The organization of the General Staff has now given us a staff system which has stood the test of mobilization and war, and in the future the function of the General Staff will be more clearly apprehended and its processes in time of peace more accurately based upon exact knowledge statistically recorded."¹⁰²

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1. Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker—America at War*. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1931) Vol. I, p. 6.
2. Same, p. 7.
3. Same.
4. *The New York Tribune*, March 8, 1916.
5. Frederick Palmer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 25.
6. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1916, Vol. I, p. 50.
7. Same, pp. 80-89.
8. Hugh L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1928) p. 546.
9. Same.
10. Same, pp. 546-547.
11. Same, p. 547.
12. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1916, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
13. Same, pp. 70-80.
14. Same.
15. Same.
16. Same, pp. 185-186.
17. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1917, pp. 144-145.
18. Palmer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 70.
19. Same.
20. Same.
21. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Report of Chief of Staff, pp. 248-249.
22. Palmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.
23. Major General H. L. Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier*. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1928) p. 557.
24. Same, pp. 558-559.
25. From *The Nation at War*, by General Peyton C. March, copyright 1932, reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc., pp. 2-3.
26. *General Orders 64*, War Department, 1911.
27. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1913, Report of the Adjutant General, Vol. I, pp. 222-223.

28. H. Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood, A Biography*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931) Vol. II, pp. 206-15.
29. *New York Tribune*, March 26, 1917.
30. *Annual Report of the War Department* 1919, Vol. I, p. 292.
31. Same.
32. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 292.
33. Same, pp. 292-293.
34. Same, p. 249.
35. *Congressional Record*, February 5, 1918, p. 1689.
36. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, p. 293.
37. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1918, Vol. I, p. 150.
38. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, p. 249.
39. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1918, Vol. I, p. 149.
40. From *Personalities and Reminiscences of the War*, by Robert Lee Bullard, copyright 1925 by Doubleday & Company, Inc., p. 21.
41. John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931) Vol. I, pp. 16-17.
42. James G. Harbord, *The American Army in France*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1936) pp. 63-64.
43. Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
44. Same, p. 123.
45. Same, p. 2.
46. Benedict Crowell and R. F. Wilson, *The Armies of Industry*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) p. 4.
47. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, pp. 340-341; pp. 245-246.
48. Crowell and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
49. Same, p. 6.
50. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, p. 249.
51. Major General William J. Snow, "Extracts from World War Memoirs." *The Field Artillery Journal*, January, February, 1940, p. 12.
52. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 250-251. Charts adapted from *Congressional Record*, February 5, 1918, Vol. 56, Part 2, pp. 1690-91.
53. Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
54. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, Part I, p. 717.
55. Much of the material which follows has been based on the Report of the Quartermaster General, *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, Part 1.
56. Section 2, H. R. 17498 approved August 29, 1916.
57. Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, *The Giant Hand*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.)
58. Comment of a special assistant to the Secretary of War who prefers to remain anonymous.
59. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 238-239.
60. Same, p. 239.
61. Same.
62. March, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
63. Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
64. Same.
65. March, *op. cit.*, p. 252.
66. Same, p. 253.
67. John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, Co., 1931) Vol. II, p. 223.
68. March, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-267.
69. Same, p. 288.
70. Same, p. 274.
71. Same, p. 283; p. 274.
72. Pershing, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 185-186.
73. Same, pp. 190-192.
74. March, *op. cit.*, p. 283.
75. Palmer, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 2-3.
76. March, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.
77. Crowell and Wilson, *The Armies of Industry*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
78. Same, p. 13.

79. *Congressional Record*, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, Jan. 21, Feb. 14, 1918. Vol. 56, Part 2, pp. 1831-1832.
80. Crowell and Wilson, *The Armies of Industry*, p. 14.
81. March, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.
82. Same, p. 168.
83. Crowell and Wilson, *The Armies of Industry*, pp. 8-18 (The quotation has been slightly rearranged but the meaning has not been changed).
84. March, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.
85. Same, p. 52.
86. Same, p. 53.
87. James G. Harbord, *The American Army in France*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1936) p. 111.
88. Same, p. 91.
89. Same, p. 93.
90. Same.
91. Final Report of General John J. Pershing. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920) pp. 12-13.
92. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vols. I (4 parts), II and III used as principal source for the description which follows.
93. Data from Senate Document 1932. 66th Congress, 1st Session, May-November, 1919, Vol. 16.
94. cf. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 255-292.
95. Same, pp. 325-326.
96. Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, "The Military Intelligence Division, General Staff," *Journal of the United States Artillery*, April, 1920, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 296, 299.
97. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, *op. cit.*, p. 416.
98. Same.
99. Same.
100. Same, p. 293, cf. Major General William G. Haan, "The War Plans Division," *Journal of the United States Artillery*, October, 1920, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 333-347.
101. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, Part I.
102. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1918, Vol. I, p. 67.

Chapter VI

Consolidating The General Staff Concept After World War I

It was not long after the November 1918 armistice before unquestioning patriotic support changed to a critical attitude toward the War Department and the Army. Public opinion, the press and Congress looked askance at the organization and strength of the entire War Department structure and our military forces both at home and abroad. This was a natural and healthy state of affairs. Along with demobilization came the task of determining the future peacetime national defense program. It was time to ask what parts of our wartime organization should be retained and what important modifications were necessary to bring the War Department and the Army up to date. And as always, there were many answers to these questions.

PLANNING FOR THE ARMY AT THE END OF WORLD WAR I

Shortly after the armistice the War Department General Staff was assigned the task of studying the entire problem and of drawing up recommendations which could be submitted to Congress. Likewise, the armistice was a signal for the Congress to reassert its rightful prerogatives. During the war the presidential war powers had been utilized to make needed changes, and consequently Congress did not have to be consulted. Congress was quick to reassert its dominance and in 1919 both Houses of Congress began to hold hearings on the proposed War Department reorganization. In August, 1919, the Secretary of War submitted a bill to Congress which embodied the Army's and the Administration's idea on what our permanent military policy should be. While the preliminary work on this bill had been done by the General Staff, General March revealed that the final bill had been "licked into shape by a committee consisting of myself, General Goethals, the head of the war plans division, the head of the operations division, the head of the military intelligence, the heads of the different divisions of the general staff, which sat nights after the preliminary work down below: and after we got through that, we had several hearings with Mr. Baker and Secretary Crowell and met in his office for two or three nights."¹ The preparation of the draft of the proposed legislation was of interest because of the lack of agreement on the part of the planners. At the start there was complete unanimity. The lessons of war should be carefully studied and used as the basis for an intelligent military policy. In addition, our postwar military policy would have to be the result of

much study and planning. But here agreement ceased. In fact, all of the interested parties admitted the foregoing as the premises only if they were to be allowed to do the planning. This was illustrated by the incidents revolving around the preparation of the bill for Congress.

The Chief of Staff directed the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff to formulate a bill for the reorganization of the Army. The heads of each administrative and technical service and bureau and the various operating agencies were directed to submit their recommendations on the proposed measure. Presumably, everyone who had a significant part in the military establishment had an opportunity to submit views and to be heard. The War Plans Division of the General Staff had to weigh these recommendations and then decide to what extent they should be incorporated into the War Department proposal. The bureau chiefs resented this assumption of authority. This was illustrated by the comments of Major General George O. Squier, Chief Signal Officer, before the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on October 2, 1919. General Squier told the House Committee that the Signal Corps was not at all satisfied with the provisions of the War Department bill.² Replying to a question from the committee, he said "that beyond the holding of several consultations with General Staff committees, the officers of his department had had no part in formulating the policies included in the bill. Practically all the recommendations made by them had been overruled."³ General Squier further suggested that the Chief Signal Officer be made ex-officio a member of the General Staff as that would give the Signal Corps "some opportunity to be heard on the General Staff; it was not represented at all on the staff at the present time."⁴ This view was representative of the attitude of all the bureau chiefs and of many individual officers of the line. All recognized the importance of the planning function but without exception all wished to be in a position to exercise control over the planning which affected them.

When the War Plans Division completed their work and submitted their report to the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff, General March, was annoyed—because the General Staff "had gone far beyond the principles outlined to them"⁵ and had produced a plan which General March would not accept and would not submit to Congress. Here again was one of the basic difficulties in planning. How much latitude should the General Staff officers have had in preparing the War Department reorganization plan? In the absence of specific restrictions they rightly assumed that there were no limits to fetter their thoughts except the dictates of judgment and right reason. In this project the General Staff planners in the War Plans Division had probably asked themselves the

question, "Are we mice or are we men?" Their answer had undoubtedly been, "Men," for their plan reflected their own views and not what they thought might be General March's ideas. In rejecting this plan and in not returning it to the War Plans Division for revision, General March indicated that at least in this instance he did not wish the General Staff to be a "thought organization" but on the contrary, a "will organization" which would merely echo and amplify his own views.

In rejecting the War Plans Division draft, General March unconsciously departed from a General Staff principle which he had previously supported with great vigor. In persuading Secretary Baker to do away with the War Council of bureau chiefs, March had argued that planning and coordination was the function of the General Staff and that you should rely on that agency. If there was any fault or defect, the personnel should be replaced for the theory of the structure was sound. But once you were sure of your men, you must perforce give them wide latitude. That was the essence of the staff relationship in the matter of planning.

GENERAL MARCH'S PLAN FOR THE NEW ARMY

General March then proceeded to write his own bill, utilizing members of the War Department General Staff as clerks. The deliberative manner in which Secretary of War Baker scrutinized the draft prepared by the Chief of Staff contrasted sharply with the opinionated predetermined attitude taken by General March who described Baker's consideration of the proposed reorganization as follows: "After he had studied the bill for a week or so, Secretary Baker went over it with me and then called a meeting in his office at night, which all the officers who had been furnished copies were ordered to attend, with their comments and proposed changes, if any. At this meeting I took up the bill by sections, explaining the reason for each section and answering any comments or criticisms from those present at the conference. As a result of this free and complete discussion which lasted until after midnight, the Secretary agreed to submit to Congress the bill as drawn by me, as the Administration bill, reserving to himself the right at the hearings before Congress to dissent in certain minor particulars. In the proposed bill, . . . the Inspector General's Department was abolished, and Secretary Baker wished to retain it. But there was substantial agreement among the civilians as well as the military men present at the conference, and all discussion was absolutely free and untrammelled."⁶

Baker's action indicated his acceptance of the idea that the General Staff in the field of planning should operate as a thought organization and that reason rather than rank should dictate the results. His attitude

was characteristic of his broad-mindedness. Although he did not entirely agree with some of the conclusions of his planners, he accepted their verdict believing that they had had more time in which to consider the problem carefully than he could afford to spend and that, therefore, he should yield. In retaining his right to dissent at the Congressional hearings, Secretary Baker brought into sharp relief the fundamental difficulty of planning. The justification for General Staff planning was that they performed a very necessary function for their principals who did not have the time to spend in that activity. But in matters where planning was necessarily colored by the opinions of the planners, chiefs were reluctant to accept the considered conclusions of their staff planners. War Department General Staff planners needed directives giving a frame of references which would indicate how far afield they should go in following their own thoughts.

The bill⁷ recommended to Congress by the War Department embodied what was considered officially to be the major lessons of the war with reference to the War Department General Staff. Disregarding those provisions which do not refer to the administration or organization of the War Department General Staff, it is striking what influence the Overman Act had on the framers of this bill. Needless to say, the War Department had enjoyed the provisions of the Overman Act, which had given the President authority to make such organizational changes in the administrative set-up as the war demanded. This was the War Department's first big taste of administrative discretion and the General Staff wanted more of it.

The bill provided: "From and within these several branches the President shall form such military organizations and such territorial, field, or tactical units or organizations as he may deem necessary, all organized as he may prescribe. The Army shall remain as at present constituted by law until the President, under the authority of this act, shall direct otherwise. The President shall merge, as expeditiously as possible after the approval of this act, all now existing departments, bureaus, and officers of the War Department into the organization herein prescribed or authorized; and shall have authority to make such distribution or redistribution of the duties, powers, functions, records, property, and personnel of such previously existing departments, bureaus, and offices as he may deem necessary for the efficiency of the military service, and authority to prescribe the duties, powers, and functions of officers of the service, units, and organizations herein authorized or prescribed."⁸

Likewise, the bill assaulted the last stronghold of administrative in-

dependence which had fortified the bureau chiefs and had enabled them to retain their autonomous positions. By specifying that the bureau heads be included in the list of general officers of the line, the bill provided a device whereby the Secretary of War could shift bureau heads to other duties whenever it was deemed advisable. In the old prewar days, the bureau chief was secure for he could be removed only for cause, a very difficult and row-resulting maneuver with all manner of political implications as the Ainsworth case proved. During the war General March had relieved the Adjutant General by the simple process of having him ordered to other duty, a procedure made possible by the Overman Act.

The bill provided for a General Staff Corps of 226 officers and 278 enlisted men. It kept the War Department General Staff in the prominent position it had gained during the war. Its duties were stated as follows:

"The Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President or of the Secretary of War, shall have supervision of all agencies and functions of the Military Establishment, and shall perform such other military duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be assigned to him by the President.

The Chief of Staff shall be the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and shall be charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the Army program.

The Chief of Staff, by authority of and in the name of the Secretary of War, shall issue such orders as will insure that the policies of the War Department are harmoniously executed by the several corps, bureaus, and other agencies of the Military Establishment, and that the Army program is carried out speedily and efficiently.

The duties of the General Staff Corps, under the direction of the Chief of Staff, shall be to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the corps, bureaus, and agencies which are subject under the terms of this act to the supervision of the Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may from time to time be prescribed by the President.

Section 5 of 'An act for making further and more effectual provision

for the national defense, and for other purposes,' approved June 3, 1916, is hereby repealed."⁹

It will be recalled that Section 5 of the act of June 3, 1916, was the onerous provision which restricted the duties of the General Staff so severely that only the extremely liberal interpretation of Secretary Baker had saved it from virtual extinction.

Congress had tolerated General Staff domination during the War but it soon became apparent that this was to be changed. One very important factor which influenced the course of events was General March's wartime solution to the ever-present question, "Can an administrative agency disregard political considerations and survive?" General March did more than disregard political considerations. His total disregard for important persons and his bluntness made it appear that he went out of his way to affront influential men. He stated with apparent pride that "an anti-March cabal was formed in . . . Congress, fostered by members . . . whose requests for favors . . . had been refused."¹⁰ The movement first started during the war when March delegated to subordinate General Staff officers the task of answering letters addressed to him by Senators and Congressmen. Assistant Secretary of War Frederick P. Keppel, who was closely associated with General March during the war, deftly described the Chief of Staff as being preeminently *fortiter in re* but not particularly *suaviter in modo*.¹¹

CONGRESS REJECTS THE WAR DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS

The tone of the opposition in Congress to the War Department was embodied in the statement made public by Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon who described his report as an "analytical and explanatory statement of the bill (S2715)." Pointed excerpts from his statement were as follows:

"Briefly stated, the principal purpose of the legislation proposed by this bill is to empower the chief of an all-powerful General Staff Corps, acting by authority of the President or in his name or with the acquiescence and in the name of the Secretary of War to do whatever each successive Chief of Staff may from time to time desire to do with regard to the duties, powers, functions, records, property, and personnel of all military bureaus and offices of the War Department; also with regard to almost the entire organization of and all the funds available for the support of a Regular Army. . . . All previous legislation by Congress with respect to the "duties, powers, functions" of officers of the various staff corps and departments and of the line of the Army is to be repealed expressly or by implication. Nearly all the control

heretofore exercised by Congress over the Army is to be transferred theoretically to the President but practically to the Chief of Staff. However, Congress is still to be permitted to foot the bills. . . .

In other words, the enactment of the (measure) . . . would make permanent legislation, so far as the War Department and the Army are concerned, of the Overman Act under which there have already been transferred to the General Staff substantially all of the Quartermaster General's Office and many important administrative duties that belong to other bureaus of the War Department. The result has been aggrandizement of the General Staff, of course, but it has brought destruction of initiative, disheartenment and disorganization to the bureaus that have been raided and has caused enormous duplication of work, great waste of funds, endless delays and general inefficiency, not to say chaos, in the work of the War Department as a whole, and of the General Staff as well. . . .

The changes proposed . . . with respect to the line of the Army are fully as revolutionary as those relating to the Staff Corps and departments.

From very early days of the Army and up to the present time Congress has prescribed the organization and commissioned enlisted strength of the various arms, regiments, battalions, troops, batteries, and companies of the line. It is now proposed that Congress shall relinquish all of this control. . . .

Important as are all the foregoing features . . . they dwindle into insignificance when compared with another feature, as dangerous as it is revolutionary, that has been very cleverly concealed, camouflaged in this and other sections of the bill. It is nothing less than a proposal to repeal or nullify substantially all restrictions of existing law relative to the selection, appointment by and with the consent of the Senate, duration of tenure, powers and duties of the chiefs of all the staff corps and departments of the Army, and to give unlimited authority to the President, at his own will and pleasure, to fill the places of those chiefs with officers of his own selection; to prescribe all their powers and duties, and to remove and replace them as frequently as he may feel disposed to do. Of course, in practice the exercise of all this tremendous power would be substantially, if not entirely, controlled by the Chief of Staff. This preposterous scheme, together with many others of like intent in the pending bill, spells one man dominance, staff despotism, and militarism to a degree never surpassed in the palmiest days of the 'Great General Staff' of the German army."¹²

While this view represented an extreme opinion, it was nevertheless

true that both Congress and the people were not entirely free of suspicion of the General Staff as an instrument for planning and coordination. Secretary Baker realized that such a feeling existed and attempted to assuage it by the following explanation:

"As a result of a prolonged study of the entire situation, the Chief of Staff, with my approval, prepared a bill for the consideration of the two Houses of the Congress. Its purpose was twofold; first, to make permanent reorganization of the War Department found necessary during the War, and, second, to provide such a Regular Army as would respond to the ideal above set forth.

With regard to the first of these objects, it is to be observed that the bill strengthens the General Staff in its control of the entire Military Establishment. Under the system of War Department administration existing prior to the establishment of the General Staff, the supply bureaus had a large degree of independence. Appropriations were made by the Congress to be expended by the chiefs of the bureaus, subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of War, and upon estimates provided by him, but without any such current coordination as was necessary effectively to make smoothly working parts of a great centralized organization. There was duplication of functions, conflict of jurisdiction, and a natural competition among the bureaus, each zealously seeking to preserve the importance of its own function. The history of this system has been so fully and powerfully stated by Secretary Root that it needs no restatement here. The remedy suggested by him, and adopted by the Congress, was the creation of a General Staff, and the donation to the Chief of Staff of certain functions of control and coordination which greatly improved the situation. But the General Staff found itself under two embarrassments; in the first place, the high degree of centralization which an effective General Staff employs inspired many Members of Congress with the fear that it would grow to be a tyrannical and arbitrary power. The public press of the country was constantly referring to the great German military machine, and to the fact that the great general staff in the German Empire had practically seized the reins of government and was bending the civil, social, and religious life of the German people into conformity to its will. This menacing picture of the transformation of the industrious and romantic people of Germany into a pliant, subservient tool of the military power, had in the background all the time the Imperial General Staff, so that the very name came to be hated and feared by those who saw what such a great centralized military autocracy was doing to the soul of a great people. As a consequence, Congress acted with distrust toward

the General Staff which it had itself created, limiting its numbers and circumscribing its functions from time to time.

The second difficulty arose from the inertia and traditions of the bureaus themselves. The chiefs of the bureaus were retained with a fixed tenure of office; in some cases appointment as chief of a bureau was limited to the commissioned personnel of the particular corps—an appropriate enough limitation in highly technical corps like the Engineer and Medical Corps, but inappropriate in the general supply bureaus for the permanent commissioned personnel originally obtaining. The bureaus were headed by aggressive specialists. Each felt that the responsibility for the success of his bureau depended upon him, and resented anything diminishing his authority or narrowing his functions.

As a consequence, the old controversies between the staff and the line of the Army, while modified, were not abated by the General Staff law, and the bureaus yielded reluctantly to coordination. In part this attitude was due to mere tradition, but in part it was based upon the fear that loss of independence and prestige would increase the difficulty of securing desirable personnel in the bureaus. . . .

Those who criticize the organization of the War Department as it now is do so primarily on the ground that it subjects supply bureaus to General Staff control; that is to say, that it places the purchase of commodities under the general supervision of soldiers rather than of business men, and that as the officers of the Army are chosen for an entirely different set of aptitudes and talents and are trained in occupations widely separated from commerce and industry, their control is not business-like and not based upon a knowledge of business. That there is some truth in this may, of course, be admitted, and yet General Staff control does not mean the exclusion of business experts, but it does mean the subordination of the business specialists to a proper place in a general program. Moreover, the only complete answer to the criticism would be a total separation of the supply bureaus from the Military Establishment. This we had substantially under the old bureau system which produced a long and trying history of disagreement between the producer and the user; differences of judgment between the bureau chief, who was a business man, and the soldiers in the field who had to use the articles supplied."¹³

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920 AND THE GENERAL STAFF

The law, finally enacted by Congress on June 4, 1920, was essentially a compromise measure as far as the War Department General Staff was concerned. Its provisions fell far short of what the War Department had desired. On the other hand, the extreme critics of the Gen-

eral Staff remained dissatisfied for the act created, by comparison with the prewar structure, a relatively strong General Staff. Because the basic provisions of this law, known as the National Defense Act of 1920, were to remain in force for the next twenty years and still exist today, that part of the law which refers to the War Department General Staff will be analyzed. Many innovations were provided by the new law and many perennial army controversies were readjusted in an effort to provide a permanent solution.

The provisions of the Act of June 4, 1920, with reference to the General Staff, were as follows:

"Sec. 5. That Section 5 of the Act of June 3, 1916, is hereby amended by striking out the same and inserting the following in lieu thereof:

Sec. 5: General Staff Corps.—The General Staff Corps shall consist of the Chief of Staff, the War Department General Staff with troops. The War Department General Staff shall consist of the Chief of Staff and four assistants to the Chief of Staff selected by the President from the general officers of the line, and eighty-eight other officers of grades not below that of captain. The General Staff with troops shall consist of such numbers of officers not below the grade of captain as may be necessary to perform the General Staff duties of the headquarters of territorial departments, armies, army corps, divisions, and brigades, and as military attaches abroad. . . .

The duties of the War Department General Staff shall be to prepare plans for national defense and the use of the military forces for that purpose, both separately and in conjunction with the naval forces, and for the mobilization of the manhood of the Nation and its material resources in an emergency, to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army of the United States, and its state of preparation of military operations; and to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. . . .

The Chief of Staff shall preside over the War Department General Staff and, under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of War under the direction of the President, shall cause to be made, by the War Department General Staff, the necessary plans for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, mobilizing, training, and demobilizing the Army of the United States and for the use of the military forces for national defense. He shall transmit to the Secretary of War the plans and recommendations prepared for that purpose by the War Department General Staff and advise him in regard thereto; upon the approval of such plans or recommendations by the Secretary of War, he shall act as the agent of the Secretary of War in carrying the same

into effect. Whenever any plan or recommendation involving legislation by Congress affecting national defense or the reorganization of the Army is presented by the Secretary of War to Congress, or to one of the committees of Congress, the same shall be accompanied, when not incompatible with the public interest, by a study prepared in the appropriate division of the War Department General Staff, including the comments and recommendations of said division for or against such plan, and such pertinent comments for or against the plan as may be made by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, or individual officers of the division of the War Department General Staff in which the plan was prepared.

Hereafter, members of the General Staff Corps shall be confined strictly to the discharge of duties of the General nature of those specified for them in this section and in the Act of Congress approved February 14, 1903, and they shall not be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus or offices of the War Department, or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the General Staff Corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of such bureaus or offices, or would cause injurious or unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work thereof.

Sec. 5a. Hereafter, in addition to such other duties as may be assigned him by the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, under the direction of the Secretary of War, shall be charged with supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs. The Assistant Secretary of War shall receive a salary of \$10,000 per annum. There shall be detailed to the office of the Assistant Secretary of War from the branches engaged in procurement such number of officers and civilian employees as may be authorized by regulations approved by the Secretary of War. The offices of Second Assistant Secretary of War and Third Assistant Secretary of War are hereby abolished.

Under the direction of the Secretary of War chiefs of branches of the Army charged with the procurement of supplies for the Army shall report direct to the Assistant Secretary of War regarding all matters of procurement. . . .

Sec. 5b. *The War Council.*—The Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the general of the Army, and the Chief of Staff shall constitute the War Council of the War Department, which council shall from time to time meet and consider policies affecting both the military

and munitions problems of the War Department. Such questions shall be presented to the Secretary of War in the War Council, and his decision with reference to such questions of policy, after consideration of the recommendation thereon by the several members of the War Council, shall constitute the policy of the War Department with reference thereto."¹⁴

This Congressional solution of what the status of the General Staff should be revealed a curious mixture of hopes and fears on the part of Congress. Fear brought the limitations of power which were placed on the General Staff and which in their operation limited the Secretary of War more than the War Department General Staff. Secretary Baker had instituted the formation of a War Council in 1917 but had yielded to March's argument that a War Council had no place in the War Department structure because the General Staff already provided the means for such consultation as was desirable. The war council created by the Act of June 4, 1920, was required to hold meetings from time to time. The Secretary of War was obliged to consider or at least listen to the recommendations of the council. By 1920 Baker had become convinced that March's opinion of war councils was correct. Baker's objections to such a procedure were as follows: "I have a very strong sympathy with the statement of a famous general that war councils never fight. I object to you making the Secretary of War listen to anybody that he does not want to hear. There might be things upon which a secretary of war has his mind made up, and if you put down a statutory provision that he has to sit down and listen while two men debate things that he does not want to hear, that seems to be an unnecessary provision."¹⁵

In spite of the Secretary of War's prior objection, Congress created a War Council. Undoubtedly, the major reason for such a step was the desire of Congress to have the basic policies or directives received on a higher administrative level than the War Department General Staff. Curiously enough, after this manifestation of lack of confidence in the General Staff, Congress turned around and evidenced great appreciation of the General Staff by requiring the Secretary of War to submit to Congress in connection with any proposed legislation the recommendations of the appropriate subdivisions of the General Staff. "Obviously the effect of this provision is that in case of a disagreement between the Secretary of War and some subordinate division of the General Staff regarding legislation falling within its province, the General Staff officers will be able to get their view before Congress and, as it were, try their controversy with their chief before a Congressional Committee. . . . Much is to be said for Secretary Baker's view that the

War Department should speak to Congress as a unit through the Secretary of War."¹⁶

The law left no doubt as to the intent of Congress on the relationship of the General Staff to operating or administrative tasks. Despite the opposition of the War Department, which favored retention of broad powers for the General Staff, Congress followed the spirit of previous legislation dealing with the General Staff and the principles enunciated by Elihu Root. The General Staff was designed to be a deliberative rather than an administrative body and Congress rightly determined that this principle was not to be abandoned. The War Department had asked for 226 officers; Congress provided 93 officers as the strength of the War Department General Staff. To offset this cut Congress made no restrictions as to the number of officers that could be detailed as members of the General Staff with troops.

The long standing controversy over the relationship of the supply bureaus and the War Department General Staff was not solved. The solution was a compromise. All operating activities of the Purchases, Storage, and Transportation Division of the War Department General Staff were prohibited. The Quartermaster General's Department was charged with the purchase and procurement of all supplies of standard manufacture and of all supplies common to two or more branches, with the storage and issue of supplies, and with the transportation of troops and supplies. The supervision of the procurement of supplies and equipment—all military needs broadly interpreted as being included in the term, munitions—was entrusted to the Assistant Secretary of War, whose duties were thus defined by statute.

This arrangement was adopted largely because of the recommendations of Mr. Benedict Crowell, who had been in charge of the procurement of munitions as Assistant Secretary of War, during the war. He had testified before the Congressional committee as follows: "All the functions of the War Department can be divided into two main groups, the military functions and the munition and supply function. At the head of the War Department stands the Secretary of War, and he should naturally have two advisers. . . . The head of the military establishment would . . . have charge of all military matters such as the training of troops, the operation of troops. He should have no authority whatever over industrial matters. The chief of munitions on the other hand should with his staff have charge of all matters relating to the munitioning of the army, but should have no voice in military matters. . . . I do not favor General Staff coordination of industrial matters. . . . Under the organization existing today there might arise a conflict

between the Chief of Operations of the General Staff and the Chief of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, the former insisting that certain supplies could be obtained as planned and the latter insisting that they could not be obtained in that quantity or that particular type. Under the organization existing today their difficulty would be settled by the Chief of Staff. Under the organization I propose, if there were a conflict between the General Staff and the Director of Munitions, the Secretary of War would settle the matter. I am anxious to take from the jurisdiction of the General Staff all matters which are industrial in their nature."¹⁷

Secretary of War Baker objected to having the duties of the Assistant Secretary of War prescribed by statute. Testifying before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, he stated: "I think it unfortunate that the sections as drawn with regard to the under-secretary give him a certain amount of independence of the Secretary of War. The under-secretary ought to be, just as the Chief of Staff is, a subordinate of the Secretary of War, to do what he is directed to do, and that direction ought to be elastic, so that the Secretary of War can add to his functions or take away from his functions as the convenience of business and the talents of the two men justify. It ought to be left open to the Secretary of War to assign to the under-secretary such functions as he wants him to perform, and either diminish or increase the assignments as the successful operation of the department from time to time necessitates."¹⁸

Nevertheless the basic recommendation of Crowell was adopted. The organization of the War Department under the Act of June 4, 1920, as interpreted by Mr. Crowell is shown on the chart¹⁹ on page 255. There was thus perpetuated although in a modified form the old dual control and the attempt to draw a fine distinction between matters of supply and matters of command. The development of the organization of the Assistant Secretary of War's office and certain problems of organization and administration created by this innovation will be described later.

WAR DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS ON THE 1920 DEFENSE ACT

To carry out the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920 the War Department issued the following instructions which operated as a charter prescribing and limiting the duties of the War Department General Staff:

"In addition to such other duties as may from time to time be assigned to him by the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War

is charged with the formulation of the War Department procurement policies and with the supervision of the execution of these policies. The Assistant Secretary of War is specifically charged with the supervision of the following activities, in accordance with the policies approved by the Secretary of War:

(a) The purchase and lease of all real estate and the purchase of commodities, equipment and supplies.

(b) The compilation of statistical data and the formulation of the necessary plans for assuring adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and of the industrial organizations of the country essential to war-time needs.

(c) The settlement of all claims against the War Department due to the cancellation or settlement of contracts, including the determination of the rights to inventions and the compensation for the use of the same by the Army.

(d) The sale or other disposition of all supplies, equipment, plants, factories, land or other facilities, declared surplus by the Secretary of War.

(2) In all matters pertaining to the performance of the duties enumerated in this section, those branches of the Army having procuring functions shall report direct to the Assistant Secretary of War. In issuing orders and instructions to those same branches, the Assistant Secretary of War will use the same methods and channels of communication as used by the Secretary of War in communicating his directions to the various branches of the Army.

The War Department General Staff:

(1) The Chief of Staff is the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development and execution of the Army program. He shall cause the War Department General Staff to prepare the necessary plans for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, mobilizing, training and demobilizing the Army and for the use of the military forces for national defense. As agent of, and in the name of the Secretary of War, he issues such orders as will insure that the policies of the branches and agencies of the Military Establishment and the Army program are carried out speedily and efficiently.

(2) The War Department General Staff is charged with the preparation of plans as outlined in the preceding paragraph, including those for the mobilization of the manhood of the nation and its material resources. It will investigate and report upon questions affecting the efficiency of all branches of the Army and the state of preparation of all branches for military operations. It will perform such other mili-

tary duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be from time to time prescribed by the President, and will render professional aid to the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

(3) The Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff and the director of each division, hereinafter provided, is authorized, on matters under his supervision, to issue instructions in the name of the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, and of the Chief of Staff for carrying out the policies approved by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

(4) The chiefs of the several branches, staff corps and departments and the directors of the several divisions of the General Staff, or chiefs of sub-divisions thereof, are authorized to communicate directly concerning matters over which the latter have supervision.

(5) The Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff shall be in charge of the Office of the Chief of Staff and shall act for the Chief of Staff in his temporary absence. In addition to such other duties as may be assigned to him by the Chief of Staff, he is charged:

(a) With the supervision of the organization, administration and methods of all of the divisions of the General Staff and with the supervision over the administrative procedure of the several branches of the Army, necessary to insure that the activities of all such agencies may be coordinated, duplication of work avoided, harmonious action secured and unnecessary machinery of organization eliminated.

(b) With the collection, for the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the General Staff, statistical information of military importance.

(6) The War Department General Staff shall include four divisions, as follows, each division being under the immediate control of an Assistant Chief of Staff who shall have the title of Director:

(a) Operations Division.

(b) Military Intelligence Division.

(c) War Plans Division.

(d) Supply Division.

(7) The Operations Division is charged with those duties of the War Department General Staff pertaining to the operations of the Army. It is specifically charged with:

(a) The formulation of policies relative to the procurement, assignment, promotion, transfer, retirement and discharge of the commissioned personnel, warrant officers, members of the Army Nurse Corps, and enlisted personnel of the Army, including the regular Army, the

National Guard, the Organized Reserves, the Officers Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps.

(b) Supervision over enemy aliens, prisoners of war, and conscientious objectors, including security of the same.

(c) Supervision over the recruitment, mobilization and demobilization of the Army; the movement and the disposition of troops; the determination of priorities for the movement and the equipping of troops.

(d) The assignment of troops to stations; supervision over all military stations, including the determination of policies relative to hospitalization projects and to construction projects concerned with the distribution and assignment of troops; supervision over the issuance of permits to build on military reservations or stations.

(e) Determination of policies relative to award of decorations and to Uniform Regulations.

(f) Determination of types and allowances of equipment to be used by the Army, including supervision over research and development work and examination of inventions.

(8) The Military Intelligence Division is charged with the collection, evaluation and dissemination of military information for the use of the Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff. It is specifically charged with:

(a) The formulation of policies with reference to military topographical surveys and maps, including their reproduction and distribution.

(b) The supervision and training of military attachés, observers and foreign language students.

(c) The formulation of policies affecting and the supervision of intelligence personnel for all units.

(d) The use of codes and ciphers.

(e) The translation of foreign documents.

(f) The establishment and maintenance of contact with other intelligence agencies of the government and with duly accredited foreign military attachés and military missions.

(g) The construction and reproduction of special maps required for intelligence purposes, including the procuring of maps from foreign sources.

(h) The custody of the General Staff map and photograph collection.

In the event of the establishment of a military censorship, the director of this division shall act as the Chief Military Censor.

(9) The War Plans Division is charged with those duties of the

War Department General Staff pertaining to organizing and training the military forces for the national defense. It is specifically charged with:

(a) Formulation of plans for the National Defense and for the use of the military forces, including plans and regulations affecting the organization, distribution and training of the National Guard and the organized Reserves.

(b) Preparation of Tables of Organization for all branches of the Army.

(c) Drafting proposed legislation, and preparing rules and regulations for the Military Establishment.

(d) Supervision over the training of the Army, including the system of military education, and including all publications relating thereto, and supervision over its morale and recreational activities.

(e) The collection and compilation of military records for historical purposes.

(10) The Supply Division is charged with those duties of the War Department General Staff pertaining to the supply of the Army. It is specifically charged with the supervision and coordination of the activities of the Military Establishment connected with the performance of the following functions:

(a) The purchase and lease of all real estate and the purchase and manufacture of supplies and equipment.

(b) The storage, distribution and issue of supplies.

(c) Transportation of the Army and its supplies.

(d) Disbursement of funds, appropriated for the War Department and property accounting. The preparation of all estimates for appropriations and arrangements for the presentation of these estimates to the Congress.

(e) The construction, maintenance and repair of buildings, structures and utilities and the operation of utilities.

(f) Computation of requirements based on the military program.

(g) The coordination and correlation of requirements and priorities with procurement, production and transportation, and relations with the Council of National Defense.

(h) The formulation of plans for assuring adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and of the industrial and transportation activities of the country for war-time needs.

(i) Transportation of troops and supplies overseas, including primary ports of embarkation and concentration camps connected therewith.

(j) The settlement of contracts, including the determination of the

rights to inventions and the compensation for the use of the same by the Army.

(k) The sale or other disposition of all supplies, equipment, plants, factories, or other facilities declared surplus by the Secretary of War.

This division is also charged with representing the War Department in making arrangements with agencies outside of the War Department and with foreign government for providing the mobilization of materiel and industrial facilities for war-time needs."²⁰

WAR DEPARTMENT CHANGES BROUGHT BY THE 1920 DEFENSE ACT

The Act of June 4, 1920, made several pronounced changes in the Army's personnel policy. The most far-reaching was the radical change inaugurated in the system of promotion. Up to World War I the system of lineal promotion in each of the several branches and services had been in effect. The relation of this scheme of promotion to the development of branch mindedness has already been noted. During the war, promotion within combat divisions and certain other departures from the branch system of promotion were permitted. The National Defense Act of 1920 placed all officers of the Army except chaplains and medical officers on a single list on which the officers were arranged according to length of service, regardless of the branch in which a vacancy occurred. This perhaps more than anything else worked for the elimination of those petty jealousies and the jockeying for branch advantages that were responsible for, and at the same time were magnified by, piecemeal legislation on Army matters.

The Air Service, the Chemical Warfare Service, and the Finance Department were added to the Army as new branches. In the post-World War I period the number of branches, bureaus and services was increased to seventeen. Of this number the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Engineers and Air Service were called the line branches; that is to say, they were the basic operating units in the Army in that they had combat missions. The Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Medical, and Chemical Warfare were technical or supply services. The Air Service and the Engineer Corps also played important roles in the field of procurement and supply. The Adjutant General's Department, the Inspector General's Department, the Judge Advocate General's Department, the Finance Department, and the Office of the Chief of Chaplains were administrative bureaus. In addition, there were the Bureau of Insular Affairs and the National Guard Bureau. The General Staff of the War Department was charged with general planning and coordinating measures.

Chiefs of Branch were established for the Infantry and Cavalry. A

chief of Field Artillery had been appointed during the war and this office was continued. The Chief of Staff in his report for 1915 and again for 1916 had urged that Congress provide a Chief of Branch and an Office of the Chief of Branch for each of the combat branches. During the long Congressional hearings which had preceded the enactment of the 1920 National Defense Act the testimony had been strongly in favor of such a step. General Black, Chief of Engineers, told Congress that he was in favor of having a chief for every staff corps and every arm of the line as well, if for no other reason than to handle the personnel problem. General Black believed that the problem of personnel was too large to be handled efficiently by one branch of the Operations Division of the General Staff. The personnel section of the office of each chief of branch would have intimate knowledge of the men with whom they dealt and ready access to their records. Thus within the limits of each branch, its own personnel section would operate leaving to the General Staff and the Adjutant General the task of coordinating personnel policies or of settling personnel matters involving more than one branch of service.²¹

General Pershing in his testimony before the Joint Session of the Senate and House Military Affairs Committee had stated that the appointment of a Chief of Coast Artillery had proved to be beneficial and that chiefs should be provided in the Field Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry. They would be advisers to the General Staff in all matters pertaining to their particular arm. General Pershing suggested that the title of these respective chiefs be inspector.²² As soon as Congress acted, the new Chiefs of Branch immediately busied themselves in establishing an office. The office established by the Chief of Infantry included an executive officer, an assistant executive officer, a 1st section handling personnel and organization, a 2nd section devoted to information and training, and a 3rd section handling arms and equipment. The Chief of Cavalry organized his staff as follows: executive officer, plans and training officer and an assistant, a personnel section, a historical and information section, a records and administrative section. With such staff organizations, the Chiefs of Branch were well equipped to take over from the General Staff many matters previously handled by it. Certainly there was now no reason why routine matters pertaining solely to a single branch could not be handled by the office of the respective chief of branch.

Another very important change was the virtual abolishment of the detail system. It will be recalled that the detail system was inaugurated by Elihu Root as a necessary accompaniment to the General Staff. From the moment of its adoption in 1903, attack had been made against it.

Although some inroads were made, the detail system persisted through the war. The preponderance of evidence given by high ranking Army officers at the Congressional hearings seemed to favor its retention. General Pershing in his testimony recalled that conditions in the War Department at the time of the war with Spain led to its adoption. "It was demonstrated then, he said, that officers in that staff corps lost touch with the line of the Army in time of war and of the duties required of them as staff officers. While a department may run smoothly with permanent personnel, he added, it does not necessarily follow that it is efficient. His experience indicated that after an officer had served two details his appointment might be made permanent; but he would not have permanency in the lower grades."²³

General Wood had likewise favored the detail system, holding that with a few exceptions such as the Corps of Engineers, the Medical Corps, and the Air Service, staff corps officers should be obtained by detail from the line of the Army.²⁴ General Goethals and General Black and other bureau heads favored a permanent staff. General Black went so far as to state that he favored making details to the General Staff permanent. The National Defense Act of 1920 settled the matter by providing that officers of the Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, and Ordnance Department, above the grade of captain, who have heretofore been obtained by detail, were hereafter to be permanently commissioned in these corps; and the only services left to be filled entirely by detail from other branches of the service were the General Staff Corps, Inspector General's Department, the Bureau of Insular Affairs, and the Militia Bureau. Such a step made for the development of specialists within each of the services. The criticism that specialized duty would develop staff officers unacquainted with the needs of the line was partially answered by the policy of assigning special staff officers to duty at the larger posts and headquarters in the field where the desirable contact with troops would be gained.

But there was this defect inherent in the scheme. Long years of specialized service within a narrow niche would operate to render an officer unfit for duty with the General Staff. In this connection Colonel (later Brigadier General) John McAuley Palmer, Chief of the War Plans Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, informed the Congressional committee that the usefulness of the General Staff depended chiefly upon the ability of the War Department General Staff to secure competent General Staff officers. He said: "The real problem is that of providing the General Staff with a properly trained personnel. . . . Nobody ought to be on this General Staff because he is a representative of the Infantry or any other branch; he ought to be there because he

is trained in the tactics of all the arms combined. . . . If he is a trained General Staff officer, under the French and German systems, the tactical faculty has been determined and developed in him and that is the primary reason he is there. A trained General Staff officer will inform the supply service as to what they ought to supply in order to conform to the tactical plan; but if you put a former quartermaster in there, who is not a trained General Staff officer, he will think no doubt, that the only way he can solve the problem is to do the quartermaster's business for him."²⁵

General Palmer's remarks could be developed one stage further and would support the contention that to the degree that specialists were developed in the several branches and services, to the same degree the supply of general staff officers was being jeopardized. What was singular was that with the proposal to eliminate the detail system from the several special staff bureaus, there was no strong move for the creation of a permanent General Staff Corps.

While the Congress did not give the War Department the free rein in matters of organization and fiscal control it had requested, the National Defense Act of 1920 represented a great improvement over pre-war conditions. Lump sum budgeting was denied but the President was granted very wide discretionary powers in organizational matters pertaining to the Army but exclusive of the War Department. Pursuant to this authority, the War Department by General Orders No. 50 organized the United States into nine Corps Areas, geographical areas established for purposes of administration, training, and tactical control. The nine Corps Areas replaced the six territorial Departments which formerly embraced the continental area of the United States. For the purposes of inspection, maneuvers, war mobilization and demobilization the nine Corps Areas were grouped into three Army areas with the senior Corps Area commander in each Army area acting as Army commander in addition to his duties as Corps Area commander.²⁶

CHANGES IN THE ARMY UNDER THE 1920 DEFENSE ACT

In addition, tactical divisions and brigades were organized, seven divisions with appropriate brigade organizations being prescribed. Likewise, Coast Artillery Districts for the South Atlantic, South Pacific, and Manila and Subic Bay area were prescribed. The Philippines, Panama, and Hawaii each continued as independent territorial Departments. The War Department thus had nine Corps Areas and three foreign service Departments with which to deal. Apparently twelve units were not considered too great a span of control for the War Department. The factor which undoubtedly prevented such a number

from being unwieldy was the small number of cross-relationships existing between Corps Areas.

In prescribing the Corps Area territorial organization the War Department provided each Corps Area commander with a General Staff and a Special Staff in such a manner as to permit the extension of the General Staff concept to each Corps Area headquarters. A General Staff with troops had been provided prior to the war but General Staff officers were available in such small numbers that the idea did not work out very satisfactorily in practice. General Orders No. 75, of the War Department of December 23, 1920, provided that "a department or corps area commander's staff will consist of the following:

Personal Staff—Authorized aides (usually 2 officers).

General Staff—Chief of Staff, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff for War Plans and Training, Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply.

Administrative, Supply, and Technical Staff—Adjutant, Inspector, Judge Advocate, Quartermaster, Surgeon, Finance Officer, Engineer, Ordnance Officer, Signal Officer, Air Officer, Officer in charge of National Guard affairs, all with such assistants as may be necessary."²⁷

The same order prescribed that the duties of the General Staff would conform to the War Department General Staff pattern. The Chief of the administrative, supply, and technical staff sections followed insofar as practicable the organization and procedures used by the Chiefs of their respective supply or administrative service in the War Department.

Direct correspondence, orders, and instructions were authorized between chiefs of administrative, supply, and technical branches and their respective representatives under the jurisdiction of department or corps area commanders in all technical matters pertaining to the operations of their respective branches and in all supply and administrative matters upon which the policy of the War Department had been announced. Direct communication on all technical matters was authorized between representatives of each administrative supply, and technical branch on the staff of a high commander with such representatives on the staff of the next subordinate commander and vice versa. This authorization for direct communication that did not follow command channels was permitted only where there was no conflict with announced policy of the War Department and it was intended to apply only to such questions as could be handled by direct correspondence, orders, and instructions without violating the rights and prerogatives of a commander or curtailing his authority over his subordinates.

The extension of the General Staff concept to Corps Area Headquarters has been noted not only because it established these War Department General Staffs in miniature but also because these staffs, so some have asserted, are better illustrations of the true General Staff concept than was the War Department General Staff itself. The argument harked back to the original meaning of the term, general staff. General Palmer, in testifying before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, stated: "One of the principal troubles with the general staff organization was that few persons knew what the General Staff was, and that this was true in civil life, in the army at large, and in the General Staff itself. In 1916, after the passage of the National Defense Act, he had been instructed to prepare regulations having to do with the duties of the Staff. As a result he made an exhaustive study of the evolution of the General Staff system. He had arrived at the conclusion that the conception which placed officers of the staff in the category of general supervisors was wrong: they were in reality specialists of the most restricted type. A translation from the German . . . had largely been the cause of the misconception. Instead of General Staff it should have been general's staff, indicating that the duties of the staff officers were those assigned by the general and of a nature to assist him in his command. The proper functions for such officers were to prepare orders, carry on training, operate an intelligence service, and supervise the supply. There should be no more interference with operating functions than absolutely necessary."²⁸

A Corps Area presented an ideal situation in which the five general staff officers could function as a general's staff. The situation made for such intimacy between the Commanding General and his circle of five General Staff officers that each could truly become the general's alter ego and so multiply five fold the general's capacity to understand the situation, to rationalize the facts, make a proper decision, and supervise its execution by checking up on the operating personnel rather than by infringing on their duties. On the other hand, it was claimed that the War Department was such a sprawling structure, that the number of General Staff officers was so large, and that individually they were so far removed from the individual processing the power of supreme command as to make the concept of the General Staff officer as the alter ego of the commander impossible of attainment. The next best solution was therefore the one actually practiced in the War Department. The War Department General Staff through necessity was forced to deal with general matters and was handicapped by sheer numbers from obtaining the insight into the general purpose that intimacy with the supreme commander gave. Such an interpretation

placed a very real limiting factor on the size of a General Staff. It ignored the fact that the larger the organization and the greater the problems, the more vital the General Staff became. At all events, the operation of the General Staff concept has been singularly successful at the various corps areas and did not encounter the difficulties which marked its introduction into the War Department.

General Douglas MacArthur recognized an aspect of this problem of size in his report of 1931 and recommended the following solution:

"In organizing the General Staff in 1903 the primary purpose was to establish a selected body of specially qualified officers who, freed from all administrative responsibilities, would devote their entire time to major problems of national defense.

At the outset the General Staff was small, and while officers at times worked individually on problems, it was clearly intended by Mr. Root that on the completed solutions there would be a real meeting of the minds, effected when the principal General Staff officers were assembled from time to time for that purpose. . . .

After the World War the reorganization of the General Staff followed very generally the system we used in France. Our General Staff problems fall into four or five natural divisions. The organization of the War Department General Staff into five divisions results in a very convenient system and, if operated properly, it will give good results. Already it has accomplished a tremendous amount of fine work, notwithstanding the attacks that have been made upon it.

Unfortunately, however, these General Staff divisions, or some of them, have grown into small bureaus, entirely too self contained. The chief of each such division has generally presented his cases to the Chief of Staff directly or through the Secretary of the General Staff. The result has been that there has been little or no proper meeting of the minds on important subjects. Uncoordinated action has too often resulted. Here and there administrative work has been taken and to the embarrassment of work of first importance. These conditions are slowly being corrected and today informal conferences are held periodically, attended by the Deputy Chief of Staff, presiding, the assistant chiefs of staff, with proper representation of the other departments in order to give balanced discussion on important matters.

In order that such a procedure may be put in definite form and its importance understood throughout the department, I recommend that the conference proposed be officially recognized and announced in an order signed by the Secretary of War himself.

Such an organization will have a far reaching effect. Many problems

of first importance are awaiting solution or proper coordination by such a body. Much excellent work has been done throughout the War Department. It is not necessary to study it all and fit each part together into the whole picture.

The membership proposed gives a balanced representation. All interested parties are assured of a hearing. Better work and feeling throughout the War Department will result."²⁹

Such a General Council was established although it did not last but it was effective only intermittently until World War II when it became of real importance. For a time, however, there was a War Council, a General Council, and a General Staff, all having deliberative functions.

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the period from 1920 to 1939 with reference to the War Department General Staff was the absence of marked structural or functional changes. In general, the principles laid down in the National Defense Act of 1920 were adhered to and accepted by the War Department General Staff and the special technical and administrative staffs and services as well as the Army as a whole. In 1921 there occurred a minor reorganization. With the appointment of General Pershing as Chief of Staff and General Harbord as Deputy Chief of Staff, it was natural that the War Department General Staff be organized along the pattern adopted by the General Staff of the AEF. This was done and on September 1, 1921, the divisions of the War Department General Staff were designated as follows:

The Personnel Division, (G-1) which handled duties of the War Department General Staff relating to the personnel of the Army as individuals.

The Military Intelligence Division, (G-2) which was charged with those duties which relate to the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information.

The Operations and Training Division, (G-3) which included those duties relating to the organization, training, and operations of the military forces and which are not expressly assigned to the War Plans Division.

The Supply Division, (G-4) which was assigned those duties relating to supervision of supply.

The War Plans Division (WPD) which performed those duties of the General Staff relating to the formulation of plans for the use in the theater of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.³⁰

Once the above organization was worked out, the War Department

General Staff settled into its groove as if to indicate that at last a proper working relationship had been achieved.

THE AIR SERVICE AND ITS EFFECT IN THE 1920S

Considerable uproar was created during the decade following World War I by the newest addition to the War Department—the Air Service. This branch very properly continued to expand while the rest of the Army was forced to retrench. With the Air Corps expansion came the cry for an independent organization. The minimum demand was for branch promotion for the Air Corps as against the single list promotion practice for the rest of the Army. In response to this clamor the Special Aircraft Committee of the House of Representatives and the President's Aircraft Board, and the Congressional Military Affairs committees made exhaustive studies on the question. As a result of these studies, the major claims of the Air Service were rejected but certain action was taken. Congress provided an additional Assistant Secretary of War who was charged with handling Air Corps matters. For a period of three years, an air section was created in each of the divisions of the General Staff and by this act Congress indicated their acceptance of the paramount position occupied by the General Staff in the field of planning.³¹ The creation of the office of Assistant Secretary for Air in 1926 did not last and in 1934 the Secretary of War announced that "the office of Assistant Secretary of War for Air was not filled because the Air Corps, like other branches of the Army now functions directly under the Chief of Staff, to the mutual benefit of the Air Corps and the Army as a whole."³² This was a victory for the General Staff concept of coordination to be effected by the Chief of Staff. However, the new position of the Air Corps complicated the organizational structure of the War Department. The Air Corps was organized tactically into a General Headquarters Air Force whose commanding general operated directly under the Chief of Staff. The General Headquarters Air Force was composed of three territorial subcommands or wings, with headquarters on the west coast, the east coast and in the south central section of the country. This change relieved the Chief of the Air Corps of the responsibility for training, administration, and command of Air Corps units. The office of the Chief of Air Corps continued in charge of procurement, technique, and aviation schools.³³

In the years between the World Wars, the most interesting development in the field of planning was not in the work of the War Department General Staff but in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War. The activity there illustrated many of the problems of administrative

planning and the work on industrial mobilization impinged on the planning activities of the War Department General Staff.

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR AND THE GENERAL STAFF

The National Defense Act of 1920 made it necessary for the General Staff to study the question of the delineation in the division of responsibilities between the General Staff and the office of the Assistant Secretary of War. The law as written provided for an overlapping of function as Section 5 charged the War Department General Staff with the duty of preparing plans for national defense and for the mobilization of the manhood of the nation and its material resources and Section 5a assigned to the Assistant Secretary of War the task of supervising the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto. A board headed by General Harbord considered this question and on its recommendation the Secretary of War in September, 1921, assigned to the Assistant Secretary of War the entire responsibility for the mobilization of our material resources. Another problem that arose was how this responsibility of the Assistant Secretary was to be administered. At the start the Assistant Secretary of War in the closing days of the Wilson Administration requested that a number of officers of the Supply Division of the War Department General Staff be assigned to the duty of industrial mobilization planning. With the change of administration came a change in procedure. The Assistant Secretary of War in the Harding Administration decided to establish his own organization for procurement planning and to deal directly with the supply branches.

The directive which the National Defense Act of 1920 gave to the Assistant Secretary of War was both a planner's dream and a nightmare. The World War had demonstrated that modern war required some six or seven industrial toilers in the workshops of the nation to support one fighting man at the front. The capacity to wage war had become a derivative of a nation's industrial might. Industrial mobilization was a very broad term—it could mean anything from a clerical computation of Army needs given certain stipulations to plans that involved the mobilization of industry under government direction until the extreme of totalitarian government was reached.

The office of the Assistant Secretary of War necessarily began on a modest basis. The stimulating part of this work was that each plan evolved revealed the need of more comprehensive planning. Likewise, with the growth of the sections in the office of the Assistant Secretary more and more cross relationships developed between the War Department and Army organizations. For instance, the Air Corps problems

involved complex relationships between the Commanding General, G.H.Q. Air Force, the Chief of Staff, the War Department General Staff, the Chief of the Air Corps and the Air Corps Schools and Testing and Experimental Stations and other activities of the office of the Chief of the Air Corps, and the various sections of the office of the Assistant Secretary of War. To further complicate the problem, the needs of the Navy and of the civilian population could not be disregarded. The first important task which was tackled by the planners in the Assistant Secretary of War's office was the problem of computing the supply requirements. The War Department General Staff was charged with the duty of drawing up tables of organization, and tables of equipment and of setting replacement and allowance schedules. The War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff initiated studies which determined the number and type of troops which would be needed in any assumed situation. The supply branches, under the directives thus formulated by the General Staff, then computed the detailed supply requirements. After this was approved by the Secretary of War, the procurement task of the Assistant Secretary of War began. Under the supervision of his office the supply branches then converted the supply requirements into procurement requirements by determining when and where the various items would be needed. In doing this it was necessary to take into consideration existing war reserve supplies and the time required to ship the articles from the point of manufacture to the place of use.

In 1926, after mature deliberation, the office of the Assistant Secretary of War decided that something had to be done about the preparation of specifications and that a greater effort should be made in standardizing the various items. The War Department General Staff was charged with the task of specifying what the military characteristics of the item should be. The appropriate supply branch then developed the desired article which was then given to the appropriate operating arm for testing. If satisfactory, the supply branch would recommend standardization of the item. Standardization was a responsibility of the General Staff. After standardization the supply branches under the supervision of the office of the Assistant Secretary prepared the necessary specifications which after completion were cleared for procurement by the Assistant Secretary of War's office. A very large amount of cooperation was essential to gain any degree of standardization. The tendency was for both the using arms, like the Infantry and Cavalry, and the technical services, like the Ordnance, to continually make and suggest improvements in articles. The attitude of never being quite satisfied was meritorious but it indefinitely delayed standardization.

The next step which engaged the planners in the field of industrial mobilization was the survey and allocation of manufacturing facilities. It was this task which greatly widened the scope of the planners' studies. The Navy's needs and the problem of what constituted necessary industrial production for civilian needs entered the picture. The Joint Board, the Army and Navy Munitions Board and other joint boards worked on this problem. For a period the Navy was not greatly interested in the allocation of facilities as the Navy did not have a pressing problem of wartime expansion. The time requirements for naval construction were such that any wartime naval expansion would be necessarily slow. The Navy, so the Navy procurement planners believed, could be but slightly increased over its peacetime size. The Army, on the other hand, contemplated a huge expansion. Therefore, the Army at one time had some 12,000 plants allocated to it while the Navy had but some 300. At first, computation of production from the manufacturing facilities allocated to the various supply branches of the Army by the procurement planners was necessarily crude. Nevertheless, the work along this line produced a major triumph which in itself justified all the planning work which had been going on in this field since 1920. The planners in the field of industrial mobilization discovered that the General Staff had adopted a mobilization plan which would have produced the same supply crisis that occurred during the World War. The Secretary of War described the situation as follows:

"Mr. President:

During my tenure of office as Assistant Secretary of War from 1933 to 1936 I became convinced that the then current War Department plan for mobilization in the event of major emergency contained discrepancies between the programs for procurement of personnel and procurement of supplies which were so incompatible that the plan would prove ineffective in war time. The basic War Department mobilization plan had its genesis in the days of the World War. It was a plan worked out conscientiously by officers of high military attainments, who, as the result of their war-time experience, naturally thought in terms of the vast armies of millions of mobilized for World War service. It was a plan that contemplated the use of great surpluses of supplies accumulated after the World War—supplies which by 1936 had become greatly depleted or obsolete. Furthermore, it was a plan that called for the maintenance of huge reserve supplies requiring expenditures of sums which the Congress never found it feasible to appropriate.

My duties as Assistant Secretary of War specifically charged me by law with responsibility for 'the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to war-time needs.' It became evident to me that the War Department mobilization plan then current was gravely defective in that supplies required during the first months of a major war could not be procured from industry in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of the mobilization program.

When I assumed the duties of Secretary of War, the General Staff had under consideration a revision of the basic War Department mobilization plan. Apart from the problem of supply procurement, the question had arisen in the War Department as to whether even the rate of personnel procurement contemplated by the original plan could be realized. My conviction on the inadequacy of the initial plan from the supply procurement standpoint was so strong that one of the first directives issued by me as Secretary of War was that the General Staff restudy the whole intricate problem of emergency mobilization with a view to complete replacement of the then current War Department mobilization plan with a program that would prove completely adequate and thoroughly practicable.

The result of that study is now found in what we term the protective mobilization plan of 1937. The 1937 plan has not been perfected; details remain to be worked out and are being worked out thoroughly and diligently. But we have every reason to believe that the protective mobilization plan is feasible and will meet our national defense requirements.

I believe the reduction of our mobilization program to sensible, workable proportions to be one of the highest attainments of the War Department since the World War."³⁴

PROCUREMENT PLANNING IN THE 1930s

Of interest was the willingness of the General Staff and the procurement planners to cooperate. At the outset it had been more or less accepted that the General Staff would designate what items of equipment were needed and in what numbers and that it was then the job of the procurement authorities to plan so that they could be provided. That idea soon disappeared. The other extreme, at which the procurement planners would prescribe what would be made available, fortunately did not occur. Instead, a middle course was worked out in which the General Staff and the procurement planners both modified their plans in the light of suggestions offered so that due weight was given to both military and procurement considerations.

In 1937 procurement planning was carried one step further. Congress authorized³⁵ the placing of educational orders for munitions and provided yearly appropriations of \$2,000,000 for five successive years for this purpose. This promised to assist materially in verifying the paper plans for the allocation of manufacturing facilities by permitting test runs to be made and thus to check plan against performance.

Procurement planning illustrated what would normally be regarded as proper administrative planning—that is, it was planning on the administrative level. In addition, it demonstrated the practical utility of planning by calling attention to the inability of supply factors to keep pace with a mobilization plan for personnel. No matter how efficient the supply bureaus were, none of them could have been expected to pick up this major error. In the first place, no single bureau was aware of the combined picture. And more important, each bureau was preoccupied with current business and no time was available for the deliberative function of planning. Procurement planning on the administrative level served to point the way and to emphasize the need for broader policy planning.

The office of the Assistant Secretary of War realized as they pushed further and further into procurement planning (determination of material requirements and plans for the procurement of such requirements) that there was a second phase that demanded attention. The success of procurement planning depended upon the effectiveness of measures which would be adopted in time of war for the control of the economic resources of the entire country and the mobilization of industry in general. At first this was regarded as a sacred field that should not be touched because it involved basic decisions on national policy far beyond the ken of the Army. But a very practical solution was arrived at shortly. It was held that the *execution* of plans for control of economic resources and mobilization of industry was a responsibility of the President, acting through such agencies as he and the Congress may decide.³⁶ But in the absence of Congressional action on these questions, the office of the Assistant Secretary of War decided that they should consider what steps should be taken so as to be in a position to advise Congress when and if their advice was desired. This over-all or policy planning involved the determination of measures that should be adopted to insure proper coordination and use of the Nation's resources, and the drafting of plans for the organization of administrative machinery to execute the necessary control measures.³⁷ Here the sky was the limit.

One interesting aspect of this planning was the action of Congress in attempting to legislate in this field. As was proper, these important

questions of policy were referred to Congress. Various committees, such as the War Policies Commission, created by Public Resolution No. 98, Seventy-first Congress and composed of six Cabinet officers, four Senators and four Members of the House of Representatives, held extensive hearings on the subject. A considerable number of bills were introduced at different times in Congress. Yet no substantial action was taken. Singularly enough, there was a great measure of agreement on the purposes and aims to be attained. The disputes were over the methods and mechanisms to be used in attaining a commonly accepted end. Some idea of where the disagreement arose can be gained from a brief statement of various opinions. The American Legion was interested in taking the profit out of war. This idea carried to its logical conclusion involved not only the conscription of wealth but the drafting of labor. The idea of drafting labor was repugnant to the supporters of organized labor who felt that such regimentation of labor would permanently destroy the right labor had gained through more than a century of struggle. Thus there was disagreement over basic methods. Should the country rely on the voluntary cooperation of labor and industry with a few indirect, coercive but carefully concealed aids such as priority arrangements and fuel allocations or should industry be arbitrarily assigned its tasks? With the continuance of the depression, there arose further controversy over what new acts should be undertaken under the guise of national defense.

In spite of the disagreement in Congress and its disinclination to act, the work of the office of the Assistant Secretary of War in this planning proved to be highly useful. Merely by presenting the problem, a service was rendered. Though politically-minded Congressmen and Senators refused to commit themselves before they were sure of the attitude of their constituents, the presentation of the problem made for public discussion out of which a definite public opinion might jell. In addition, certain economic questions were brought before the public. A majority of the people in the United States had assumed that the country was so blessed with natural resources that it was almost completely self-sufficient. By labelling the raw materials that were vital to our needs and that had to be obtained elsewhere as strategic raw materials, a more accurate picture was presented to the country. Knowledge of this situation made for a more intelligent and rapid understanding by citizens of problems of national defense and national policies with respect to trade and national interest, especially the grave problems which arose as World War II approached. Work along this line induced Congress in 1939 to provide for the accumulation of stockpiles of strategic raw materials. The investigations also brought to light the fact

that a large part of war industry was located in the northeastern part of the United States and that the electric power facilities in that one region were inadequate to carry the peak load that had been planned. This raised a vital problem of policy without attempting to give a solution.

Planning along such broad lines has sometimes been considered as fugitive thinking—any and all free and irresponsible dream and thought patterns of men not in a position to translate their thoughts into action. Classed in this category was the examination and analysis for national defense of possible measures designed to build up a healthy economy. Thus deficit spending, compensatory spending, and pump-priming were all justifiable as aids to our national defense.

During the depression years of the early 1930s the Budget and Legislative Planning Division exercised a very powerful influence. Such drastic reductions in budgetary estimates had to be made that it was virtually impossible to resort to any but arbitrary methods. Many necessary reductions in funds were resisted strongly by both the using services and the General Staff divisions. There were many who believed that the Budget Section had become too powerful and that it had usurped functions that properly belonged to various General Staff sections. This, of course, was not the case; the Depression merely emphasized the role of the War Department budget officer. There were instances when the General Staff divisions did not utilize to the maximum the techniques of control which the budgetary process offered.

An analysis of the activities of the War Department General Staff of this period should also include some reference to the criticisms levelled against this agency. In general, the criticisms were all variations of the theme that the planners' enthusiasms had run away with them and that the result was a multiplication of organizations and controls that complicated and slowed down effective operation of the line and supply branches. Variations of this theme were the arguments that the War Department system was such as to prevent the development of the desirable planning and coordinating specialists.

CRITICISM OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

General Johnson Hagood has been one of the most outspoken critics of the War Department General Staff and the War Department's organizational structure. That General Hagood was a staff expert must be admitted, but his ideas were undoubtedly influenced by his early service as a Coast Artilleryman under static conditions and by his work in the services of supply during World War I. General Hagood insisted that there were too many agencies in the War Department working to accomplish the same thing.³⁸ "The old bureaus of the War Department




CHART 6

known from the beginning up to 1903 as the General Staff . . . the new General Staff created in 1903 . . . and the chiefs of branches, one created in 1901 and the others in 1920 . . . each covers the entire field of Army activity. The first group carried us through most of our wars and was complete and sufficient without the other."³⁹ General Hagood's idea of the overlapping of agencies is shown on the chart on page 308. General Hagood upheld the necessity for a permanent trained staff and likened the usurpation of power by line officers temporarily on the General Staff and the reduced position of the special staff to "the overthrow of Intelligentsia by the Communists."⁴⁰ General Hagood's solution was one which in essentials merged the various staff organizations into three main groups: tactics, administration, and supply. Field soldiers would be permitted to run the tactics division while a permanent staff would run administration and supply.

There was also the complaint that the War Department General Staff was all right in theory, but that in practice it did not work well because the General Staff officer was a makeshift who, because he did not understand his role, prevented the organization from operating in the way it was intended to. In brief, this criticism was that the General Staff officer and the procurement planners in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War were incompetent by virtue of their background. Brought up within the narrow confines of a line branch or a supply service, the officer selected for planning and coordinating duty could not change himself like a chameleon. Thus it was argued that General Hagood, for example, always thought and acted and functioned as a Coast Artillery officer while he was on the General Staff, that General Summerall remained a Field Artilleryman, and that General Pershing remained essentially a Cavalryman at heart. Further, it was stated that the effort to develop a desirable type by the establishment of the Army Industrial College and the Army War College had been futile. General Hugh Johnson in his picturesque way called the Army Industrial College a get-rich-quick course and said that the effort of that school to develop procurement planners from run-of-the-mill supply branch officers was simply an attempt to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.

Then there was the argument that the Army school system had gone too far. This criticism emphasized the point that officers assigned to planning tasks had been so indoctrinated in the Army schools that a mental set in favor of existing methods resulted. This argument seemed far fetched, but it was true that the War Department General Staff remained traditionally conservative and slow to accept change. To a large degree however, this may be attributed to the practice of staffing it with




CHART 7

older officers. The presence of younger officers, even though they bring in a few "half-baked" ideas, would be healthy.

Despite all its critics, the War Department General Staff had a very commendable post-World War I history. Its usefulness was such that its desirability was taken for granted by the entire Army. The post-World War I organization of the War Department is shown graphically on pp. 310-311. Practically every Chief of Staff reiterated the praise expressed by General Summerall who in his Report as Chief of Staff stated: "To the War Department General Staff, I am indebted for a period of conspicuous progress in sound planning and coordination. The chiefs of divisions and their assistants have been among the ablest officers in the service. Their loyalty, industry, and harmony have been worthy of the highest praise. The final studies and policies adopted have been the result of combined effort and mature judgment based upon the most thorough analysis."⁴¹

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

1. Senate Hearings, 66th Congress, 1st Session, August 8, 1919, p. 84.
2. *Army and Navy Journal*, Oct. 11, 1919, Vol. 57, p. 167.
3. Same.
4. Same.
5. From *The Nation at War*, by General Peyton C. March, copyright 1932, reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc., p. 331.
6. March, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-333.
7. S2715, 66th Congress, 1st Session.
8. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, Part I, p. 480.
9. Same, p. 481.
10. March, *op. cit.*, p. 349.
11. Frederick P. Keppel, "The General Staff," *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1920, Vol. 125, p. 548.
12. *Army and Navy Journal*, September 20, 1919, Vol. 57, p. 71.
13. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1919, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 61-63.
14. Act of June 4, 1920, Chapter I, Section 5, quoted from Bulletin 25, War Department, June 9, 1920, pp. 6-9.
15. Hearings, Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Congress, 2d Session, January 21, 1920, p. 23.
16. John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1922) p. 320.
17. Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-316—Quoted from Hearings, Senate Sub-committee, 66th Congress, 1st Session, S2691, pp. 1761-1771.
18. Same, p. 318.
19. Crowell and Wilson, *The Armies of Industry*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) p. 17.
20. General Orders No. 48, War Department, August 12, 1920, Section II, III.
21. *Army and Navy Journal*, Sept. 13, 1919, p. 51.
22. Same, p. 294.
23. Same.
24. Same, September 13, 1919, p. 51.
25. Keppel, *op. cit.*, p. 546.
26. General Orders No. 50, War Department, August 20, 1920, Par. I, pp. 1-2.
27. General Orders No. 75, War Department, December 23, 1920.
28. *Army and Navy Journal*, Oct. 18, 1919, p. 199.
29. *Annual Report of the War Department*, 1931. Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, pp. 70-71.

30. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1922*. Report of Secretary of War, pp. 112-113.
31. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1926*. Report of Secretary of War, p. 34.
32. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1934*. Report of Secretary of War, p. 4.
33. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1935*. Report of Secretary of War, p. 10.
34. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1938*. Report of Secretary of War, p. 1.
35. Public No. 639, 75th Congress.
36. Industrial Mobilization Plan, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1936, p. XI.
37. Same.
38. Hagood, *The Services of Supply*. (Boston: The Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1927) p. 359.
39. Same, pp. 359-360.
40. Same, p. 365.
41. *Annual Report of the War Department, 1930*. Report of the Chief of Staff, p. 153.

Chapter VII

Defects In War Department Organization At The Outset Of World War II

IN large part the defects arising after 1939 in the War Department organization and in the War Department General Staff were due to conditions which were peculiar to World War II. But why were these special conditions not anticipated by War Department planners, and why was the organization and personnel of the War Department and the General Staff not flexible enough to make the necessary adjustments? Full answers to these questions are not easy to give, much less to evaluate.

A possible answer to the second question is that the War Department and the Army were so reduced in the economy years of the early 1930's that they were too weak to stand the strain of rapid expansion. Although the economy years did hurt the Army and the War Department, there was no responsible comment to the effect that the War Department had been harmed organizationally by the prolonged economy periods which lasted until 1935. Outside of the clamor for a separate Air Force, responsible leaders in the War Department generally agreed that, organizationally speaking, conditions were satisfactory.

GENERAL MACARTHUR'S COMMENTS ON WAR DEPARTMENT DEFECTS

Typical was General MacArthur's comment before the House Military Affairs Committee on April 26, 1933, when he stated:

"The existing War Department organization is based upon the accumulated lessons of experience. Congress fixed the structural outline, in which process it had the advice and counsel of experienced leaders in the World War. The purpose was to provide an agency at the seat of Government which could lead the Army from the business of peace to that of war with the least possible shock.

The organization of the General Staff has been often criticized. It comprises 92 officers, divided into groups along the lines that were demonstrated by the World War to be most applicable to the work of a General Staff. It is a great coordinating agency; because of its existence we no longer have the old struggle between fighting arms and supply services. In former times, for instance, fighting arms used to complain bitterly that they could not have the weapons they needed because some technician in the supply service, who had no experience in fighting, decided some other weapon was to be manufactured.

The General Staff views every subject from the broad standpoint of

efficiency for the Army of the United States, and in doing so groups all subjects under the four general heads of personnel, intelligence, operations and training, and supply. Organization follows this division of functions, and in my opinion is as satisfactory a grouping as can be devised.

Each of the several technical services is an operating agency and heads up into a chief's office. Their functions in experimentation, procurement, storage, and issue are so well known as to need little discussion. So far as I know the only revision proposed with respect to them is to consolidate one or two of them with other technical services. This suggestion is born of the prevalent but mistaken idea that in consolidation lies the sure road to economy and efficiency. The experience of the war was full of lessons to the contrary.

* * *

Each of the combat arms also has a chief in Washington. These chiefs are responsible for the schools of their respective arms [branches], where their officers are educated in the tactics and technique pertaining to that particular branch. In all matters relating to technical development in their own arms they are advisers to the General Staff and the Chief of Staff. Each is also the representative in the War Department of the personnel of his arm.

They analyze and classify officers' efficiency reports, make recommendations for assignments, and constitute focal points in which are digested matters pertaining to the morale and efficiency of the several fighting branches. They have proved distinctly worthwhile; their headquarters establishments are not large, and incur little additional expense. Their abolition could not save more than a few thousand dollars, and these insignificant savings would be many times out-weighted by the consequent feeling throughout each of the fighting branches that it is not entitled to its own representative in the War Department.

Revision should not be undertaken solely for the sake of change, or to satisfy the whim of a particular person. We have 12,000 officers. They understand our organization. For the most part they have been through the various echelons of our school system and have been educated in the functions and organizations of the War Department and subordinate headquarters. Drastic revision would create confusion and therefore, far from increasing efficiency, would, in its general effects, operate in the opposite direction.

I could speak for many minutes on comparative organization in other armies. But I think it well to say that our organization is founded upon experience, is well understood throughout our Army, has proved satisfactory to date, and is well adapted to the needs of emergency."¹




CHART 8

*Organization of the War Department
October 1939*

ESTABLISHMENT OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS IN 1939

From an organizational point of view the major item which had not been taken into consideration was the possibility that the United States would become involved in a war of more than one front. The distinguished soldiers of World War I had redesigned the War Department General Staff in the light of their experiences in that war. They had contemplated that in any future war the Chief of Staff would take the field and become the commander of the army in a one front war. He would take with him the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff which would become the General Headquarters Staff of the field forces. This appeared logical. Presumably those officers who had devoted all their attention to the preparation of these plans were the best fitted to form the staff of the commander who was to execute the operation. General MacArthur, while Chief of Staff, had sponsored in 1932 the plan of establishing the organizational nucleus of four field armies which could be detached when required from the nine Corps Area set-up to form a mobile force. Initially the four senior Corps Area commanders were to command those four armies and the Chief of Staff would command the entire mobile force, with the War Plans Division of the General Staff prepared to take the field as the nucleus of a General Headquarters Staff.

But events immediately prior to World War II did not fit into such a concept. Beginning in the fall of 1939 and getting into high gear by the fall of 1940, the country began to prepare for war. An army had to be organized and trained in the United States, and the Chief of Staff and the War Plans Division had so many other duties that they could not take the field as contemplated. General Marshall reported in 1941:

"In the gradual merging of the Army from a peace-time basis into an organization for possible action, the following additional changes have taken place:

General Headquarters of the field forces was set up at the Army War College last July (1940) to direct and supervise the training of the troops. More recently it was placed on an operating basis by the addition of a portion of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff. By this arrangement, General Headquarters not only supervises training throughout the Army but is being prepared to perform its normal theatre of operations functions if required."²

The establishment of the General Headquarters Staff separately at the War College was bound to affect the War Department General Staff organization. The problems created and the solution adopted will be described later on.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR, OCTOBER 1939

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
HONORABILIUS JOHNSON

Development of industrial plans. Supervision over oil purchasing and other business activities of the War Department pertaining thereto. Army Industrial College. Delegated duties listed in. Member of War Council, Army and Navy Munition Board, and Patent and Design Board.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executes policies and plans of A.S.W. and coordinates activities under his command. Member of Executive Committee, Army & Navy Munition Board. Member of Aviation, Procurement Committee, Procurement Division of the Treasury Department, Procurement Information Section, Statistics Section (for delegated duties see Executive Office below).

STATUTORY DUTIES

Sec'y, Army and Navy
Munitions Board

DELEGATED DUTIES

National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice

Provide for marksmanship instruction of able-bodied citizens. Maintain and manage small arms competitions, including national matches. Assist recognized associations organized for such purposes, in conduct of competitions. Procure and sell to members of N.R.A. and issue to clubs organized for small arms practice, supplies necessary for such. Construct, equip, maintain and operate rifle ranges and their accessories and appliances.

Executive Office

Citizens. Real estate. Clemency cases. National cemeteries. Bridge permits. Permits for laying submarine cable. Personnel matters pertaining to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, including the Specialist Reserve.

Plans Branch

Supervision of all arms and services in preparation plans for war-time procurement. Member of plans for industrial mobilization in war. Member of Executive Committee, Army and Navy Munition Board. Member of Joint Economy Board. Member of W. D. Budget Advisory Committee. Office Section—Routine office administration.

Army Industrial College

Instructs annually a student body of approximately sixty officers from Army, Navy and Marine Corps in problems of procurement and industrial mobilization.

Current Procurement Branch

Supervision over procurement and other business activities of the War Department pertaining thereto. General liaison with Procurement Division, Treasury Department.

Administrative Section

General policies, legislation, and complaints on procurement matters. Salvage, surplus, export, patent and design questions.

Procurement Control Section

Review of all invitations for bids, awards. Open market purchases. Procurement progress reports. Procurement information for the public. Regulations governing procurement. Statistical and other studies concerning current procurement matters. Procurement of surplus property from other government departments.

Administration Division

Mobilization plans for administration. Training of reserve officers. Statistical records.

Legal Division

Legislation. Contractual procedure. Contract forms. Other legal matters.

Controlling Division

Priorities. Control of production. Control of distribution. Control of economic supplies.

Procurement Plans Division

Analysis of procurement plans. Coordination and follow up.

Standards Division

Designs and specifications. Standardized practices. Liaison with technical societies.

Commodities Division

Study strategic and critical commodities. Plans for control measures.

Allocation Division

Survey of production facilities. Match capacity to requirements. Distribute industrial load.

Construction Division

Analysis of plans for procurement construction. Plans for control of construction materials.

A requirements and priorities division is provided in practice but is inactive in peace organization.

CHART 9

INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION BEGINS AS WORLD WAR II APPROACHES

Nor did the industrial mobilization for war in the United States develop as contemplated by the industrial mobilization plans of the Army and Navy. It is only fair to say that the Army and Navy industrial mobilization planners could hardly have been expected to anticipate the trend of events stemming from lend-lease and the political issue involved in helping the democracies against totalitarian aggression while the United States at the same time attempted to remain in theory a neutral power. The point to be stressed is that in carrying out the Lend-Lease and help-the-democracies program during a period of theoretical neutrality, it was necessary to restrict as much as possible the direct participation of the War and Navy Departments and on the surface make it appear that they were not involved. Various boards and emergency establishments of the civilian part of the government were established and these maintained contact with the War and Navy Departments through civilian members such as the Assistant Secretary of War and later the Under Secretary of War. The planning done in the general field of industrial mobilization was not wasted; it was of immeasurable assistance even though the organizational structure for its execution had to be remodeled to fit World War II conditions. It is conceivable that the industrial mobilization organization might have developed as it did without the influence of all the planning that had been done through the years since World War I. At all events, the manner in which the Under Secretary of War's office did develop profoundly influenced the organization of the War Department and the War Department General Staff, and indirectly contributed toward and influenced the major War Department reorganization of 1942. Under the National Defense Act of 1920 the Assistant Secretary of War was charged with the supervision of the industrial mobilization program. The Act of December 16, 1940, established the position of Under Secretary of War and assigned to the Secretary of War, but with authority for him to delegate, duties relative to procurement of military equipment and supplies. Judge Robert P. Patterson, who had been Assistant Secretary of War, was designated as the Under Secretary and it was logical for Mr. Stimson to leave undisturbed the organization and procedure then in existence for Lend-Lease matters and the procurement of munitions for the Army. During the time of Mr. Louis Johnson, as Assistant Secretary of War, his office consisted of some fifty-odd officers engaged in the main in *planning* for industrial mobilization. The October 1939 organization is shown on pp. 318-319. As the country moved toward war the personnel in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of

War increased reaching a total of 181 persons by July 1, 1940, and expanded further to nearly 1200 officers and civilians in the Office of the Under Secretary of War by the end of the calendar year 1941.³ Prior to the end of 1941, the increased business made it necessary to expand the 1939 organization by establishing in the Planning Branch a Facilities Division, a Power and Fuel Division, and a Defense Aid Division⁴ and by adding a Purchase and Contract Branch, a Production Branch, and a Statistics Branch.

The Under Secretary of War, appearing before the Senate Committee to investigate the National Defense Program, explained the operation of his office as follows:

"Army procurement of munitions is under control of the Under Secretary who acts for the Secretary of War in discharging this duty. . . . The General Staff (G-4 Section), under direction of the Chief of Staff, prescribed the types of military weapons to be procured, set the requirements as to quantity and fixed the time element. These specifications were then sent to the Under Secretary who transmitted them to the supply services for procurement. The Supply services (Air Corps, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Engineers, Chemical Warfare, Signal Corps and Medical Corps) then placed contracts, made schedules, followed up production and attended to inspection, under direction of the Under Secretary. With the weapons ready for delivery to the troops, G-4 Section of the General Staff again took charge, giving appropriate directions to the supply services as to what to do with the weapons. . . . As Under Secretary, my chief responsibility has been to direct the procurement of military supplies for the Army. This work involves . . . the setting up of production programs, the planning of resources in conjunction with the War Production Board, the setting up of new facilities for production, sometimes direct and sometimes through the Defense Plant Corporation, tax amortization procedure, the revision of procurement policies, the placing of contracts, the determination of pricing, renegotiation of contracts and price adjustments, labor and industrial relations. . . . Since the American Revolution the Army and Navy have been in charge of production of their own weapons. The War Production Board is mobilizing the resources, facilities, and materials (raw and semi-finished) necessary to such production and necessary also to civilian activities. It likewise allocates and controls the flow of materials so as to resolve conflicting demands . . . and to adjust the program to available resources. . . . The functions of the War and Navy Departments on production of weapons cover the entire range of pro-

duction and distribution. . . . On the other hand control of materials is properly placed in a civilian agency, the War Production Board.”⁵

Thus the Under Secretary of War's Office had become by the end of 1941 an important operating agency exercising supervision and coordination over all the supply services in matters of procurement.

The Supply Division, G-4, of the General Staff also exercised supervisory and coordinating functions over the supply arms. It was organized into a Planning Branch, Development Branch, Construction and Real Estate Branch, Supply Branch, Transportation Branch, Fiscal Branch, and an Executive Office. By the end of 1941, the Supply Division, G-4, of the War Department General Staff had increased in size until it consisted of nearly 150 officers and approximately 130 civilians. Necessity had forced the G-4 division to shift its emphasis from planning to directing and coordinating the supply services, and in so doing G-4 became more of an operating agency than a staff division. As shortages developed and as mobilization increased its pace, it was difficult to maintain the fine distinctions that separated the duties of the 1200 officers and civilians in the Under Secretary's Office, and the nearly 300 officers and civilians in the Supply Division, G-4, of the War Department General Staff. Under these circumstances the difficulties inherent in multiple set-up were bound to cause confusion. There were the problems of what were the relationships existing among and the channel to be followed among the Supply Services, the G-4 Division of the General Staff, the Chief of Staff's office, the Under Secretary of War's office, and the Secretary of War, when military considerations clashed with what might be called procurement and production interests. With the development of many inter-departmental committees involving allocation of resources, procurement, and other matters, there also arose questions of who could speak for and commit the War Department at those times when neither the Under Secretary nor G-4 but some other officer would have to be selected to represent the War Department in conferences.

THE AIR CORPS AND GHQ AIR FORCE

Another difficult problem pressing for a solution was the organizational position of the Air Corps. Any discussion of this question always started with the premise that the then existing War Department and Army organization was so defective that no minor adjustments would be satisfactory. This was probably correct. Entirely apart from the clamor for a separate Air Force, there were sufficient organizational and administrative defects to require a drastic change. After World War I the Air Service, which became the Air Corps in 1926, had slow-

ly expanded with more and more consideration being given to its needs as time passed. Until 1935 the air tactical units were, like all other tactical organizations of the Army, under the Corps Area commander of the Nine Corps Areas in which the unit happened to be stationed. The Chief of the Air Corps had as his principal function the supervision of the design and procurement of airplanes although he was also concerned with Air Corps personnel matters, development, training, and doctrine in much the same fashion as the Chief of Infantry and other Chiefs of Arms or Services were interested in these questions with respect to their own units and personnel. With this decentralization of air combat units under the command of nine separate commanders, who were invariably ground officers, it was difficult to obtain uniform, vigorous leadership, and flexibility in concentrating or employing air units from the several Corps Areas. The Chief of the Air Corps was not a commander, and in theory the War Department General Staff was the responsible planning, coordinating and supervisory agency.

In 1935 all the air tactical units were incorporated in the General Headquarters Air Force which was to operate under the supervision of the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff. The air units were formed into a tactical hierarchy of wings and groups in four air districts. For administration, discipline and common items of supply they remained under the Corps Areas. For Air Corps supply and other matters peculiar to the Air Corps, the Chief of Air Corps exercised control, but indirectly. Thus the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff were concerned with air matters involving the commander of the General Headquarters Air Force, the Chief of the Air Corps, and the Corps Areas commanders.

The administrative difficulties growing out of the GHQ Air Force setup and attendant upon a rapidly expanding air force made further remedial action necessary. In June 1941 the Army Air Forces were established with two main branches; the Air Force Combat Command replacing the General Headquarters Air Force, and the Office of the Chief of Air Force. The Air Force Combat Command, with headquarters at Bolling Field, D. C., commanded the four continental Air Forces which supplanted the four air districts. The Office of the Chief of Air Corps, through its Materiel Division and Air Service installation, continued its procurement and Air Corps supply activities. In addition, an Assistant Secretary for War for Air was named in 1941. During the last half of 1941 and the early months of 1942 there was still considerable confusion due in part to the change in set-up but stemming primarily from the growing pains of extremely rapid expansion.

It was inevitable that in this situation organizational questions would have to take into account the unquestioned personal leadership and the preeminent position and influence of General H. H. Arnold in all air matters. He was, in fact, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Chief of the Air Corps, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Air of the War Department General Staff—all at the same time. A complete staff for the Army Air Forces Headquarters was organized. It was large and energetic and in practice was not content to deal through the Commanding General of the Air Force Combat Command who also had a complete staff, or through the established sections of the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. With the outbreak of War in December 1941 the propensity for direct dealing increased. Officers on the War Department General Staff, in Headquarters Army Air Forces, and in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps—all anxious to carry out General Arnold's wishes—acted. Who was supposed to do what about what was not always very clear.

Some of the problems of air organization were similar to those involving General Headquarters relationship with the War Department General Staff. When General Headquarters was established in July 1940, it was given the mission of directing and supervising the training of the field forces of the Army stationed within the continental United States. The field forces were defined as all harbor defense and mobile forces, to include General Headquarters aviation and the Armored Force. That the plan for the Chief of Staff to take the field as Commanding General of the Field Forces was not abandoned was indicated by the fact that instead of being designated as Commanding General, General Lesley J. McNair was named the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters. Initially at least, the theory was that the Chief of Staff (of the Army) would use the General Headquarters staff for the direction of the field forces while he would retain the War Department General Staff to plan, supervise, and coordinate all other matters relating to national defense.

DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

For the first year General Headquarters grew very slowly, but even so organizational relationships very rapidly became complex. In August 1940 General McNair's staff consisted of only seven officers; by June 1941 a modest expansion had increased the number of officers to 23. The staff was organized in the standard Army fashion and consisted of a General Staff (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) and a Special Staff (Sections for each of the following: Adjutant General, Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Cavalry, Armored Force, Engineers, Signal, Quartermaster,

Medical, Air, and Civilian Components).⁶ It did not take long, however, for organizational relationships with War Department officers to become involved. When General Headquarters was given the job of directing and supervising the training of all the field forces in the United States, and when General Headquarters found it necessary to establish Special Staff sections for each of the principal combat arms (Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Cavalry, Armored Force, and Air), a substantial part of the former duties of War Department Special Staff sections passed to the General Headquarters Special Staff. Yet the offices of The Chief of Infantry, Chief of Field Artillery, and the rest did not decrease in size. All of the Chiefs of combat arms of the War Department still had so much to do in connection with supervising their branch schools, the training of officers, the writing of field manuals, and other duties that it was not apparent to them that the barn door had been opened and the horse, in the form of their major function, had been stolen by General Headquarters special staff sections manned by relatively junior officers. This was not true of the Air Corps, however, and was true only to a certain degree of the Armored Force.

To further complicate organizational relationships, the tactical units of the Army were removed from the command of the nine Corps Area commanders in October 1940. The purpose was excellent—armed as it was to relieve commanders of tactical units from supply and administrative duties. Thus, under the War Department the nine Corps Area commanders were responsible on a geographical basis for administration, supply, construction, repair, and all the other miscellaneous tasks pertaining to all the posts and camps where troops were stationed. This was what might be termed the Zone of the Interior facilities set-up. The troops, organized into divisions, corps, and armies, were under the General Headquarters in what can be called a "theater of operations" arrangement. Conceivably, the mobile force under General Headquarters could move out of the country without disturbing the War Department-Corps Area set-up. General McNair described their arrangement as the superimposing of a theater of operations on the Zone of Interior.

By and large, the relationships between General Headquarters and the War Department and between the tactical forces and the Corps Area installations went smoothly despite their obvious complexity.

As war became increasingly imminent the United States was divided for various other purposes into additional areas. Thus the Western, Eastern, Central, and Southern Defense Commands were established as defense areas and the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff had principal concern over the adequacy of the defense arrangements. With the establishment of the Army Air Forces, the four

Air Forces, organized to command air units in the United States, divided the country into four air areas. Each Air Force was divided into a Bomber Command and an Interceptor Command which, because of the requirements for an air warning service, also had to be organized on a geographical basis. In addition, the United States was divided into procurement districts by the Ordnance Department; the Quartermaster General had a nationwide network of purchasing centers for food products; the Chief of Engineers had the United States broken down into Engineer districts; and there were other similar arrangements for other purposes.

GHQ AND OVERSEAS BASES

General Headquarters was mildly concerned over the lack of unity of command within the United States, but it was the lack of effective control over the overseas bases like Bermuda and Newfoundland that really worried General McNair and his staff. They believed strongly that all of the fighting forces in a single geographical area must be under a single commander who reported to General Headquarters. From June through December 1941 there was a series of memoranda and discussions between General Headquarters and the War Department, and also with the Army Air Force. A mutually satisfactory arrangement on the command and control of air units in the United States could not be reached.

During the last half of 1941, it became increasingly apparent that the war which was coming would not be a one front war and that widely separated bases or theaters of operation would have to be established. The concept still was that General Headquarters would continue to be the instrumentality through which General Marshall, not as Chief of Staff but as the commander of our field forces would exercise command over combat operations. General Headquarters was to be the executive agency, but the War Plans Division of the General Staff continued to do the planning for defense. Actually, working arrangements had to be devised to insure coordination among General Headquarters, Headquarters Army Air Forces, the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff, the Supply Division, G-4, of the War Department General Staff, the office of the Chief of Engineers, the offices of the Quartermaster General, the commanders of the Defense Commands, the base commanders, and the theater commanders, with regard to planning, command, and supplies. General McNair cited as an example of the problem of effective control the setup in the Newfoundland Base Command in which seven Army agencies in the

United States exercised some direct command influence or major policy direction as follows:

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Concerned with</i>
War Plans Division, War Department General Staff	Personnel and material reserves available
United States-Canadian Joint Permanent Board of Defense	Defense plan
Second Corps Area	Supply other than Air Corps technical supply
Middletown Depot, AAF	Air technical supply
Chief of Engineers	Construction
Chief of Army Air Forces through G-3 War Department General Staff	Relief of air squadron at Newfoundland Airport
General Headquarters	Such inspection and coordination as is practicable under the circumstances

The problem was plain but the answer was not simple. A single authoritative agency was needed to insure prompt and effective action both to make and carry out adequate defense measures and plans for offensive military operations. But to make General Headquarters that agency would necessitate that it either be superimposed over the War Department or that it duplicate the large and unwieldy War Department organization.

The crux of the problem was not only that the tasks were so varied and so gigantic but also that everything was in such a state of change that very few things could be handled as routine matter. This being so, could a streamlined quick-acting organization ever be devised?

In spite of the fact that the War Department General Staff was endeavoring to carry out the Chief of Staff's mandate to decentralize, the ever-increasing volume of business brought more and more personnel into all War Department offices. When General MacArthur testified before Congress in 1933, he emphasized that there were only 82 officers on the War Department General Staff in Washington.⁷ In September 1939 approximately 635 officers were on duty in Washington with the various War Department offices. By January, 1942, the number had increased to 4407 officers. The War Department General Staff had 122 officers on duty in September 1939, and by January 1942 the total was close to 700. This increase, together with the ever-growing number of national defense problems greatly complicated organizational relationships. Added to this was the all important fact that time

was so vital that a well considered but slowly arrived at answer was seldom as good as a quick but even hastily considered decision.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN 1941

In the peacetime era questions could be considered at length and the Chief of Staff had the time to maintain close personal relationships with his many principal advisors. In this connection the Chief of Staff's "span of control"—the number of people who reported directly to him or who had the right to come directly to him—may well be examined. For a comparison the dates May 1931 and May 1941 have been selected. In May 1931 the following, in theory, had direct access to the Chief of Staff:

- The Secretary of War
- The Assistant Secretary of War
- The Deputy Chief of Staff
- The Secretary, War Department General Staff
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Operation and Training, G-3
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, G-4
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Plans, WPD
- The Chief of Infantry
- The Chief of the Air Corps
- The Chief of Cavalry
- The Chief of Field Artillery
- The Chief of Coast Artillery
- The Chief of Engineers
- The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
- The Chief of Chaplains
- The Chief of Finance
- The Chief of Ordnance
- The Chief Signal Officer
- The Surgeon General
- The Quartermaster General
- The Adjutant General
- The Inspector General
- The Judge Advocate General
- The Chief of the National Guard Bureau
- The nine Corps Area commanders
- The six overseas Department Commanders (Hawaii, Philippines, China, Alaska, Porto Rico, and Panama)

The three commanders of Army schools (War College, Command and General Staff School, and West Point)

The total was forty-four and a more liberal interpretation of the status of other offices, boards, or organizations would raise this number materially.

In May 1941, this list of forty-four persons within the Chief of Staff's theoretical "span of control" had either been increased or was in the process of being increased to include the following:

The Under Secretary of War

The Assistant Secretary of War for Air

Two additional Deputy Chiefs of Staff

The Director, War Department Bureau of Public Relations

The Chief, Morale Branch

The Chief of the Armored Force

The Commanding General GHQ Air Force

The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters

The four Commanding Generals of the four field armies in the U. S.

The four Base Section Commanders of new overseas bases (Newfoundland, Bermuda, Trinidad, and Greenland)

The total in May 1941 was thus 61 and this figure would be much larger if there should be included the relationships with the incipient Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff organization, with such governmental officials as the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury, and if we estimated in like terms the increased demands for time and individual attention made by individual members and committees of Congress.

As a practical matter the Chief of Staff could not and did not regularly see such a large number of individuals. With the addition of two more Deputy Chiefs of Staff, General Marshall had General Arnold as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air handle many of the problems involving the Air Force. General Richard C. Moore as Deputy Chief of Staff handled many questions involving supply, equipment, construction, and the Armored Force. General William Bryden, who by tenure was the senior Deputy Chief of Staff, handled "all other matters incident to General Staff business."⁸ The office of the Secretary, War Department General Staff, increased its number of Assistant Secretaries. These assistants received the staff studies and other papers coming to the Office of Chief of Staff from the War Department General Staff divisions (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, WPD) and in some cases direct from the many other agencies listed. The Assistant Secretary would then thoroughly

study the subject-material until he was informed on all the details. Then each morning the various assistant secretaries of the Secretary of the War Department General Staff (all colonels or junior to that grade) would present orally to one or more Deputy Chiefs of Staff the contents of the staff studies and other papers received the day before. For the principal items of business, the presentation would again be made to the Chief of Staff himself in the afternoon. In some matters the various Assistant Chiefs of Staff would see either the Deputy Chiefs or the Chief of Staff. On some questions the Adjutant General, the Surgeon General, or other Chiefs of the Arm and Services would talk directly to the Chief of Staff. In many instances this procedure was entirely satisfactory but it was often cumbersome and slow.

WAR DEPARTMENT DIFFICULTIES IN 1941

Where the decisions were not to the liking of certain officers who had the right to report to the Chief of Staff, it was natural that they would want to talk directly to him to make sure their problem had been correctly presented. It was not unnatural for them to wonder if some junior officer in one of the General Staff Divisions had twisted the picture in his staff comments or if the major or lieutenant colonel who, as assistant secretary, had made the oral presentation, had omitted a significant fact or had emphasized a minor point unduly. Illustrative were the discussions about establishing a Chief of the Armored Force. The Chief of Infantry and the Chief of Cavalry and their offices opposed the idea violently. Much of the early development of the tank had been carried out under the direct supervision of the Chiefs of Infantry and Cavalry. They held that the use of tanks was so intimately related to Infantry and Cavalry troop deployment and tactical technique that they should continue their former role and not give way to a new Chief of the Armored Force. On such a question it was natural that the Chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry should want to talk to the Chief of Staff direct and that they should resent all intervening staff officers who appeared to block this direct access or who added what they regarded as inexperienced opinion if it was not in agreement with their own views.

Another source of difficulty in the War Department under these arrangements was the problem of coordination, orientation, and information. The Chief of Staff might have aired his views on a question to one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, to an officer in the office of the Secretary, War Department General Staff, to one of the five Assistant Chiefs of Staff, or to one or more of the seventeen Chiefs of Combat Arms or Supply or Administrative Services. To transmit this informa-

tion to all who should know it was difficult, and no special technique was devised for doing it. Where the Chief of Staff had discussed questions informally with several officers at different times, there was always the problem, when their interpretations of what the Chief had in mind varied, as frequently happened, of ascertaining which officer had the right version.

Even more difficult was the problem of orienting or giving guidance to the "pick and shovel" man who had to do the basic job and who was submerged five or six layers down in the War Department General Staff or in the War Department. This is not to imply that the top personnel should do the main job for their junior officers. Two illustrations of different aspects of the problem will bring out the point. A study with recommendation for a policy is wanted on a particular problem. Say the word on this matter went down by the most complicated route, something like this: Chief of Staff to Deputy Chief of Staff; to an assistant secretary of the War Department General Staff; to the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division; to the executive officer, War Plans Division; to the chief of the Strategy Group, War Plans Division; to a chief of section; and thence to Major X who must come up with a draft of what is wanted. Major X sometimes gets a very fragmentary version of what has happened and starts in with a very vague notion of what is wanted. Sometimes, of course, this is an excellent way to obtain an objective study. Where many imponderables are present, Major X would welcome (one General Staff officer would put it in even stronger terms) five minutes' conversation with the officer once or twice removed from the source. Such orientation saves hours and forestalls any mental excursion in the wrong direction. But understandably enough, Major X hesitates to venture forth for more enlightenment. He may be timid, or fearful that his question will sound stupid to a hard pressed superior who may not realize that the officer has not been in on the previous discussions.

The situation may be similar when a completed staff study is returned to Major X with an amended approval or a drastic change in the recommendations submitted by the originating staff section. The word comes back that the Chief of Staff or Deputy Chief of Staff has decided on some drastically different decision or solution. Without being contentious, the "pick and shovel" officer, Major X, who after all has gone deeper into the matter than anyone else, may wonder if salient considerations may not have been overlooked. Should he try to find out whether this has happened? Or should he assume that all significant aspects of the problem have been considered and that nevertheless the final result is that his proposed solution has been discarded? Obviously,

such problems in coordination, orientation, and information will always arise as the number of personnel involved increases. In General Staff practice, this was offset to some extent by a general willingness of the personnel in the Office of Chief of Staff to be approached by all officers without respect to channels and to give them as far as possible whatever information they had on the attitude or slant of the top men.

The increasing volume of business in the War Department during 1941 raised the question of whether the manner in which mail and files were handled was not obsolete. In theory all mail for the War Department came to the Adjutant General's Office where it was sorted and determination was made as to what office should handle it. If the correspondence required General Staff action, it was sent to the appropriate General Staff division which, after action, might return it direct or through the Office of the Chief of Staff. The action to be taken was conveyed to the Adjutant General by means of a covering memorandum. The Adjutant General's Office would then use the memorandum to prepare an answer and this was sent out over the signature of some officer in the Adjutant General's Office. The theory was that the General Staff action should be anonymous and indirect. Whoever received the answer would not know who acted in the case but would know because the Adjutant General's Office had signed it that the action was official and had been handled by the appropriate office in the War Department. Handling correspondence in this fashion also meant that the Adjutant General maintained the official files of the War Department and conceivably no other office of record was needed. But this extreme centralization became a bottleneck when the volume of business sky-rocketed. Additional complications resulted from personnel changes which occurred when veteran clerks were commissioned as officers and transferred or when higher civil service ratings in newly organized offices afforded opportunities for transfer. When files that had been requested could not be produced immediately, and when files were not complete, the temptation was for every officer and office to establish temporary files of their own to meet their needs. When delay ensued or when a letter was misrouted, the tendency was for an officer or an office to deal directly, with the result that the Adjutant General's Office was by-passed. This generated a vicious circle because the files in the Adjutant General's Office thus became increasingly incomplete. This made proper routing of correspondence more difficult. As dissatisfaction over routing and completeness of files increased, the practice of by-passing the Adjutant General and corresponding direct with the field grew apace.

As the War Department and the War Department General Staff

increased greatly in strength and as the volume of business increased in 1940 and 1941, it became increasingly difficult to reconcile the philosophy or concept of the General Staff with its manner of operation. The distinction between staff and command positions and functions likewise became increasingly obscure. The accepted General Staff theory is that General Staff officers assist their commander by giving him such assistance in planning, coordinating and supervising as he would do for himself were his capacity supernaturally unlimited. General Staff officers do not exercise command; they act only in the name of and for their commander. This requires that they must know their chief intimately, and even more important, his opinions, prejudices, and wishes. By law, War Department General Staff officers are restrained from operating. When the War Department General Staff approached 700 in number toward the end of 1941, and when other demands on the Chief of Staff restricted drastically the time he could spend with even his top General Staff advisors, then as a practical consequence General Staff officers had to act according to their own judgment, often in complete ignorance of what might be the Chief of Staff's attitude. And when officers so act, they cease to be staff officers in the usual sense of the term and become commanders. When the Chief of Staff's span of control reached unmanageable proportions, some one else had to act for him.

It is academic to attempt to determine at what point the officers ceased to be War Department General Staff officers in the strictest sense and became commanders. The interesting point is the attitude of both the General Staff officer and the officer who is immediately concerned with a General Staff officer's decision. Certainly all officers of the War Department General Staff try their best to give answers that practically take the words out of the mouth of the Chief of Staff. They are generally hesitant or reluctant to give an answer if they are not sure the Chief would agree, and this feeling tends to foster delays and slow action. The officer or office receiving the decision wants to be sure that the answer is really the decision of the Chief of Staff. If there is any suspicion that this is not so, he is anxious to appeal. If, however, the General Staff officer giving the decision were thought of as a commander, the verdict would be received without question. It would have been very natural for the Chief of Engineers in January, 1942, to take exception to or to look askance at an action approved by General Somervell as Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, G-4. But after March 1942, when General Somervell became the Commanding General, Services of Supply, with the Chief of Engineers as one of his principal subordinates, there would be no question over the action.

What does all this prove? The answer is that to retain the General Staff concept, the staff must not become too large and the span of control of the Chief of Staff must not be so great that General Staff officers are forced to act in a role which more appropriately belongs to a commander rather than a staff officer.

Probably the most troublesome single question the 1941 situation brought up was how could the War Department General Staff coordinate and supervise without operating? With events crowding events, with time running out and much action required, with the impelling necessity to translate policy into action, the War Department General Staff had to *operate* in 1941—indeed, every section of it *operated*. The concept of operating was foreign to the General Staff philosophy. It was something that had to be done that was not supposed to be done. The upshot was that the War Department did not possess a streamlined executive agency which could implement effectively and expeditiously plans and policies requiring action. In General Ainsworth's heyday, he conceived the Adjutant General's Department as being just such an agency. The General Headquarters in 1941 was aspiring to be such an agency, but it never had the authority or the jurisdiction.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

1. *Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 73d Congress, 1st Session*, pp. 17-19.
2. *Biennial Report of Chief of Staff, 1939-41*, p. 13.
3. *Annual Report of the Services of Supply for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1942*, p. 2.
4. Established to maintain liaison on matters relating to the Act of March 11, 1941 (Public 11, 77th Congress) to coordinate requests for and from foreign governments with interested agencies of the War Department.
5. Statement by Honorable Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, Before the Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, Dec. 16, 1942. War Department Bureau of Public Relations Press Release.
6. Acknowledgment is made for the assistance derived from preliminary drafts of the histories of General Headquarters and of the Army Ground Forces.
7. *Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 73d Congress, 1st Session*, April 26, 1933, p. 17.
8. *Biennial Report of Chief of Staff, 1939-41*, p. 14.

Chapter VIII

The War Department Reorganization Of March 9, 1942

How do these things affect the personal factor in generalship? They obliterate it, and why? The staff becomes an all-controlling bureaucracy, a paper octopus squirting ink and wriggling its tentacles into every corner. Unless pruned with an axe it will grow like the fakir's mango tree, and the more it grows the more it overshadows the general. It creates work, it creates officers, and, above all, it creates the rear spirit. No sooner is a war declared than the general-in-chief (and many a subordinate general also) finds himself a Gulliver in Lilliput, tied down to his office stool by innumerable threads woven out of the brains of his staff and superior staffs.—MAJOR GENERAL J. F. C. FULLER.¹

THE War Department reorganization of March 9, 1942,² was the most drastic and fundamental change which the War Department had experienced since the establishment of the General Staff by Elihu Root in 1903. The gestation period began at least as early as the closing months of 1940. To bring about the event an unusual combination of circumstances was required. It could probably never have been accomplished except in wartime. The Pearl Harbor catastrophe and the action compelling events of the early days of World War II were helpful in bringing a general state of mind conducive to casting off the shackles of the past. It required high courage and vision on the part of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War to assume the risk of major change in the midst of war. It could only have been accomplished administratively under the authority granted to the President by the War Power Act; it was too much to expect of a peacetime Congress whose members would have been susceptible to pressure group tactics from those who did not approve certain details of the change.

GENERAL STAFF THOUGHT ON HIGH COMMAND ORGANIZATION—1941

General Staff planners in the War Plans Division gave considerable thought to the organization of the Army high command as the war clouds gathered more thickly. This was to be expected, and it was natural and proper that the problem be considered from the viewpoint of how the United States should mobilize, train, deploy and fight the Army in the event of war. But even though this problem was considered primarily from the strategical, logistical and tactical viewpoints, it was inevitable that questions about the organization and administration of

the War Department and the General Staff should come out to occupy the spotlight. As postulates were such statements as these: "A single commander should be over all Army forces and activities in order to secure coordinated effort in the accomplishment of national military policy." "Sound organization demands decentralization by the delegation of responsibility and authority to subordinates according to the following principles: (a) The commander should deal directly with the minimum practicable number of subordinates; (b) means necessary to accomplish his mission should be given to each subordinate; (c) no responsibility should be given to a commander unless he is also given authority and means for its accomplishment; and (d) organization should follow functional lines." On the basis of these principles, functions were then spelled out in detail.

The two major categories into which the activities of the Army could be grouped were the preparation and maintenance of the field forces for combat, and combat operations. It was thought that the preparation and maintenance of the Army was essentially a Zone of Interior (continental United States) task which fell under two main headings. Under one were grouped together the duties relating to the procurement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; construction and operation of facilities; transportation; hospitalization; administration and training; air raid precautions and action on domestic disturbances; and similar activities. The second heading included those functions having to do with the training and administration of units of the field forces, including the air forces, mobile ground forces, and harbor defense. The second major category, combat operations, was broken down into major operations involving theatres of operation in the United States or abroad and defensive tasks involving the security of the United States and adjacent island possessions. From this analysis the General Staff planners concluded that the forces in the United States engaged in the preparation of the field forces for combat and their maintenance in combat operations fell into three obvious groups—air forces; ground forces; and Zone of the Interior service functions. It was asserted that groupings for combat operations should be such that unity of command would exist. The commander of each theater of operations would necessarily be immediately under the Chief of Staff and would report to him.

This was the essence of a War Plan staff study prepared in the fall of 1940. With these principles there was little disagreement. But violent dissension arose in their application and in spelling them out in specific organizational and administrative details.

Difficulty in applying these principles with any measure of agreement to the organization and relationships of General Headquarters

Army Air Forces; the Supply Division of the War Department General Staff; and the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff caused the Chief of Staff to convene a board of officers in August, 1941. Their major task was to define the status and authority of General Headquarters, but they concluded that a major reorganization of the War Department was in order. Short of this there was no way to adjust satisfactorily the conflicting spheres of control or to give General Headquarters that control of supply essential to command which the War Department General Staff in the persons of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, G-4, and the Assistant Chief of Staff of the War Plans Division insisted on retaining. General McNair, the GHQ Chief of Staff, reviewed the problem with his characteristically unselfish and objective approach. As Chief of Staff it would have been natural for him to urge that General Headquarters take over the War Department supply control. To do this, however, would have brought to GHQ all the complications of War Department organization with the result that GHQ would not be able to exercise superior command over theatres of operation any more expeditiously or effectively than the War Department itself. General McNair therefore favored the elimination of GHQ, the streamlining of the War Department General Staff, and establishment of a Services of Supply similar to that established by General Pershing in France during World War I. Practically, it was difficult for the GHQ staff to do much to bring about their own early demise.

The Army Air Forces had a strong indirect interest in the project to reorganize the War Department. Army Regulations 95-5 of June 20, 1941, if literally interpreted, gave virtual independence to the Army Air Forces, and air officers considered with apprehension the possibility of having GHQ interposed between Headquarters Army Air Forces and the air force tactical units or air force combat operations commanders. It was therefore vital to the interests of the Army Air Forces to obtain a reorganization which would make certain that air power would be properly exploited and directed by expert air officers unfettered by a cumbersome chain of command.

GENERAL ARNOLD'S PLAN FOR WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION

The plan which General Arnold submitted to the Chief of Staff has a particular interest for students of organization because of the way in which principles of organization and principles of strategy were interwoven:

"Part I. Reorganization of the War Department.

The development of the Air Force as a new and coordinate member of the combat team has introduced new methods of waging war.

Although the basic Principles of War remain unchanged, the introduction of these new methods has altered the application of those Principles of War to modern combat.

In the past, the military commander has been concerned with the employment of a single decisive arm, which was supported by auxiliary arms and services. All these arms and services were welded into a single, cohesive battle team, whose principal effort found all forces cooperating in time and space at a decisive point.

Today the military commander has two striking arms. These two arms are capable of operating together at a single time and place, on the battle field. But they are also capable of operating singly at places remote from each other. The great range of the air arm makes it possible to strike far from the battle field, and attack the sources of enemy military power. The mobility of the air force makes it possible to swing the mass of that striking power from those distant objectives to any selected portion of the battle front in a matter of hours, even though the bases of the air force may be widely separated.

These priceless attributes of air power—

Endless variety for the selection of the Objective;

Capacity to concentrate all the Mass of its strength upon that Objective;

Mobility which provides maximum opportunity for Cooperation,—are valid only if the Air Force is organized and controlled as a single entity. Unity of Command within the Air Force is essential.

On the other hand, Unity of Command over both principal members of the combat team is also essential. This Unity of Command can be expressed only by a *superior* Commander, who is capable of viewing impartially the needs and capabilities of the ground forces and of the air forces. Only a superior commander can select the employment which will result in the maximum contribution of each force toward the National Objective. This kind of Unity of Command requires the establishment of a separate command agency; not the subordination of one member of the team to the other.

This conception of Unity of Command really is fundamental throughout the entire structure of national military organization; it permeates all the strata of military organization, from the very highest on down, in which two or more integral forces are joined together for collaboration. A suggestion for the application of this conception to the major war-making agencies of the government is submitted herewith in Part II of this memorandum.

To summarize: streamlining of the modern war machine demands
(a) Unity of Command within the Air Force.

(b) Unity of Command over both the Ground Force and the Air Force.

(c) Unity of Command within the Ground Force, at least for administration and training.

The War Department has already provided for the first requirement, by creating the Army Air Force, which is capable of waging air warfare as a separate entity, or of supporting ground operations.

The second requirement needs further clarification. To be sure, Unity of Command over both ground forces and air forces is provided in the person of the Chief of Staff. But he, as an individual, has no staff agency to help him discharge his command functions over these two combat forces. The War Department General Staff, as constituted in the past, is primarily the staff of a Ground Commander. The Air Staff is essentially the staff of an Air Commander. Neither can take over the functions or coordinations, because that would result in the *subordination* of the ground forces to the air forces, or vice versa. What is needed is a *superior* coordinating staff, embracing both ground and air personnel. Such a staff would prove invaluable in helping the Chief of Staff to deal effectively and impartially with two coordinate fighting agencies: the Armies and the Air Forces.

The third requirement listed above can be met by placing a ground commander over all the ground forces, to insure uniformity of training and combined training of all the ground arms.

Because the ground forces and the air forces both rely upon certain supply Arms and Services, those supply Arms and Services should be made equally accessible to both. In order that conflicting demands from the two combat forces upon the common services may be adjusted, it is suggested that all the common services and supply Arms be grouped under a Service Commander.

It is suggested that the War Department be reorganized along these lines. Specifically, it is suggested:

(1) That the ground combat forces be grouped together under a Commanding General, and that that General be provided a Ground General Staff. The present GHQ organization, supplemented by parts of the G-1, G-2, and G-3 Divisions of the present War Department General Staff might be utilized for this purpose.

(2) That the supply arm and services be grouped together under a Service Commander, and that that Service Commander be provided with an adequate staff. This staff might be made up from members of the G-4 Division of the General Staff and the A-4 Division of the Air Staff, supplemented by officers from the Offices of the Chiefs of the Supply Arms and Services.

(3) That the Chief of Staff function as the Commander of the military forces of the War Department, that he be provided with a small General Staff, and that he exercise his control within the continental United States through the Ground, Service, and Air Force Commanders. This General Staff should be a small policy-making, war planning, coordinating staff, made up of equal representation from the Ground Forces and the Air Forces.

(4) That these major divisions of the War Department be correlated with the existing unified Army Air Force, with its Air Staff, so as to provide a streamlined and flexible framework for the development of a modern war machine.

(5) That Theater Commanders and Department Commanders report directly to the Chief of Staff.

These same basic conceptions are applicable to all Theaters of Operation, Task Forces, and Departments, which are composed of large units of the ground forces and of the air forces. The Theater Commander then will become the superior Commander who exercises control over both the ground forces and the air forces of his command. He should be assisted by a small, composite, coordinating staff. In this manner the integrity of the ground forces and of the air forces will be preserved, and the latter will be capable of effective employment as a unit.

One Theater, the Caribbean Defense Command, is now organized in this manner, and has been found to be eminently satisfactory.

This proposal is offered in the belief that it will provide for the maximum efficiency of the War Department in the prosecution of war.

Part II. Military Policy Staff.

International relationships are dominated today by the actions and intentions of powerful military forces.

The President of the United States is being confronted daily with international problems of the utmost importance.

The dangers arising from the acceptance of national policies and international commitments which are beyond the capacity of the military forces to authenticate are written large in recent history. For example, the policy of Czarist Russia toward Japan in 1903 was completely out of step with Russian military capacity. The result was disastrous to the Russians.

The President of the United States has no official staff which is capable of weighing the military, economic, and diplomatic factors involved in the changing world situation, and submitting reasoned, balanced recommendations for setting the course of national military policy in these dangerous times.

Likewise, if the President should be called upon to act in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, he would have no official staff to assist him in formulating the military policy of the nation in the conduct of a war, or to translate his desires into military instructions for the coordinated employment of the Armed Forces. The Joint Board—Army and Navy, has all the shortcomings of a committee, and the fallacy of conducting warfare by the committee method has been demonstrated in England.

The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations are burdened with the operation of large Military Departments. These responsibilities preclude their being available continuously for consultation and study.

It is suggested that these difficulties be resolved by the creation of a Military Policy Staff, to serve the President directly. Such a staff should consist of not more than three members from the Army, three members from the Navy, two members from the State Department, and one member from the Office of Economic Warfare. It should be presided over by a Chief of Staff selected from the Army or Navy and empowered to exercise authority over the other members.

The members of this staff should have no other duty than performance of this staff function.

They should be empowered to call upon any agency of the government for assistance, and they should be segregated in a building which is readily accessible to the White House.

In the event of our active and overt participation in the war, the President will have thrust upon him military responsibilities which parallel those of Mr. Churchill, or, for that matter, of Herr Hitler. The former seeks military advice from The Chiefs of Staffs Committee; the latter from the small strategic staff headed by General Jodl. The President of the United States should have a military staff to which he can look for advice and upon which he can rely for transmission of his orders and instructions.

The need for Unity of Command over the Army and Navy is so insistent that a solution *must* be provided if the armed forces become engaged or even threatened. The President, as titular head of the Army and Navy, will have to accept personally the full responsibility and burden of that command. There is no other commander available in our scheme of government. Hence it is proposed that the staff and command machinery which the President will need, and does need at this time, be provided."

The Chief of Staff asked General Leonard T. Gerow, Assistant Chief

of Staff, War Plans Division, and General Stanley Embick, Chairman of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense for United States and Canada, for their comments. On November 18, 1941, both informed the Chief of Staff by memorandum that further study and development of details of the plan for the reorganization of the War Department were favored. The War Plans Division concurred in the broad principles and the general organization proposed.

GENERAL STAFF REORGANIZATION SUGGESTIONS—1941

The timing of the various proposals was unfortunate. All of the key War Department officials were so immersed in the day to day business of getting ready for probable war that they could ill spare the time to give the question adequate thought. There was natural concern over the dislocations and confusion incident to making a major change. Could the War Department and the General Staff afford to take the time at this crucial period to make the change? With such thoughts and questions in mind, it was determined to try out the idea in war game manner. On December 1, 1941, the War Plans Division therefore asked each of the General Staff Divisions to study the proposal and trace out how the various items of War Department business would be handled under the suggested new order. The following directive was issued to assist the officers participating in this study:

*"Considerations and Procedure Governing the Development of the
Details of the War Department Organization Proposed by the
Army Air Forces*

1. *Purpose of the organization* is to simplify, speed up and make more efficient the functioning of the War Department General Staff and other agencies now included in the War Department.

2. *Need*—The Present War Department organization is cumbersome, confused and slow in operation. The Chief of Staff has directly under him numerous subordinates and agencies for whose coordination he is responsible. The War Department General Staff, assisting the Chief of Staff, must study all matters in sufficient detail to coordinate all of the direct subordinates of the Chief of Staff. With the great expansion of the Army the multitude of problems to be settled has increased enormously, resulting in an over-expansion of the General Staff. The attempt to decentralize by means of GHQ has not been successful nor has it been possible to define accurately the authority of the GHQ. The conception that GHQ can control combat operations is erroneous since to shift its reserves from the Zone of the Interior or to provide special means of action it must utilize the Arms and Services. The latter should

not be under both the War Department and the GHQ at the same time and should remain under the War Department. Since GHQ must request assistance in performing its mission it cannot exercise the necessary command authority and actually operates as an element of the War Department General Staff. The dual status of the Air Force Staff as concurrently a part of the War Department General Staff and also the staff of a commander subordinate to the War Department is not in accord with sound principles of organization.

3. *Basic principles of the proposed organization*—The proposed organization reduces to the minimum the number of commanders and activities to be coordinated by the Chief of Staff, thereby simplifying the problem of the War Department General Staff.

4. *The purpose of the present study*—To develop in sufficient detail the proposed organization to determine its practicability and to the extent to which it is an improvement over the present organization.

5. *Considerations governing the present study.*

a. *Responsibility of the War Department General Staff.*

The War Department General Staff is the staff of the Chief of Staff, who is responsible for all of the activities of the Army. Therefore the responsibilities of the War Department General Staff must cover all of the activities of the Army. The duties of the War Department General Staff are correctly defined in the National Defense Act.

b. In the discharge of its responsibilities the War Department General Staff should decentralize to commanders subordinate to the Chief of Staff the maximum amount of responsibility and authority, *i.e.*, the authority to make and act on decisions. In general the War Department General Staff should confine itself to basic decisions and policies, to the assignment of missions, the allocation of means and other items essential to the direction and coordination of the major organizations of the Army.

c. Changes in the functions and operations of existing commanders and chiefs of arms and services should be avoided as far as practicable.

d. (1) In the group subordinate to the Commanding General, Air Force, should be those commanders and activities which must be closely coordinated with the Air Forces and not with either of the other components of the Army.

(2) Corresponding rule applies to the ground forces.

(3) The Commanding General, Services, should have under him those commanders and activities which in general serve both the air and ground forces or which are not directly and closely related to either.

6. *General functions of major subordinates of the Chief of Staff.*

a. The present study should not attempt to fix too rigidly the or-

ganization or functioning of the air, ground forces or the services since these can be adjusted readily by experience so long as the basic organization is correct.

b. Commanding General, Theater of Operations (Department, etc.)

(1) Commands air and ground forces in Theater of Operations except those specifically exempted.

(2) Directly under Chief of Staff except that matters where policy already fixed in War Department directives should be handled with Commanding Generals, Ground Forces, Air Forces and Service Commands directly (*i.e.*, routine matters, type of equipment, replacements, etc.).

c. Commanding General, Air Forces.

(1) Development, procurement (air equipment), organization, training and preparation of air units for field operations.

(2) Administration and supply of Air Forces in U. S.

(3) Air defense of the United States except—

(a) Defense of units and installations against low-flying aircraft.

(b) In U. S. areas where Theater of Operations set up to resist invasion—under Theater of Operations commander.

(4) Assist in preparing Theater of Operations plans and implementation of such plans.

(5) Direct contacts with Commanding Generals, Theater of Operations, Departments, etc., on matters where policy set by War Department directive.

(6) Inspections of air elements overseas garrisons as directed by the Chief of Staff.

d. Commanding General, Ground Forces.

(1) Development, organization, training, administration and supply of ground elements of field forces and their preparation for field service.

(2) Preparation of plans for defense of U. S. against invasion—combined air and ground—predicated on failure of air defense (see 6c

(3) above).

(3) Assist in preparing Theater of Operations plans and implementation.

(4) Direct contacts with Theater of Operations, on matters where policy set by War Department directive.

(5) Inspections of ground forces overseas as directed by the Chief of Staff.

e. Commanding General, Service Command.

(1) Recruiting, induction, reception.

(2) Procurement, supply and service common to both air and ground forces.

(3) Other operative matters not directly subordinate to either ground or air forces.

7. *Procedure*—In order to examine the practicability and desirability of the proposed organization it is necessary to determine in detail the procedure which will be followed in the operation of the command and staff.

a. Basis for study.

- (1) Considerations outlined in paragraph 5 above.
- (2) War Department General Staff functions.
- (3) Functions of major subordinate commanders (paragraph 6 above).
- (4) Functions of Chiefs of Arms and Services and Corps Area Commanders, as outlined in Army Regulations.

b. For each General Staff division (G-1, G-3, G-4 and WPD) examine [current procedures and projects] in connection with the functions of the major commanders under the Chief of Staff and one or more subordinates which may be considered typical, tracing each item through from its initiation to execution.

c. The outline of operation should be written down in such manner as to show, in addition to the complete operation itself, a statement of the details which must be retained by the General Staff, recommendations as to changes in the organization proposed, any undesirable features resulting from the proposed organization and whether from the G-1 (G-3, G-4 or WPD) viewpoint there will actually result an improvement in the operation of the War Department.

d. It will be noted that the proposed organization does not make provision for the Military Academy or the General Service Schools. It is also questionable whether The Adjutant General, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Finance should be under the Commanding General, Service Command rather than directly under the Chief of Staff and whether the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch should not be under the Commanding General, Service Command."

THE UNITED STATES ENTERS WORLD WAR II

Before much could be accomplished on this, war came on December 7, 1941. After that it became more difficult for officers in key jobs on the General Staff to take the time required to trace out details of the plan. It can be alleged that this indicated that the General Staff had departed from the original General Staff concept which emphasized that there must always be time to think and to plan. General (then Colonel) W. K. Harrison, of the War Plans Division, kept the project alive and was the spark plug behind what was done. The going was

tough, not so much because of strong disapproval of the idea, but largely because of passive attitudes and the propensity to procrastinate and urge that action be deferred to a more opportune time. Illustrative was the non-occurrence of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, G-3, who stated on January 15, 1942:

"The G-3 Division recognizes that there is merit in the proposed plan for reorganizing the War Department but is firmly convinced that during the present emergency situation such a change would not be remunerative.

The proposed organization, it is believed, is adaptable to long-range planning and deliberate action in executing prepared plans, but would not lend the same facility to transforming decisions into action on short notice as does the present organization. Under the present organization task forces are alerted and moved to a staging area or to a theater within a reasonable time after the approved plan reaches G-3, without sacrificing that close coordination with G-4, G-1, and Chiefs of Arms and Services so essential to the successful execution of a troop movement under the present status of units in personnel and equipment. A like plan executed under the proposed decentralization, due to dispersion of offices concerned, difference in interests, and lack of authority in any one of the three commanders to render decisions on controversial questions, would require much more time.

The G-3 Division recognizes that minor details are susceptible of solution when consideration of the major factors involved have led to a sound decision. However, in the proposed organization the position in which several of the Arms and Services have been placed is considered to be of considerable import. Most of those listed have service functions with Ground or Air Forces in addition to supply responsibility.

The number of functions of this Division which could be transferred to a lower echelon and at the same time retain in this Division information in sufficient detail to permit considered operations is relatively few and would not justify the existence of another echelon in the command chain. If the Chief of Staff desires to keep in touch with the details of organization and operations, a large staff will be required. The advantage of having relatively few officers on duty with the War Department G-3 and an extremely large number with the three major commanders, as would be required for making effective the proposed organization, is not apparent.

G-3 withholds concurrence . . . for the following reasons:

- a. . . . no conclusive proof that there is a necessity for a major reorganization of the Army at the present time.

- b.* Presentation does not substantiate the inference that War Department General Staff functions should be changed materially.
- c.* More detailed analysis is required."

THE REORGANIZATION PROBLEM IN WARTIME

What undoubtedly contributed in large measure to the delay in determining whether to accept or reject the reorganization project was the difficulty in getting a hold on the nub of the problem—how to make the change and still fight the war and how to determine in advance (and before assuming the risk) whether the new organization would work and whether it would be a great improvement over the old. Most of the preliminary discussion was in very general terms. It was perhaps proper that only the main outline be considered by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the other interested senior officers. They could not have possibly taken the time to trace out the following steps:

- (*a*) What are all the things that the War Department does now?
- (*b*) What are the steps, the flow of work, and the procedures involved in transacting each kind or each type of business under the present organization and in detail how would this be altered under the proposed plan?
- (*c*) What were the advantages and disadvantages of the new organization over the old?

These were essentially the steps and procedures that would have had to be followed in war gaming the proposed reorganization. War gaming was the technique which the War Department and the Army used in testing a plan by making believe that it was in effect and by going through the motions of carrying it out. It would have taken many months to do this, and what was more to the point there were few individuals who had the broad knowledge and familiarity with all phases of War Department business necessary to work out just how things were or should be handled. It was therefore necessary to sell the project on faith and on the general idea that the reorganization would at least bring a healthy housecleaning.

General Joseph T. McNarney was then designated to head the reorganization committee. He had returned in December 1941 from service in England which had included a visit to the USSR. Immediately thereafter, he had served with the commission, headed by Justice Roberts, which President Roosevelt had designated to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack. In addition General McNarney had served in the War Plans and Military Intelligence Divisions of the War Department General Staff, in the Headquarters of GHQ Air Force and on the U. S. Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense. He was thus an air

officer of exceptionally varied service. Both by background and by temperament, he was well suited for the task. Characteristic of his terseness and directness was the memorandum proposing the reorganization which he submitted to the Chief of Staff on January 31, 1942 and which appears on page 349.

The Chief of Staff approved the reorganization memorandum of January 31, 1942 but it was of course necessary to secure the approval of the Secretary of War and the President. Unquestionably the subject had already been discussed informally a number of times. Nevertheless, the task of selling a particular reorganization at a particular time to all in the higher levels of the government required a delicate handling. If piecemeal criticism and grumbling over details were not avoided, delay would ensue, and the longer the delay the greater were the opportunities for those adversely affected or otherwise opposed to rally their forces to obtain a further delay. Had such tactics ever been permitted to develop, the reorganization project would probably never have been carried out.

EXECUTIVE ORDER FOR 1942 REORGANIZATION

The first step in accomplishing the reorganization was to obtain approval of the Executive Order which would authorize it. After considerable discussion and many successive drafts the following was approved and became Executive Order No. 9082 of February 28, 1942:

"EXECUTIVE ORDER

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES AND TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, approved December 18, 1941 (Public Law 354, 77th Congress), and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Army of the United States is reorganized to provide under the Chief of Staff a ground force, under a Commanding General, Army Ground Forces; an air force, under a Commanding General, Army Air Forces; and a service of supply command, under a Commanding General, Service of Supply; and such overseas departments, task forces, base commands, defense commands, commands in theaters of operations, and other commands as the Secretary of War may find to be necessary for the national security.
2. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chiefs of the following-named branches of the Army of the United States are transferred to the

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Reorganization of the War Department.

1. The organization presented.

- a. Is designed to fight the current war.
- b. It provides:
Commands to furnish individuals, equipment, supplies, and transportation.
Commands to take the individuals and equipment and weld them into trained balanced units.
Commands to command the combat functions.
The whole comprising the Army of the United States under a single responsible head.
- c. It deletes:
Unnecessary or obsolete headquarters, including GHQ, Air Force Combat Command, Chiefs of Air Corps, Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery and Cavalry.
Operating activities of the General Staff.

2. Concurrences.

If this plan is submitted to staff divisions and other interested parties, the result will be numerous non-concurrences and interminable delay.

3. Recommendations.

- A. Approval in principle.
- B. Selection of Ground Force, Air Force and Service Commanders.
- C. Creation of an executive committee responsible only to the Chief of Staff with power to coordinate details and execute the reorganization.

Tab 1--Functions under Proposed Organization.
Tab 2--Method of Conversion to Proposed Organization.
Tab 3--Organization of Executive Committee.
Chart A--Organization of the Army.
Chart B--Organization of Army Ground Force.
Chart C--Organization of Army Air Force.
Chart D--Organization of the Army Service Command (initial)

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Major General, U.S. Army.

TAB 1

FUNCTIONS UNDER PROPOSED ORGANIZATION

1. WDGs
 1. Strategic direction and control of operations.
 2. Determination of over-all requirements.
 3. Basic decisions and policies relating to Organization, Administration, Training and Supply and other matters not delegated.
2. CGs, AF, GF, SC.
 1. Administration, Supply, Organization, Training of the forces and installations assigned or attached to their commands.
3. Additional AF Functions.
 1. Development and procurement of aviation equipment as at present.
4. Additional SC Functions.
 1. Procurement, storage and issue of personnel, equipment and supplies for entire Army (except aviation equipment).
 2. ZI Functions (Transportation, hospitalization, internal security, counter intelligence, service functions for both AF and GF).

TAB 2

METHOD OF CONVERSION TO PROPOSED ORGANIZATION

1. Appoint CGs GF and SC.
2. Allow not to exceed one month for familiarization of commanders with processes of command and staff functioning, on date designated by the Chief of Staff:
- a. On 15 April, G-1, G-2, G-4, WDGS, except not to exceed 5 to 10 officers each for WDGS, become the staff of the CG Serv. Command.
- b. Existing GHC ceases to exist as such and becomes staff of CG GF. Prior to same date, CHQ will turn over to WPD its functions and records related to command and planning for theaters of operation, Defense Com-
mands, Departments, Divisions, Bases and Tank Forces.
- c. G-2 will be reorganized. Intelligence Branch remains in WDGS. Remainder becomes Military Intelligence Operations.
- d. All papers will be routed in accordance with functions prescribed in Tab 1, herewith.

TAB 3
ORGANIZATION OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Chairman--General Officer
Members --WDGS, WPD
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
Secretary's Office
Representative CGAF
CGGP
CGSC
AGD
IGD
JAG
Total

Commanding General, Army Ground Forces: Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps (except those relating to procurement, storage, and issue).

3. The functions, duties, and powers of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command) and of the Chief of the Air Corps are transferred to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

4. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chief of Coast Artillery relating to procurement, storage, and issue are transferred to the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

5. Any officers holding offices the functions, duties, and powers of which are transferred by this order shall be reassigned to suitable duties but shall continue to hold their respective offices until vacated.

6. The Secretary of War is authorized and directed to prescribe such functions, duties, and powers of the commanders of the various forces and commands of the Army of the United States and the agencies of the War Department and to issue from time to time such detailed instructions regarding personnel, funds, records, property, routing of correspondence, and other matters as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this order. Such duties by the Secretary of War are to be performed subject always to the exercise by the President directly through the Chief of Staff of his functions as Commander-in-Chief in relation to strategy, tactics, and operations.

7. This order shall become effective on March 9, 1942, and shall remain in force during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the termination thereof.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 28, 1942."

Executive Order 9082 clarified the philosophy of Army and War Department organization on several particular points. To satisfy the legal critics it was necessary to invoke all of the President's authority. Not only was the First War Powers act cited but in addition, reference was made to the authority of the President and the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Under our form of government the President in war-time must be in fact the Commander-in-Chief; he must make the basic decisions; and he must shoulder the heavy responsibilities that go with the making of the crucial decisions.

Organizationally, the President had always been detached and separated by interposing layers of authority from those professional soldiers whose direct advice was essential. The Executive Order remedied this by stating that the President may exercise his functions as Com-

mander-in-Chief in relation to strategy, tactics, and operations directly through the Chief of Staff. Secretary of War Stimson approved this direct contact between the President and the Chief of Staff in matters of military operations and strategy, and in so doing he exemplified those qualities of high character, statesmanship, and unselfishness that marked him as a great Secretary of War. There was never any doubt that the Secretary of War was the top man in the War Department and his respect for and tolerance of the position which the Chief of Staff occupied increased his stature. The Executive Order also emphasized the pre-eminent position of the Chief of Staff by stating that all elements of the Army functioned under the Chief of Staff. The supply services were specifically included. It followed then that the position of the War Department General Staff was strengthened. As the instrument of the Chief of Staff, it was the over-all planning, coordinating, and supervisory agency for all activities of the War Department and the Army.

COMMENTS OF DIRECTOR OF BUDGET BUREAU ON REORGANIZATION

There was considerable concern on how the reorganization would affect the procurement duties of the Under Secretary of War. In this connection and because of other significant observations, the following comments made to the President in a memorandum dated February 25, 1942, by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget were of particular interest:—

"I should like to call to your attention a number of features of the War Department reorganization contemplated by the Executive Order which Secretary Stimson has submitted to you. The Bureau has been in close touch with many of the problems which this reorganization seeks to remedy. Pursuant to a request by General Arnold, we have had some of our regular staff, supplemented by outstanding experts in organization and management assisting in the development of the detailed plan of organization and administration for the Army Air Forces. As a part of our current survey of war procurement and production administration, we have been giving close attention to the proposed set-up of the Services of Supply and their relation to the War Production Board.

1. Based upon continuous dealings with the War Department as well as the above surveys, I believe the reorganization provided by the Executive Order to be generally sound. It brings together related arms and services into relatively clear-cut units. This should simplify and expedite the operations of the department.

2. While there are some questionable aspects in the detailed set-up

for the Air Forces, the plan as it stands at this moment corrects most of its present administrative defects. In the hands of competent officers, the plan should prove effective.

3. We have not examined the proposed set-up of the Ground Forces, but the principle of unifying the several arms under one command appears sound.

4. The pulling together of the several supply services into a unified service is desirable. The plan aims to eliminate the present duplication among the work of the supply services, the General Staff and the Under Secretary's office, and to unify their work. This is all to the good. In so doing, however, the question arises as to the extent to which the Commanding General, Services of Supply, should function under the command of the Chief of Staff and the extent to which responsibility for supply should be tied up to the Under Secretary. The proposed Services of Supply command contains some military as well as non-military functions. This makes any organizational solution somewhat of a compromise. The Executive Order places the Commanding General, Service of Supply, directly under the Chief of Staff. If it is your desire that purchase and procurement facilities within the War Department should be responsible to the Secretary through the Under Secretary, and that Donald Nelson have a direct channel to such facilities through the civilian side of the War Department, then I think a clear directive supplementing the Executive Order should be issued by you, defining the functions of the Under Secretary in this respect. Otherwise, the proposed arrangement could easily result in purchase and procurement work being insulated from the top civilian side of the Department.

5. The issuance of the Executive Order and the promulgation by the Secretary of War of the orders which set up the various units under these three new commands will be only an initial step in the reorganization. The real job will be to work out the specific assignment of functions all the way down the line, to revise and simplify procedures to fit the new structure, and to eliminate the great amount of review at higher levels of minor matters which should be resolved at lower operating levels. Paper work and routines which have accumulated over peacetime years need to be thoroughly examined and revised. This will call for the addition of personnel skilled in organization and procedures work to be established in the Secretary's office, at the top of the three new commands, and also in their major subdivisions. In this connection the Air Forces is to be commended for providing an 'Organization and Planning Unit,' under the Director of Management Control who is responsible to the Chief of Air Staff. The Bureau of the Budget staff

will continue to work with this unit of the Air Forces in the execution of the new plan. There has been some talk of such a staff in the Services of Supply command but it has been mostly in terms of an inspection unit rather than a staff to develop and improve internal organization and procedures. It would be advantageous if you would emphasize to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff the need for this kind of work.

6. As you know, one of the obstacles in the effective administration of the War Department has been the lack of a sufficient number of high grade civilians with the necessary technical and administrative background who could give continuity to the administrative work of the Department. A surplus of officers during peacetime led to their replacement of civilians assigned to administrative work. The rotation of officers and their continued reassignment further impedes good management. Steps have been taken recently to recruit high grade civilians—in many instances they have been given commissions—but I do not think the Department has yet been adequately organized for this purpose nor has there been sustained effort to scour the country for the best technical and administrative abilities and to place such persons throughout the various arms and services where special abilities are needed.

7. Under present reorganization plans the War Department contemplates placing over-all budget and legislative planning work for the Department within the Services of Supply command. Many general department services, such as finance, records, etc., are also being placed under that command. While we question the wisdom of locating general administrative services of a department within one of its operating subdivisions, I am chiefly concerned here with the plan of subordinating budget and legislative policy matters within a large operating branch of the War Department rather than to establish it as the management arm of the Secretary. If the Secretary is to be the chief executive of the Department and carry the final responsibility for its policies and programs, it is imperative that the budget and legislative planning function and any other related general management function be made a part of the Secretary's equipment and that such facilities have ready access to the General Staff where most of the budgetary and legislative determinations will originate and even be resolved.

8. Inasmuch as the organization and functions of the Service of Supply command affect vitally the whole war purchasing and production program and the administrative relationships with a number of agencies, I suggest that you arrange with the Secretary of War to have the pro-

posed plan and orders relating to this command cleared with the Bureau of the Budget before promulgation."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S COMMENT ON THE 1942 REORGANIZATION

President Roosevelt replied to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in the following terms:

"I have referred your memorandum of February 25 to the Secretary of War and have received a report from him on the points which you raise.

The Secretary of War advises that insofar as the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 6 are concerned, there is no difference of opinion. He feels that there are certain unusual conditions affecting the organization of the War Department which do not apply to the non-military services which should be given consideration in fixing the organization.

In regard to your paragraph 4, the duties of the Under Secretary with relation to procurement are set forth in existing orders of the War Department which are not to be changed. The proposed Tables of Organization, which I understand were explained to your staff, indicate that the Under Secretary should be fully responsible for matters of procurement and in dealings between the War Department and Mr. Donald Nelson. Already the War Department and Mr. Nelson have begun the draft of procedure to regulate business between the two organizations.

With regard to your paragraph 5, the Secretary of War advises that the necessity for continuous review of organizations and procedures is well recognized and that special organizations are being set up to handle such matters in the three commands to be created. The Deputy Chief of Staff is to be charged with handling questions of organizations and procedures for the Staff and for the Army as a whole. He feels that with such an arrangement and with the emphasis that he intends to place on such matters, organization and planning will receive the attention which they deserve. He further advises that he will be happy to have any of his officers consult with your staff whenever you feel that it will be mutually helpful.

In connection with the comments you have made in paragraph 6 of your memorandum, the War Department points out that it is employing a very large number of former civilians in its bureaus and staffs to deal with administrative and procedural policies. Moreover, Reserve Officers with civilian backgrounds are replacing Regular Officers who are being sent to tactical units. I am advised, however, that it is one of the features of the proposed reorganization that more topnotch men

in civil life will be called to the Department to perform supervisory work involved in supply and procurement.

With regard to your paragraph 7, the Secretary states that the legislative matters are in fact placed in the immediate office of the Chief of Staff. Budgetary matters are placed under the Commanding General of the Services of Supply for the reason that a very large part, some 90 to 95 per cent, of all budgetary matters spring from the Supply Services. In such matters, the Commanding General of the Services of Supply will be the Secretary's representative and have direct access to him whenever it is desired. I believe this fully covers the point which you raise.

With regard to your paragraph 8, I am advised that you have already been furnished with copies of the proposed order and have reviewed them.

It seems to me that the Secretary has fully met your objections, and I am proceeding to execute the order."

These comments pointed up certain problems which were to come up again during subsequent months of World War II. How these problems developed and what action was taken will be described in a later chapter.

THE ORGANIZATION OF 1942 GETS UNDER WAY

The guiding organizational principles and the charts which General McNarney's memorandum had presented were used as the framework upon which the details of organization were added. General Arnold, General McNair, and General Somervell were logical selections for the big jobs of major commanders. General Arnold had been and was, both in title and in fact, the Air Force leader. General McNair had been the key man in the General Headquarters organization which was to be abolished. General Somervell was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, G-4, of the War Department General Staff and he had been the driving force behind all supply activities. Each of these designated commanders concerned himself with the tasks of selecting key personnel, of sorting out officers to be retained or to be assigned to other duties, and with working out the detailed organizations and procedures for his command. The reorganization committee, consisting of General McNarney, General Laurence S. Kuter, and Colonel Harrison, with Lieutenant Colonel Nelson as recorder handled problems involving the inter-relationships between the three major commands and between those commands and the General Staff.

Certain phases of the technique of working out and putting into effect a major reorganization will be described in some detail. The fol-

lowing are excerpts of the minutes of the first meeting of the representatives from the interested divisions of the War Department:

"MINUTES OF THE
OPENING SESSION—SPECIAL COMMITTEE
REORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Officers representing offices as indicated met in Room 2045, Munitions Building at 1 p.m., February 16th, 1942.

Present

Major General Joseph T. McNarney	Chairman
Col. W. K. Harrison	WPD, G.S.
Lt. Col. I. P. Swift	G-1, G.S.
Lt. Col. C. Y. Banfill	G-2, G.S.
Lt. Col. W. B. Leitch	G-3, G.S.
Lt. Col. C. F. Robinson	G-4, G.S.
Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter	Office of the Secretary of the General Staff
Brig. Gen. James A. Ullo	Adjutant General
Lt. Col. C. W. West	Judge Advocate General
Col. P. E. Brown	Inspector General
Lt. Col. James G. Christiansen	GHQ
Lt. Col. B. E. Gates	Air Force
Col. W. D. Styer	G-4 and Services of Supply
Major General Brehon Somervell	G-4 and Services of Supply
Brig. Gen. A. H. Carter	Office of Under Secretary of War
Lt. Col. O. L. Nelson	Office of the Secretary of the General Staff

Four charts [those shown on pages 362-363, 377, 379, and 383] outlining the reorganization to be effected were distributed to each officer present.

Minutes of the meeting were as follows:

Major General Joseph T. McNarney:

Gentlemen. The Secretary of War has approved in principle the reorganization of the War Department as shown on the charts. This committee has been formed for the purpose of coordinating details and preparing the necessary directives to put the reorganization into effect. It is not a voting committee. It is not a debating society. It is a committee to draft the necessary directives. It will prepare directives and such other papers as may be necessary so that the new organization may be prepared to function as early as March 9, 1942, if so ordered by the Secretary of War.

In general the directives to be prepared will include the responsibilities and authority which will be delegated to the chiefs of the three biggest services—the Ground Force, the Air Force, and the Service Command; the scope and preparation of plans and the coordination of

the execution of those plans to be effected by the War Department General Staff; the methods of routing communications; and in addition the preparation of the Executive Order necessary to authorize the new organization.

Colonel Nelson will act as recorder of the committee. The committee will be informal, we will have few full meetings.

The General Staff, as such, will be drastically restricted in personnel. In a similar manner the policy staffs of the three commands must be held to a low level in order that we do not start doing again what we are trying to cure.

Representatives of the General Staff sections—G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and WPD will submit by 8:30 A.M. on February 18 or sooner the proposed organization of their Staff division to include a chart on the order of this one which shows the new functions and a re-write of Army Regulations 10-15, as pertains to each section.

The following strengths are allotted: G-1, G-3 and G-4 each will have eight General Staff officers, of which four are Air. In addition, four juniors, preferably Reserve officers not above the rank of captain. G-2, 12 General Staff officers, of which six are Air, and six juniors. WPD, 60 General Staff officers, of which 20 are Air, and 40 juniors for a total of 100.

The representatives of the Ground Force, Air Force, and Service Command,—will submit at the same time a policy staff organization plus a redraft with reasons for any changes in organization chart handed you today. Changes in the organization charts must not differ in principle from the organization outlined in the charts, but minor changes will be considered.

I ask the representatives of the Adjutant General, the Inspector General and Colonel Nelson, acting as a sub-committee, to draw up an organization of the message centers, routing and custody of communications, method of addressing communications, plus the directive for putting the whole into effect. In considering the method of addressing and answering communications, I would like to have you consider improving code words, particularly in all messages sent by signal communications to the theaters of overseas commands, so that when the answers come back, the message center will know who originated the message so it can be sent there without fail.

I assign General Kuter the problem of submitting an organization for the Secretary's office, Legislative and Liaison Branch.

I assign to the Judge Advocate the task of drawing up the Executive Order which must be signed by the President to authorize the reorganization.

I request the Adjutant General to submit a list of all miscellaneous boards, missions, commissions, etc., and to whom they report at the moment and his recommendation as to where they should go under the reorganization.

Now, for the division of personnel. Generally, excess officers in G-1 and G-4 will go to the Service Command. The excess in G-2, G-3 and WPD, if any, will go to the Ground Command, except that WPD will have first call on G-2 and G-3 officers being released. Personnel of the Office of The Chief of Infantry, Field Artillery, Cavalry and Coast Artillery will go to the Ground Command, except Coast Artillery officers on Procurement.

I request each staff Section and each Command to figure out the amount of office space needed and where it should be. I assign General Kuter to be coordinator of that. One principle is that training commands now being formed or already in being will not be located in Washington.

I would like to finish all these things this week and next week actually get the directives to put this into effect and so smoothed out that they can be turned over to the commands who will then have about ten days with the directives so that they can go ahead with the reorganization.

I ask the Inspector General's representative to write a directive which will insure that after the reorganization is effected, inspection to assure that the orders are carried out, particularly with respect to operation by the General Staff, to inspect for undue delay in processing any kind of work, to locate bottle-necks, particularly in communications, and to determine how messages relating to the projected combat operations which have circulation in the War Department, and messages relating to combat operations may be kept secret.

The question of the names to fill high commands, particularly where a general officer is considered necessary, should receive immediate consideration of these new commands. Of course, that is a function the Chief of Staff will hold in his own hand but we can start thinking about it. Those names should be available on call.

The names of the Air Force officers who will be made available for General Staff work will be obtained from the Air Corps, through General Kuter.

I wish to impress upon all of you, that this is confidential and this is not to be discussed except with the people with whom it is actually necessary to get the work done. This reorganization at the moment is confidential and is not a subject for open discussion.

This concludes all the directives which I have to give you. I will

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES FROM GHQ AND CHIEFS OF ARMS TO ARMY GROUND FORCES




CHART 11

probably sit in this room as long as it is available, from 8:30 to 5:30 for discussion at any time you want me."

THE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND THE ARMY

In carrying out General McNarney's instructions, there was much drawing of organization charts, writing of statements of functions, and studying of the various proposals on the shifting of personnel. After a number of discussions and conferences, agreement was reached on statement of functions, organization charts, and personnel to be retained. Then the question of transfer of functions and personnel were considered. The chart on page 359 shows the method followed by the organization planners of the Army Ground Forces to ensure that the functions performed by the officers of the Chiefs of Arms, such as Chief of Infantry, were not lost but consolidated and assigned to staff sections in the new organization. The greatest difficulty was experienced in determining what was to go to the Services of Supply. After much study the following tabulation was agreed upon:


TABULATION SHOWING TRANSFERS AND ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

<i>Former Assignment</i>	<i>Assignment in the Services of Supply</i>
1. Supply Division, G-4, W. D. Gen. Staff (less personnel retained in G-4 War Department General Staff.)	
<i>a.</i> Planning Branch (Parts of)	Staff—Requirements
Planning Branch (Parts of)	Staff—Operations
<i>b.</i> General Supplies, Special Supplies and Arms & Ammunition Sections of Supply Branch	Director of Procurement & Distribution
<i>c.</i> Planning Section of Supply Branch	Staff—Requirements
<i>d.</i> Defense Aid Section of Supply Branch	Staff—Defense Aid
<i>e.</i> Depot Section of Supply Branch	General Depots Division
<i>f.</i> Fiscal Branch	Staff—Budget and Financial Administration

*Former Assignment**Assignment in the Services of
Supply*

- | | |
|--|---|
| g. Construction & Real Estate Branch. (Less Planning & Control Sections.) | Chief of Engineers |
| h. Planning Section of Construction & Real Estate Branch | Staff—Requirements |
| i. Control Section of Construction & Real Estate Branch | Staff—Control |
| j. Transportation Branch. (Less Motor Sec.) Motor Section | Transportation Division
Staff—Operations |
| k. Development Branch | Director of Procurement & Distribution |
| l. Executive Office | |
| (1) Operations | Staff—Operations |
| (2) Administration | Staff—Administrative Assistant |
| (3) Reports & Control | Staff—Control |
| 2. Office of the Under Secretary of War. | |
| a. Resources Branch | Staff—Resources |
| b. Statistics Division | Chief of Administrative Services |
| c. Supply Arms Divisions and General Office, Procurement Branch. (Less Defense Aid Division and Air Corps Division.) | Director of Procurement and Distribution |
| d. Contract Division, Procurement Branch | Director of Procurement & Distribution |
| e. Defense Aid Division | Staff—Defense Aid |
| f. Military Requirements and Supplies | Staff—Requirements |
| g. Administrative Branch | |
| (1) Accounting and Finance Divisions | Staff—Budget and Financial Administration |
| (2) Reception & Information Divisions | Remains in O.U.S.W. |
| (3) Industrial Information Division | Staff—Public Relations and Information |

War Department General Staff



*Former Assignment**Assignment in the Services of Supply*

- | | |
|--|---|
| (4) Military Personnel & Civilian Employees Divisions | Staff—Administrative Assistant |
| (5) Office Service Division | Staff—Administrative Assistant |
| (6) Tax Amortization | Staff—Budget and Financial Administration |
| (7) Advance Payments | Director of Procurement and Distribution |
| (8) Delegated Duties | Remains in O.U.S.W. |
| 3. Office of the Defense Aid Director | Staff—Defense Aid |
| 4. Financial & Budget functions of the Budget & Legislative Branch | Staff—Budget and Financial Administration |
| 5. Functions of the Chief of Finance as Budget Officer of the War Department | Staff—Budget and Financial Administration |
| 6. Budget Advisory Committee | Staff—Budget and Financial Administration |
| 7. Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Officers | Adjutant General |
| 8. National Guard Bureau | Adjutant General |
| 9. Ports of Embarkation, Staging Areas and Regulating and Reconsignment Stations for overseas shipments. | Transportation Division |
| 10. Ordnance Department | Commanding General, Services of Supply |
| 11. Quartermaster Corps (Less Transportation Division) | Commanding General, Services of Supply |
| 12. Transportation Division, Office of the Quartermaster General | Transportation Division |
| 13. Chemical Warfare Service | Commanding General, Services of Supply |
| 14. Corps of Engineers | Commanding General, Services of Supply |
| 15. Medical Department | Commanding General, Services of Supply |

<i>Former Assignment</i>	<i>Assignment in the Services of Supply</i>
16. Signal Corps	Commanding General, Services of Supply
17. General Depots	General Depots Division
18. Appropriate part of G-1, General Staff	Staff—Personnel
19. Appropriate part of G-3, General Staff	Staff—Training
20. Chief of Finance (less duties as Budget Officer of the War Department)	Chief of Administrative Services
21. Judge Advocate General	Chief of Administrative Services
22. Provost Marshal General	Chief of Administrative Services
23. Adjutant General	Chief of Administrative Services
24. Chief of Special Services	Chief of Administrative Services
25. Chief of Chaplains	Chief of Administrative Services
26. Post Exchange Services	Chief of Administrative Services
27. Corps Areas	Commanding General, Services of Supply
28. Exempted Stations, not otherwise assigned.	Commanding General, Services of Supply
29. Joint Army & Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation	Chief of Special Services
30. Joint Army & Navy Selective Service Committee	Staff—Personnel
31. Military Police Board	Provost Marshal General
32. War Department Decorations Board	Staff—Personnel
33. War Department Uniform Board	Staff—Personnel
34. Personnel in the Offices of the Chiefs of the Combat Arms engaged in matters pertaining to officer candidates.	Staff—Personnel
35. Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.	Commanding General, Services of Supply
36. United States Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.	Commanding General, Services of Supply

*Former Assignment**Assignment in the Services of Supply*

- | | |
|---|---|
| 37. Joint Military Communications Board | Chief Signal Officer |
| 38. Procurement functions, Office of Chief of Coast Artillery | Ordnance Department |
| 39. Functions relating to Harbor Defense Projects, Office of Chief of Coast Artillery | Commanding General, Services of Supply
(Definite assignment to be determined)" |

STAFF PROCEDURE UNDER THE 1942 ORGANIZATION

The various organization charts, statements of function, and manning tables for the general staff divisions were consolidated and the chart which appears on pp. 362-363 was issued. Among the most difficult questions to settle were some that seemed trivial. Prolonged discussion was required on names. The titles, "Army Service Command," and "Services of Supply" were the two favorites and each had many supporters. The Under Secretary of War's preference for Services of Supply was decisive. Changing the name of the War Plans Division involved much effort and discussion. Finally, the name "Operations Division" was selected in conformance with the Secretary of War's dictum of "say what you mean." Problems of administration and procedure were not always easy of solution. How orders on military operations were to be signed and authenticated produced much discussion. The following staff memorandum illustrated the emphasis on decentralization and expeditious staff procedure:

"WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Memorandum for the A. C. of S., G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and WPD:

March 8, 1942

(Information copies to Commanding General,
Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and
Services of Supply, and The Adjutant General)

Subject: Functions and Procedures, War Department General Staff.

1. The several divisions of the War Department General Staff are charged with the functions listed in paragraph 3, Circular 59, War Department, March 2, 1942, and in chart entitled, 'War Department General Staff,' dated March 9, 1942.

2. Staff procedure will adhere to the following:

a. Where directives do not change established policies and where they relate to activities concerning only one division of the War Department General Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the responsible division will issue the directive and furnish information copies to interested divisions of the War Department General Staff including the Secretariat.

b. Where directives do not change established policies but relate to activities concerning several staff divisions, the staff division with primary interest will obtain concurrences, by conferences preferably, from the interested divisions.

(1) If all concur, the division with primary interest will issue the directive. Copies will be sent to interested agencies.

(2) When there are non-concurrences, the division with primary interest will refer the conflicts to the Deputy Chief of Staff for decision.

c. Detailed staff studies will be made only when they are essential to directives initiating or changing important policies and when an adequate understanding of the problem requires such a study. When detailed staff studies are prepared, existing procedure, as prescribed by the Green Book, Edition 1941, will be followed.

d. When the facts upon which important decisions depend can be presented orally, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff or members of their division will present the matter to the Deputy Chief of Staff for decision. Whenever practicable, conferences and direct action will be utilized in lieu of written communications. All concerned are cautioned of the necessity to record and to issue information copies on actions or decisions arrived at orally.

3. Issuance of instructions and directives.

a. The Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff are authorized, on matters under their supervision, to issue instructions in the name of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.

b. Orders relating to strategy, tactics, and operations will be issued by order of the Commander in Chief; all others by order of the Secretary of War.

c. Paragraph 10 *a* (5), Circular 59, War Department, March 2, 1942, authorizes the various sub-divisions of the War Department General Staff to call upon The Adjutant General directly for administrative services.

(1) This includes the preparation of the necessary number of copies, the distribution to individuals designated, editing or the preparation of replies.

(2) Correspondence addressed to individual officers of the War Department General Staff may be referred to The Adjutant General

informally by marginal notes or otherwise for reply. The Adjutant General will prepare and dispatch replies furnishing a copy to the officer concerned. This method will provide for coordinated and consistent action in those cases where inquiries of general import are addressed to individual officers by persons unknown to them or by those who have no official relations with the officers addressed.

(3) Correspondence regarding appointments, employment, promotions, transfers, letters of congratulations, letters of condolence and other miscellaneous matters may be referred to The Adjutant General for reply.

(4) Requests from civilians for the allotment of military units, complaints about military actions, and similar communications may be referred to The Adjutant General for direct reply. Such replies will be immediate and general in nature and requests for data on which to base reply will be made only in exceptional circumstances.

d. Unless otherwise desired, no change need be made in the prevailing practice of having War Department regulations, orders, circulars, bulletins, and similar instructions authenticated as:

By order of the Secretary of War:
G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

e. Instructions, directives, and orders issued by the War Department General Staff will conform to the following:

(1) Orders relating to strategy, tactics, and operations will be signed as follows:

By direction of the Commander in Chief:

_____,
Chief of Staff
or
Deputy Chief of Staff
or
Assistant Chief of Staff, G—.

Official:

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations.

(2) Except as prescribed in (1) above, all other orders will be signed as follows:

By order of the Secretary of War:

_____,
Chief of Staff

or

Deputy Chief of Staff

or

Assistant Chief of Staff, G—.

Official:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjutant General

(3) The authentication by The Adjutant General may be dispensed with if distribution of the copies is limited.

f. Sub-divisions of the War Department General Staff maintaining files of temporary records are reminded of their responsibility to transfer files of permanent value to The Adjutant General when no longer current. Communications of no permanent value should be eliminated and destroyed by the office concerned and not sent to The Adjutant General for permanent file.

4. Revision of A. R. 10-15 and Green Book, Edition 1941, is contemplated. In the meanwhile, the instructions contained therein, with the obvious modifications made necessary by Circular 59, War Department, March 2, 1942, will be followed.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

/s/ John R. Deane
JOHN R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff."

To further emphasize decentralization, all overseas commanders and Defense commanders in the United States were informed by radio as follows:

"The following instructions relating to the processing of correspondence under the new War Department Reorganization are furnished for your guidance:

(a) The purpose of the reorganization is to decentralize, giving major commanders greater responsibility and freeing the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff from administrative details and routine.

(b) You will refer correspondence to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,

or the appropriate subdivisions of the War Department General Staff only when command decisions beyond your authority are involved. In general, commanding generals in the field directly under the Chief of Staff will address correspondence to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, when the subject matter relates to mission of the force, operational activities, military intelligence, relations with allies, substantial increase in forces and means, or to matters in which the field commander desires action by the Chief of Staff or of which the Chief of Staff should be informed.

(c) All other matters should be forwarded to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, or Services of Supply, or appropriate subdivisions thereof, for necessary action. On routine administrative supply and technical matters, direct correspondence between your headquarters, or appropriate subdivisions of your command, and Services of Supply, Army Ground Forces, or Army Air Forces Headquarters, or appropriate subdivisions thereof, is authorized and desired. Correspondence so routed will be referred to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, or the War Department General Staff only when these agencies can not take the necessary action. Field commanders may, if in their judgment the matter is of sufficient importance, submit the case to the Chief of Staff or the War Department General Staff, when unsatisfactory action results or an appeal is deemed essential.

(d) Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply are authorized and directed to take action on requests from commanders in the field who are directly subordinate to the Chief of Staff, providing such action is in accordance with established policy, does not involve transfers of general officers, or does not involve a change in the existing or planned assignment of troops and means in which shortages exist.

(e) Field commanders may address correspondence to The Adjutant General in cases when the proper addressee can not be determined."

Simultaneously with the development of detailed organization charts and statements of functions for the various staff officers and commands, there were being collected and scrutinized the various summaries which, when consolidated at the major command level, would furnish the material for the basic order announcing the establishment and the detailed organization of the major command concerned. From these drafts summaries were prepared which, with the addition of material on the General Staff provided the greater part of the over-all order announcing and presenting the reorganization. Stated in other terms, this procedure could be described as completing the circle. At the start

there was general agreement on the main outline and on the general framework of the organization to be instituted. Work had to begin with the top structure and then the analysis and the implications had to be determined for each office and command through the several successive layers of organization until the last affected unit or organization was reached. Then the start was made at the bottom to formulate the organization required and this procedure was continued until the organization charts and statement of function were built up from the bottom to the top. The end product of course had to be in accord with the original framework which had been prescribed.

WAR DEPARTMENT ORDERS ON THE 1942 REORGANIZATION

Circular No. 59 of March 2, 1942 was the War Department document which described the details of the reorganization and which prescribed March 9, 1942 as the effective date for the change. This document remained substantially unchanged during the entire war period, and there were many references to it in discussions involving organizational matters during the rest of World War II. This circular, which established the over-all organization for World War II, follows in full:

"WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, March 2, 1942

WAR DEPARTMENT REORGANIZATION

1. The President has approved a reorganization of the War Department and the Army, *effective March 9, 1942*. Pending the issuance of detailed instructions and changes in regulations, a summary description of the new organization is furnished for the information and guidance of all concerned.

2. *a.* The War Department and the Army will be organized so as to provide under the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff a War Department General Staff, a Ground Force, an Air Force, and a Services of Supply Command, all with headquarters in Washington, D. C., and in addition thereto such number of oversea departments, task forces, base commands, defense commands, commands in theaters of operations, and other commands as may be necessary in the national security. Charts A, B, C, and D, illustrate the organization of the War Department, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply. It is anticipated that the experience of the first three months under the new organization will indicate the desirability of minor modifications within the principal subdivisions. Recommendations will be submitted accordingly.

b. The functions, duties, and powers of the chiefs of the following arms are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces: Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery Corps (except those relating to procurement, storage, and issue).

c. The functions, duties, and powers of the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force (Air Force Combat Command) and the Chief of the Air Corps are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

d. The functions, duties, and powers of the Chief of Coast Artillery relating to procurement, storage, and issue are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Services of Supply.

e. Supply arms and services and War Department offices and agencies will come under the direct command of the Commanding General, Services of Supply as indicated below:

(1) Those parts of the office of the Under Secretary of War engaged in functions of procurement and industrial mobilization.

(2) The Budget Advisory Committee.

(3) The Surgeon General.

(4) The Chief of Engineers (except with respect to civil functions, for which he will report directly to the Secretary of War).

(5) The Chief Signal Officer.

(6) The Quartermaster General.

(7) The Chief of Ordnance.

(8) The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service.

(9) Present supply functions of the Chief of Coast Artillery, and the military and civilian personnel assigned thereto.

(10) The Chief of Finance.

(11) The Judge Advocate General. (Except with respect to courts martial and certain legal matters for which he will report direct to the Secretary of War.) The Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces may request legal opinions from The Judge Advocate General direct.

(12) The Adjutant General.

(13) The Provost Marshal General.

(14) The Chief of Special Services.

(15) The Chief of Chaplains.

(16) All corps area commanders.

(17) All general depots.

(18) Ports of embarkation, staging areas, and regulating and re-consignment stations for oversea shipments.

3. War Department General Staff (pages 374-375).—*a.* The Chief of Staff is the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters

relating to the military establishment and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the military program.

b. The War Department General Staff under the direction of the Chief of Staff will coordinate the development of the armed forces of the United States and insure the existence of a well-balanced and efficient military team. The War Department General Staff assists the Chief of Staff in the direction of the field operations of the Army of the United States. It is specifically charged with the duty of providing such broad basic plans as will enable the Commanding Generals of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Services of Supply, defense commands, task forces, and theaters of operations to prepare and execute detailed programs.

c. The War Department General Staff will include the following divisions, each division being under the immediate control of an Assistant Chief of Staff.

(1) *Personnel Division* (G-1) which is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff relating to the personnel of the Army as individuals.

(2) *Military Intelligence Division* (G-2) which is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff relating to the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information.

(3) *Organization and Training Division* (G-3) which is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff relating to the mobilization, training, and organization of the military forces.

(4) *Supply Division* (G-4) which is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the supply of the Army.

(5) *War Plans Division* (WPD) which is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff relating to the formulation of plans and the strategic direction of the military forces in the theater of war.

(6) *The Secretariat, War Department General Staff* is charged with the administration of the office of the Chief of Staff and will maintain a Message Center for the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff.

4. Other War Department Agencies (pp. 374-375).—a. *Legislative and Liaison Branch, War Department* is charged with supervising the preparation of legislation requested by the War Department, with preparing reports to Committees of Congress, and with the maintenance of liaison necessary thereto. Preparation of reports on legislation affecting

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY




CHART 13

the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, or the Services of Supply may be assigned to the command concerned.

b. The Military Intelligence Service, under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, will operate and administer the service of the collection, compilation, and dissemination of military intelligence. The activities and personnel of the Foreign Liaison Section of the Air Staff are transferred to the Military Intelligence Service.

c. Bureau of Public Relations.—(1) Under policies prescribed by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, the War Department Bureau of Public Relations is the agency for the dissemination of military information to the public from the War Department, for the establishment of public relations policies and practices, and for liaison with other Government agencies on matters of mutual interest in the field of public relations.

(2) The War Department Bureau of Public Relations will be the agency for the distribution to the public of all War Department informative material for general public interest.


(3) The War Department Bureau of Public Relations, subject to the review of the Director thereof, will refer to the Public Relations Officer, Services of Supply, publicity and censorship on all matters pertaining to procurement, contracts, production, materiel, labor relations and morale, speeches to workers and commendations of their efforts, plant visits by the press, and on activities relating to the office of the Under Secretary of War.

(4) Public relations offices of the Commanding Generals of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Services of Supply, and other agencies in the War Department will maintain direct contact with the War Department Bureau of Public Relations, and their dealings with the public will be under the supervision of that Bureau.

(5) In the field, commanders are responsible for carrying out established War Department policies of public relations within their own commands. Dealings with the public at any one station will be coordinated through the station public relations office. Direct contact between the War Department Bureau of Public Relations and commanders and public relations officers in the field is authorized.

d. The Inspector General's Department is charged in general with the inquiry into, and the report upon, all matters which affect the efficiency and economy of the Army of the United States, and to make such inspections, investigations, and reports as may be prescribed by law or directed by the Secretary of War, by the Chief of Staff, or requested

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY GROUND FORCES



^a 1. Military Characteristics.
2. Equipment Development.
3. Tables of Organization and Allowances.
4. Operational Changes.
5. Preparation of Training Publications and T. of O.

by the Commanding Generals of the Army Ground Forces, of the Army Air Forces, and of the Services of Supply.

5. Army Ground Forces (page 377).—*a.* Under policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, is charged in general with the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom over individuals and units assigned to the Army Ground Forces.

b. The mission of the Army Ground Forces is to provide ground force units properly organized, trained, and equipped for combat operation.

c. The following duties are specifically assigned to the Army Ground Forces:

(1) The operation of Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Cavalry replacement training centers and schools for the Army Ground Forces, including officer candidate schools for the Army Ground Forces.

(2) The provision of basic training for individuals in the Army Ground Forces inducted in excess of replacement training center capacity.

(3) The organization of tactical units as directed by the War Department.

(4) The training of all tactical units assigned to the Army Ground Forces.

(5) The organization, equipment, and training of such task forces as are directed by the Chief of Staff.

(6) The development of tactical and training doctrine, tables of organization, tables of basic allowances, military characteristics of weapons and equipment, and operational changes needed in equipment for the Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, Cavalry, and specialized combat units. Under the Chief of the Requirements Division, a separate section will be established for each of the combat arms of the Army Ground Forces. Headed by a general officer from the arm concerned, each such section is charged with the responsibility of furthering the orderly continuity and progressive development of its arm. The Chief of the Requirements Division will coordinate the various sections in the interests of the Army Ground Forces as a whole.

(7) The review with the Commanding General, Services of Supply of the tactical doctrine, military characteristics of weapons and equipment, tables of organization, and tables of basic allowances of Services of Supply units assigned to the Army Ground Forces.

(8) The discharge of personnel functions formerly performed in the offices of the Chiefs of Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and

[illegible]

CHART 15

CHART C

Cavalry, less those now engaged in the procurement of officer candidates.

(9) The assignment of officers of the Army Ground Forces including Army Air Forces and Services of Supply personnel on duty therewith.

(10) The supply of Infantry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery and Cavalry personnel to the Army Air Forces, Services of Supply, defense commands, theaters of operation and oversea forces in accordance with policies announced by the Chief of Staff.

(11) The submission to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, of such recommendations on construction, shelter, training aids, movements, supply, equipment, real estate, estimates of funds needed for field training and travel, and such other matters as may be necessary.

(12) The control of the expenditure of funds allocated to the Army Ground Forces.

(13) The development jointly with the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, of ground-air support, tactical training, and doctrine in conformity with policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff.

(14) The minimization of the administrative activities of the Army Ground Forces by utilizing the services available in the Services of Supply to the maximum degree consistent with proper control of the Army Ground Forces.

(15) The use of judicious shortcuts in procedure to expedite operations.

6. Army Air Forces (page 379).—*a.* Under policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, is charged in general with the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom over individuals and units assigned to the Army Air Forces.

b. The mission of the Army Air Forces is to procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide air force units properly organized, trained, and equipped for combat operations. Procurement and related functions will be executed under the direction of the Under Secretary of War.

c. The following duties are specifically assigned to the Army Air Forces:

(1) The operation of Army Air Forces replacement training centers and schools, including officer candidate schools, for the training of personnel in pilot functions and specialist nonpilot functions of combat and ground crews and in all duties involving the care, supply, and maintenance of aeronautical materiel.

(2) The provision of basic training for individuals in the Army Air Forces inducted in excess of replacement training center capacity.

(3) The organization of air force tactical units as directed by the War Department.

(4) The training of all tactical units assigned to the Army Air Forces.

(5) The organization, equipment, and training of such task forces

(6) The development of tactical and training doctrine, tables of organization, tables of basic allowances, military characteristics of aircraft, weapons, and equipment and operational changes needed in equipment, aircraft, and weapons peculiar to the Army Air Forces.

(7) The discharge of personnel functions pertaining to the Army Air Forces.

(8) The assignment of officers of the Army Air Forces including Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply personnel on duty therewith.

(9) The supply of air force personnel and equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, to the Army Ground Forces, Services of Supply, defense commands, theaters of operation, and oversea forces in accordance with policies announced by the Chief of Staff.

(10) The approval of general plans governing the construction of stations of the Army Air Forces.

(11) The submission to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, of such recommendations on construction, shelter, training aids, movements, supply, equipment, real estate, estimates of funds, and such other matters as may be necessary.

(12) The control of the expenditure of funds allocated to the Army Air Forces.

(13) The development jointly with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, of ground-air support, tactical training, and doctrine in conformity with policies prescribed by the Chief of Staff.

(14) The installation of such specialized air force equipment and materiel as may be provided by the Services of Supply and the maintenance of such portion thereof as is not maintained by the Services of Supply.

(15) The preparation of proposals and recommendations for conducting the design competitions authorized by law.

(16) The command and control of all Army Air Forces stations and bases not assigned to defense commands or theater commanders and all personnel, units, and installations thereon, including station complement personnel and activities.

(17) The supervision of all air force activities in connection with

the research, development, procurement, storage, supply, maintenance, and final disposition of military aircraft, accessories, supplies, facilities, and appurtenances used in connection therewith, including technical inspection and issuance of pertinent technical instructions.

(18) All aerial operations of the Army Air Forces except for those units thereof assigned or attached to other commands.

(19) The minimization of the administrative activities of the Army Air Forces by utilizing the services available in the Services of Supply to the maximum degree consistent with proper control of the Army Air Forces.

(20) The use of judicious shortcuts in procedure to expedite operations.

7. Services of Supply (page 383).—*a.* The duties and responsibilities placed on the Secretary of War by Section 5a of the National Defense Act, as amended, shall continue to be performed by the Under Secretary of War. The Director of Production shall continue to perform his present services reporting direct to the Under Secretary of War.

b. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, shall, on procurement and related matters, act under the direction of the Under Secretary of War and shall, on military matters, report to the Chief of Staff. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, is charged in general with the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom over individuals and units assigned to the Services of Supply.

c. The mission of the Services of Supply is to provide services and supplies to meet military requirements except those peculiar to the Army Air Forces. Procurement and related functions will be executed under the direction of the Under Secretary of War.

d. The Services of Supply consolidates under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, the supply arms and services, certain administrative services of the War Department, certain parts of the office of the Under Secretary of War, certain boards and committees, general depots, ports of embarkation and auxiliaries, and corps areas, with such amalgamation, reallocation of duties, and reorganization as is necessary or advisable.

e. The following duties are specifically assigned to the Services of Supply:

(1) The direction and supervision of engineering research, development, procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies and equipment, except those peculiar to the Army Air Forces.




CHART D

CHART 16

(2) The establishment of purchasing and contractual policies and procedure.

(3) Transportation and traffic control.

(4) Construction for the Army.

(5) The consolidation of programs and requirements of the Army with the programs and requirements received from Defense Aid and the Navy and procured by the Army.

(6) The securing of War Department funds, the arrangement for their defense and justification before the Bureau of the Budget and Congress, and the control of fiscal policy.

(7) The administration of all functions which are Army-wide in scope and which pertain to personnel as individuals, both military and civilian, to include premilitary training, mobilization of industrial manpower, and labor relations.

(8) The operation of replacement training centers and schools for the supply arms and services, including officer candidate schools.

(9) The provision of basic training for individuals in the Services of Supply inducted in excess of replacement training center capacity.

(10) The operation of all reception centers.

(11) The organization of Services of Supply units as directed by the War Department.

(12) The training of all units assigned to the Services of Supply.

(13) The assignment of officers of the Services of Supply, including Air Forces and Army Ground Forces personnel on duty therewith.

(14) The supply of Services of Supply personnel and units to the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, theaters of operations, and overseas forces in accordance with the policies announced by the Chief of Staff.

(15) The development of tactical and training doctrine, tables of organization, tables of basic allowances, military characteristics of weapons and equipment, and operational changes needed in equipment for the Services of Supply subject to the qualification listed in paragraph 5c(7).

(16) The command and control of all stations except those assigned Army Air Forces, defense commands, and theaters of operations.

(17) The use of judicious shortcuts in procedure to expedite operations.

8. The following boards, exempted stations, military missions, and commissions are placed upon the jurisdiction of the authority indicated after their respective names:

<i>Title</i>	<i>Responsible authority</i>
Air Corps Board.....	Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
Battle Monuments Commission ..	The President.
Beach Erosion and Shore Protection Board	Chief of Engineers.
Board of Commissioners, United States Soldiers' Home	Secretary of War.
Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors	Chief of Engineers.
Budget Advisory Committee	Commanding General, Services of Supply.
California Debris Commission ...	Chief of Engineers.
Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.	Commanding General, Services of Supply (curriculum and doctrine under supervision of G-3, W.D.G.S.)
Director of Defense Aid	Commanding General Services of Supply.
Industrial Mobilization Board ...	Under Secretary of War.
Military Missions	War Plans Division, War Department General Staff.
Military Police Board	Provost Marshal General.
Mississippi River Commission ...	Chief of Engineers.
Motion Picture Review Board ..	Bureau of Public Relations.
National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice.	Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.
Photo News Board	Bureau of Public Relations.
United States Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.	Commanding General, Services of Supply (curriculum and doctrine under supervision of G-3, W.D.G.S.)
War Department Decorations Board.	Commanding General, Services of Supply.

<i>Title</i>	<i>Responsible authority</i>
War Department Uniform Board	Commanding General, Services of Supply.
Harbor Defense Board	Abolished.
9. War Department relationship with joint activities will be maintained by the authority indicated:	
Aeronautical Board	Under Secretary of War.
Army and Navy Munitions Board	Under Secretary of War.
Joint Army and Navy Board and Planning committee.	Chief of Staff.
Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation.	Commanding General, Services of Supply.
Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee.	Commanding General, Services of Supply.
Joint Military Communications Board.	Commanding General, Services of Supply.

10. Administrative procedure in the new organization will conform to the following:

a. Routing, custody, and method of addressing communications.—

(1) In both the War Department Communications Center (Sig. C.) and War Department Post Office, mail will be delivered as addressed.

(2) In the future, mail and dispatches, except as provided in (4) below, will no longer be addressed to The Adjutant General, but to the—

(a) Chief of Staff, United States Army.

(b) Commanding General, Army Ground Forces,

(c) Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

(d) Commanding General, Services of Supply

or to such subdivisions of each thereof as may be appropriate.

(3) Mail and dispatches addressed to The Adjutant General will be received, sorted, and delivered to the proper agency.

(4) Correspondence relating to the following will be addressed to The Adjutant General:

(a) Permanent personnel records (officers, enlisted men, Organized Reserves, Reserve Officers' Training Corps).

(b) Classification of skills, abilities, and aptitudes.

(c) Machine personnel records.

- (d) National Guard Bureau affairs.
 - (e) Conformance to personnel allotments.
 - (f) Publications.
 - (g) Initial procurement and assignment of officers and enlisted men.
 - (h) Transfers of personnel between any two of the following: War Department General Staff, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply.
 - (i) Separations from the service of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men.
 - (j) Archives.
 - (k) Administration relating to appointment and admissions of cadets to the United States Military Academy and their separation therefrom.
 - (l) Government and control of the United States Disciplinary Barracks and of all offenders sent thereto for confinement and detention.
 - (m) Army Postal Service and Army Courier Service.
- (5) The Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, may forward to the Adjutant General of his command or to The Adjutant General, routine messages for action and answer.
- (6) *Custody of communications.*—(a) The Adjutant General is the custodian of the permanent records of the War Department. The Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and the Commanding General, Services of Supply may establish files of temporary record which will be transferred to The Adjutant General when no longer current.
- (b) The Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and the Commanding General, Services of Supply, will report to The Adjutant General the files that are to remain in their permanent custody, and that are to be exempted from control of The Adjutant General.
- (c) Records of the General Headquarters, the Chief of Infantry, the Chief of Field Artillery, the Chief of Cavalry, and the Chief of Coast Artillery will be transferred to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces for suitable disposition. Records of the Chief of the Air Corps and of the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, will be transferred to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, for suitable disposition.
- b. *Organization of message centers.*—(1) The Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and the Commanding General, Services of Supply,

will establish such message centers as may be deemed necessary to distribute mail and dispatches, reporting to the War Department Post Office the location of the message center and the agencies and offices to be served therefrom.

(2) Message Center organization and procedure will provide special handling for the following classes of mail and dispatches:

- (a) Messages relating to command and combat operations.
- (b) Other coded messages.
- (c) Classified mail to include secret, confidential, and restricted mail and dispatches.

(3) Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply will, as soon as practicable after receipt, furnish War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, with a copy of all messages received by them from services outside the continental limits of the United States pertaining to current or projected combat operations whenever the original does not indicate that the War Department Communications Center has sent a copy direct. The foregoing commanders will, as soon as practicable after receipt furnish the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, with a copy of all messages received by them from sources outside the continental limits of the United States pertaining to combat intelligence whenever the original does not indicate that the War Department Communications Center has sent a copy direct. Safeguarding measures, as prescribed in AR 380-5, will be taken in the preparation, transmission, and custody of these copies.

(4) All War Department telegrams, radiograms, and cables will include an identifying symbol of five letters, the first two of which will identify the sending agency, and the last three of which will identify the subdivision of the sending agency.

(a) Symbol letters are assigned as follows:

- 1. War Department General Staff WD
- 2. Army Ground Forces GN
- 3. Army Air Forces AF
- 4. Services of Supply SP

(b) Each agency in (a) above will assign appropriate third, fourth, and fifth letters to identify subdivisions of their command.

(c) War Department General Staff Symbols are assigned as follows:

- 1. Chief of Staff, U. S. Army WD CSA
- 2. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 WD GAP

3. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 WDGBI
4. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 WDGCT
5. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 WDGDS
6. Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD WDWPD

(d) General instructions.

1. When replies to messages are desired, the term "reply requested" will be incorporated into the body of the message or letter.

2. Letters will bear an identifying symbol if the symbol system for identifying the specific place of preparation within the originating office is in use. In telegrams, radiograms, and similar messages sent in the clear, the message will close with the word, "end," followed by the identifying symbol.

By order of the Secretary of War:

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,
*Major General,
The Adjutant General."*

The reorganization prescribed in Circular 59 strengthened the top position of the Chief of Staff under the Secretary of War. The overall planning, coordinating, and supervisory role of the General Staff was reaffirmed and at the same time the General Staff was directed to refrain from becoming involved in administrative details and operating activities. The number of deputy chiefs of staff was reduced from three to one. A number of Air Corps officers were assigned to the General Staff Division although the goal of fifty present on duty was never reached, principally because qualified Air Corps officers were so scarce. The intention was to streamline the War Department. The War Department General Staff was reduced in size but the War Department as a whole continued to increase. The tables just below give a comparison of personnel strength before and after the reorganization by using the dates of January 31 and April 30, 1942. The reorganization did reduce drastically the span of control of the Chief of Staff and it did decentralize operating activities. Under the new order of things the Chief of Staff could transact most of his business through four officers; the three major commanders (of the Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Services of Supply) and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the General Staff. For staff advice the Deputy Chief of Staff, the five Assistant Chiefs of Staff (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, and OPD) and the Sec-

retary of the General Staff were all that would usually be needed. The comparative strength tables follow:

COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION
MARCH 9, 1942

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF DIVISIONS

<i>Name of Office</i>	<i>Strength, January 31, 1942</i>		<i>Strength, April 30, 1942</i>	
	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Civilian Personnel</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Civilian Personnel and Enlisted Clerks</i>
Personnel Division, G-1	67	81	13	22
Military Intelligence				
Division, G-2	390	559	16	10
Organization and Training				
Division, G-3	88	107	16	35
Supply Division, G-4	149	138	11	26
Operations Division, OPD	75	57	121	204
Totals	769	942	177	297
Military Intelligence Service			342	1005
Legislative and Liaison Division			9	14

COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION
MARCH 9, 1942

ARMY GROUND FORCES

<i>Name of Office</i>	<i>Strength, January 31, 1942</i>		<i>Strength, April 30, 1942</i>	
	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Civilian Personnel and Enlisted Clerks</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Civilian Personnel and Enlisted Clerks</i>
G.H.Q., USA.	153	409
Office, Chief of Cavalry	10	23
Office, Chief of Coast Artillery	35	56
Office, Chief of Field Artillery	21	39
Office, Chief of Infantry	31	36
<i>Army Ground Forces</i>			212	512
Totals	250	563	212	512

COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION
MARCH 9, 1942
ARMY AIR FORCES

<i>Name of Office</i>	<i>Strength, January 31, 1942 Civilian Personnel and Enlisted Clerks</i>		<i>Strength, April 30, 1942 Civilian Personnel and Enlisted Clerks</i>	
	<i>Officers</i>		<i>Officers</i>	
Headquarters, Army Air Force	290	131		
Office, Chief of Air Corps	452	1404		
Hq. & Hq. Squadron, Air Force Combat Command	124	795		
Assistant Sec'y War for Air	1	12		
Headquarters, Army Air Forces			885	3309
Under orders to report			59	
Totals	867	2342	885	3309

Note: Basis of comparison subject to criticism. Headquarters Squadron counted in entirety on January 31; excluded on April 30, 1942; Certain new staff divisions brought officers to Washington from the field.

COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION
SERVICES OF SUPPLY

<i>Name of Office</i>	<i>Strength, January 31, 1942 Civilian Personnel and Enlisted Clerks</i>		<i>Strength, April 30, 1942 Civilian Personnel and Enlisted Clerks</i>	
	<i>Officers</i>		<i>Officers</i>	
<i>*Operating Services</i>				
Quartermaster General's Office	399	5426	423	4720
Office, Chief of Engineers	285	1223	377	4954
Office, Chief of Ordnance	666	2603	899	4961
Office, Chief Signal Officer	333	1245	616	4457*
Office, Chief of Chemical Warfare	136	258	190	604
Office of the Surgeon General	119	754	158	1343
Office, Chief of Transportation			183	899
Office, Chief of General Depots			8	8
Totals, Operating Services	1938	11509	2854	21946

COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION
SERVICES OF SUPPLY (CONT.)

***Administrative Services*

Chief of the Administrative

Services			15	22
Office, Chief of Chaplains	18	32	22	48
Office, Chief of Finance	33	809	41	1977
Office, Judge Advocate General	135	113	184	163
Office, Chief of Statistical				
Services			43	256
Office of the Adjutant General	156	3875	202	6521
Office of the Provost Marshal	53	80	115	278
Office of Special Services	83	**	47	226
Post Exchange Services			73	93
Totals, Administrative				
Services	478	4909	742	9584
Office of the Under Secretary				
of War	275	589	16	50
Office, Commanding General and				
Chief of Staff			4	6
Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for				
Requirements and Resources			5	7
Administrative Branch			19	192
Control Branch			14	23
Public Relations Branch			29	41
Procurement and Distribution				
Division			91	212
Operations Division			27	38
Training Division			21	40
Civilian Personnel Division			13	58
Military Personnel Division			81	104
Fiscal Division			36	132
Requirements Division			47	59
International Division			55	180
Resources Division			123	395
Total Staff Divisions	275	589	581	1537
Grand Total Services of				
Supply	2691	17007	4177	33067

*Figures for April 26th

**Civilian Personnel included in Office of the Adjutant General

PROBLEMS NOT SOLVED BY 1942 REORGANIZATION

There were certain organizational problems which the reorganization did not solve. In some respects, solutions were admittedly compromises and there were a few problems which it was better to ignore than to attempt a change that might have held up the entire reorganization. The General Staff concept was in the main reaffirmed—but the philosophy was not clarified in one vital respect. How was the General Staff to refrain from operating and still provide the Chief of Staff with a high level executive agency which would implement his directives effectively and expeditiously? Such an agency was the goal which the General Headquarters had sought to attain but for which it could never acquire the requisite authority. Under the reorganization the War Plans Division, appropriately renamed the Operations Division after the reorganization, did meet this need. It was designed to be the command post of the Chief of Staff and it did direct military operations in the many far flung theaters. It did operate and it was meant to operate.

Was this then not a repudiation of the General Staff concept? The answer which the reorganization gave was "Not necessarily so." When the General Staff must necessarily operate, have it understood that it is to operate and separate operating from planning duties. This was done in the Operations Division by establishing a Policy and Strategy Branch to perform the planning function and an Operations Branch to do the operating. Similarly in the work of military intelligence, the reorganization attempted to distinguish between the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff (the planners and the thinkers) and the Military Intelligence Service, the special operating unit which was to collect, assemble, and otherwise perform the many administrative and operating functions of intelligence.

The reorganization did not follow in every instance the organizational maxim that every subordinate should have one and only one boss. This is perhaps an ideal that can never be achieved in complex organizations. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, reported directly both to the Under Secretary of War and to the Chief of Staff, and this left unsolved the question of where the General Staff stood in supply matters.

The old argument of geographical versus functional jurisdiction also was not settled in certain respects. Thus for defense purposes, the Eastern and Western Defense Command on the East and West Coasts were geographical areas whose commanders reported to the Operations Division. But for training, the air units in these Defense Commands were under the Army Air Forces. Designated ground units were

under the Army Ground Forces for training purposes. At first the Ninth Service Command of the Services of Supply which was within the Western Defense Command, was to all practical purposes under both the Western Defense Command and the the Services of Supply.

The reorganization did attempt to end one long-standing dilemma. On the one hand tactical commanders had long insisted that control of supply and administration was an indispensable part of command. Opposed to this was the belief that when tactical commanders and their staffs took the time to run administrative and supply matters they became so involved that they did not have the time to do their all-important jobs of training and fighting. The Services of Supply sought to answer this dilemma by providing "hotel" service for the air and ground tactical units under a scheme of things in which every supply, administrative and service demand made by a tactical unit would be met immediately and cheerfully.

SUMMARY OF WAR DEPARTMENT 1942 REORGANIZATION

The reorganization of March 9, 1942 can best be summarized by the following statement which General McNarney made before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on March 6, 1942:

"... I might say that this reorganization has been under study for a period of about a year. The Chief of Staff gave considerable thought to the problem and decided that for the purpose of actually winning the war which appeared to be close upon us at that time some reorganization of the staff of the Army was necessary.

* * *

... It was decided that the time had come when a reorganization was necessary, and as a result, this reorganization has now been approved by the President, and is about to go into effect on March 9.

The Chairman. I suggest that you give us briefly a description of the organization. . . .

General McNarney. In starting with the General Staff, I will start with General Marshall himself.

Due to the fact that there were no large responsible subordinate commands to which administrative details could be delegated, the General Staff has had to take onto itself a large number of administrative details during the past years of peace.

These details formerly came up either to the Deputy Chief of Staff, or Chief of Staff for decision. This system resulted in completely overburdening the Chief of Staff and his deputies with decisions on what were relatively minor matters of detail.

With the expansion of the Army, and particularly when he is charged by the Commander in Chief, the President, with the strategic direction of our several overseas forces, it was evident that the Chief of Staff and General Staff should get back to Mr. Root's original conception of the General Staff. General Pershing's general staff was set up along those lines. The Congress itself has stated the duties of such a general staff in the National Defense Act.

The War Department General Staff must be a planning and policy-making Staff. Rather, it must not operate and be bothered by minor details. This reorganization, the basic purpose of this reorganization, is to effect that very thing, by creating three large commands with responsible commanders to which administration and other decisions will be delegated.

The War Department General Staff has been radically reduced in numbers. It will be restricted to policy planning, with only the necessary supervision and inspection. To the three great commands—the Ground Force, the Air Force, and the Service Command—have been delegated the administrative work which was previously referred to the General Staff.

The Army Air Forces, of course, have had a similar organization for the last few months, with General Arnold placed in charge of the Air Forces and given his own staff. It has worked out very well.

We found that General Arnold made many decisions which formerly had to go to the General Staff. However, there was one unfortunate result—we actually had two General Staffs. We had an air staff and a ground staff. The recognized War Department General Staff was purely a ground staff and General Arnold's, the air staff, was concerned with aviation exclusively. In this day of air-ground fighting, two isolated staffs cannot properly provide the commander with the assistance he must have. Furthermore, the Army air forces were still to some extent a stepchild in the War Department. All material decisions made by the General Staff had to be presented to the Chief of Staff. They were worked out by the General Staff which had the ground viewpoint. A change there was indicated.

The several branches in the ground forces were under chiefs of branches who were very keen on the development of the separate arms. They had control over the disposition of their personnel within the Army. They did a very good job. Some may have done their jobs too well. It was felt, to fight this particular war, it was mandatory that the ground arms, themselves, should no longer be separate branches within an army, but should be welded into a combined ground fighting unit. A division is composed of infantry, field artillery, some cavalry (a re-

connaissance outfit), and antiaircraft artillery, which comes from the coast artillery. In order to coordinate their developments and weld them into a coordinated fighting unit, it was felt that their military requirements, that is, their tactical and technical training doctrines, tables of basic allowances, and development of their equipment, the changes in their equipment found necessary in combat, could and should be better coordinated. We believe that the Army ground force command under General McNair will do that very thing.

The great procuring services have been operating directly under the Under Secretary of War. They have been doing very well, but there are large numbers of other services which serve both the ground and the air—distribution of material, traffic movement, procuring ships for overseas movements, procurement of personnel, processing, getting them into the arms and the services—these are all services for both the ground and the air. When we set up two great fighting services, the ground and the air, all of those common services were grouped in a large command and made the responsibility of a single commander. That, in brief, is what we believe we have accomplished.”³

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII

1 From *Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure*; by Major General J. F. C. Fuller.

2. Much of the material in this chapter was written from personal knowledge, conversation with officers, and unpublished material. Documentation is therefore difficult and incomplete.

3. *Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Second Session on S-2092, March 6, 1942*, pp. 1-2.

Chapter IX

War Department And Army Developments During World War II

IT was not expected that the March 1942 reorganization of the War Department would cure all organizational and administrative ills and bring the millennium. What was provided was a structural framework susceptible of wartime development. The Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff had selected key personnel in whom they had confidence who were to remain in the job during the greater part of the war. The "first team" had been selected and it was imperative that signals be worked out which would permit the right men to run with the ball as the play of war dictated.

The new organization encouraged this. It made for flexibility, for within their respective domains the principal commanders were given the green light to go ahead on their own authority and make whatever changes were necessary to meet new conditions. While the organization as prescribed by Circular 59 remained unchanged during the war, the period from 1942 to 1945 was packed with developments, conflicts, and adjustments.

WORLD WAR II JOINT (ARMY AND NAVY) CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

One extremely important area of development was the growth of the Joint (Army and Navy) Chiefs of Staff organization. Although this cannot be correctly described as a War Department development, the relationship was so close and the indirect influences were so great as to require a knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization as an essential preliminary to an understanding of wartime developments in the War Department. Key personnel in the War Department "doubled in brass" in that many officers with specific jobs in the War Department also had duties as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. Much of the planning activity in the War Department was preliminary or subsidiary to planning on the higher Joint Chiefs of Staff level. Likewise, there were many conflicts and changes in the War Department which grew out of or resulted from the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization emerged because some agency of the sort was essential in our dealings with the British—and in determining quickly over-all military policy and strategy. General Marshall accompanied the President in his meetings with the British Prime

Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff in August 1941 and in December 1941 and January 1942. Although admittedly an overstatement, there is a basis for the allegation that the necessity for Allied unity of action and coordination forced the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces to devise a speedier and a more effective means of collaboration. Certain Joint Army-Navy Boards did already exist but they were inadequate.

Curiously, the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff just grew. In recognition perhaps of the delicate situation that arises when jealously guarded prerogatives elbow one another, there was no general understanding on the part of anyone on what constituted the articles of organization or the charter of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was probably better that these were left unsaid or at least unadvertised, and that the organization and procedure were permitted to evolve gradually. At any rate there was a general awareness among those closely interested that in late 1941 and in early 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of Admiral Leahy (Chief of Staff to the President), General Marshall (Chief of Staff of the Army), Admiral King (Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations), and General Arnold (Commanding General, Army Air Forces), had been established to resolve those top military and related political and economic problems of the United States which were matters of joint concern. When the accredited representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff met with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the assembly was called the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Through the medium of weekly meetings (the JCS on Tuesdays and the CCS on Fridays), the Joint Chiefs of Staff in U. S. matters and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Allied business formulated and supervised the execution of plans and policies relating to the following matters: the strategic conduct of the war; the determination of over-all requirements based on approved plans; the need, availability, and assignment of means of transportation; and the allocation of critical means such as munitions, food, raw materials and so forth. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff became planning organizations par excellence. To a marked degree they overshadowed and affected the General Staff and the War Department.

The need for an effective Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was recognized at the outset by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An indication of how important General Marshall considered this was to be found in his sponsorship of General W. B. Smith for Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Smith had been Secretary of the War Department General Staff and in that capacity he had worked more closely with

the Chief of Staff than any other officer. In selecting Smith, it was evident that the Chief of Staff picked an officer he regarded very highly. Admiral King likewise made an able naval officer available for the job of assistant secretary. The Public Health Building across Constitution Avenue from the Munitions Building was made available for offices. In a brief span of time a secretariat was organized.

It must have been apparent from the beginning that a highly formalized procedure was needed to make effective the meetings of the four Chiefs of Staff and to expedite the transaction of business. Thus it was customary for the Joint Secretariat to issue several days before the weekly Tuesday meetings a mimeographed agenda that listed the subjects to be discussed. In order for an item of business to be ready for inclusion in the agenda, it had to be properly presented in the form of a Joint Chief of Staff paper stating "the problem," giving the necessary background under the heading of "discussion," reaching one or a series of "conclusions," and ending with "recommendations." To prepare such papers a number of Joint Committees were needed and so the following were established, not all at the outset but gradually as the need arose, or as work increased to the point where part of the functions of an existing committee was given to a new one:

Joint Strategic Survey Committee	Joint Committee on New
Joint Staff Planners Committee	Weapons and Equipment
Joint Production Survey Committee	Joint Communications Committee
Joint War Plans Committee	Joint Meteorological Committee
Joint Logistics Committee	Army-Navy Petroleum Board
Joint Administrative Committee	Joint Security Control Committee
Munitions Assignment Board	Joint Intelligence Committee
Joint Military Transportation Committee	Joint Post War Committee

Each committee received a formal charter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This prescribed the organization or mission, the membership, the functions and the methods of procedure. Thus, a Joint Chief of Staff committee could have considered a problem and on its own initiative submitted a paper to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When such a paper had been prepared in the standard form, it was given a Joint Chief of Staff number, say JCS 133. The Secretary's office mimeographed a number of copies, all carefully numbered; and established the appropriate security classification, usually "secret"; and might then circulate it by sending copies to those on the appropriate Distribution List. More frequently, General Marshall, Admiral King, or General Arnold would submit a paper which had been prepared in the War Department, Navy

Department, or the Air Forces. Such a paper would be mimeographed and copies distributed as appropriate. The Joint Secretaries might then refer this paper to the appropriate Joint Chief of Staff committee. If the original document had been numbered JCS 222, the committee's report would be numbered JCS 222/1. If the Joint Chiefs were not satisfied with the report they might direct that the paper be returned for further work on the problem. Their comments in such a case would be JCS 222/2, and the further report of the committee would be JCS 222/3. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff disposed of a problem, final action was usually taken through the medium of a letter, a directive, or a radiogram.

When the Chief of Staff attended a Tuesday meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the system was such that he was well advised and prepared on the subjects to be discussed. The agenda giving the subject and the Joint Chiefs of Staff papers with their appropriate numbers had probably reached him on Sunday. In the Office of the Chief of Staff a book had been prepared which contained the agenda, all the pertinent Joint Chiefs of Staff papers, and a brief prepared in the main in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and in part in the Office of the Chief of Staff. The purpose of this brief was to summarize the salient points, to emphasize what the War Department interest was, and to suggest the action to be taken. On Monday the Chief of Staff had the opportunity, if time permitted, to read what was usually a voluminous book. Then on Tuesday morning the Chief of Staff was briefed orally. General Arnold had an advisory council—at one time two officers who were called "the heavenly twins"—to keep him posted. Admiral King, no doubt, had a similar arrangement.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was in effect an extension of the Joint Chiefs of Staff set-up. Thus a British officer served as Deputy Secretary. When he and the American Secretary signed their names to a paper, it became a Combined Chiefs of Staff paper. Most of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committees functioned with the addition of British officers as Combined Chiefs of Staff committees. Allied matters requiring Combined Chiefs of Staff committee reports and Combined Chiefs of Staff action followed generally the procedure described for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the exceptional case it was possible for a question to be acted upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Tuesday, referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday, considered in a Combined Chiefs of Staff in their meeting on Friday. More often, an additional week or two was needed.

In a sense the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff were dependent on the Joint and Combined Committees. In most instances it was the

committee who had done the pioneer work. They had dug out the facts and the background material. They submitted the conclusions and recommendations. And even more important, they wrote the paper and to the extent they unintentionally weighted any aspect of the problem, they conditioned or influenced the Chiefs who often knew a particular problem only from the written report. The individual Chiefs, of course, could and did detect flaws in individual papers. But over a long period of time what the committees served in the way of reports had to be the diet of the Chiefs. The Chiefs' decisions were dependent on the information the committee reports presented, and for this reason the composition of the committees was highly important. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee had senior Army and Navy officers serving full time and with no other duties to distract them. There were also a few other committees whose members were on full-time duty with no other assignments. But the members of most of the committees had other important duties in the Navy or War Department, or in Headquarters, Air Forces.

As an example, the Army members of the Joint Logistics Committee were the key logistics officers in the War Department. The head of the Logistics Group in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, the head of the Plans and Operations Division of Headquarters, Army Services Forces (the Services of Supply), and the key officer on logistical planning in the Army Air Forces, with their counterparts in the Navy Department, made up the Joint Logistics Committee. It was thus possible for these officers, when the need arose for a subcommittee, to staff it with officers who were working on this problem in their jobs in the War and Navy Departments. Likewise, full utilization could be made of information available in the War or Navy Departments. In many instances a vast amount of preliminary work was done within the War and Navy Departments. Normally, this tended to obtain first of all a complete treatment of the problem along comparatively narrow lines. The representative of the supply services (Army Service Forces) could be relied upon to develop his side of the problem; the Army Air Force representative, the air side; and the representative from the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, the operational or strategic aspect. In the Navy Department there was a similar approach. There the air, ground, sea, and supply views were put together and differences reconciled. The point to be emphasized is that this procedure encouraged the adjusting of differences at the lowest level where, by informal methods, the working members could ascertain the views of their respective superiors and then adjust, give way, or compromise. Obviously this was a far better arrangement than processing separate opinions through the staff eche-

lons to the highest level and then making the attempt to achieve agreement after each interested party had taken a firm position.

CONTRAST AND WEAKNESSES OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The organization and methods of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contrasted sharply in several important respects with comparable General Staff views and practice. General Staff theory held that the top planning and coordinating must be done by men who had time to think and who therefore must not be saddled with time-consuming operating and administrative duties. As we have seen, a few of the more important committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were formed of officers who had no other duties. However, most members of Joint Chiefs of Staff committees had other important duties and very often these were of an operational character. So it may be said that in large measure the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee planning was done by a council composed of operators. Such a system had the admitted advantage of bringing into the planning level men who were thoroughly familiar with the problem by virtue of being involved in day to day operations. Likewise, this system made for the elimination of unnecessary echelons in an organization. The two disadvantages of this method of staffing planning bodies were, first, that the planners were apt to be partisan or narrow in their viewpoint, and second, that the demands made by their other duties left too little time for their planning duties, which made for delay or, at the other extreme, hasty deliberation. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized these tendencies was evident from the issuance of the following policies:

"Non-partisanship. Officers on duty with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization are drawn from the several services to assist in integrating the capabilities, functions, and needs of their particular service to the problems presented this organization. Their efforts should be to reach sound solutions to all problems presented by the most effective employment of the joint means at hand. As Staff Officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it is their duty to reach decisions which will best prosecute the war after due consideration has been given to the views of the agencies of the War and Navy Departments interested in the matters under consideration.

Committee members not to be instructed. Committees are required to make solutions of the problems presented after full consideration of all pertinent factors. They should approach the problem with open minds and without firm pre-conceived decisions based on consideration of partial information only. Deliberations and not negotiations are required.

Deliberation cannot ensue if committee members are hampered by instructions or [by] the answers to problems from which they are not permitted to depart.

* * *

Delay. The practice of supporting committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting only on a specified day each week . . . [will] . . . be discontinued. The Chairman of each supporting committee . . . [will] . . . call meetings of his committee as often as the number and nature of the papers awaiting action require."

However, the overwhelming urgency of winning the war was such that there was little unnecessary delay and few instances of crippling partisanship. In a peacetime situation it would be much more difficult to develop true Joint Chiefs of Staff officers under such a committee system. On the contrary, potent influences would emphasize that the committee members were Army, Navy, or air officers, and woe to those who forgot it and became imbued with the general instead of the narrow viewpoint. Before the war, a somewhat similar situation had existed at times in the War Department when an Infantry or Cavalry officer on the General Staff had advocated policies not to the liking of the Office of the Chief of Infantry or Cavalry. However, the opportunities for thus curbing such officers were far fewer under the General Staff set-up than in a committee system.

A further structural weakness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was that it was well devised to foster tendencies to compromise, procrastinate, and straddle. This was not a fault, of course, where the right answer was a compromise. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not equipped or organized to handle a situation where there were sharply divergent views, either of which was preferable from an objective viewpoint to any solution that tried to scramble irreconcilables. In wartime, questions had to be settled; in peacetime, difficult problems would tend to remain unanswered.

In emphasizing formal reports, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization pursued an understandably opposite policy from the General Staff. Instructions issued at the time of the 1942 War Department reorganization laid emphasis on dealings by word of mouth and by phone, and on using the conference method rather than detailed written staff studies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was accordingly sometimes referred to as a "paper factory" for the volume of Joint Chiefs of Staff papers grew voluminous. But the General Staff could take informal action because of the authority delegated to the five Assistant Chiefs of Staff. In the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization there was no authority

to give orders below the top. Consequently, everything had to be written for the record. This was necessary and understandable. The Secretariat did develop an expeditious and efficient system for the preparation, coordination, distribution, follow-up and filing of all Joint Chiefs of Staff papers.

EFFECT OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

The status of the War Department General Staff was materially affected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. It was probably inevitable that General Staff planning would become subordinated to a secondary role and that is what happened. One of the objects of the War Department reorganization had been to put enough air officers on the General Staff to make it an effective planning and coordinating medium in air-ground matters. General Arnold's position as one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tended to by-pass all of the more important air policy questions around the General Staff directly into the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee channels. The necessity of keeping down the size of the different Joint Chiefs of Staff committees reduced their General Staff membership. It was not desirable to have a Joint Committee of more than four or six because this would mean that the Combined Committee would number eight or twelve. Consequently there were normally two or three Army members and an equal number of Navy members on the Joint Committees. It was always difficult to determine from what organization in the War Department the Army members should be selected. Very often it was desirable to designate one officer from the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, one from the Air Forces, and one from the Services of Supply, as the three Army members. In some cases no other arrangement could have worked satisfactorily. But this practice not only removed all members of the War Department General Staff except those in the Operations Division from the picture, but it tended to lower the position and usefulness of the General Staff. With no representative on the Joint Logistics Committee the Supply Division of the General Staff was handicapped. The necessary restriction on the size of committees resulted in making the Operations Division the only effective and in-the-know division of the General Staff. Some took the extreme view of insisting that the Operations Division had become the complete General Staff for the ground forces only, with the other General Staff sections dying on the vine, and that this resulted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization becoming in effect the General Staff which planned and coordinated basic air-ground-supply matters.

While the General Staff was thus affected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff development, the growth of the staffs of the three major commands (Ground, Air and Service Forces) also had their influence. As was intended, the staffs of the three major commands took over many duties which had previously been performed by the General Staff. The staffs of the three major commands were General Staffs for their commanders. Starting out afresh, changing as the situation required, and using personnel that had few preconceived ideas about General Staff policy or procedure, these new staffs had a development that cannot be ignored. In particular, the thinking and the changes in the Air Staff and in the Services of Supply Staff were important because they questioned or confirmed parts of General Staff doctrines and illustrated many organizational principles.

WORLD WAR II ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS ARMY GROUND FORCES

The Army Ground Forces made few innovations of organization or administration. The organization chart for the Army Ground Forces at the time of the March 1942 reorganization was included in Circular 59. At that time the Army Ground Forces planned to distinguish between a *policy* staff (Plans, G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4) and an *operating* staff with sections for Personnel, Operations, Training, Requirements, Transportation, Construction, Hospitalization and Evacuation, and Supply. The Special Staff included sections for the Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, Adjutant General, and Budget. There were thus five policy and planning sections, eight operating sections, and four special staff sections. The method of operation and coordination was prescribed in the Army Ground Force memorandum of March 9, 1942, on organization and operational procedure as follows:

"Relation of General and Operating Staffs.

a. The General Staff, under direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, will prepare plans and establish policies pertaining to the organization, equipping and training of the ground forces. It will not become involved in operational matters but will, for planning and policy-making purposes only, exercise supervision over operating divisions as follows:

G-1	Personnel
G-3	Training
	Operations
G-3 and/or G-4	Requirements

G-4

Transportation
Construction
Hospitalization and Evacuation
Supply

b. Each division of the Operating Staff will take final action on matters pertaining to it, in accordance with policies established by the General Staff. The necessary coordination between operating divisions will be informal and direct, without reference to the General Staff. Operating divisions will also deal directly with appropriate agencies of the Army Air Forces and the Services of Supply. Matters will be referred to the appropriate general staff section(s) only in case of disagreement or if a question of policy arises. Chiefs of operating divisions, however, will keep the chiefs of appropriate general staff sections informed of important matters handled directly by their divisions.

* * *

Administrative Activities.

All elements of this command will comply with the provisions of paragraph 5c (14) and (15), Circular No. 59, War Department, March 2, 1942. It is intended that subordinate administrative agencies of this command, such as an Army, will deal directly with appropriate supply and administrative agencies in the Services of Supply in connection with routine matters, thus by-passing this headquarters in the great majority of supply and administrative activities. Only in exceptional cases where action by this headquarters is deemed necessary to obtain the supplies or services required, will such matters be submitted to this headquarters."

A year and a half later, the Army Ground Forces had returned to the general and special staff system existing in the War Department prior to the reorganization. The October 1943 organization chart of the Army Ground Forces appears on page 407. Under this organization the Army Ground Forces had what could properly be designated as six general staff sections and nine special staff sections. The ground policy and operating staff sections existing in March 1942 had either been consolidated or made into special staff sections. Thus the Ground G-1 and the Ground Personnel Sections were consolidated, as were the Ground G-3 section, the Operation, and Training sections, all of which became the G-3 section for Operations and Training. The Hospitalization and Evacuation Section, which had been listed on the operating staff, became the Ground Medical Section under the Ground Surgeon, a member of the special staff.

Why did the Army Ground Forces return to what was in general the

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY GROUND FORCES - OCTOBER 1943




CHART 17

prewar organizational setup? Possibly there were a number of reasons, but logically there was one important circumstance which must have determined the matter. Armies, army corps, and divisions had all retained a headquarters organization which, with a few changes, dated back to World War I. They all had a general staff of the conventional form (G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4) and a special staff consisting of the supply and administrative services (sections for the Adjutant General, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Surgeon, Engineer, Signal, Finance, and Chemical). Army Ground Forces Headquarters dealt with the various headquarters of the armies and it was confusing to have staff sections that did not correspond. Either the headquarters organization of the major tactical units should have been changed to conform to the Army Ground Forces Headquarters organization, or the Army Ground Forces should change its headquarters organization. The second was much the simpler and was done. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this change back to the old is not that the new form was defective but rather that the new must have been extended down into the major tactical units in order for it to work in the Army Ground Forces Headquarters.

The other developments in the Army Ground Forces were minor ones. The Public Relations section was renamed the Ground Information Technical Section. A Ground Historical Section was added in response to War Department instructions. The work of the Ground Statistical Section and the Ground Requirements Section represented new and important developments.

The Army Ground Forces field organization was functional in type with the tactical units organized into four field armies, each reporting to Army Ground Force Headquarters on training matters. The armies happened to occupy fairly compact and distinct geographical areas, but organization by geographical areas was not followed nor did the Army Ground Forces consider it a determining factor of organization. The Replacement and School Command, the Antiaircraft Command, the Armored Command, the Tank Destroyer Center, and the Airborne Command also were organized to perform special training functions.

On the question of whether supply and service functions could be divorced from command and training responsibilities, the Army Ground Forces view was that it could be done and that it was being done satisfactorily in practice. At least this was the view of General McNair and General Lear while they were in command.

Because of the singleness of purpose in their concentration on training there was some criticism of Headquarters Army Ground Forces on the basis of comparisons with the other two major commands, especially

the Air Forces. It was sometimes argued that the Ground Forces should have taken the same interest in the overseas forces in action that the Army Air Forces showed. The extreme view was that the War Department General Staff was actually the Ground Force general staff and that the other two commands had the equivalent of both the Ground Forces staff and the War Department General Staff.

WORLD WAR II ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES


The organizational experience of the Army Air Forces during World War II was unique and comparable only to Air Forces development in general. Reorganizations and personnel changes followed one another at such speed as to cause mingled feelings of astonishment, amazement, and admiration both on the part of observers and members of the organization itself. Fortunately, there were a few key officers on the top level who stayed there for long periods and also a number of junior officers who were similarly permanent fixtures and who continued to do their same work in the same way no matter how or how often they were reorganized.

There were several important distinguishing characteristics in the Air Forces organization. The Air Forces reorganization of March 9, 1942, was a merger of two essentially different types of organization—the Air Force Combat Command and the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. The consolidation raised again the old problem of the command type of organization versus the supply bureau structure. It was typical of what had always been one of the chronic War Department-Army organization problems. The new Army Air Forces organization seemed in theory to be a command type of organization, but in practice it continued to be a compromise. In the command type of organization, the flow of authority and responsibility was from the commander of the higher echelon to the commander of the lower echelon. Each had the usual general and special staff organization. Thus under the new organization General Arnold held the four Air Forces commanders responsible for all matters pertaining to the tactical units under their command. Each Air Force contained heavy bombardment units, fighter groups and other types of units. So the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces had to have some staff section to advise him as to what instructions should be issued in his name and as to how well the over-all program was going. But this staff section was not primarily responsible; the Air Forces commanders and subordinate commanders had that responsibility. Under the bureau type of organization an operating section of the Washington top office actually operated and was responsible for all the field agencies and activities in a specific area of activity.

As an example of this, the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps had always had as one of its principal activities a Materiel Division. The Chief of this division had the title of Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, and he was not only the staff advisor but also he was the responsible head who operated all the materiel and supply activities—at the Wright Field (Ohio) center of the Materiel Division and everywhere else. In the 1942 reorganization the Chief of the Materiel Division became the Commanding General of the Materiel Command, but he retained his Washington headquarters and continued to operate in much the same fashion as he had when his division was a part of the Office, Chief of Air Corps bureau organization. This transmutation from bureau type to command type of organization worked satisfactorily for materiel, but in other instances it did not work and complications arose.

DIRECTORATE SYSTEM OF ARMY AIR FORCES

The directorate system was the device used to place in a command type organization agencies to handle questions previously taken care of by sections in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. The March 1942 Air Force organization charts emphasized that the air policy staff was composed of A-1 (Personnel), A-2 (Intelligence), A-3 (Training), A-4 (Supply), and Plans. Then there were operating staff sections headed by Directors (Director of Military Requirements, Director of Air Defense, Director of Bombardment, Director of Ground Support, Director of Base Services, Director of War Organization and Movement, Director of Individual Training, Director of Technical Services, Director of Communications, Director of Weather, Director of Traffic Control and Regulations, Director of Photography, Director of Technical Inspection, Director of Personnel, Director of Management Control, Director of Organization Planning, Director of Statistical Control, and Director of Legislative Planning). There were thus eighteen directors although they were grouped under three main divisions. (See organization chart—Circular 59, page 379). Then in addition to the four air forces and their subordinate commands, there were the Technical Training Command, the Flying Training Command, the Proving Ground Command, the Communications Command, the Weather Command, the Materiel Command, the Air Service Command, and the Ferry Command, all of which had commanding generals who under the command type of organization were responsible directly to the Commanding General of the Air Forces and not to any subordinate staff section of headquarters of the Army Air Forces. This point was thoroughly understood by the field commanders; it was not so well recognized by the officers in the various offices of the Di-



rectors but this was not entirely their fault. If, for example, something went wrong in the program for heavy bombardment units, General Arnold wanted to call in the officer whom he could hold responsible. Personnel, training, and supply policies might all be involved, so neither A-1, A-3, nor A-4 could be held responsible. The four Air Force commanders could be held responsible but could claim that they had merely carried out instructions. As a result of this situation it was the Director of Bombardment who became responsible for the heavy bomber program in all its phases. This tended to make him operate under the bureau type of organization as it had functioned in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps. He had to issue instructions and he did this directly to the bomber units affected. So did all the other seventeen directors and there were instances of conflicting instructions. The field commanders and their staffs promptly raised the question of command responsibility; were they responsible or were the directors responsible?

Too often, there was no understanding on the part of various officers as to whether they were functioning in a staff section operating under the command theory or working in a responsible operating section under a bureau organization. If the command structure was to be used, then there was need for a more effective top level command office to weigh staff advice against advice from field commanders and then make decisions. If the bureau organization was to be followed, agencies in the field needed to be segregated so that appropriate field activities knew they were subordinate to and responsible to the appropriate bureau section chiefs in Washington.

The directorate system did not work out in the way in which it was intended. The theory was that a specialist was needed in each of the many fields of Air Force activity. He would concentrate in his field of interest and would follow matters of design, personnel and training policies, and supply, and everything else that affected his specialty. Actually, the duties of these directors were analogous to those of the former chiefs of arms, such as the Chiefs of Infantry and Field Artillery, whose positions were abolished as obsolete in the 1942 War Department reorganization. There was a need for such specialists in a staff advisory capacity, but when they became operators they cut across the normal division of staff duties and their activities confused the issue of command responsibility and authority. Had the Chiefs of the Ground Arms who were eliminated in the reorganization and the Air Forces Directors been designated as Inspector of Infantry or Inspector of Air Defense, this type of organization might have continued to serve a useful purpose. The clash between bureau type and command type organization in the Air Force was abated with the elimination of the Directors. The

consolidation and rearrangement of Air Staff duties effected by October 1943 is shown on page 411. This was a step toward the return to the conventional general and staff set-up and later reorganizations continued in that direction.

The directorate system was established at a time when, figuratively speaking, it was necessary for a number of individuals to run with the ball. The Air Force was expanding very rapidly in all its diverse fields. It was a time of great change. The Directors did contribute some confusion through issuing to field commanders many directives and instructions that sometimes appeared to be conflicting. Nevertheless, the Directors performed extremely valuable services at a time when their particular contribution was indispensable. It was unfortunate that the situation required operational activities from staff advisors and thereby precipitated their complete elimination.

In planning and, in particular, in the presentation of planning data the Army Air Force experience and development included much of interest to General Staff planners. A unit whose sole duty was planning had been established in the early 30's in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. There had been some criticism of this planning unit by other staff sections who complained that it dabbled into matters which were the business of other sections. Nevertheless, the Air Forces continued to have a Plans Section and considerable importance was attached to its work. The Air Force reorganization of March 1942 emphasized the distinction between the planning and policy staff on the one hand and the operating staff on the other. Thus an A-1 was charged with the formulation of personnel plans and policies while the Director of Personnel headed the operating agency for personnel matters. In the October 1943 organization of the Air Forces these two sections were combined under an Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel who had a separate Plans Section along with several operating sections in his organization. A similar change was made in all other instances where separate staff sections for planning and operating had been established. From the Air Force experience it could be argued that the War Department General Staff personnel, intelligence, training and supply division should engage in a certain amount of operating work, but that in so doing they should establish a small sub-section exclusively for planning.

AIR FORCES PLANNING AND PROGRAM PLANNING

Under the reorganization the mission of Headquarters Army Air Forces had been restricted to supply and training activities, and in recognition of this what had been the War Plans Section became the Plans Section. Nevertheless, because of General Arnold's position on the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Plans Section did continue to concentrate on matters of strategy and operation planning. Its role in this field was made legitimate when General Arnold took direct charge of the very long range bombardment air force. In their planning for strategic bombing and in the preparation of target folders, the Army Air Forces both in Washington and in the field produced planning documents that could well be used as models by other planning agencies. Possibly because there were necessarily so few Regular Army Air Force officers engaged in the planning, the presentation of Air Force planning took on an advertising aspect. War Department General Staff studies in the pre-World-War-II days were usually stuffy documents, lengthy, formal, and without illustration. Frequently, the Air Force plans were presented with all the advertising and selling technique of industry. A good illustration of this was the Air Force folder on Strategic Air Objectives Pre- and Post-Operations Analysis prepared in May 1944.

Of particular interest, also, was the Air Forces activity in program planning. This illustrated an effective control and coordinating technique which was essential but which for many reasons was exceedingly difficult to develop and use. Beginning with their 1938 expansion, the Air Corps had recognized the necessity for developing a technique that would reveal how plans were being fulfilled, where bottlenecks were developing, and where phases in the program were not meshing. As the Air Forces continued its war expansion and as the Air Staff grew larger and larger, it became increasingly difficult to keep the air program in balance and in mesh. Individual initiative was praiseworthy but the resulting action could raise havoc with a coordinated program. Many times the information was not available so that individuals did not know the consequences of their actions on a coordinated program.

The Plans Division of the Air Staff had always claimed that program control was their job. Nevertheless, an Assistant Chief of Staff for Program Control was created in the summer of 1942. In March 1943 this position was eliminated and the work was given to a section in the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations, Commitments, and Requirements. In December of 1943, Dr. E. P. Learned of the Harvard Business School became the Advisor for Program Control, and it was his work that finally developed program control into an effective technique.

Practically all of the Air Staff divisions had some part and responsibility in the programming function. Thus, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, prepared studies concerning objectives and means (except logistical support) by which proposed Army Air Forces operational plans could be accomplished; established the basis for, and

monitored, the preparation of logistical plans for the AAF; formulated future strategical and operational plans for the AAF, as contemplated by decisions of higher authority; and collaborated with other AAF agencies in the formulation of AAF plans and program objectives and revisions thereto. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments and Requirements, translated approved AAF plans into an integrated AAF program with over-all schedules and priorities for the procurement of plans, equipment and crews. Current checks of progress under approved schedules were made, and necessary action was initiated to prevent or correct deficiencies. This office, further, established unit requirements of organization, personnel, training, and materiel to meet approved AAF plans, and obtained reports of projected availability and balanced the requirements against them; scheduled preparations of units for theater assignment and reassignment, and directed the movement of these units; made block allocations of aircraft and trained crews; and authorized for the Army Air Forces the issuance of orders for the activation and movement of units and crews.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, planned, established policies for, and supervised the military personnel program, civilian personnel program, civilian training program (except flying training), special services program, air chaplain program, air WAC program, ground safety program, and the personal affairs program for the AAF; and collaborated with other offices of the Air Staff and War Department and with other Governmental agencies in establishing and insuring the accomplishment of the AAF personnel programs and policies.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training, established schedules, policies, standards, and doctrines required for the training of individuals and units to attain approved AAF programs.

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Services, established logistical policies, plans and programs for research and developmental engineering; procurement, production and modification; industrial resources and contract termination; supply, including quantitative requirements, receipt, storage, issue, stock control, reclamation, salvage and disposal; equipment and installation maintenance; traffic and transportation; installation requirements, acquisition, construction, assignment and reassignment; and requirements of service units. This office also collaborated with other offices of the Air Staff and maintained necessary liaison with War Department and other governmental and Washington agencies in establishing and insuring the accomplishment of AAF logistical programs and policies.

ARMY AIR FORCES PROGRAM CONTROL OFFICE

When the Program Control Office was established, the purpose was to have an agency that was not concerned with operation but with review and control. Its principal responsibility was to review continuously and recommend the action necessary for the over-all balanced control of the AAF program so as to insure a coordinated flow of aircraft, equipment, and trained personnel to meet commitments. It involved the coordination of the activities of other offices with operating responsibilities. This office recommended to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments and Requirements, the approval, disapproval, or adjustment of proposals that would effect a change in approved AAF programs. It also recommended to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments and Requirements, action to reconcile conflicts in quantitative requirements in order to fulfill commitments of highest priority and keep programs within the limits of the authorized Troop Basis.

The Office of Advisor for Program Control was organized to provide an Aircraft and Crew Section, a Training Section, a Personnel and Manpower Section, a Supply Section, an Administrative and Research Section, a Standards and Factors Section, and an Executive Office. The Executive Office maintained general supervision of the office and negotiated with members of the Air Staff. The Advisor for Program Control attended all Air Staff meetings. The Aircraft and Crew Section was concerned with the unit and replacement aircraft and crew programs and cooperated with the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Services, with the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training, and with various divisions within the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments and Requirements to bring about coordinated staff work on these items. Recommendations for aircraft cutbacks originated in this section and were presented to the Aircraft Requirements Board. This section was particularly charged with studying trends of losses as revealed in the reports of the Statistical Control System. It recommended adjustments in the planning factors to give effect to these trends. The Personnel and Manpower Section worked with the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, on personnel program matters, and with the Manpower Division of the Management Control Staff on the Zone of Interior manning requirements against scheduled program. Since there was a tendency in the Air Staff to create desirable requirements for units and training, the implementation of which might more than exhaust allowances of bodies in the Troop Basis, this section was constantly faced with the task of trying to eliminate or reduce some requirements so that higher priority requirements might be honored. The Training Section

worked particularly closely with the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training, to see that approved programs were followed through and to recommend changes in the training program in case it became out of balance. This section and the Personnel and Manpower Section worked with the Troop Basis Division in the determination of student population requirements. The Supply Section was chiefly charged with furnishing sound program information to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel and Services, for transmission to the Air Technical Service Command so that the Army Supply Program would be founded on solid facts. This section also, with the intermittent cooperation of the Statistical Control Division, made studies designed to forecast program requirements for important items of supply such as gasoline and engines. The Administrative and Research Section collected and distributed program information, and in cooperation with the Division of Statistical Control published monthly program books on units, aircraft, and crews, and special studies on training programs and Zone of Interior manpower requirements. The Research staff participated in the preparation of staff studies on the program. The Standards and Factors Section, assisted by the Division of Statistical Control, analyzed staff planning factors and operating trends in order to make recommendations regarding indicated adjustments.

Probably the most difficult task which the Program Control office had was to prepare and present all this basic data in a way that it could be readily understood. It had to have all the information that the Air Forces Statistical Control System collected. It had to secure from each of the many staff divisions a detailed computation of what was required and when it was needed to complement future plans. Forecasts of losses had to be made and later these had to be checked against actual losses. All this data was provided in book and in graphical form. On the basis of this information the air program could be coordinated. In addition, the data could be summoned to show that some new program could not be launched without vitally delaying some project already on the way, or that an increase of air units for a planned operation could not be accomplished because it required implementing actions that should have been taken weeks previously. The Army Air Forces Program Control organization provided an effective control technique and it became an indispensable instrument in the command process.

AIR FORCES STATISTICAL CONTROL SYSTEM

The Air Forces Statistical Control System provided the basic data without which program control could not have functioned. Statistical Control provided the basic information; program control took this infor-

mation, added to it planning data, forecasts, and other staff data, and then interpreted the whole as a basis for necessary command decisions. Statistical Control could not very well have engaged in the analysis of its data for that would have destroyed its usefulness as an objective reporting agency. Statistical Control was started to obtain authoritative information and to put an end to conflicting data. In the days of the Office of the Chief of Air Corps, Air Forces Combat Command, and Headquarters, Army Air Forces, each agency had its own small statistical section. Lack of common definitions and different interpretations resulted in as many different sets of figures as there were statistical sections. At the time of the 1942 reorganization these statistical units were consolidated under the Director of Statistical Planning, who worked under the direction of the Director of Management Control. The Director of Statistical Planning was given the following mission:

- (1) Conduct continuous studies of Army Air Forces statistical requirements and devise methods for meeting these requirements.

- (2) Develop and maintain a reporting system to keep headquarters offices continuously informed on the status of Air Forces units.

- (3) Develop and maintain a statistical system for the scheduling and reporting in summary form of personnel recruitment, personnel training, and material production.

- (4) Coordination of all machine tabulation installations in the Army Air Forces.

- (5) Provide machine tabulation and other statistical services for all subdivisions of the Army Air Forces located at headquarters.

In carrying out this mission the Statistical Control System built up a worldwide reporting system. Standard reports on aircraft, equipment, supplies, training, operations, housing, and personnel were inaugurated. The reporting system was such that action could be taken by each echelon of command as the data flowed upward to Headquarters, Army Air Forces.

The concept of a single centralized statistical agency responsible for these over-all activities was new to the Air Forces in March of 1942, and required the discontinuance of the previous system of direct contact between staff office and field activities on reporting matters. At that time there existed numerous unrelated reports, many of which contained duplicate information and which did not give the type of control information needed. Most reports were designed by separate headquarters offices largely for their own purposes and therefore did not provide for over-all informational needs. These types of reports were perhaps adequate for the small pre-war Air Forces, but completely inadequate for coping with and controlling the program of the wartime expansion of

the Army Air Forces. The following basic reporting policies were therefore established:

(a) A limited number of integrated reports would be developed which could be prepared from basic records maintained by preparing organizations.

(b) The over-all needs for data on any major activity would be provided for in a single comprehensive report on the subject. Needs of all offices in AAF headquarters and of echelons in the field would be served through the availability of identical information as it passes through the chain of command.

(c) Reports would not be initiated unless a proven need existed and it could be shown that the information was required for action and planning purposes.

(d) Reports would continually be surveyed and studied in order to eliminate those of a duplicate and obsolete nature.

(e) Reports to be received by AAF headquarters would contain a minimum of summary information essential to the proper control and future planning at this level. Detailed information on any subject would be currently maintained at command level and secured as a special report when necessary.

Using the above general ground rules as a guide, the first standard report of statistical control was initiated during March of 1942. It covered personnel, and was typical of the standard reports initiated shortly afterward on aircraft, equipment, supplies, training, operations and housing.

The Personnel report, identified as AAF Form 127, was developed to fulfill the needs for information on personnel strength, by military occupational specialty and by grade for each organization under the jurisdiction of the Army Air Forces. The report included the number within each specialty authorized for the preparing organization, the number with each specialty actually assigned to the organization, the number assigned to duties other than those in which they were basically classified, and the number short or surplus in each specialty. The section of the report on grades provided a distribution of authorized and assigned personnel by Arm or Service by grade. There was additional space on the report forms for use by each command in obtaining additional related information required at its level, but not required in Headquarters AAF. Prior to the initiation of the 127 Report, meetings were held with interested staff offices and field commands to determine the needs for this type of information and the action to be taken upon its receipt. The reports were prepared by all AAF organizations to which personnel were assigned, the original of the report was sent directly to the command

headquarters, and exact copies were dispatched simultaneously to intermediate echelons of command. Summaries of the reports submitted by the preparing organizations were consolidated at command headquarters by means of mechanical equipment in the Statistical Control organization, and a summary report for the command was transmitted to the Statistical Control Division over teletypewriter lines in the continental United States and by Air Mail from overseas Air Forces. Reports were prepared monthly. Thus, all echelons of command got an exact copy of the status report of the organizations for which they were responsible and AAF headquarters received summary control information.

The following action was taken upon receipt of the Personnel Report at various echelons:

(a) The echelon next higher than the preparing organizations (the Wing over several Groups) reviewed the reports to determine the status of shortages or surpluses by specialty. Transfers of specialists between organizations under its jurisdiction were made where surpluses and corresponding shortages existed. Wrong assignment of specialists within each reporting organization was corrected and the effect of current critical shortages on unit training was reported to higher headquarters.

(b) A similar procedure was followed by the next higher echelon.

(c) At command headquarters (headquarters of the Second Air Force, for example) over-all action was taken to adjust and control wrong personnel distribution and assignment between all types of organizations within the command. In addition, personnel initially made available to the command through the action of Headquarters Army Air Forces were assigned by that headquarters to the organizations in which the most critical shortages by appropriate specialty existed. Special studies of grade levels by specialty, experience levels by specialty, relative intelligence ratios based on AGCT scores, and many other related personnel analyses were prepared for command use by the Statistical Control organization thereat for the purpose of improving personnel use, distribution, and efficiency within that command.

(d) At Headquarters AAF several staff offices acted to carry out their respective responsibilities based upon data presented according to their particular needs by Statistical Control Division.

(1) The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Personnel, having been furnished control reports showing the personnel position by specialty and grade for each command, arranged for the transfer of specialists surplus in one command to a command having corresponding shortages; allocated the output of flying and technical training schools to commands requiring such specialists; scheduled the inflow of recruits to bal-

ance with training requirements; and filled requisitions for filler and replacement personnel submitted by overseas theaters.

(2) The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Training, having been provided with information and studies needed to establish controls over rates of training by specialty in the flying and technical training schools, evaluated the progress of training in the continental Air Forces and Training Command; adjusted out-of-balance situations; scheduled input into particular types of training; and balanced individual training courses and unit training based upon action operating requirements reported in the 127 report.

(3) The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Operations, Commitments and Requirements, also having been supplied data and studies with which to determine the position of the Army Air Forces in relation to the AAF Troop Basis, established checks and controls for scheduled additions to or eliminations from the Troop Basis; initiated corrective action where integral parts of the Troop Basis had been exceeded; and projected the AAF Personnel Program.

(4) The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Materiel and Services was supplied with information on which individual and unit requirements for supplies and equipment could be planned and procured and base facilities for personnel and units measured and projected.

(5) Management Control, Manpower Division, was furnished with reports showing the functional distribution of personnel within each continental command for use in regulating the authorizations for permanent party activities and to establish experience yardsticks for various types of personnel requirements.

(6) Agencies of the War Department were provided with control reports of the kinds needed by them to prepare reports of the personnel situation for the Army as a whole. Such reports varied from summaries by command, Arm or Service, and grade for The Adjutant General to reports prepared by functional activity of the AAF for the War Department Manpower Board, and reports indicating the position of the AAF in relation to its Table of Organization and Troop Basis authorizations for the War Department Strength Accounting and Reporting Office.

In addition to the recurring control reports and special data prepared by the Statistical Control Division for staff offices on personnel, many special studies and analyses were made to aid in establishing new policies and controlling special features of the AAF Personnel Program. The following were typical:

(a) Analysis of aircrew and ground personnel returned from overseas to determine re-use factors by specialty.

(b) Analysis of distribution of personnel and organizations by func-

tional category by Air Force and Command within the AAF Troop Basis.

(c) Analysis of combat crew and ground casualties by cause and by theater for all AAF personnel.

(d) Analysis of grade distribution within the various specialties by Command and by Theater.

(e) Analysis of upgrading by specialty to determine in-unit training requirements.

(f) Analysis of elimination rates in flying and technical training courses to determine revised training rates.

(g) Analysis of discrepancies between AAF Personnel Program and current status to determine the type of remedial action necessary.

The operation of the Personnel reporting system and the action taken by each echelon of command in connection with the flow of facts in its own echelon was typical of every other standard report included in the statistical control system. Inasmuch as each basic report included enough information to fill the needs of all echelons, action could be taken upon receipt of each particular type of report and controls could be established and plans developed at each level upon the basis of the same set of facts.

There were two main problems that continually occupied the attention of the Director of Statistical Control. In order to provide one authoritative set of figures the reporting system had to provide for the different needs within the different echelons of subordinate commands and at the same time furnish the over-all consolidated data needed at headquarters of the Army Air Forces. Complicating this first task was the further requirement that the data be timely and consistent. By the end of the war the Statistical Control System had been developed to the point where the Army Air Forces had the most complete and timely reporting system in the War Department and in the Army.

Under the sponsorship of both the Assistant Secretary of War for Air and the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces the development of organizational planning, procedural analysis, and management control technique was emphasized late in 1941. Before the Office of the Chief of Air Corps was abolished a section for Administrative Planning and Coordination had been established, and from this seed there grew the office of Management Control which was established in the 1942 reorganization. Under General B. E. Gates this office exercised an important influence on Air Force organizational and procedural developments. He recruited a large staff of civilian expert consultants and officers whose previous civilian experience had included management work.

A considerable difference of opinion existed in the Air Forces as to the need and value of the Management Control organization, but there is no question but that it did make an important contribution. Perhaps

because there was so much to be done, it was difficult to appreciate what had been accomplished. The Air Forces were continually undergoing new reorganizations and there were many other officers and agencies who dabbled in the business of reorganization and who were unwilling to recognize that the Management Control office had any special competence. At any event, the office of Management Control was emasculated before the end of the war. It did meet a vital need; it merited top level support; its work required a "passion for anonymity" from within the office and a sympathetic understanding and appreciation from other staff divisions. Needless to say, not all of these conditions existed. The work of the Management Control Division did force other staff sections of the Air Force and divisions of the War Department General Staff and the two other major commands to take note of their work and methods. They were, therefore, a very healthy influence.

AIR FORCES AND THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

The Air Forces never achieved any well defined or commonly accepted solution for the relationship between tactical units on the one hand and supply and maintenance facilities on the other. Likewise there was no geographically decentralized responsibility for the coordination of the many air installations of various kinds which were all located in a given area. In the 1942 reorganization the Air Forces did not follow the Army Ground Force practice of having the Services of Supply perform all the housekeeping functions at Army posts and camps. Air Forces facilities became exempted stations under Air Force command. The reason for this was the Air Force view that the air tactical commander must command the air base with all its facilities. Strangely enough, within the Army Air Forces there was a pronounced tendency and considerable support for the separation of Air Force maintenance, depot, and supply activity from the tactical unit. The Air Service Command followed a pattern not dissimilar to the Army Service Forces organization of the nine Service Commands.

Probably because the Air Forces objected to any geographical grouping of air units with other Army installations, they were unable to devise any acceptable pattern for the control of diverse air units and facilities in any area. This was a need which remained unfilled.

Organization of Air Force units remained fluid. The Air Forces commonly borrowed the conventional Army organization and applied it or modified it to suit Air Forces special needs. With the rapid expansion of the Air Forces many officers reached positions of authority who had had little contact with the ground or service elements of the Army. They naturally drew on their civilian experience when organizational or




CHART 19

administrative questions arose. There was likewise the incentive to make the Air Forces fully independent and self-sufficient. This meant that the supply services should be integrated into the Air Force organization structure. On page 424 is an organization chart illustrating one method of accomplishing this integration. It is of interest because it abandoned the concept of a general and special staff organization and substituted a Directorate system of departmentalization.

WORLD WAR II ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY (ARMY SERVICE FORCES)

The wartime development of the Services of Supply (which was soon renamed the Army Service Forces) impinged on both the General Staff and the other major commands. The organization problems of the Army Service Forces arising out of the 1942 reorganization were admittedly the most complex of all. This was recognized by General Somervell, and he not only gave these problems much of his personal attention but he established and supported a Control Division which was established to handle organizational and procedural questions.

When the Services of Supply was established in March 1942, it was recognized that there was both a short-term and a long-term organizational problem. Into the initial SOS organization had been put every office and activity that was left over after the General Staff and the other two major commands (Ground and Air Forces) had determined their organizational structure. The concept had been to integrate the supply and administrative services. The far-flung field activities of the supply services were such that any drastic change in them would require a very considerable period of time. Thus the initial organization was essentially a catch-all and the span of control of the Commanding General was over thirty. The long-term objective was to shift activities into a functional type of organization but this was never achieved.

Because the 1942 reorganization did not pretend to solve the Services of Supply organization problem, and because there was so much continuing organizational work to do after the reorganization, the activities of the ASF Control Division were particularly important. The Army Service Forces organization manual, M-301 of July 1943, prescribed the following mission, organization, and functions for the Control Division:

"Mission.—(1) To gather, analyze, and evaluate data regarding the efficiency of the operations of all elements of the Army Service Forces;

(2) To recommend changes of existing policies, organization, procedures, and methods in situations requiring corrective action;

(3) To supervise statistical and reporting procedures within the

Army Service Forces and to prepare or supervise the preparation of statistical reports on the operations of the Army Service Forces.

Major functions.—The Control Division performs the following functions:

(1) Maintains constant review of the organization and activities of the Army Service Forces, conducts specific surveys in fields requiring corrective action, and makes recommendations in regard thereto.

(2) Where appropriate, recommends new general administrative or organizational policies or procedures for, or changes of existing policies of, the Army Service Forces.

(3) Acts as staff agency over the execution of control functions throughout the Army Service Forces.

(4) Supervises and coordinates statistical and reporting systems and methods of the Army Service Forces, including clearance of certain recurring reports.

Organization.—(1) The *Control Division* consists of the Administrative Management Branch, the Statistics and Progress Branch, the Office Service Section, and Special Advisors as designated from time to time.

(2) The *Administrative Management Branch*:

(a) Where appropriate, recommends new general administrative or organizational policies or procedures for the Army Service Forces or changes therein, which are not the subject of consideration by another branch of the Division.

(b) Recommends changes in the over-all organization of the Army Service Forces; evaluates and makes recommendations in respect to proposed organizational changes within the Army Service Forces, including the organization of Service Commands; maintains the Army Service Forces Organizational Manual.

(c) Acts in an advisory and service capacity to other branches of the Division on problems of organization.

(d) Where appropriate, works with outside agencies to improve relationships between the Army Service Forces and those agencies.

(e) Maintains a record of the progress of the work of the Control Division.

(f) Acts as a staff agency over the execution of control functions throughout the Army Service Forces; advises and services control offices throughout the Army Service Forces on organization, plans, programs, and the recruiting of personnel for such offices.

(g) Develops control techniques and prepares literature on control work.

(h) Coordinates the preparation of a history of the Army Service Forces; prepares reports of an historical or generally informative nature.

(i) Maintains a pool of general survey personnel for assignment to the Special Advisors of the Division.

(j) Provides for the training of new personnel for the Division and of personnel for control units of the Army Service Forces and overseas Supply organizations.

(k) Acts as recruiting agency for executive personnel for the Division.

(l) Executes special surveys and projects not assigned elsewhere in the Division.

(m) Acts as official liaison between the Army Service Forces and the Inspector General; supervises the processing of Inspector General reports through the Army Service Forces; reviews all such reports and determines the adequacy of remedial action taken thereon.

(3) *The Statistics and Progress Branch:*

(a) Supervises the reporting system of the Army Service Forces, including clearance of recurring reports prepared by agencies of the Army Service Forces for circulation outside of the preparing agency.

(b) Supervises preparation of the Monthly Progress Report of the Army Service Forces and other recurring reports. When necessary, compiles special reports.

(c) Analyzes those aspects of the progress of operations of the Army Service Forces which can be measured quantitatively from recurring and special reports.

(d) Acts in a staff supervisory and advisory capacity in respect to statistical and reporting methods and procedures.

(e) Coordinates the furnishing of statistical information requested by agencies outside of the Army Service Forces.

(4) *The Office Service Section* performs routine office service functions.

(5) *The Special Advisors:*

(a) Maintain constant review of the organization and activities involved in fields specifically assigned, in order to uncover unsatisfactory situations; make recommendations for corrective action.

(b) Conduct specific surveys within the fields assigned where necessary.

(c) Keep the Director continually informed regarding the fields assigned where necessary.

(d) Handle requests for information relating to fields assigned where such requests are for information not specifically within the province of the Statistics and Progress Branch."

Control divisions were also established in each of the supply and administrative services and in each of the nine Service Commands. Under General C. F. Robinson, who had worked closely with General Somervell for a considerable time and who therefore knew his policies and had his confidence, the Control Division became a very powerful influence and accomplished much in the improvement of organizational procedures. Despite the effectiveness of the Army Service Forces Control Division, certain basic organizational questions affecting both the Army Service Forces and the War Department remained intentionally unanswered or at least not conclusively settled.

WORLD WAR II ORGANIZATION FOR PROCUREMENT

The March 1942 reorganization did set the stage for a marked improvement in the War Department organization for procurement which previously had been scattered in the Office of the Under Secretary of War; in the G-4, Supply Division of the War Department General Staff; in each of the Supply Services, and in several other non-War Department agencies. An important contributing factor was the rearrangement of office space, a factor not always appreciated in organization yet one that in practice materially affected organization relationships. The Office of the Under Secretary of War had been in the New War Department Building while the G-4 Supply Division was in the Munitions Building far enough away to discourage frequent personal contacts. With the move into the Pentagon Building the office of the Under Secretary of War adjoined the office of the Commanding General, Services of Supply, and the staff sections of the Services of Supply were also located in the immediate proximity. The result was that it was convenient for the Under Secretary of War to carry out his duties by using General Somervell's staff. This, of course, made it necessary for the Commanding General, Services of Supply, to report to both the Under Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. Likewise, a number of General Somervell's key staff officers reported directly to the Under Secretary of War in procurement matters. From one organizational point of view it was undesirable to have a situation where individuals had more than one boss. It did result, however, in a considerable economy of personnel and it did work out effectively owing to the caliber and understanding of the men involved. Because the Under Secretary used the Services of Supply staff it was not necessary for him to have an office force of his own of more than twenty-five or thirty persons.

The creation of the War Production Board in January 1942 and the consolidation in it of various industrial control activities assisted the War Department in its procurement activities by more clearly defining

respective duties and responsibilities. In March 1942 an understanding was reached between the War Department and the War Production Board that made the War Department responsible for the following:

(a) Determination of its military requirements, including new productive facilities, transportation, and communications.

(b) Computation from established military requirements of the raw materials, tools, and labor required and the furnishing of this information to the War Production Board so that it could make the necessary allocations.

(c) Negotiation, placement, and administration of all contracts for procurement of supplies needed by the Army.

(d) Establishment of specifications and the initiation of research and development work to improve specifications and design.

(e) The exploiting of production and the conservation of critical materials.

War Department-War Production Board relations indeed required much liaison work and this was performed by officers from the Services of Supply staff sections who, in this capacity, represented the Under Secretary of War, and thus the War Department. Likewise, it was necessary to establish within the Services of Supply large planning and coordinating staff sections to meet the needs of the Under Secretary and the Commanding General, and to assist them in their responsibilities for the Army Supply Program and in their relationships with other government organizations. As a practical matter, it was inevitable that the Services of Supply would become a self-contained organization reporting through its Commanding General to the Under Secretary of War. The problem that this created was simply this: how could the Supply Division of the General Staff coordinate and supervise the Under Secretary of War? This could not be done and was not. Yet when there was disagreement among the three major commands, or when a military, training, or personnel policy was contravened, some reviewing authority was needed. But this was difficult in those cases where the Under Secretary had either approved a course of action or had delegated the right to go ahead with it to an officer in the Services of Supply. How the Supply Division, G-4, of the War Department General Staff ought to fit into the Services of Supply-Under Secretary of War relationship remained a problem.

Theoretically, two opposite lines of organizational development with respect to the supply services were open to the Services of Supply after the 1942 reorganization. The Supply Services were essentially "product" organizations and they were each organized to handle every phase of

the design, production, storage, and distribution and, where necessary, the maintenance of the products they provided the Army. Their activities made it necessary for them to operate installations in all parts of the United States. For example, Ordnance activities encompassed TNT plants, ammonia and ammonium nitrate plants, smokeless powder plants, loading plants, tank plants, small arms plants, arsenals, depots, and maintenance installations. The Office of the Chief of Engineers engaged in construction activity wherever Army expansion required it and to administer this the Engineer Districts were used. These had been established in connection with River and Harbor work and they covered the entire United States.

Conceivably the organization of the Services of Supply could have followed the holding corporation type. Under such a scheme Headquarters Services of Supply would have remained a small-sized organization with the supply services continuing to be self-contained and to be able to deal directly and independently with other elements of the Army and the War Department. The other solution was the integration of the Supply Services into a highly centralized functional organization. This would have required a large Services of Supply headquarters staff with operating agencies divided possibly into design and experimental development, procurement and production, storage, construction, transportation, and utilities and maintenance. Both types of organization had distinct advantages. The "product" type organization, the type in existence, not only had the benefit of historical tradition and experience, but it placed responsibility for the end product on definite individuals such as the Chief of Ordnance or the Chief of Engineers. The disadvantage was that the holding type of organization did not fit in well with the military command concept. Likewise, it was contrary to the system of geographical field organization which the Services of Supply inherited when they took over the Corps Areas which became the Service Commands. An integrated functional organization would have been more economical and it would have fitted into the accepted geographical pattern for field organization. But to change the supply services from "product" organizations into one integrated functional organization was such a tremendous task that it was of questionable wisdom to undertake that change in wartime.

The problem of the organization of Headquarters, Services of Supply, had its counterpart in the organization of field installations. Under the 1942 reorganization the nine Corps Areas into which the United States was divided were converted into Service Commands. The organizational literature of the Army Service Forces indicated that each commander of

a Service Command would command his geographical area in the same fashion that the Commanding General, Services of Supply, commanded all the Chiefs of Services in Washington. This theory of geographical field organization collided with the organization structure of the Supply Services that had districts, facilities, depots, and other installations which they wished to have report directly to them. Initially, the trend was to increase the authority of the commanders of the Service Commands and emphasize that the chain of command was from Commanding General, Services of Supply, in Washington to the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands except for technical routine matters which would be transacted from the office of the Chief of the Supply Service concerned in Washington to the office of the respective supply officer on the staff of the Service Command commander. This made for complicated channels of communication. When the route was from (1) the office of the Chief of a Supply Service, to (2) the appropriate staff section of Headquarters Services of Supply, to (3) the corresponding staff section in the Headquarters of a Service Command, to (4) the respective office of the supply service in the Service Command headquarters. It was an involved and cumbersome course. But that was the channel to be used if the commander of the Service Command was to be held responsible. If the Chief of the Supply Service in Washington was to be responsible, instructions could go direct to his field representative.

There were clear cut instances when the responsibility was obvious; there were many border line cases difficult to determine. In case of doubt, the offices of the Chiefs of Supply Services were instructed to defer to the authority of the commander of the Service Commands, under the following statement of policy: "The plan of service command organization previously existing was not given to the most efficient accomplishment of these basic wartime missions of the Services of Supply. . . . [The Service Commands] . . . is the direct agency of the Commanding General, Services of Supply. In doing so many peacetime precedents of methods and procedures as between the offices of the chiefs of supply and administrative services and their agents on the staffs of service commanders are violated. This is done advisedly. It is the intention . . . to place complete responsibility and commensurate authority for the field operations of the Services of Supply, except procurement, depot storage, new construction, port operation, and certain other transportation operations clearly in the hands of the service commanders . . . [who] . . . must assume the initiative in prosecuting this plan of action without hindrance by details of former procedures whether established by regulations, custom, or precedent."¹

SIZE OF ARMY SERVICE FORCES ORGANIZATION

By June 30, 1944, the Army Service Forces organization had become well defined and fixed. The Services of Supply name had been changed in March of 1943 to Army Service Forces. During the two years that had passed since the reorganization of 1942, many improvements in organization and procedure were brought about largely under the guidance of the Control Division. Expediency had required many compromises rather than more clear-cut solutions. The organization chart² for the Army Service Forces in June 1944 is on page 433.

The Army Service Forces did provide both a staff and an operating organization to carry out to his satisfaction the procurement duties of the Under Secretary of War. The issue between the Army Service Forces and the Supply Division, G-4, War Department General Staff, was not clearly resolved. Actually the office of the Director of Plans and Operations ASF provided the Commanding General of Army Service Forces and the Under Secretary of War with all the services and information that G-4 could make available. By July 1944 the office of the Director of Plans and Operations included 601 persons of which 232 were Army officers. It consisted of a Planning Section of 63 officers, a Mobilization Division of 75 officers, and a Requirements Division of 68 officers. This was essentially a G-4 organization. At this same time there were 37 Army officers in the G-4 Supply Division of the War Department General Staff. The Army Service Forces could well ask, "What can G-4 do with its 37 Army officers that the ASF Plans and Operations Division with its 232 officers cannot do much better?" If there was any doubt about the answer, the Army Service Forces might have added that in case of need they could have their Control Division with its strength of 190 do whatever else G-4 might think of doing.

While the Army Service Forces had solidified their headquarters organization by July 1944, the basic organization question between the Supply Services and the headquarters had not been clearly answered. Neither a holding company type nor an integrated type of organization had been achieved. Each of the Supply Services remained a "product" organization and all had made strenuous efforts to be self-sufficient organizationally. Headquarters, Army Service Forces, had not remained small nor had it conceived its mission to be one of effecting a minimum of supervision over a confederation of essentially autonomous supply services. The result was that Army Service Forces headquarters grew to be very large.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES - 30 JUNE, 1944




CHART 20

COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	<i>January 31, 1942</i>		<i>April 30, 1942</i>		<i>June 30, 1942</i>	
	<i>Civilian</i>		<i>Civilian</i>		<i>Civilian</i>	
	<i>Employees</i>		<i>Employees</i>		<i>Employees</i>	
	<i>and</i>		<i>and</i>		<i>and</i>	
	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>
		<i>Clerks</i>		<i>Clerks</i>		<i>Clerks</i>
Office of the Under Secretary of War	375	589	16	50	30	74
G-4, Supply Divi- sion, War Depart- ment General Staff	149	138	11	26	35	42
Headquarters Staff (Planning and Supervisory) Army Service Forces	—	—	565	1,487	1,635	2,495
Offices of Chiefs of Supply Services, ASF (Engineers, Ordnance, Quar- termaster, Signal, Chemical Warfare, Surgeon General, Transportation, General Staff)	1,938	11,509	2,854	21,946	5,421	28,173

The above strength figures may be misleading unless the increase in volume of work as the war progressed is appreciated. The point to be emphasized, however, was that the planning and supervisory staff of Headquarters, Army Service Forces, tripled in size over the period and the offices of the Chiefs of Supply Services doubled. The evidence indicates that Army Service Forces had started the integration process and had built up its headquarters to complete the job but had then stopped. The Supply Services in their organizations evidenced no signs of relinquishing their historical position. In wartime the Army could afford the necessary compromise; in the peacetime economy years it is likely that one of the two echelons will have to be drastically reduced in size.

In the development of the Army Service Forces the Supply Services retained their chiefs and their branch identity and consciousness. In the Army Ground Forces the Chiefs of Arms were eliminated as obsolete.

This posed a problem. Historically the old bureau supply chiefs had done well for their officers in comparison with line officers in matters of promotion and assignment. The result had been that line officers clamored for representation in Washington. Partially in recognition of this, the Chief of Infantry, the Chief of Cavalry and the other Chiefs of combat Arms had been established. To do away with the Chiefs of Arms while retaining the Chiefs of Services might give rise to the old claim that supply officers were better looked out for in Washington than their line comrades. The disadvantage of fostering branch feeling and compartmentation was that modern war requires the flexibility and the simplification that could be achieved if the Army was consolidated into no more than the three large groups—air, ground and service.

The question of the type of field organization to develop was settled fairly well by a compromise solution. The Army Service Forces did strive to make the Commanding Generals of the nine Service Commands in the United States miniature Commanding Generals of the Army Service Forces, and efforts were made to pattern the organizations of each Service Command Headquarters after the Army Service Forces Headquarters in Washington. The predominant feature of the organization was the command element; and the chain of command was from the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to the Commanding Generals of the nine Service Commands. Yet the lesser organizational strain of bureau type officers of Chiefs of Supply Services with numerous field installations reporting directly to them was so much in evidence that it was sometimes difficult to tell which was the predominating strain. A solution was achieved by designating certain installations as Class IV exempted stations. These exempted stations were not under the command of the Service Command commander but reported direct to the Chief of their Supply Service. The number of such exempted stations tended to increase and become large.

ARMY SERVICE FORCES ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

The Army Service Forces faced a difficult organizational dilemma because they inherited conflicting organizational tendencies. If the major purpose was to emphasize the geographical area type of organization in the field under the Service Command commanders, then it would have been desirable to consolidate the supply Services by eliminating the "product" basis of differentiation and by establishing a functional organization. This could not be done as a practical matter in wartime and it was therefore necessary to compromise their field type of organization and admit that many exceptions must be made of having in the field a geographical area organization. The trouble with this position was that

it challenged one of the basic concepts of Army Service Forces organization. If individual installations of the supply Chiefs could not function under the command of the Army Service Forces Service Command commanders, then why should Army Air Force and Army Ground Force activities be commanded by an Army Service Forces Service Command commander under a geographical area type of field organization?

Of the three major commands the Army Service Forces had the most complex organizational and administrative problems. It was appropriate for them to place great emphasis on management control which they did. A very large and important amount of work was done by the Control Division ASF in preparing organization and procedure manuals and in assisting Army Service Forces personnel in understanding the complex relationships. An excellent and pertinent example of the work done by the Control Division was the following enunciation of Army Service Forces organizational principles:

"THEORY OF ORGANIZATION

GENERAL

(a) While the over-all organization of the Army Service Forces has been specifically determined, considerable leeway is allowed in respect to the internal organization structure of its various individual components.

(b) It is essential, however, that commanders of these components be familiar with the principles of organization on which the Army Service Forces is based, as a guide to the development of their own organization structures and in order to assure that the basic pattern of the over-all organization is followed throughout.

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

(a) There are certain fundamental principles of organization that should govern in the establishment of any organization structure, regardless of its size.

(1) Every necessary function involved in the mission and objectives is assigned to a single unit of that organization.

(2) The responsibilities assigned to each unit of an organization are specifically clear-cut and well-understood.

(3) No function is assigned to more than one independent unit of an organization. Overlapping responsibility will cause confusion and delay.

(4) Each member of an organization from top to bottom knows—

(a) To whom he reports.

(b) Who reports to him.

(5) No member of an organization reports to more than one supervisor.

(6) Responsibility for a function is matched by the authority necessary to perform that function.

(7) Independent individuals or units reporting directly to a supervisor do not exceed the number which can be feasibly and effectively coordinated and directed. (Note.—Experience indicates that not more than seven individuals should report directly to any one supervisor. The existence of a chief of staff, executive officer, or deputy as a coordinating and directing officer for a commander makes it possible for ten to twelve individuals to report directly.)

(8) Channels of command are not violated by staff units.

(9) Authority for action is decentralized to the units and individuals responsible for actual performance of operations to the greatest extent possible, so long as such decentralization does not hamper necessary control over policy or the standardization of procedures.

(10) An organization should never be permitted to grow so elaborate as to hinder work accomplishment.

LINE AND STAFF ORGANIZATION

(a) Classification of elements of the organization of the Army Service Forces:

Line or Operating Elements:

(1) The units of the organization which perform the operating duties of the Army Service Forces are the Technical Services and the Service Commands. They are responsible for the ultimate execution of the various jobs that constitute the mission of the Army Service Forces. Specifically, they design, manufacture, procure, transport, store, distribute, issue, maintain, repair and salvage supplies and equipment; train personnel; provide administrative services, internal security, transportation, shelter, health, religious training and welfare to Army units within the Zone of the Interior; construct new facilities; and provide fixed communications services.

(a) As *line units*, the Technical Services directly operate various field installations, such as procurement districts, depots, manufacturing arsenals, ports of embarkation, etc.

(b) As *line units*, Service Commands directly operate posts, camps, and other installations not under the supervision of Technical Services or the Air Forces.

Staff Elements:

(2) The staff units of the Army Service Forces are the Staff Divisions and the Technical Services.

(a) Staff Divisions are intended to be purely staff in character and not to perform operating functions.

(b) Technical Services are staff agencies in respect to certain activities within the Army Service Forces which they do not directly perform.

(3) Thus the organizational units of the Army Service Forces may be classified as follows:

(a) *Line*—The Service Commands.

(b) *Staff*—The Staff Divisions. They exercise staff functions in respect to both Technical Services and Service Commands.

(c) *Both line and staff*—Technical Services. They are 'staff' in respect to Service Commands, and perform certain basic operating functions.

(b) Nature of the responsibility of elements of the organization of the Army Service Forces:

(1) The *Staff Divisions* cover in a staff capacity most Army Service Forces functions. Such Divisions are the functional specialists concerned with the manner in which the respective functions assigned to them are executed in all parts of the organization.

(2) The *Technical Services* have three basic responsibilities:

(a) They perform certain *operating activities* in connection with procurement and production, distribution and issue except as this latter function is performed by Service Command installations.

(b) They *directly supervise field installations* in connection with procurement, production, construction, storage and distribution, transportation and certain other miscellaneous activities. Such field installations include procurement offices, manufacturing plants, proving grounds, depots, ports of embarkation, other transportation agencies, and certain other miscellaneous installations.

(c) They *act in an over-all staff capacity* through Service Command Headquarters on questions involving issue, storage, repair, and maintenance, salvage, transportation, medical service, communications, housing and utilities and training.

(3) The Service Commands perform all operating functions of the Army Service Forces except those directly performed by the Technical Services and minor specialized activities which are under the direct control of the Staff Divisions.

(c) *The Nature of Staff Responsibilities*: The nature of staff responsibilities includes: (a) *pure staff activities*, (b) *activities performed for Headquarters*, (c) *supervision of certain field activities*.

(1) The *pure staff activities* of Staff Divisions are composed of the following:

(a) *To advise the Commanding General* in respect to the function




CHART 21—Line Elements of Army Service Forces




CHART 22—Staff Elements of Army Service Forces




CHART 23—Line and Staff Elements of Army Service Forces

which is the general responsibility of the particular Staff Division. Such advice includes recommendations on policy, indications as to progress and performance, and any other information which should come to the personal attention of the Commanding General.

(b) *To formulate plans, policies, and procedures.* A Staff Division is the ultimate authority for over-all planning and policy-making in respect to a function as it is executed from an operating standpoint by other components of the organization. These plans, policies, and procedures usually take the form of regulations, orders, directives, etc., which, where appropriate, specify uniform methods, procedures and systems for the performance of the functions throughout the entire organization. In order that they may give full attention to this basic phase of their job, *it is important that Staff Divisions do not become burdened with routine operating responsibilities.*

(c) *To advise and provide service to subordinate operating units.* It is the responsibility of a Staff Division to advise and assist subordinate components in the performance of their jobs.

(d) *To follow up on performance throughout the organization.* Staff Divisions should constantly follow up with the subordinate components of the organization to assure that the policies, plans, and procedures which have been specified are carried out in the manner in which they were originally conceived.

(2) *Staff Divisions perform for Headquarters,* in an operating capacity, those activities for which they have staff responsibility throughout the organization. This is done primarily for two reasons: (1) because they are presumably the most competent experts on the particular function involved, and (2) because such activity provides an excellent laboratory for practical testing of policies, plans, and procedures for adoption throughout the entire organization.

(3) Under certain exceptional circumstances, *direct supervision of certain field activities by Staff Divisions* may be necessary where decentralization to one of the Technical Services or the Service Commands is impracticable. Such direct supervision is to be avoided wherever possible, however, so that decentralization of purely operating matters may be accomplished to the greatest practicable extent.

(d) All functions other than those indicated as staff functions are actually executed by the line units of the Army Service Forces.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIOUS UNITS OF THE ORGANIZATION

(a) As the ultimate planning and policy-making agencies for their respective functions as performed throughout the organization, Staff Divisions (or Directors) may issue instructions and directions in the

name of the Commanding General, to Technical Services and Service Commands.

(b) Technical Services may issue instructions and directions to Service Commands, in the name of the Commanding General, on matters within their jurisdiction.

(c) In other words, Technical Services operate under the plans and policies formulated by Staff Divisions, and Service Commands operate under plans and policies formulated by Staff Divisions and Technical Services.

(d) In a line and staff type of organization, channels of authority and command are well-defined and should not be violated. A Staff Division may not, on its own authority, direct any other unit of the organization. Similarly, Technical Services have authority only over the installations directly attached to them, and have no authority to direct Service Commands except in the name of the Commanding General.

(e) Instructions and directions from Staff Divisions to Service Commands, and from Technical Services to Service Commands, should be addressed to the commander of the unit of the organization involved. Where the matter is one of a technical nature familiar to a subordinate of the commander, it should be addressed to the commander for the attention of the subordinate. Informal personal and telephone contact is not precluded by this arrangement, but formal agreements, decisions, or instructions should be issued or confirmed through the prescribed channels."³

STATUS OF ARMY GROUND FORCES, ARMY AIR FORCES AND ARMY SERVICE FORCES

The 1942 reorganization raised an academic question concerning the status of the three major commands on which a variety of opinions existed. The dividing line between the War Department and the Army had always been obscure, and it was thought by some that the reorganization had clarified this point. One view was that the headquarters of the three major commands were the top levels of the Army. They were not, therefore, a part of the War Department, which thus would only include the Office of the Secretary of War (the offices of the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of War come under this title), the Office of the Chief of Staff, and the War Department General and Special Staffs. This concept was generally acceptable to the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces. The Army Service Forces could not accept it. The Chiefs of the supply and administrative Services were both by custom and by statute commonly considered as parts of the War Department. And so Headquarters, Army Service Forces, took the view

that ASF was both one of three major elements of the Army and also an integral part of the War Department. If this was to be accepted, then the other two major commands also claimed War Department membership; otherwise, the Army Service Forces would be superior to (and of a higher echelon than) the top headquarters of the Air Forces and the Ground Forces. The quick response to this whole question was, "Well, what difference did it make, one way or the other?" The answer was that in day to day transactions of routine details it did not make any difference. The answer was, however, of great importance to any clear understanding of the philosophy of the organization of the War Department.

If the three headquarters of the major commands were the top levels of the Army and if they were not part of the War Department, then they could not invoke the authority of the Secretary of War. Their actions could thus be taken only on the basis of the authority of their Commanding Generals, or pursuant to instructions issued by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff through the War Department. Likewise, the three commands were co-equal, with their relationships governed primarily by mutual agreement and consent. If, on the other hand, the Army Service Forces was a part of the War Department and the other two commands were not, then for certain functions the other two commands were under the Army Service Forces. This was not a fine distinction of no consequence; actually it was the cause of much discussion.

ARMY SERVICE FORCES AND ARMY AIR FORCES RELATIONSHIPS

Between 1942 and 1945 there was much discussion of the Army Service Forces role vis-à-vis the Air Forces. Circular 59 of 1942 had established a unified supply and administrative service to be provided by the Army Service Forces to serve the Air and Ground Forces. For the Army Ground Forces, the Service Forces provided complete house-keeping, supply, and administrative services which included the command of posts and facilities where Army Ground Force tactical units were located (but not, of course, command of those units). The Army Air Forces accepted certain supply and administrative services from the Army Service Forces, but the Army Air Forces insisted on retaining command of their air bases. It was natural for the Army Service Forces to urge that they perform similar functions for both of the combat services; otherwise, if the Army Air Forces adopted higher or more extravagant standards, the Army Ground Forces units would believe that they were getting inferior service. There was, therefore, much to justify the Army Service Forces position that they ought to serve everyone

equally and maintain one standard for all. But this was where the question of War Department position came in. The Army Service Forces wished to impose their service by authority of the Secretary of War. The Air Forces position was that they themselves should have the right to say what Army Service Forces functions they wished to have done for them and to decline those which they wished to perform for themselves.

There were, of course, many other considerations that affected this question. The Air Forces had been seeking independence for years and wished to build a self-sufficient organization. Then there was a fear on the part of combat soldiers that they would become subordinate to and under the authority of supply personnel who would *tell* them what they would get. This raised the perennial question over the belief of line soldiers that control over supply and administrative matters was an indispensable attribute of command. There was no disagreement that at some high level there must be one authority in control of all functions. The question was rather at what point in the chain of command you do separate tactical command and supply control. One view was that every commander who was given a job—be it combat, training, administrative, or any other—must be given both the tactical and the supply means to do the job. The opposite of this was the belief that if you gave a commander too much to do, especially about details of supply, he would do nothing well. This reasoning held that a commander should divest himself of all subsidiary tasks and concentrate on the main job, be it training or combat, and let someone else worry about the supply and administrative details.

Discussion over the question of whether control over supply and administration was an indispensable attribute of command was always complicated by consideration of definitions and details. If supply and administrative services were limited to the furnishing of potatoes and other standard items of goods and to the maintenance of the water and sewerage system on an Army post, that was one thing. But if the definition was made all inclusive to cover control of personnel, funds, and all administrative and supply functions, the situation was quite different. In 1944 the question arose of the channels through which funds would be allocated. This raised the entire issue on the relation of supply and service agencies to combat forces. The Commanding Generals of the three major commands convened as a board to consider this question. Their expressed views were important in enunciating a philosophy on what the relationship should be and their report is quoted at length:

"Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Relation of Supply and Service Agencies to Combat Forces.

1. . . . the Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces have met and considered 'the overall question of service and supply functions and responsibilities together with their relation to command'. Throughout our examination of the subject, the necessity of demonstrating within the Army unity of purpose and action within itself and a satisfactory relation of service agencies and combat forces, as well as between combat forces themselves, was considered desirable. . . . The Army Air Forces, however, have felt that no relation can be satisfactory that prevents either combat force from operating at maximum efficiency. . . . The Commanding Generals have been unable to resolve certain fundamental differences of view as to functions which should be performed for the Army as a whole by a common service agency, and those which should be performed for itself by the combat force.

2. It is the view of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, that the basic command responsibility of the air combat force is and must be to maintain quantitative and qualitative superiority in the air; that this responsibility extends far beyond employment of aircraft in combat and training of personnel to fly and maintain aircraft; and that successful performance of this responsibility requires ability to maintain most continuous operations from bases both in the Zone of the Interior and the theater of operations. The administrative, supply and service functions related to maintenance of air superiority are and must be so completely integrated with combat and training operations of the Air Forces that their performance by a distinct command produces fatal divided responsibility. Such a relationship transfers from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, duties and responsibilities, with accompanying command authority, which are essential to effective operation of the Air Forces. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, recognizes, however, that there are certain supply and service activities, common to the Army as a whole, which in the interest of economy and uniformity must be performed by a central service agency.

3. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces, believe that the primary purpose of the War Department and the components thereof should be to maintain quantitative and qualitative superiority over the forces of the enemy and that the decision with regard to the role which the Air Forces are to play should be a War Department decision and not the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces. They believe further that the system proposed by the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces would,

to all intents and purposes, create a separate Air Force within the framework of the War Department with direct command over its activities extending into the theaters of operation. . . . The Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces, are further of the opinion that:

a. The system adopted for the organization of supply and services should be such as to most effectively promote the maximum combat effectiveness, the efficiency and welfare of the Army as a whole, as distinguished from that of any individual component.

b. The establishment of a single agency within the Army to provide supplies and render common services is vital to avoid duplication and in the interest of economy.

c. Uniformity in the supply and service system of the Army is highly desirable and the relationship between the Ground and Service Forces and between the Air and Service Forces can and should be made substantially identical.

d. The combat forces should be relieved to the maximum extent possible from supply and service functions to permit them to devote their time to training and combat; combat units should be organized to perform only those supply and service functions essential to their internal operations to meet their combat missions; all supply and service functions not so organic to combat units should be performed by a common service agency; unity of command and authority commensurate with responsibility within the combat forces is assured when a combat commander has authority over his unit and the supply and service functions organic thereto.

4. Proper definition of the functions and responsibilities which should be performed by a service agency on an Army-wide basis is not a simple matter. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, believes the definition of paragraph 3*d* to be so uncertain as to be impossible of practical application and to beg the question. The Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces, believe that this definition is based on the same principle of 'economy of force' historically and properly used in the Army in the organization of tactical units, provides a satisfactory basis for assignment of responsibilities and authority for supply and services, and will result in a system which will tend to weld the Army into one force and promote the efficiency and welfare of the Army as a whole, whereas the system proposed by the Air Forces will tend to separate the combat forces of the Army. The basic differences above described are best illustrated by the main specific differences set forth in Tab A [page 448]. Consideration and resolution of these specific differences in relation to the command re-

sponsibilities of the respective combat forces should pave the way for a sound determination of the Army-wide functions of the common service agency.

5. There are attached as Tab B [page 452] and Tab C [page 459.] respectively, statements submitted by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and by the Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces, in further development of the views set forth in the foregoing and in Tab A [below].

H. H. ARNOLD,

General, U. S. Army,

Commanding General, Army Air Forces

BEN LEAR,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.

BREHON B. SOMERVELL,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,

Commanding General, Army Service Forces."

TAB A

AGF and ASF are of the opinion that—

1. Development, design and procurement of all materiel (to requirements of the combat forces) should be performed by the ASF, except that during this war procurement of aircraft and spare parts therefore should be done by the AAF.

2. Maintenance, salvage and disposal of materiel, except that performable by personnel and facilities organic to tactical units of AGF or AAF, should be performed by the ASF, except that during this war maintenance, salvage and disposal of aircraft and spare parts therefor should be done by the AAF.

AAF is of the opinion that—

1. Development, design and procurement of materiel of a type of peculiar utility to AAF or in which its interest is predominant should (as at present) be the responsibility and under command control of AAF. ASF's function in this regard must be correspondingly limited as at present.

2. All maintenance of materiel utilized by AAF which is of peculiar utility to AAF or of a type and all maintenance of all materiel in which its interest is predominant performable at AAF stations should (as at present) be the responsibility and under command control of AAF. ASF's function in this regard must be correspondingly limited as at present.

3. Storage and distribution of all materiel, except that performable by personnel organic to tactical units of AGF, should be performed by the ASF, except that during this war storage and distribution of aircraft and spare parts therefore should be done by the AAF.

4. On posts utilized by the combat forces in the Zone of the Interior, the Service Force should perform supply and Service activities not organic to tactical units utilizing the post. This can take the form of:

a. A service commander on the post responsible for such activities and under the supervision of the Commanding General of the ASF Service Command. This method relieves the tactical commander of direct responsibility and provides the maximum amount of time and freedom for the command and training of his combat unit.

b. A tactical commander being responsible to the Commanding General of an ASF Service Command for the performance of these activities. For this method the tactical commander would be furnished the necessary station complement. Such an arrangement provides full command supervision over supply and services at the station level and will permit

3. All distribution of all materiel utilized by AAF of peculiar utility to AAF or of a type in which its interest is predominant, and distribution at AAF stations, whether by personnel organic to AAF tactical units or not, of all materiel should (as at present) be the responsibility and under command control of AAF. ASF's function in this regard must be correspondingly limited as at present.

4. Administration of all AAF stations and of all service and facilities thereon should (as at present) be the responsibility and under command control of AAF. Full command control of AAF stations and of all facilities and administrative, supply and service activities continuously required thereon is essential to effective operation of AAF units. Because of the inherent nature of Air Force operations, these activities are all inter-dependent and must be fully available and integrated under one command.

tactical troops to leave a station without disturbing station activities.

5. Establishment of Army-wide technical standards, techniques and procedures for all phases of supply and service activities not directly connected with training and preparation for combat of troops organic in AGF or AAF should be the responsibility of the ASF.

6. Except for that 'organic to tactical units of the combat forces at various echelons, and to the requirements of the combat forces as approved by the War Department,' the ASF should perform the following service functions for the Army. Transportation of troops and supplies by rail, water, air and motor vehicles; operation of fixed signal communications; procurement and disposal of real estate; construction, maintenance of structures, and fire protection; care of the sick and wounded, hospitalization, sanitation, and veterinary services; fiscal services; accounting, disbursing, auditing; personnel services, procurement, classification, assignment, discharge, recreation and welfare; legal services, litigation, claims, contract law, military justice; and other service activities such as exchanges, laundries, publications and blank

5. Establishment of technical standards, techniques and procedures for supply and service activities of peculiar utility to AAF or in which its interest is predominant should (as at present) be the responsibility and under command control of AAF, ASF's function in this regard being limited to establishment of technical standards, techniques and procedures for certain supplies and services of Army-wide utility.

6. Performance, as at present of all administrative, supply and service functions continuously required either at AAF stations or by AAF organizations, and control of personnel and funds required therefor should be the responsibility and under command control of AAF, recognizing, however, that certain administrative, supply and service functions which are of Army-wide utility and are not continuously required at AAF stations or by AAF organizations (such as construction of fixed facilities, storage of materiel of Army-wide utility prior to distribution, factory overhaul or quantity repair of such materiel, review of court-martial proceedings establishment of procurement regulations in coordination with AAF and others of like nature), should be the responsibility of ASF, and should be so designated from time to time by the Under

forms, insurance, mapping, military police, prisoners of war, files and records.

7. In order to secure maximum economy and efficiency of the Army, the degree of dependency of the combat forces (AGF and AAF) and the service agency (ASF) for administration, supplies and services should be substantially identical on whatever basis established.

8. ASF should act as the staff agency of the Chief of Staff and the Under Secretary of War for supply and service activities throughout the entire Army; *i.e.*, there should be only one Surgeon General who should act as *The* Surgeon General of the Army.

9. No direct command responsibilities below the Chief of Staff should be exercised by any agency

Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff.

7. AAF, while recognizing the value of uniformity within appropriate limits, is of the opinion that uniformity is not an end in itself, and should be applied only to the extent that it promotes the effectiveness of the combat forces; and that the relationship advocated by AGF and ASF, if conducive to the effectiveness of AGF, is detrimental to AAF effectiveness and should not be applicable as between AAF and ASF.

8. The AAF believes that all of the activities of the ASF should be subject to general policies laid down by the General Staff as now constituted, that the requirements of the combat forces should be determined and adjudicated by a General Staff in no respect subject to one of the major commands, and further that many staff functions now performed for the Army by ASF should be restored to General Staff level, ASF to retain necessary operating functions subject to General Staff direction. The AAF disagrees with the view that a service agency under independent command should act as a staff agency for the Chief of Staff and Under Secretary of War for administrative, supply or service activities.

9. Except as to supply and service functions and activities which are of a world-wide or inter-thea-

in the Zone of the Interior over any supply and service activities in overseas theaters. The theater commander must have command over and be responsible for all Army activities in his theater. Each theater of operations should have a service force for the performance of supply and service functions not organic to the combat elements in the theater. In theaters of operations, all supply and service activities are the responsibility of the theater commander. The air and ground forces should have organic units to perform supply and service functions back to the same tactical level—army for ground and air forces for air. In rear of this level a theater service force should support ground and air alike.

ter nature (such as weather service, airways communications, air transport including delivery of aircraft), no direct command responsibilities below the Chief of Staff should be exercised by an agency in the Zone of Interior over such functions and activities in overseas theater. Subject to the above exceptions, the theater commander must have a service agency for performance for the theater ground force and theater air force of all supply and service functions other than (a) those of peculiar utility to the air force, (b) those continuously required at air force stations and (c) those in which its interest is predominant. These functions should be performed by and under command control of the air force, subject to the theater commander. A relationship apparently considered appropriate as between the ground force and service agency has no application to the air force and would be detrimental to the effectiveness of theater air operations.

TAB B

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Relation of Supply and Service Agencies to Combat Forces.

The Commanding Generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces, have been unable to resolve certain differences with respect to the above subject and have submitted a statement of these differences [pages 446 to 448]. That statement contains material introduced by the Ground and Service Forces which is believed far afield from the requirements of the Chief of Staff's directive for a presentation of clear-cut issues and differences. Inclusion of this material has, however, seemed necessary to secure an agreed statement and

the statement has accordingly been signed by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. This Memorandum is submitted in further development of the view of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

The Question and Primary Considerations Involved

The question for consideration is the extent to which administrative, supply and service functions must, for maximum effectiveness and sound business administration of a combat force, be under command control of the combat force; and, accordingly, the extent to which performance of such functions under command control of a common service agency will promote maximum effectiveness of each combat force and hence of the Army.

The Ground Forces and Service Forces are not willing to concede that their position involves placing these functions under command control of the service agency, free of the authority of the combat force. Creation of such an independent command authority is, however, the inevitable result of their position.

Presumably, the primary consideration must be maximum effectiveness of each combat force. A service agency, by definition, is only a means to provide a combat force such assistance as will enhance its effectiveness. Whether or not certain functions or activities come under the command and control of a service agency does not affect that agency's efficiency; on the other hand the effectiveness of a combat force is crippled if it does not embrace certain essential functions within its own command and control. The sound relationship of the service agency to a particular combat force must be determined by the responsibility to be sustained by that combat force and the nature of its operations.

With respect to the Air Forces, establishment of the relationship requires analysis of the necessary responsibility and operations of the Air Forces. The Ground Forces and Service Forces have not been willing to analyze the responsibility of either the Air Forces or Ground Forces or the nature of their respective operations in arriving at a conclusion.

The Basic Differences of Opinion

In a paper submitted in the course of these discussions by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, concentration of "business" and service activities of the Army as a whole under authority of a single head is advocated; and that this authority should furnish to the combat forces supplies, services and personnel of the types, character and qualifications in the numbers and quantities and at the locations and times designated by them. This is the essence of the relationship proposed by the Ground and Service Forces.

Under this concept, the Ground Forces and the Air Forces confine themselves to training and fighting, exist as tenants of the service agency without control of their stations and facilities and rely for all but a bare minimum of administration, supplies and services (even, apparently, for classification, technical training and assignment of personnel) upon a super-agency under independent command.

This concept is far removed from that of a Service of Supply. It is based on the obvious fallacy that command can be exercised without administrative control. It ignores the obvious fact that direction of a combat force like the Air Forces is necessarily management of a huge business, to which administration and service activities are inherently organic—not to be farmed out to an independent contractor.

Administrative control is an essential of command control. To place this essential under independent command removes from the officer charged with combat responsibility a most important element of command. Followed to its logical conclusion the concept will introduce into the Army a type of 'office commissar' controlling and vetoing decisions of the combat officer.

It is equally logical, and in fact is suggested by the Army Service Forces, that these functions be performed to the maximum extent by civilians having perhaps more administrative experience than military personnel. The tendency to create a corps of 'civil service' or civilian commissars is too obvious to be overlooked.

The Responsibility of the Air Forces, and What it Involves

The basic responsibility of the Air Forces and their units, whether in the Zone of the Interior or theater of operations, is and must be to maintain air superiority over an enemy. Otherwise, it has little reason for existence. The air force is the first line. An inferior air force is short-lived and useless. This basic responsibility covers many fields, as for example:

Equipment. It does not require argument to establish the fact that we cannot have air superiority unless our aircraft and related equipment are at all times superior to those of the enemy or any potential enemy. In no field is change more rapid, or do revolutionary developments more frequently occur. These changes and developments usually originate as a result of experience of units in combat or in training. To assure air superiority, the knowledge and experience of tactical personnel must be translated most readily into new or modified equipment and into new or modified techniques of employment and of servicing. The route by which this knowledge and experience is made effective must

be direct through channels of the air command and not by way of a service agency independent of air command. The channel must be under air command from air front to factory.

Training. To accomplish this same objective of air superiority, air force personnel must be highly specialized in the most complicated types of technical equipment and their employment and maintenance. Training standards of combat, technical and service personnel must be subject to immediate modification with developments in equipment or tactical or maintenance techniques.

The channel by which tactical and technical knowledge and experience is made effective in training, not only of combat personnel, but of supply and service personnel, must be similarly direct through channels of the air command and not by way of a service agency independent of air command. In fact the training establishment must, in certain phases, be co-existent with the combat units in the field.

Maintenance. Even with superior equipment, air superiority in combat will not be long maintained if the aircraft are not kept operational and in the air. Both in the theater of operations and throughout the training establishment replacement, maintenance and overhaul of aircraft and equipment are essential parts of the air commander's responsibility. Timing, scheduling and control of these functions to meet operational requirements, the determination of methods, standards and techniques, and facilities required for the task, must be under air command.

Bases. Control of air operations, and air superiority, depend on the air base and its vital related facilities. The Air Forces must rely for training effectiveness, mobility, flexibility and fighting power on these airbase and peculiar depot installations. This is true in the Zone of the Interior and the combat theater. Facilities for housing, sustaining and serving personnel, for maintaining and operating runways, control towers, special air communications facilities, special weather apparatus, bombing and gunnery ranges, off-base navigational aids, satellite landing fields, night landing devices, field lighting, synthetic device buildings and extensive shops and warehouses to maintain and supply aircraft and technical equipment—all are required for air operations from the base. All are interdependent and must be continuously available at all times of day or night as required by air operations, whether in combat or training.

The base is as much part of the air weapon as the air craft that fly from it. Administration of all base activities must be completely integrated under air command.

Command is Responsibility. Responsibility Should be Matched by Authority.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that necessary authority commensurate with the responsibility of the Air Forces is provided only by full command control (subject, of course, to the Chief of Staff or theater commander) over all required personnel and funds and over all functions and facilities (including all those required at bases and depots) of peculiar utility to the Air Forces or in which their interest is predominant.

Placing any of these under an authority not fully responsible to the air command is the essence of divided responsibility and prevents effective employment of Air Force units or development of a highly efficient Air Force. Definite examples of the effects of such divided responsibility and its disastrous consequences to the air arm are to be found in the experience of other nations.

The Essential Principles That Must Govern Air Force Organization and Command Authority and Relationship to a Service Agency

The following principles of Air Force organization and business management are basic to a satisfactory relationship to a common supply and service agency:

The unity of command necessary to the Air Forces is a single clear channel of command with no split responsibilities or divided authorities in any echelon or at any station.

The command authority within the Air Forces commensurate with their command responsibility requires that:

Military requirements for personnel, funds, materiel, services and facilities (whether of Army-wide or peculiar utility) be determined through command channels of the Air Forces with final adjudication for the Army by the General Staff.

Control, administration and employment of personnel, funds, materiel, services and facilities; including stations, be exercised through command channels of the Air Forces.

Development, procurement, and methods and techniques of employment of materiel and services of peculiar utility to the Air Forces or in which they have a predominant interest be responsibilities of Air Force Command.

Application of the foregoing principles requires that the Army-wide supply and service agencies, in relation to the Air Forces, should:

Develop and procure, to requirements of combat forces, materiel of Army-wide utility in which the interest of the Air Forces is not pre-

dominant and distribute as required by the combat forces, within policies established by the General Staff.

Provide to the Air Forces those services of Army-wide utility (such as construction of fixed facilities, storage of materiel of Army-wide utility prior to bulk distribution, factory overhaul or quantity repair of such materiel) which either are not continuously required by Air Force organizations or at Air Force stations for performance of command responsibilities; or are, for Army-wide efficiency and economy, best performed by specialized organizations elsewhere than at Air Force stations or by Air Force organizations.

Experience Has Proved the Foregoing Principles to be Sound.

The question of control of the functions under discussion is not new. It runs through the entire history of the Air Forces. Shortly after the outbreak of war, when adoption of the most efficient organization for the rapid development and effective employment of the air arm was crucial, the decision was made in the light of many years' experience to place with the Air Forces the greater part of the command, control and responsibility which they have always considered necessary. This made possible the prompt translation of tactical and operating needs into new or modified equipment, new techniques and training procedures, new organizational and administrative methods. If it had not been for the reorganization of 1942 it is doubtful if the Army Air Forces as we know it today could have been equipped, trained and developed into the great fighting organization that it now is.

Additional steps in the same direction have been taken as the result of war experience of the past three years. Within the Air Forces themselves, transfer of responsibilities for supply and service functions at bases from a distinct air service command to operating air commands has made possible improved operations in the United States. Progressive War Department action, placing with the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, responsibility for and authority over funds and administrative, supply and service activities required at air stations, and over development and procurement of equipment of principal interest to the Air Forces, has further contributed to the effectiveness of the air arm.

Recognition of need for these steps confirms Air Force judgment that the pre-war division of responsibility within the air arm, resulting from command of bases by the old Air Corps, independent of combat command units utilizing those bases, was detrimental to operations and unsound.

A program seeking re-establishment of the former split responsibility

and divided authority in relation to Air Force operations and administration is designed only to turn back the clock. It is difficult to understand the contention of the Ground and Service Forces that either now or with the return of peace the Army should go back to the disproved theories which hobbled for so long the development of air power in the United States.

The Fallacies of the Opposing Position.

The uniform organizational relationship proposed by the Ground and Service Forces is put forward without analysis of responsibility of their combat force or the nature of its operations. Advocating maximum relief of each combat force from administrative, supply and service responsibilities, they suggest turning over to the service agency those not 'organic to tactical units' based on Tables of Organization established as 'essential to the combat mission.'

Without definition of the combat mission or of the nature or required operations or of the functions which must be 'organic' to units or are inherently organic or necessary to performance of a defined mission, the program is based on circular reasoning.

It reflects no understanding of the relation of the air base and its activities to air operations or of the position of the base and the depot and their activities as essential Air Force equipment.

It reflects no understanding of the responsibility for maintenance of flexibility and continuous operations or of the necessity for integrated control of functions related thereto.

It reflects lack of comprehension of the need of most direct action to effect the rapid changes in equipment, operating techniques and training procedures necessary to meet ever-changing tactical requirements and developments and thereby to assure air superiority.

It would transfer to the independent command of a service agency authority over functions on which the Air Forces must rely for effective operation.

It advocates split responsibility and divided authority in respect to these functions. Such a relationship may be conducive to effectiveness of the Ground Forces. To make it applicable to the Air Forces is to seek uniformity of an inapplicable relationship at the expense of effectiveness of the air arm.

Conclusion

The relationship between the Air Forces and an Army-wide common service agency advocated in this Memorandum is that which promotes maximum effectiveness of air operations. This has been proven in war.

It is certain that during the war no change should be made and no basis exists for disregarding in time of peace the lessons learned in war.

* * *

H. H. ARNOLD
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

TAB C

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

Subject: Supply and Service Activities in the Army.

1. Pursuant to the instructions contained in your memorandum of 26 October 1944, the undersigned have considered 'the over-all question of service and supply functions and responsibilities together with their relation to command.' Throughout our examination of the subject, the necessity for demonstrating within the Army a satisfactory relation of service agencies and combat forces, as well as between combat forces themselves, was considered a prerequisite for securing the acceptance of the idea of a single Department of National Defense.

2. The following discussion indicates the viewpoint of the AGF and ASF concerning the organization and assignment of responsibility and authority for the supply and service activities of the Army. It is understood that the detailed viewpoint of the AAF will be submitted separately.

3. The Army must be able to demonstrate unity of purpose and action within itself if it is to secure acceptance of the idea of a single department of National Defense.

4. Regardless of the assignment of authority and responsibility the term 'supply and services' includes the activities listed in Tab D [page 463].

5. The system adopted for the organization of supply and services activities should be such as to most effectively promote the efficiency and welfare of the Army as a whole, as distinguished from that of any individual component of the Army.

6. The system should be such as to promote the maximum fighting effectiveness of the combat forces.

Discussion: The above principle should be extended to the principle that the combat forces should be relieved to the maximum extent possible from supply and service activities to permit them to devote their time to training or fighting.

7. Uniformity in the system adopted for the organization of supply and services in the Army is highly desirable and should be provided

to the extent that it does not seriously interfere with the combat effectiveness of the combat forces.

Discussion: The relationship between the Ground and Service Forces and between the Air and Service Forces can and should be made substantially identical.

8. The system should involve the minimum of duplication and overlapping.

Discussion: The establishment of a single agency within the Army to provide supplies and render common services not available organically in combat units is vital to avoid duplication and in the interest of economy.

9. The system should provide for the simplest and most direct relationship between the various components of the Army and between services with the minimum number of staff layers.

10. Unity of command throughout the combat forces must be assured.

Discussion: Unity of command is assured when the combat commander has command of his unit and the supply and service activities organic therein. (See paragraphs 12 and 13.)

11. Command authority within the combat forces must be commensurate with command responsibility.

Discussion: The combat forces must, under any circumstances, be dependent on outside service and supply agencies and must be subject to policies, procedures and directives of higher authority. The requirements of this principle are fully met when a combat commander has authority over his combat troops and over the supply and service activities organic in his combat unit and when the supply and service agencies furnish to the combat forces supplies, services and personnel of the types, character and qualifications in the numbers and quantities and at the locations and times requested by them in accordance with War Department policy.

12. Supply and service activities cannot be completely divorced from combat units. All combat units and the combat forces themselves must be dependent to some degree on outside supply and service agencies. The question is where to draw the line of this dependency.

Discussion: The line of dependency should be drawn where it is essential that such services need be an organic part of the operations and organization of the particular combat unit to meet its combat mission. For example:

a. Provision should be made in the organization of tactical units, divisions, wings and sub-divisions thereof, for the performance of those organic supply and service functions which are essential to the combat mission of such units. All supply and service functions which are not

essential to the combat mission should be divorced from tactical units and be performed by the common service forces.

b. In Theaters of Operations where large tactical units such as Corps, Armies and Air Forces are assembled provision should also be made for the performance by them of those internal supply and service functions which are essential to their larger combat missions; but the common service force of the theater should perform the other general supply and service functions required by the combat forces in the theater.

c. In the Zone of the Interior where divisions, wings, or subdivisions thereof, are stationed on a post or base for training without the service units of the next higher tactical command, the service force should perform all supply and service functions for the units so stationed which are not organic to their tactical organization. The maximum use of civilians or limited service personnel should be made by the service force to provide this service.

d. The common service force of the Army should perform for the combat forces all supply and service functions which are related primarily to the post or base as distinguished from those which are a part of the internal operations of tactical units. (See paragraph 13*c*.)

13. There should be a service force serving both the Air and Ground Forces. The question lies in what this service force should do for the combat forces.

Discussion:

a. The Service Force should perform all aspects of supply and service activities which are not organic to tactical units. The Service Force should perform the following:

(1) Design, development, procurement, storage, distribution and disposal of all supplies and equipment (to the requirements specified by the combat forces and approved by the War Department).

(2) Except for that organic to tactical units of the combat forces at various echelons and to the requirements of the combat forces as approved by the War Department:—maintenance of all supplies by rail, water, air and motor vehicle; operation of fixed signal communications; procurement and disposal of real estate; construction, maintenance of structures and fire protection; care of the sick and wounded, hospitalization, sanitation and veterinary service; fiscal services, accounting, disbursing, auditing; personnel services, procurement, classification, assignment, discharge, recreation and welfare; legal services, litigation, claims, contract law, military justice; and other service activities such as exchanges, laundries, publications and blank forms, insurance, mapping, military police, prisoners of war, files and records.

b. On posts utilized by the combat forces, the Service Force should

perform supply and service activities not organic to tactical units utilizing the post. This can take the form of:

(1) A service commander on the post responsible for such activities and under the supervision of the Commanding General of the ASF Service Command. This method relieves the tactical commander of direct responsibility and provides the maximum amount of time and freedom for the command and training of his combat unit.

(2) A tactical commander being responsible to the Commanding General of an ASF Service Command for the performance of these activities. For this method the tactical commander would be furnished the necessary station complement. Such an arrangement provides full command supervision over supply and services at the station level and will permit tactical troops to leave a station without disturbing station activities.

c. The Service Force should be responsible for standards, techniques and procedures for all phases of supply and service activities not directly connected with training and preparation for combat of troops organic in the combat force, and these standards, techniques and procedures should be applied throughout the entire Army. The Service Force should act as the staff agency of the Chief of Staff and Under Secretary of War for supply and service activities throughout the entire Army, *i.e.*, there should be only one Surgeon General who should act as *The* Surgeon General of the Army.

14. No direct command responsibilities below the Chief of Staff should be exercised by any agency in the Zone of the Interior over any supply and service activities in overseas theaters. The theater commander must have command over and be responsible for all Army activities in his theater. Each theater of operations should have a service force for the performance of supply and service functions not organic to the combat elements in the theater. In theaters of operations, all supply and service activities are the responsibility of the theater commander. The air and ground forces should have organic units to perform supply and service functions back to the same tactical level—Army for ground and air force for air. In rear of this level a theater service force should support ground and air alike.

15. *Conclusions.*—It is believed that the system as proposed by the Ground and Service Forces should be adopted. That system will tend to weld the Army into one force and promote the efficiency and welfare of the Army as a whole, whereas, the system as proposed by the Air Forces will tend to separate the combat forces of the Army. The system proposed will eliminate duplication and secure economy in the use of personnel, materiel and funds.

It is recognized that during this war the Army Air Force must retain its responsibility concerning provision of aircraft. However, it is dangerous to the other components of the Army to allow the Army Air Forces to procure all supplies and equipment peculiar to the Air Forces because it permits one component to bid against the others for the utilization of production facilities in the United States. Otherwise, it is believed that the Army should proceed to adopt the system proposed as the conduct of current operations permits.

BEN LEAR,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Army Ground Forces.

BREHON SOMERVELL,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Army Service Forces

TAB D

The term 'Supply and Services' includes the following activities of the Army:

1. Supply.
 - a. Design and standardization of supplies and equipment.
 - b. Procurement of supplies and equipment.
 - c. Distribution, storage and issue of supplies and equipment.
 - d. Maintenance of supplies and equipment.
 - e. Disposal of surplus and unusable supplies and equipment.
2. Transportation of supplies and equipment and troops by rail, water, air and motor vehicle.
3. Communications.
 - a. By electrical means.
 - b. Postal service.
4. Construction of facilities; procurement and disposal of real estate; maintenance of real property; fire prevention and protection.
5. Health.
 - a. Hospitalization and the care of the sick and wounded.
 - b. Sanitation.
 - c. Veterinary service.
6. Fiscal Service. (Appropriated and non-appropriated funds).
 - a. Accounting.
 - b. Disbursing.
 - c. Auditing.
 - d. Insurance.
7. Legal Service.
 - a. Litigation.

- b. Claims.
- c. Military justice.
- d. Contract law.
- 8. Personnel Service.
 - a. Procurement of personnel.
 - b. Classification, assignment, and discharge.
 - c. Personnel records.
 - d. Recreation, welfare and safety of personnel.
 - e. Prisoners of War.
- 9. Miscellaneous Services.
 - a. Mapping.
 - b. Military Police.
 - c. Publications and blank forms.
 - d. Files and records.
 - e. Laundry service.
 - f. Exchange service.
 - g. Food service.
 - b. Military Government."

The issues on the relation of Supply and Service Forces to Combat Forces were well presented but they were not resolved. The status quo was maintained.

Sufficient description and illustration of the development of the organizations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the three major commands have been given to indicate the setting in which the War Department General Staff worked in World War II and the areas in which there existed a need for general staff planning, supervision, and coordination.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IX

1. Par. 400.00 *Services of Supply Organizational Manual* 1942.
2. P. 77, *Army Service Forces Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1944*.
3. Par. 103.01 to 103.04 *Army Service Forces Manual M-301*, July 1943.

Chapter X

The General Staff During World War II

April 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF AND THE
THREE MAJOR COMMANDERS:

At a dinner for me in London, the head of the British Administrative Services read for our amusement a letter that had just come to his attention, written by the Duke of Wellington from Spain about 1810 to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Bradford. I asked for a copy and quote it below for our guidance in the present struggle.

"My Lord,

If I attempted to answer the mass of futile correspondence that surrounds me, I should be debarred from all serious business of campaigning.

I must remind your Lordship—for the last time—that so long as I retain an independent position, I shall see that no officer under my Command is debarred by attending to the futile drivelling of mere quill driving in your Lordship's Office—from attending to his first duty—which is, and always has been, so to train the private men under his command that they may, without question, beat any force opposed to them in the field.

I am,

My Lord,

*Your obedient Servant
(Sgd.) WELLINGTON"*

The reaction to instructions from Washington of a troop commander far from home, in surroundings with which we are utterly unfamiliar, may be akin to those of the Great Duke, and we could well govern ourselves accordingly.

*(Signature) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff.*

With the world-wide war developments, with the many strategical, administrative, political, training, and other problems, and with the growth of the headquarters of the three major commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, the War Department General Staff, greatly curtailed in strength, faced a crucial test after the March 1942 reorganization. Many of the veteran Regular Army General Staff officers left to take commands in the field. The experienced General Staff officers who remained, though inwardly doubtful that the General Staff shell left after the reorganization could handle the gigantic tasks ahead, were determined to make a go of the streamlined staff and to achieve the

goal of staff planning, coordination, and supervision through maximum decentralization and with the minimum number of directives.

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF SYSTEM IN WORLD WAR II

In March 1942 it was thus necessary for the War Department General Staff to take stock of itself and the changed conditions and to determine what its new role was to be. Certain points were clear. In number of personnel the General Staff was now committed emphatically to a policy of a small streamlined organization that did not engage in administrative or operational details. Likewise, all understood the Chief of Staff's decided views that the commanders of the overseas commands in particular and of the three major commands and the Defense Commands in the United States were to be treated with all possible consideration. The task was to see how their wishes could be met, and there was to be no repetition of World War I experience when General Pershing and his staff were critical of the attitude and understanding of the War Department. Also, it was made clear initially, and a number of times thereafter, that field commanders were not to be harassed by requiring them to make innumerable reports or to read voluminous detailed instructions.

All this did not mean that the officers on the General Staff no longer had a job to do. Quite the contrary, they were expected to know what was going on both in the United States and overseas; they were expected to recommend the establishment of well considered policies on personnel, intelligence, training, supply, and operational matters. If the Chief of Staff wanted to know why certain actions had been permitted, why a commander had not been authorized to go ahead and do what he wished, what was the story behind a news item critical of the Army, why a radio from overseas had not been answered promptly, or any of a host of other questions, the appropriate general staff officer had better know the answer. Similarly, when information for the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff was needed to answer or give information to the President, Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other government departments, the press and the radio, it had to be forthcoming overnight. The well established and traditional General Staff mission of planning, coordinating and supervising was still there. Instead of a large number of not too high-ranking and comparatively amenable commanders and staff officers to coordinate, there were, after March 1942, a number of extremely important and high-ranking commanders who were properly conscious of their momentous command responsibilities and who were insistent on having all the necessary means, and who thought that perhaps a safety factor of additional means might be included, even

though these were in short supply and insufficient to go around. If at all possible, the General Staff answer had better be "yes." But if the right answer was "no" it had better be "no," but "no" explained in such a fashion that the reason was apparent. Finally, and most important, the General Staff had to assist the Chief of Staff in exercising the necessary leadership. Among other things, this involved indicating when and where conditions were unsatisfactory, pushing individuals when that was needed; pressing for better performance; suggesting indirectly if possible new methods to replace obsolete ones; attempting to reduce requirements down to what could be made available; and taking a number of unpleasant actions when such actions were unquestionably necessary. The World War II problems of the War Department General Staff were thus more matters of improved technique than changes in organization.

GROWTH OF GENERAL STAFF IN WORLD WAR II

Despite all the efforts to the contrary, the War Department General and Special Staff sections did increase after March, 1942 in number of personnel and in new sections that were added, though increases came usually as a measure of last resort to meet conditions that could not be ignored. Among the General Staff Divisions, the G-1 Personnel, the G-3 Organization and Training, and the G-4 Supply Divisions did not increase greatly in personnel nor change radically in organization. The G-2 Intelligence and OPD Operations Divisions increased very considerably in numbers and changed materially in organization in order to carry out more efficiently their wartime duties. There were many changes in the War Department Special Staff both in number of personnel and in new divisions that had to be established. In March, 1942 the special staff sections totaled three in number; the Bureau of Public Relations, which reported directly to the Secretary of War's office, the Office of the Inspector General, and the Legislative and Liaison Division. By the end of 1944 the Civil Affairs Division, the Budget Division, the Special Planning Division, the New Developments Division, the War Department Manpower Board, and several other special sections and groups had been added as members of the War Department Special Staff. The diagram of the War Department organization at the middle of the war period (January, 1944) is shown on page 469.

How much the War Department General and Special Staff Divisions were able to resist the tendency to increase in personnel strength is shown by the comparison of strengths in the table on page 468.

At first glance it might appear that the old adage about how staffs tend to increase was correct, or that staffs though crushed to earth

COMPARISON OF PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

	January 31, 1942		April 30, 1942		June 30, 1943		June 30, 1944		November 30, 1944	
	Officers and Enlisted Clerks		Officers and Enlisted Clerks		Officers and Enlisted Clerks		Officers and Enlisted Clerks		Officers and Enlisted Clerks	
Organization	Officers	Enlisted Clerks	Officers	Enlisted Clerks	Officers	Enlisted Clerks	Officers	Enlisted Clerks	Officers	Enlisted Clerks
G-1, Personnel.....	67	81	13	22	15	26	35	33	56	44
G-2, Intelligence.....	390	599	16	10	388	1,149	583	1,158	621	1,169
Military Intelligence Service.....	—	—	342	1,005	—	—	—	—	—	—
G-3, Organization and Training.....	88	107	16	35	17	29	34	41	44	39
G-4, Supply.....	149	138	11	26	16	38	35	42	37	45
OPD, Operations.....	75	57	121	204	154	329	203	333	217	323
Bureau of Public Relations.....	58	—	—	—	105	317	135	346	142	—
Legislative and Liaison.....	—	—	9	14	11	20	18	25	31	34
Inspector General.....	48	—	55	—	120	114	112	85	140	75
Civil Affairs Division.....	—	—	—	—	25	43	28	33	26	34
New Developments Division.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	11	10	12
Budget Division.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	13	25	13	29
Special Planning Division.....	—	—	—	—	—	—	22	21	28	25
War Department Manpower Board	—	—	—	—	13	12	11	11	14	16
Army Air Forces*.....	664	—	885	3309	1,936	3,843	2,395	5,521	2,561	5,403
Army Ground Forces*.....	—	—	212	512	267	973	335	978	350	935
Army Service Forces*.....	—	—	4,177	33,067	5,381	32,294	5,683	30,133	5,636	29,743

*Includes Washington Staff and Departmental Sections but no field agencies.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT - JANUARY 1944




CHART 24

will rise and thrive again. More detailed study of the data indicates that for about a year and three months the line was held and but few increases were made. But even by the end of 1944 most of the General Staff divisions were considerably below their personnel strengths for January 31, 1942. By the end of 1944 the Operations Division had approximately tripled its officer strength and had increased its civilian and enlisted personnel six-fold over what the old War Plans Division had in January, 1942. The Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff and the Military Intelligence Service doubled in size between 1942 and 1944. In these fields it was accepted that the administrative and operating functions inherent in the performance of General Staff duties had to be included as an integral part of the work of these General Staff divisions.

The changes in organization and in personnel strength of the General Staff Divisions were noteworthy principally because they illustrated the most controversial aspect of General Staff philosophy. How can you plan, coordinate, and supervise effectively unless you have the administrative and operational means to collect the necessary information, to keep in touch with the day-to-day activities by being in the channel of communication, to implement the directives by whatever amount of executive work is necessary, and to inspect to insure compliance and coordination? The answer which was implicit in the 1942 reorganization was that subordinate agencies could be called upon to perform or assist in practically all of this work and that the General Staff Divisions need not have the means within their own organization to do all of this. The World War II years thus provided an excellent test of this doctrine and the activities of the General Staff will be scrutinized with this in mind. The answer to the question is difficult to state in general terms; application to specific cases is necessary and consideration must also be given to the technique of control and improvements in procedure.

IMPROVEMENTS IN STAFF COMMUNICATION—1942

The 1942 reorganization precipitated a complete re-examination of channels of communication and the procedures involved in filing and in handling radiograms, secret letters, and ordinary correspondence. This would have come anyway as the prewar practices were, to somewhat understate the case, inadequate. Here was an important field that had been neglected in war planning and this was due, of course, to the idea that the General Staff must not become involved in administrative matters although there were other contributing factors. In peacetime the War Department did not have the funds nor the need for expensive equipment to handle a large volume of business quickly. The vol-

ume was not present and time was not pressing. Army officers were not concerned about this kind of problem. For their experience had been largely with small Army units and they naturally applied what they had learned there to all similar problems, ignoring the element of size. When war became imminent, everyone was too busy to be concerned with the details of procedure and the methods of handling communications. At the same time, the dictates of military security had to be observed and additional safeguards were introduced to prevent the disclosure of military information. The result was that at the very time simpler, faster, and more effective methods were needed, the exact opposite was the trend because of the imposition of additional safeguards with no change in method. Peacetime disregard, wartime expansion in volume, urgent wartime need for speed, wartime inability of men in authority to consider the problem, and the continual imposition of additional security safeguards while exposing horrible examples where slips occurred and taking disciplinary action to frighten everyone—these were the things that made procedures the Achilles' heel of the War Department as the War Department side of the Pearl Harbor story indicated only too well. Whether there had been a 1942 reorganization or not, it was inevitable that drastic steps of some kind would have had to be taken to gear the War Department procedurally to a war tempo and a gigantic volume.

In January and February, 1942, a number of officers in the Office of the Chief of Staff became concerned with the processing of incoming and outgoing secret messages. Their purpose was to coordinate the action on messages and to secure more rapid transmission and delivery. At that time the War Department Signal Center, a part of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, received or transmitted these messages and did the encoding and decoding work. Developing the world-wide Army radio network was a very large undertaking in itself. The tasks of verifying that the message was authentic and properly coordinated, that the appropriate offices received information copies, that an action copy of an incoming message was properly routed, and that all the other minutiae were properly performed was the job of a section of the Adjutant General's Office. Then there was also the Message Center of the Office of the Chief of Staff, which directed the routing of messages to the Secretary of War's office, the Chief of Staff's office, and the War Department General Staff Divisions. Further, each General Staff Division had its own Message Center and Record Room. When the War Department Code Center deciphered a message, one copy would be sent to the addressee or office that should handle the matter of the message involved and take necessary action. Long-time Army custom had

decreed that all communications to the War Department be sent to the Adjutant General (AGWAR). On many messages it was no small task to determine who should get it, particularly in those days of 1941 when General Headquarters, the Air Force, the War Plans Division of the General Staff, and Office of the Chief of Staff had overlapping duties. When the addressee or designated office received the message, he acted upon it or had the responsibility of transferring it to someone who could handle it. Likewise, he was responsible for preparing such extra copies as were needed to send information copies to the appropriate offices. If this was neglected or delayed, important information was thus withheld. The bugaboo of security was such that the constant temptation was to ignore the need for fast and accurate distribution of many messages when many copies of the message were needed. These messages would consequently be copied a great number of times in a succession of offices and sections, which took much time.

On April 1, 1942, the War Department Classified Message Center (WDCMC) was established as an agency of the Office, Chief of Staff under the general supervision of the Secretary, War Department General Staff. It was created to provide one central agency within the War Department for the handling of all classified (secret, confidential, etc.) cables, radiograms and telegrams, thus to insure essential coordination in the handling of such messages. Its responsibilities included:

a. Processing of all incoming and outgoing classified messages transmitted by electrical means.

(1) *Assignment of action*: WDCMC assigned each incoming classified message to an appropriate agency for action, making the assignment on the basis of message content and not necessarily in accordance with the address.

(2) *Assignment of information*: WDCMC furnished information copies of both outgoing and incoming classified messages to all agencies having sufficient interest in the subject matter to warrant receiving distribution.

b. Operation of overseas radio conference facilities (classified).

c. Publication and distribution of a register of incoming and outgoing messages received and dispatched during the preceding calendar day.

d. Preparation for the Chief of Staff of the daily log of important messages received and dispatched. The log included current operations and intelligence reports, as well as all other messages that should be brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff. Copies of the log were furnished to the Chief of Staff for the Commander in Chief; the Secretary of War; the Deputy Chief of Staff; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations; and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

e. Preparation for the Chief of Staff of situation maps covering the operational and intelligence reports placed in the daily log.

Mechanical equipment was provided; appropriate forms and reproduction facilities were installed; and other steps were taken to make the system capable of handling thousands where tens of radio messages had formerly been processed. The lesson was learned the hard way, but once learned it was properly exploited. As theater headquarters were established overseas, representatives, forms, and equipment were sent over and identical systems installed.

At the same time this improvement was being made, each of the three new major commands were either establishing or reorganizing their message centers and record rooms. The management control divisions in both the Air Forces and the Service Forces were devising new forms and new procedures to reconcile the requirements of speed, volume, and security. Illustrative of this type of work was the project to provide faster handling of secret action mail and radios in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff.

In Operations Division the problem was to get the action mail as soon as possible to the officer who would have to do the work on it. Before the war pressure grew, the message would be passed on down successively until it reached the low level where work was to be started. Even after the war had begun a sample check indicated that it took seven representative messages an average of nearly 26 hours to go from the receiving clerk to the section that assigned the responsibility for action. The detailed steps in handling Operations Division secret action mail were about 100 in number:

- (1) Division messenger obtains mail from the Office, Chief of Staff Mail or Distribution Room.
- (2) Division messenger signs receipt book.
- (3) Division messenger delivers to Receiving Clerk (Chief Clerk's Office).
- (4) Receiving Clerk opens and time stamps.
- (5) Receiving Clerk reads and decides on group or section to handle.
- (6) Division messenger takes mail to Supervisor, Record Section.
- (7) Supervisor, Record Section, reads and passes to Classifier.
- (8) Classifier reads, classifies by Dewey Decimal Classification, enters on 3x5 file card, and attaches it.
- (9) Typist obtains mail from Classifier.
- (10) Typist reads and classifies by WPD Classification.
- (11) Typist obtains WPD Classification Manual and checks cross references (4).

(12) Typist types on 3x5 Index Card Dewey and WPD cross reference numbers, digest, group referred.

(13) Typist types on Referral Form, Dewey number, date, subject, group referred.

(14) Typist obtains Daily Record Form and types Dewey number, digest, group referred.

Note: Daily Record is made in duplicate—one copy for Record Room, other for Executive Office.

(15) Typist passes 3x5 Index Card to tray and Daily Record Form to table.

(16) Typist carries mail with Referral Form attached to Supervisor, Record Section.

(17) Supervisor, Record Section, checks work of Classifier and Typist and puts in Out basket.

(18) Division messenger obtains mail and carries to Division Executive Office. (See (A) for supplementary steps.)

(19) Division Executive Officer reads, and checks group referred and occasionally refers to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations.

(20) Division messenger obtains and carries to Operations Group Executive Officer.

(21) Group Executive Officer reads, assigns to Section.

(22) Secretary registers — date, Dewey number, subject, section assignment — puts in Out basket. (See (B) for supplementary steps.)

(23) Division messenger obtains and carries to Section Record Room — puts in an officer's basket.

(24) First officer reads and passes to a private.

(25) Private fills out Form B in pencil—Dewey number; classifies finer in some cases, determines two or three cross references, subject, time, brief—attaches to mail and passes to second officer.

(26) Second officer reads, assigns Section Number and writes it on Form B, on the basic communication, and on Journal which is filled out in pencil. (See (C) for supplementary steps.)

(27) Second officer assigns mail to Section Officer for action and enters on Form B. (See (D) for supplementary steps.)

(28) Private carries mail to Section Chief.

(29) Section Chief reads, and confirms or changes assignment.

(30) Private obtains and carries mail to officer assigned.

(31) If assignment is changed, private returns mail to section Record Room and changes assignment entry on Form B and Journal.

(32) Private carries to officer X.

(33) Officer X registers on personal journal—date, number, subject.

(34) Officer X reads, takes action, puts into Out basket.

- (35) Officer X enters on personal journal the action and date.
 - (36) Private takes mail to Section Chief.
 - (37) Section Chief reads or reviews, signs if required, puts in Out basket.
 - (38) Private takes to Section Record Room, and gives to officer noted in (24).
 - (39) First officer reads to learn action and passes to private.
 - (40A) If concurrence, private completes Form B—(by whom handled)—private completes Journal, action taken, etc.
 - (40B) If original action, private takes off a copy of action, makes another Form B, files Form B in a serial file beginning with 1 each month, files action copy in Dewey System file.
 - (40C) If chief of section does not accept responsibility, private enters action on Form B and holds it as a tickler. When approved, private receives copy of letter, entry is made in Journal for second time and Form B is filed.
 - (41) Division messenger obtains mail and takes to group Executive Office.
 - (42) Group Executive reads and passes to group Chief or discusses with him.
 - (43) Secretary enters action on her register and puts in Out basket.
 - (44) Division messenger obtains and takes to Receiving Clerk (Chief Clerk's Office).
 - (45) Receiving Clerk checks to see if mail is properly assembled and puts in Out basket.
 - (46) Division messenger obtains and takes to Division Executive Office.
 - (47) Division Executive Officer reads and may refer to Division Chief—the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations.
 - (48) Division Executive Officer checks daily record (see note under 14) and releases mail.
 - (49) Division messenger obtains and takes mail to Division Chief Clerk.
 - (50) Chief Clerk scans papers for content and passes to Dispatch Clerk.
 - (51) Dispatch Clerk stamps signatures on copies, time stamps.
 - (52) Dispatch Clerk separates file copy and Referral Form.
 - (53) Dispatch Clerk prepares Receipt Form—date, digest of subject.
 - (54) Dispatch Clerk encloses in jacket and puts in Out basket.
 - (55) Division messenger obtains and passes mail out of Division.
- (See (E) for supplementary steps.)

There were these additional supplementary steps:

(A) Record Room.

1. Second Typist obtains 3x5 card from tray (see 15) and
2. Searches for 5x8 cross reference cards (average 4).
3. Second Typist types information from 3x5 cards to each 5x8 card.
4. Second Typist files 3x5 card in Active Section of file.
5. Second Typist carries and files 5x8 cards in WPD Classification files.

(B) Secretary, Group Office, on first and fifteenth of month makes list of open entries on her register and sends to Section Chiefs as a follow-up.

(C) Typist, Section Record Office, types two copies of Journal, one to be kept and one to send to the general or colonel heading the group.

(D) Form B is used as a tickler on the mail assigned.

(E) Supplementary steps:

- (1) Division messenger returns receipt to Dispatch Clerk.
- (2) Dispatch Clerk attaches receipt to file copy and Referral Form.
- (3) Division messenger takes these papers to Supervisor, Record Section.
- (4) Supervisor, Record Section, assigns and carries papers to Typist.
- (5) Typist obtains 3x5 card (see A 4).
- (6) Typist types 3x5 card disposition date, to whom referred and passes to tray.
- (7) Typist obtains Daily Record binder.
- (8) Typist removes page and enters disposition (same as E 6).
- (9) Typist inserts sheet in Daily Record binder and puts away.
- (10) Typist passes file copy and Referral Form to tray.
- (11) File Clerk obtains file copy and Referral Form from tray.
- (12) File Clerk obtains file jacket from cabinet.
- (13) File Clerk's de-acco's and inserts material chronologically in the folder.
- (14) File Clerk types entry on Accession Sheet in folder — date, digest of subject.
- (15) File Clerk reassembles folder and fastens.
- (16) File Clerk takes jacket and replaces in file.
- (17) File Clerk obtains 3x5 card (see E 6).
- (18) File Clerk takes 3x5 card and files in 'Awaiting Comeback' section of file.
- (19) File Clerk receives pink disposition slip from Office of Chief of Staff.
- (20) Receiving Clerk forwards to officer who took action.
- (21) Receiving Clerk receives pink disposition slip from officer.

- (22) Receiving Clerk forwards slip to Supervisor, Record Room.
- (23) Supervisor, Record Room, sends slip to File Clerk.
- (24) File Clerk obtains corresponding jacket (see E 16).
- (25) File Clerk staples disposition slip to Stayback copy in folder.
- (26) File Clerk takes jacket and replaces in file.
- (27) Receiving Clerk receives Comeback from The Adjutant General.
- (28) Receiving Clerk forwards to Supervisor, Record Section.
- (29) Supervisor, Record Section carries to File Clerk.
- (30) File Clerk obtains 3x5 card (see E 18).
- (31) File Clerk date stamps 3x5 card.
- (32) File Clerk takes 3x5 card and files in "Inactive" Section of file.
- (33) File Clerk obtains jacket (see 26) from cabinet.
- (34) File Clerk de-acco's, inserts comeback, takes out and destroys stayback and pink slip (E 25).
- (35) File Clerk refiles jacket in cabinet.

The improved procedure involved the use of a Combined Routing-Information-Filing Form and the use of the ditto process to make adequate copies. The new system involved the following steps:

(1) Division messenger obtains mail from Office, Chief of Staff Mail or Distribution Rooms.

(2) Division messenger signs receipt book.

(3) Division Messenger Service sorts mail, giving secret mail to Secret Mail Dispatcher.

(4) Secret Mail Dispatcher opens and reads.

(5) Secret Mail Dispatcher enters on a preliminary dispatch sheet the following:

Time stamp,

Subject, or a check mark when subject on letter is satisfactory,

Digest when message is very important and others besides the Action Section are concerned,

Underline primary subject and cross-reference subjects if any,

Dewey Decimal Classification Number or Numbers when cross reference is needed,

Section or group chief who is to take action,

Others interested, for example—Division Executive, Group Chief, etc.

Attaches sheet to message and passes to Typist.

(6) Typist makes Ditto Master dispatch sheet from preliminary sheet, puts master on duplicator and makes necessary copies, attaches one to message and puts in Out basket or calls Dispatch Messenger. (See (A) (B) for supplementary steps.)

- (7) Dispatch messenger takes message to Section Chief.
- (8) Section Chief reads, takes initiative to talk to Group Chief if necessary, then assigns to officer by writing name on dispatch sheet and passes to secretary or assistant.
- (9) Secretary (or assistant) to Section Chief takes dispatch sheet and delivers message to officer for action. (See (C) for supplementary steps.)
- (10) Officer takes action and forwards message to Section Chief.
- (11) Section Chief reads and when approved passes to his secretary (see 9).
- (12) Secretary (Section) keeps copy of action paper for file, attaches dispatch sheet and takes to Group Chief's Secretary (or assistant).
- (13) Secretary (Group) notes on Group Chief's copy of dispatch sheet that message is received and passes action paper to Group Chief.
- (14) Group Chief reads, and when approved, passes to his secretary (see B 6).
- (15) Secretary (Group) enters any further action on Group Chief's copy of dispatch sheet and holds, then takes or forwards action paper to Division Executive.
- (16) Division Executive Officer reads and may refer to Division Chief.
- (17) Division Executive Officer destroys his copy of dispatch sheet or holds for reference and forwards action paper.
- (18) Division messenger obtains and delivers action paper to Dispatch Clerk (Record Room).
- (19) Dispatch Clerk reviews papers for completeness; time stamps, stamps signatures on copies, etc.
- (20) Dispatch Clerk separates file copy and dispatch sheet and enters action taken on dispatch sheet.
- (21) Dispatch Clerk prepares receipt form in usual way.
- (22) Dispatch Clerk encloses in jacket and forwards by dispatch messenger.
- (23) Dispatch messenger takes mail to destination out of Division. See (D).

Supplementary steps in handling by the new plan:

- (A) Typist makes necessary copies of dispatch sheet (in addition to the one which goes on the message) including:

Copy to Division Executive (or Chief),

Copy to Group Chief,

Copies to any record clerks who must keep a record,

5x8 Dewey Decimal Primary file card for Record Room,

5x8 cross reference cards for Record Room,

8x10¹/₂ copies on paper for any section where message must be put on a tickler plan.

(B)

(1) Typist forwards copies of dispatch sheet to Division Executive, Group Chief and any others concerned secondarily, by Dispatch messenger.

(2) Typist forwards or passes 5x8 cards to Supervisor, Records.

(3) Division Executive reads digest and refers any urgent cases to Division Chief.

(4) Division Executive holds copy of dispatch sheet until message arrives.

(5) Group Chief or Executive reads digest and, if any questions arise, talks to the Section Chief by phone or calls for conference, but Section Chief takes initiative (see (8) above).

(6) Group Chief holds copy of dispatch sheet until message arrives.

(7) Supervisor, Record Section, checks papers and cards to be familiar with them and passes to file clerk.

(8) File clerk files primary 5x8 Dewey Decimal card and cross reference cards.

(C) Secretary files dispatch sheet in ring binder which becomes the tickler and reference book.

(D)

(1) Dispatch messenger returns receipt to dispatch clerk.

(2) Dispatch clerk attaches receipt to file copy and dispatch form and puts in "file" basket for file clerk.

(3) File clerk obtains papers.

(4) File clerk obtains Dewey Decimal primary card, enters date and officer who took action.

(5) File clerk's entry is by hand; card is refiled.

(6) File clerk de-acco's and inserts material chronologically.

(7) File clerk types entry on Accession Sheet in folder—date, subject.

(8) File clerk reassembles folder and fastens.

(9) File clerk replaces folder in file.

(10) Receiving clerk receives pink disposition slip from Office, Chief of Staff.

(11) Receiving clerk forwards to officer who took action.

(12) Record Room receives pink disposition slip from officer.

(13) File clerk obtains jacket.

(14) File clerk staples slip to stayback copy.

(15) File clerk replaces jacket in file.

(16) Record Room receives comeback from The Adjutant General's Office.

- (17) File clerk obtains jacket from cabinet.
- (18) File clerk de-acco's, inserts comeback, takes out and destroys stayback and pink slip.
- (19) File clerk refiles jacket in cabinet.¹

The actions taken to improve the handling of papers were minor yet indispensable steps in establishing for the Chief of Staff in the War Department a command post geared to the requirements of a global war. They were the little things that had to be done before the major change could become effective.

OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF— WORLD WAR II

The Operations Division started as a consolidation of War Plans Division and General Headquarters. Gradually it achieved the organization best suited to carry out its mission. By the end of 1944 the organization shown on page 481 had been evolved. It considered its responsibilities and functions to be as follows:

"Responsibility. The Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD will be responsible for the formulation and development of strategic, logistical, and operational plans and for assisting the Chief of Staff in the strategic direction of the military forces in theaters of war. The Operations Division will—

1. In conjunction with the agencies of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, develop and keep current the future strategic, operations, and logistical plans involving the Army of the United States.

2. Estimate the current situation to determine military policy, objectives, requirements, and means.

3. Initiate War Department execution of the actions approved by the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate agencies.

4. Act as command post for the Chief of Staff for all theaters of operations, defense commands, and base commands and direct and coordinate the activities of the three major commands in the zone of the interior, required to carry out approved decisions relating to the military operations of theaters of operations, defense commands, and base commands.

5. Maintain information and advise on the requirements and availability of troops, units (including location), and supplies required for projected military operations; initiate action to adjust unit and supply programs as required; and direct, coordinate, and give guidance on all matters pertaining to control of troop movements between, to, and from theaters, including redeployment.




CHART 25

6. Furnish necessary guidance to other agencies of the War Department concerning current and projected operations and future plans.

7. Provide representation on various boards and committees of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and on the Joint Board on Defense, Canada-United States; the Joint Mexico-United States Defense Commission; the Communications Coordination Committee; the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee; and other committees; and provide a working member in the Civil Affairs Division.

Organization. The subdivisions of the Operations Division and their functions are:

1. *Executive Group.* Is final coordinating agency on all matters for which the Operations Division is responsible and provides administrative controls and services for the Division, including personnel services, classified message center, division records, and security control.

2. *Strategy and Policy Group.* In conjunction with appropriate agencies of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, formulates plans and policies involving the Army of the United States. Furnishes strategic guidance to other agencies of the War Department General Staff and the three major commands. Reviews and, after coordination with other interested War Department agencies, recommends action to the Chief of Staff on action papers of the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. Initiates and follows-up on War Department implementing action resulting from decisions of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate agencies. Furnishes officers for duty with the Joint War Plans Committee, the Joint Post-War Committee, the Aeronautical Board, the Munitions Assignment Sub-committee (Air), and *ad hoc* sub-committees of supporting agencies of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group is the Army member of the Joint Staff Planners and the United States Army member of the Combined Staff Planners.

a. *Strategy Section.* Estimates the current war situation and initiates or reviews and coordinates strategic and operational plans. Specifically:

(1) Furnishes formal and informal strategic guidance to other agencies of the War Department General Staff and to agencies of the three major commands.

(2) In collaboration with G-2, maintains current estimates of the situation in theaters of operations to determine military objectives and possible lines of action.

(3) Initiates or reviews strategic plans and reviews operational plans for the Chief, Strategy and Policy Group and advises him on strategy matters.

(4) Reviews and coordinates plans of theater commanders and of General Staff divisions as they relate to strategy.

(5) Reviews, coordinates, and processes for the Chief of Staff all papers involving strategic plans submitted to the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

(6) Reviews and advises on demobilization and post-war plans.

(7) The War Department General Staff member of the Joint Post-War Committee is assigned from this section.
are drawn from the Strategy and Policy Group.

(6) Reviews and coordinates with other sections of Operations Division Plans Committee is the working committee of the Joint Staff Planners to prepare war plans, studies, and estimates as directed. Army members

c. Policy Section. In conjunction with appropriate agencies of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, formulates policies on matters

b. Army Section of Joint War Plans Committee. The Joint War

(3) Reviews all War Department papers to be referred to the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Chief of Staff.

(4) Reviews, coordinates, and processes for the Chief of Staff all papers on subjects, other than strategic plans, submitted to the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

affecting present or future military operations; coordinates all matters affecting the War Department under consideration by the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff; and insures that decisions of the Joint and the Combined Chiefs of Staff are implemented by appropriate War Department action. Specifically:

(1) Prepares staff studies on Joint and Combined policy matters.

(2) Initiates appropriate War Department implementing action on all decisions of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate agencies and follows up to insure that action is taken.
appropriate Secretariat.

(5) Provides the formal channel of communication between War Department agencies and Joint or Combined agencies through the sion and with other War Department agencies, studies under consideration by the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff or their subordinate agencies.

3. *Theater Group.* Serves as the operating command post for the Chief of Staff for all military operations beyond the continental limits of the United States and for defense commands. Receives from each theater of operations, defense command, and base command, requirements, requests, and recommendations pertaining to allocation of troops, supplies, equipment, and operational plans; investigates and determines

the justification for such requests, and recommends priorities for personnel, materiel, and units. Prepares and publishes WD Troop Deployment and the Six Months Forecast of Unit Requirements and maintains individual troop basis for each theater of operations, defense, and base command. Exercises control over documents governing overseas movements and redeployment of all U. S. Army Forces and directs and controls such movements. Maintains liaison for the Operations Division with the State Department, Navy Department, and other government agencies.

a. Southwest Pacific Section. Handles or monitors War Department action relating to the Southwest Pacific Theater; keeps currently informed of plans, operations, supply status, and problems of the theater, and represents its interests in the War Department. Specifically:

(1) Keeps the theater commander currently informed on War Department decisions, orders, regulations, policies, and actions, including information on status of units to be moved and unit movements.

(2) Reviews requests, recommendations, and reports of the theater commander, pertaining to operations, personnel, organization, training, supply, and other matters; determines their justification and modifies them when necessary to meet over-all War Department requirements; transmits such recommendations to War Department and other agencies for necessary action; and monitors action taken.

(3) Provides information and guidance to other groups of OPD and other War Department agencies on plans, operations, status, and other matters pertaining to the Southwest Pacific Theater.

(4) Reviews and coordinates proposed War Department actions, plans, and programs affecting the Southwest Pacific Theater, including:

(a) troop basis and changes.

(b) activation, inactivation, constitution, disbandment, Tables of Organization, Equipment, and Allowances, and organization and reorganization of units.

(c) disposition by transfer or inactivation of units declared excess.

(d) overhead allotment for theater.

(e) fillers and replacements.

(f) rotation and leave policies and adjustments.

(g) personnel and equipment priorities, allocations, and levels of supply.

(h) unit requirements and availability of units and replacements.

(i) unit movement orders and troop movements; shipping and water priorities.

(j) availability of equipment and supplies for special units and operations.

- (k) air transportation, air tonnage allocations, and air priorities.
- (l) recommendations on the selection and promotion of general officers and assignment of other officers for special duties.
- (m) training of units, correction of training deficiencies, and special training.
- (n) civil affairs matters.
- (5) Anticipates operational and logistical requirements in the Southwest Pacific Theater to the extent required to permit ready solutions to problems arising from changes in the tactical situation.
- (6) Reviews operations reports and intelligence reports for the Southwest Pacific Theater; prepares periodic operations summaries and operational and special intelligence studies; prepares situation maps and studies for current and future operations; and maintains statistical and historical records of operations, and current intelligence information as required.
- (7) Provides members on boards and committees of the War Department and of Joint or Combined agencies, in connection with operations in the Southwest Pacific Theater.
- (8) Maintains direct contact on matters concerning the Southwest Pacific Theater with other General Staff divisions, the major commands, the Navy Department, and other agencies.
- (9) Makes arrangements on special matters involving the Southwest Pacific Theater such as visits of Very Important Persons, Red Cross services, settlement of foreign claims, etc.
- (10) Furnishes officers as observers for special operations and as exchange officers in the theater.

b. American Theater Section. Performs functions indicated in paragraph *a* above, pertaining to: Caribbean Defense Command; U. S. Army Forces in South Atlantic; Eastern Defense Command; Southern Defense Command; Western Defense Command; Greenland, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Iceland Base Commands; U. S. Army Forces Azores; U. S. Army Forces Central Canada; U. S. Army Forces Eastern Canada; Alaskan Department; and staff control over the Northwest Service Command, which is under the command of Army Service Forces. Prepares and coordinates on policies, plans, and procedures for effecting military cooperation with the American Republics, including Lend-Lease matters and the furnishing of Army materiel and services. Handles matters pertaining to all Latin-American military missions. The Chief, American Theater Section is a member of the Joint Advisory Board on American Republics.

c. Asiatic Theater Section. Performs functions indicated in paragraph *a* above, pertaining to the China-Burma-India Theater.

d. European Theater Section. Performs functions indicated in par *a* above, pertaining to the European Theater.

e. Mediterranean Theater Section. Performs the function indicated in par *a* above, pertaining to the North African and Middle East-Central African Theaters, the Persian Gulf Command, and the U. S. Military Mission to the U.S.S.R. Handles matters pertaining to military missions in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

f. Pacific Theater Section. Performs the functions indicated in par *a* above, pertaining to the Pacific Theater, with special regard to coordination with the Navy Department.

g. Troop Control Section. Exercises over-all control of requirements, allocations, availability, priority, and movement of troops for all theaters of operations, defense commands, and base commands. Specifically:

(1) In coordination with other War Department agencies, investigates, analyzes, and determines justification of unit requirements; investigates and determines means, resources, and priorities; makes allocations of units to theaters; prepares staff studies on special requirements for theaters.

(2) Formulates and directs publication of movement orders for units and replacements moving to theaters and directives for inter-theater (including redeployment), and domestic movements within the sphere of OPD responsibility.

(3) Obtains and processes Status Reports on units moving overseas; processes clearance reports for sailing of units to overseas destinations with Office of Chief of Transportation; processes Inspector General reports on preparation of units for overseas service; prepares reports on special units placed under movement orders; coordinates shipping priorities on unit movements; maintains control system over all committed units; and makes deferments and deletions from movement orders of unqualified units.

(4) Coordinates with Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 on the troop basis and activation schedules and advises that division of changes and adjustments.

(5) Prepares, publishes, distributes, and keeps up-to-date War Department Troop Deployment and the Six Months Forecast of Unit Requirements.

(6) Directs and supervises the preparation, publication, and revision of Preparation for Overseas Movement of Units, Preparation for Overseas Movement of Air Units, Preparation for Overseas Movement of Replacements and other documents governing overseas movements, and renders decisions on Special POM questions.

(7) Coordinates requirements and prepares reports on present and

projected overseas and inter-theater (including redeployment) movements and shipping requirements and prepares plans and reports and maintains records on unit movements, staging area and port activities, sailings, arrivals, shipping facilities, movements to staging areas, and related matters.

(8) Estimates future overseas requirements for replacements, fillers, and rotational personnel; allocates replacements and fillers to fill requisitions and advises Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 on requirements and allocations and coordinates with Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1 and G-3 on policies and plans pertaining to grades and ratings, rotation, furlough, strength reports, priorities for procurement, retraining of wounded, reassignment and discharge.

(9) Plans for execution of strategic plans by control of resources and directs the movement of troops and their equipment to theaters in accordance with allocations and plans and executes returning of units in excess of overseas requirements and provides for disposition at destination.

b. Liaison Section. Maintains liaison on operational matters for the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD with the State Department, Navy Department, and other Government agencies. Specifically:

(1) Maintains daily liaison with the State Department on military matters which have diplomatic or political implications and matters of national policy which affect military plans and operations and informs the State Department on the progress of military operations.

(2) Maintains daily liaison with the Navy Department on matters of interest to both departments, including current naval operations.

(3) Obtains the recommendations and coordination of the State and Navy Departments on matters under consideration of the Operations Division.

(4) Keeps the Commanding General, Air Transport Command informed of War Department decisions, orders, regulations, and policies.

(5) Provides the War Department representative on the State, War, and Navy Committee on 99-Year Leased Bases in British Territory.

(6) Provides the Operations Division representatives on the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee which assesses damage to enemy shipping.

(7) Maintains liaison, and takes action for the Theater Groups, on special matters involving more than one theater including legal matters, prisoner of war matters, Air Transport Command matters, war crimes, and soldier voting.

4. *Logistics Group.* In conjunction with appropriate agencies of the

Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, develops logistical plans involving the Army of the United States. Furnishes logistical planning guidance to other OPD Groups and War Department agencies. Advises on, and recommends or makes determinations with respect to, logistical aspects of current and future operations and to supply problems of theaters of operations, base commands, and defense commands. Provides membership on committees and boards of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Chief, Logistics Group is a member of the Combined Administrative Committee, the Joint Logistics Committee, and the War Department Budget Advisory Committee.

a. Projected Logistics Section. Analyzes, coordinates, and makes recommendations on the logistical aspects of strategic plans and operational projects and furnishes information and guidance to other War Department agencies on projected logistical plans. Specifically:

(1) Analyzes, coordinates with other agencies concerned, and prepares recommendations on logistical aspects of joint and combined papers for the Chief, Logistics Group and the Strategy and Policy Group and assists and advises the Chief, Logistics Group, in his work as member of the Joint Logistics Committee and the Combined Administrative Committee.

(2) Analyzes, coordinates with appropriate War Department agencies, and takes action upon theater operational projects, with particular reference to suitability and availability of supply, effect on other theaters, conformance with strategic plans, and other logistical considerations.

(3) Provides representatives on the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, which is the working committee of the Joint Logistics Committee and is responsible for the preparation of logistical plans, studies, and estimates.

(4) Advises, coordinates, and, when necessary, takes action on amphibious warfare, international aid, munitions assignment, civil affairs, and other matters affecting projected logistical plans.

(5) Compiles and maintains current data on deployments and status of major units and on Army parts of joint deployments; assembles and coordinates information on future Army strategic deployments; and takes action on papers pertaining to troop deployments.

(6) Provides Army representation on the Joint Amphibious Warfare Committee and on Joint and Combined *ad hoc* Committees as required.

(7) Prepares plans and policies and supervises activities concerning location and armament of coast and land fortifications and bases.

b. Operational Logistics Section. Takes or initiates necessary War Department action on current problems of supply of overseas areas, departments, theaters, and base commands and advises other agencies of

OPD and the War Department on logistical matters affecting current military operations. Specifically:

(1) Advises the Theater Group and other OPD agencies on matters of availability for specific theaters of all classes of supply and on supply procedures and policies.

(2) In accordance with decisions and policies of strategic planning agencies, and in coordination with the Theater Group and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, establishes inter-theater priorities.

(3) Supervises the determination of theater levels of supply and, in coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, prepares staff decisions on questions pertaining to them.

(4) Allocates critical items of equipment to meet operational requirements.

(5) Advises the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, on the effect of supply policies and procedures on overseas operations and on the revision of replacement and day of supply factors for overseas theaters.

(6) Collaborates with G-4 in controlling the allocation of all types of ammunition and in revising the day of supply factor for ammunition distribution.

(7) Coordinates requests from theaters for special lists of equipment.

(8) Obtains from theater commanders periodically, experience data on expenditures and replacements for all classes of supply.

(9) Prepares and follows up directives to theater commanders to emphasize and expedite programs for the reconditioning of damaged and unserviceable materiel, especially ammunition, and for the salvage of that which cannot be made fit for issue.

c. Reports Section. Prepares periodic reports showing status and deployment of divisions including Allied divisions; prepares Weekly Status Map, showing personnel, present and projected, major units, and airplanes of defense commands, overseas departments, and bases.

5. *Current Group.* Receives and maintains current information on operations in all theaters and prepares and disseminates reports, summaries, analyses, and publications for the use of higher authority and the theaters; handles miscellaneous OPD papers pertaining to more than one command or agency and not directly pertaining to the work of another group. Operates OPD Staff Officers' School.

a. Coordination and Reports Section.

(1) Prepares and distributes to appropriate agencies, reports on current military operations, including Daily White House Report, Daily Situation Summary, OPD Diary, Weekly Operational Report for Minutes of the General Council, and special operational reports as directed.

(2) Prepares daily situation maps and photomaps on all active theaters, and indicates to Office of Strategic Services priorities for production of relief models and photomaps.

(3) Prepares recommendations to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 on the establishment of campaigns in the current war for battle participation awards.

(4) Represents Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD at daily G-2 meetings and Secretary of War's press conferences.

(5) Reviews and selects motion pictures for OPD screenings.

b. Combat Analysis Section.

(1) Reviews incoming reports and documents on current operations and selects material for action by the War Department Board of Review; prepares digests of bulky reports.

(2) Selects material for, reviews and edits, publishes, and distributes Operations Division Information Bulletin (at semi-monthly intervals) and Combat Lessons (bi-monthly).

c. School, Code, and Biennial Report Section.

(1) Operates the OPD Staff Officers' School.

(2) Supervises the assignment and use of code words.

(3) Assists in the preparation of the Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff.

d. Assistant to Group Chief. Presents at the Chief of Staff's daily conferences a verbal summary of the action in each theater and presents special operational reports to the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff as directed."²

OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, AS COMMAND POST FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

As command post for the Chief of Staff, the Operations Division performed a number of duties that under some versions of the role of the General Staff were not in keeping with General Staff work. Actually what Operations Division did boldly was the same kind of executive action that all the General Staff Divisions had been doing surreptitiously. Properly understood, the performance of the Operations Division illustrated very well what a General Staff ought to do. The planning activities of OPD were carried out principally by the Strategy and Policy Group although the Logistic Group and the Current Group did their part. Likewise, there were officers in the other sections who contributed materially to planning activities. On the whole, the OPD planners were free to plan and were not caught in day-to-day operations. In one sense the Theater Group did engage in administrative and operating work but only to the appropriate degree. They were the watchdogs of

the channels of communication to the overseas theaters. They checked all messages to see that prompt action was taken and that no message remained unanswered. They stopped improper actions and caught instances where conflicting instructions would result. They were, in effect, the Washington representatives of the overseas Theaters of Operation and yet their loyalty was on a plane broader than a one-theater viewpoint. They operated only to the extent necessary to see that the appropriate agency did each job that needed to be done. They blocked improper requests on and from the overseas Theaters of Operations.

In a sense, OPD filled a gap that had existed in the War Department structure since the decline in the position of the Adjutant General. General Ainsworth would probably have insisted that OPD was doing what the Adjutant General should be doing. And yet the Adjutant General under World War II conditions could never have performed these tasks. The routine Adjutant General administrative work was so great that it was proper to allow him to concentrate on those duties alone. Besides, the Adjutant General's office was too big and too far removed from those of the Chief of Staff and the other key officers who were directing military operations, and because of this, proper routing or instructions could not be effected by the Adjutant General's office. What the War Department had needed in the first days of the war was a coordinating and executive agency that could handle things that were not routine and that could coordinate the many operational, and sometimes administrative, details that were important and that were apt to become tangled up and confused. And so what Operations Division did in addition to its role in planning and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff was to act as a high level Adjutant General for overseas and Defense Commands operations requiring high-level supervision and guidance. There existed at times a tendency for OPD to take in too much territory and to take over and do jobs that should have been passed on to other General Staff Divisions or to the three major commands. When this occurred, it was usually done by some over-zealous or over-conscientious officer who was not sure that any other agency could do the job as well as it would be done if OPD did it. Often the time element was such that immediate and direct action had to be taken. Between the Logistic Group and the staff sections of the Army Service Forces, there were instances when the G-4 Supply Division of the General Staff was ignored.

The Operations Division had to and did resist the urge for unnecessary expansion or assumption of duties that belonged elsewhere. The personnel increases in OPD were due in large part to their twenty-four-hour around-the-clock operations and due also to the circumstance that they inherited a number of jobs by default. Where a task was important

or of immediate interest to the Chief of Staff, and where there was no other division to which it could be given—OPD usually took the job. To prevent overdoing this, the announced policy was never to charge OPD with a task that could be done by another organization. There were, of course, exceptions made to this policy. From a strictly organizational point of view, Operations Division did many things which should have been passed on. An example of one "improper" activity was the school for staff officers which OPD conducted. This was not a proper General Staff activity, but if the staff had to do it the Organization and Training Division G-3 would have been the appropriate agency, not OPD.

The Operations Division was the staging area or home port, so to speak, for the staffs of task forces or embryonic Theater Headquarters. It was in OPD that the personnel was assembled and where the new staffs were formed and completed their initial planning before embarkation. Helping these new staffs or Theater Headquarters in obtaining personnel or in filling other needs was frequently the type of activity which took OPD far afield into the functions and responsibilities of other General Staff divisions or those of the three major commands.

With all of the overseas Theaters of Operation, the Defense Commands in the United States, and the outlying American hemisphere bases reporting directly to them on all matters of consequence, the Operations Division naturally enjoyed great prestige and a dominant role. By comparison it so overshadowed the other General Staff divisions that problems arose. The tendency was for the other General Staff divisions to be ignored and for Operations Divisions to become a complete War Department General Staff in itself. At one time a responsible suggestion was made that the G-2 Intelligence and the G-3 Organization and Training Divisions be absorbed by Operations Division and that the G-1, Personnel and the G-4, Supply Divisions be taken over by the Army Service Forces. This proposal was rejected, and the leadership in Operations Division did all that was possible to limit what was, from an organizational point of view, an unfortunate trend.

METHODS OF DIRECTING WORLD-WIDE OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

The organization of the Operations Division and the improved procedures and controls over radio messages into and out of the War Department set the stage for a more effective direction of the world-wide military operations. The best test of General Staff services is the way in which they lengthen the directing arms of the Chief of Staff and it is this contribution which will now be examined.

Available to him each morning when the Chief of Staff reached his office was the log that contained the messages of importance received or dispatched during the preceding evening and night. This log was prepared by officers in the War Department Classified Message Center which functioned under the Secretary of the General Staff. It was his business to instruct and to keep informed those analysts in the Message Center who had the job of routing messages and selecting the contents of the log. At the same time the Chief of Staff received his own copy of the log, a few other key officers received their copies. At noon and in the late afternoon additional pages of the log were distributed. Appropriate geographical maps and sketches showing where the place names mentioned in the log were located were parts of the log. Here then was a condensed daily summary of the important information that the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, and a few others needed to know. At times there were messages for the Chief's log only. After the Chief of Staff had digested the latest information on world-wide developments, he was ready for the morning conference. The chief actors in these were the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, who with one or two assistants presented a résumé of what the Allied forces had done and what the enemy reaction had been. In this presentation maximum use was made of maps and charts.

Considerable trial and error experimentation was necessary before a satisfactory system of presenting information was obtained. Initially a huge "war room" was equipped and tried out. This was run by the Intelligence Division and in addition to the section maintained by G-2 there were parts of the war room where representatives of Operations Division, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces also portrayed largely on maps and charts the essential data pertaining to their functions. At the same time that the War Room in the Munitions Building was flowering, a super War Room was installed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Building by the Office of Strategic Services. The theory of establishing war rooms where up-to-date significant data would be portrayed graphically was excellent, but in practice they did not work out very well. There was too much material and the war rooms became a combination of a museum and World's Fair exhibits. There were too many officers in attendance both as spectators and performers. The Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff attended war-room presentations only a few times. Curiously enough, the technique of having a war room where a daily presentation of the military situation was made continued, and was apparently satisfactory, in the

Army Air Forces and in the headquarters of several of the overseas Theaters of Operations. Portable maps and charts that folded together compactly and could be placed on a portable stand were devised. Both G-2 and OPD prepared their own sets which were transported in a small wheeled map carrier. This made it possible to have excellent presentations each morning in the Chief of Staff's office and weekly ones at the General Council Meeting. This method had certain advantages. Only the information to be presented need be portrayed and the other data that cluttered up the proceedings was eliminated. Highly secret information could be presented graphically because only a few men saw the charts and maps and they could be folded and kept secure at all other times. Also, the charts were more available to be brought up to date, for when they were not being used at a presentation they were available to be worked on and corrected. In the war room, which was open for a considerable period during the day, it was always a problem to decide when the maps and charts should be worked on by those responsible for posting the latest information. For a considerable period the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Operations and for Intelligence personally gave the oral presentation to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. Later, specially selected officers were given this job, and with the opportunity to concentrate on this task free of other duties, these junior officers were able to do a better job than the two Assistant Chiefs of Staff who had many more important tasks to absorb their time.

At the morning conference the Chief of Staff and his principal advisors were thus first oriented on the current situation. After the presentation, problems requiring decision or action were discussed and future plans outlined. At times issues pending before the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staffs were raised and the Army view determined. Normally the morning conferences did not last over forty-five minutes. The Secretary of War attended frequently the Chief of Staff's morning operational conferences and a fine relationship always existed between them. The Secretary of War insisted that the conference be held in the Chief of Staff's office and that they be the Chief's conferences. Their two private offices adjoined and the Secretary of War would come into the Chief's office for the conference. General Marshall was very careful to defer to the Secretary of War on political matters. On strategical and purely military matters Mr. Stimson was extremely careful to give General Marshall complete freedom.

Here then was an effective technique which lengthened and strengthened the directing arm of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. The Daily Log and the Daily Operational Conference gave them succinctly the essential information in as painless and brief a manner as

possible. Top decisions could be no better than the information on which they were based. All too often top officials in high positions became removed by procedural customs or accident from access to the complete information which is the foundation of a proper decision. After the Chief of Staff had digested the pertinent information, then the questions on which action had to be taken or directives issued were discussed. At this time there was available the best staff advice. Frequently the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations would summarize the salient points and recommend the action to be taken. At other times the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations or the head of the Strategy and Policy Group in OPD would discuss the matter. Frequently the Commanding General of the Air Forces or the Deputy Chief of Staff or others would add to the discussion. At any rate, there were at hand the essential prerequisites of a good decision—accurate, timely information and the best staff advice procurable. It was perhaps unfortunate that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 for Personnel, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 for Organization and Training, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 for Supply were not included in these conferences. For them to be effective and not unduly time-consuming the line had to be drawn somewhere; otherwise the increase in numbers would have destroyed the value of the conferences. It was apparently the Chief of Staff's opinion that there was not sufficient information immediately pertaining to G-1, G-3, or G-4 to justify their attendance and that where they were involved either the Deputy Chief of Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations could inform them.

On Tuesdays and Fridays there might be discussed at the morning operational conference items on the agenda of the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting of that afternoon. Normally this occurred only when there were especially important or controversial subjects coming up. To prepare the Chief for this meeting was the principal task of one of the Assistant Secretaries of the General Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Florence Newsome, an extremely capable and conscientious WAC officer. This was primarily an editing job and involved briefing all the salient facts and indicating what OPD, the Deputy Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General of the Air Forces or the Service Forces thought about the question and what their recommendations were.

Prior to the war administrative, personnel, training, legislative, and a host of other questions had come up to the Chief of Staff for decision. After the 1942 reorganization, the emphasis on decentralization reduced the number of papers for a time but after six months or so the volume was again large. Nevertheless, improved procedures enabled the one Deputy Chief of Staff to handle the papers where three had been found

necessary before the reorganization. There was also a comparable reduction in the number of Assistant Secretaries of the General Staff. The Secretary of the War Department General Staff and one assistant secretary spent a large amount of time on what might be termed the purely personal business of the Chief of Staff—assisting in the answering of personal correspondence and a number of related matters. One of the assistant secretaries of the War Department General Staff was the liaison officer with the White House, visiting there daily and assisting in the preparation of replies to many personal letters received by the President or the President's wife which related to Army matters or to someone in the Army on whom information had to be secured. This was the bulk of the routine work, but there were also many other transactions that were not sufficiently important to be taken up directly with the Chief of Staff himself, but which nevertheless required high-level intelligent handling.

After the 1942 reorganization the Assistant Chiefs of Staff were encouraged to take action on their own initiative and to send around to interested parties an information copy of their directives. This produced such a snowfall of information copies that these were soon not read at all by the officers who needed to know the information in them. The remedy for this was to make the meetings of the General Council more effective.

WAR COUNCIL AND GENERAL COUNCIL IN WORLD WAR II

There were two council meetings of importance on the top War Department level. It was appreciated that under decentralization there was an urgent requirement to keep men and organizations informed concerning general War Department business. At best it was difficult to prevent the individuals authorized to take action from issuing conflicting instructions. Council and conference meetings were relied upon heavily as a way to disseminate information and improve coordination.

Once every two weeks on a Wednesday the Secretary of War held his War Council. This council included the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries of War, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Commanding Generals of the three major commands, and from time to time, additional members of the Office of the Secretary of War. At this meeting matters of War Department interest and policy were discussed. Each person who attended commented on questions or gave information which was considered to be important and of interest to the Secretary. The Secretary of War discussed matters of interest and often asked for comments on pending questions.

The General Council met in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

each Monday morning at 11:30 o'clock. This Council was attended by the heads of all the War Department General and Special Staff Divisions and by the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Forces. In all some eighteen to twenty were present. It was customary for the Deputy Chief of Staff to open the meeting by discussing subjects of current interest. Often instructions of a general nature were issued. Attention was called to unfavorable performance, occasionally individuals or offices were commended for particularly outstanding performance. The Deputy Chief of Staff gave guidance to the organizations represented by giving information on important policies which were under consideration or which had been changed by important decisions. Each of the officers present then summarized the principal items of business transacted and policies established by their activities during the past week. The last item of business was the presentation of the world-wide military operations of the week. This was given by the Operations and the Intelligence Divisions and was a weekly summary of what had been presented daily at the Chief of Staff's morning conferences. The discussions and comments were published as the Minutes of the General Council and normally took up some twenty-five to thirty-five pages. Appendixes of from five to fifty pages included statistical data on items of interest and trends to indicate performance. As an example, there was published monthly the performance data on the time required to handle correspondence received by the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff and sent to various agencies for information on which to base a reply or for preparation of reply. This data showed how long it took each office to answer correspondence. By publishing this information monthly and by showing the trends the average time required to handle correspondence of this type was reduced from an average of six or seven days to an average for the month of November, 1944, of two and a half days. A similar record was maintained and published on staff studies and other correspondence which had been pending for more than twenty days in any office. There was also published monthly a detailed analysis of War Department military and civilian personnel on duty in Washington inasmuch as the War Department was making every possible effort to keep this figure to the minimum. Likewise, monthly statistical data was published on the world-wide strength and deployment of the Army with emphasis placed on maladjustments, overstrengths and understrengths.

One hundred copies of the Minutes of the General Council were published and distributed by 8:00 o'clock Tuesday morning. Each General Staff and Special Staff Division of the War Department General Staff received copies which were read by the officers who did not attend the

General Council Meeting. Copies were also sent to the three major commands and were circulated by them through their staffs. In many instances conferences were held by other agencies and at these conferences pertinent parts of the Minutes of the General Council were passed on to those present as a preliminary to a more detailed discussion in the particular field of interest. For example, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-1, of the War Department General Staff assembled all of his officers on Tuesday morning and discussed the principal items of interest to the Personnel Division which had been mentioned in the General Council, together with such additional instructions as he wished to give to his officers. Normally, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces held a conference on Tuesday morning attended by the chiefs of the principal divisions under his command, where matters of interest to Army Service Forces were discussed. The point to be emphasized is that the program of decentralization was accompanied by strenuous efforts to disseminate information in order that the decentralization would not result in uncoordinated action.

Procedural improvements were stressed to speed up business. Where personal or telephonic contact was not possible a Staff Disposition Form was used. This was merely a simplified telegraphic type form which could be indorsed informally from one section to another but which provided at the same time the necessary information for record. Likewise, a Summary Sheet was used as a cover sheet for all staff studies which were more than one page in length and for letters prepared for the signature of the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, or the Deputy Chief of Staff. The Summary Sheet described very briefly what the subject matter was, who had prepared it, and what officers or offices had been concerned in the action. The Staff Disposition Form and the Summary Sheet were typical of a number of similar improvements effected. It was necessary after the 1942 reorganization to have the General Staff divisions submit reports on actions taken. At several General Council meetings the Deputy Chief of Staff indicated items of business which General Staff divisions were handling that should have been completed in one of the major commands and not referred to the General Staff at all. Attention was also called to certain papers referred to the Office Chief of Staff on which the General Staff division which had referred them could have taken final action.

The problem of determining on what organizational level final action should be taken on questions of different degrees of importance could never be solved by any simple formula. The question was not too difficult where a matter of principle was involved and where the intrinsic importance of the subject under consideration could be determined.

Workable procedures were devised for handling such matters, and on the whole the question of jurisdiction and degree of decentralization was understood. The matters for which satisfactory working rules could not be established were those innumerable and relatively trivial questions involving matters in which some top-level individual in the War Department, in other government departments, or in Congress was interested in behalf of someone else, or in which such persons were directly concerned because they were involved. These were the kind of questions that all despaired of ever handling on a sound organizational or procedural basis. Usually the right answer was "no." But before the "no" could be given, the trivial matter would have to be cleared all the way up to the top to include the Secretary of War, simply because the individual concerned was sure to appeal to the top for reconsideration.

ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY STAFF REPORTS IN WORLD WAR II

Immediately after the 1942 reorganization a great drive was launched to eliminate useless reports and rewrite Army regulations to simplify procedures. This was a major undertaking and involved the collaboration of the offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Inspector General, and the Commanding Generals of the three major commands. The Office of the Inspector General carried the burden of the work but all contributed. The task was begun by tabulating for each of the thousands of routine reports the following information: title of report, form number, authority for submission, by whom and when submitted, routing, office of final action, explanation or special remarks, and recommendation for continuance or discontinuance. By August of 1942 the Army Service Forces had surveyed 331 reports with the result that 207 were eliminated and 35 materially simplified. In September, 1943, the Army Air Forces reported that they had eliminated a total of 715 recurring reports of which 283 pertained to personnel, 160 to aircraft and equipment, and 121 to training and operations. In addition, a procedures committee with Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Forces membership, but with the Army Service Forces playing the leading role, was established to simplify shipping and supply procedures. This resulted in the following major savings: (a) elimination of the preparation, mailing, and filing of about 9,000,000 copies of shipping tickets per month and 2,500,000 acknowledgment post cards per month, (b) the development of a new shipping document form which replaced ten old forms, and (c) an improved bill of lading procedure which eliminated the preparation, mailing and filing of 18,000,000 copies and 6,000,000 envelopes annually.

Reports like weeds could be cut down, but they had a tendency to

grow again. By November 1944 a Reports Control System was established by the Statistics Branch of the Office, Chief of Staff, and action was taken to reduce the 209 reports the various War Department General and Special Staff divisions were requiring. A reports Control System had been established also by the three major commands. This system required the justification of all types of reports prior to their being submitted. By the assignment of control symbols to each report, by centralized control, recurring analysis, and elimination of the obsolete, and by standardization of necessary reports, much was accomplished.

The importance of procedural and administrative economies should not be underestimated. Many improvements would have been made irrespective of the organizational change. The 1942 reorganization necessarily involved a housecleaning in that old forms and methods had to be looked over to see if they would work under the new system. But these factors were of comparatively minor consequence.

The dominant influence was top-side leadership. There had been many at the working level who recognized that economies could be effected but who could not do anything about these things because of the far-reaching effects of even a minor change in a blank form. It would not have been unnatural for an attitude to develop that the War Department was busy fighting a war, and that attention should be focused on the main job and not dissipated on economies in paper work. It was the top-level leadership which recognized that concern over procedures and reports was not a question of going off on a sidetrack. General Marshall in July 1942 instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff as follows:

"I want the matter of reports looked into immediately. I am not talking about routine reports. My reference is to those called for by the Air Corps and by G-2 in particular; also, though not exactly reports, the immense number of cables or radiograms being sent daily to commanders. [General] Bonesteel [commanding general of the forces at Iceland] told me that while he was guessing, and probably exaggerating, it seemed to him that about fifty a day came to his headquarters which submerged him in detail, however much he might struggle against it.

I know there is a tendency to acquire a mass of most recent information here in order to make quick replies and furnish information without delay. But this is very distracting to people in the field and tends to make the reports valueless in time. I saw this to a pronounced degree in the First Army in France; I think it has developed now to a serious state."

The implementing action taken by the Deputy Chief of Staff was such as to cause *Life* magazine in an editorial report on our Army in 1942 to state: "In time of peace Americans treat their Army like a mangy old dog, and their Navy like a comfortable house cat. But when war comes they expect the services to produce the greatest military leadership on earth. The amazing thing is that, after the heartbreak of Pearl Harbor and Bataan, and despite all the waste and blundering and friction and hot tempers the services have almost done it. . . . Unlike the civilian Administration in its management of the war, the War Department has been willing to be tough with itself. Under Lieutenant General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, the Army dog has been shaken until his teeth rattled, with the object of jarring his brains out of the coma of administrative detail. Relieved by better management of a great part of the old routine Army load, General Marshall has become a formidable strategist. Lieutenant General Somervell abolished more than a dozen semiautonomous Army bureaus, and now operates the whole vast Army Service Forces (the old SOS) with only fifteen men reporting to him directly—a big management achievement."

In the War Department and the three major commands there were many senior officers who recognized that procedural and administrative details and economies were perhaps the vital factors that made organization charts a farce or a reality. The observation was made, "Let me prescribe the channels of communication, determine the flow of business, and regulate the procedural and administrative details and it will not be necessary to be concerned over organization charts or designation of key officers." The point to be emphasized was that the War Department recognized what an important technique of control was the regulation of procedural and administrative details and economies.

G-1 PERSONNEL DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF IN WORLD WAR II

The G-1 Personnel Division of the General Staff, after the 1942 reorganization, was determined to restrict its activities to planning and formulation of policies, but this resolve was complicated by procedural and jurisdictional difficulties. To make the adjustment from a January 1942 strength of 67 officers and 81 civilian employees to a reorganization strength of 13 officers and 22 civilians, General John H. Hilldring, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, exhorted his officers by memorandum as follows:

"Under the new plan, the functions or duties of G-1, are the same as those now being performed except that the War Department General

Staff's duties heretofore assigned to the A-1 Staff, Army Air Forces, will be taken over by G-1. Specific duties assigned to G-1 are listed on charts previously furnished all concerned.

The work of G-1 will be *planning*, the formulation of policies and the supervision of the execution of the policies. It will be the principal function of G-1 to look into the future. Initially, planning for the immediate future will be given priority.

In carrying out its mission, G-1 will deal largely in thought, consultation and brief directives. Insofar as practicable, no studies will be prepared in G-1. The keeping of records and statistical information is a function of the Services of Supply, Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces. Reference data obtained from these sources will not be utilized as part of any directive issued by G-1.

Directives issued by G-1 will be limited to one page (letter size). The author of each directive is charged with the responsibility of coordinating and with the prompt handling of approved projects. He is also charged with the responsibility of following each directive until it reaches field commanders concerned. Coordination between sections should be by direct consultation with the individuals concerned. Written communications are to be reduced to a minimum and should be used only where the matter cannot be handled by personal contact or telephone conversation. In general, approved directives emanating from G-1 go to the Personnel Division of the Command concerned and then to troops. Matters pertaining to two or more commands will be sent to the Personnel Division, Services of Supply Command, for the preparation and issuance of necessary orders or publication.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, will assume responsibility for keeping the Deputy Chief of Staff informed of the current status of G-1 affairs. However, it is the responsibility of each Chief of branch of this division to inform himself of the current status of all projects in his branch and to keep the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, advised.

By every means at his disposal, G-1 will reduce the number of papers it handles to a minimum.

Visits with field commanders to determine the effect of present or future policies and to increase the efficiency of the Army will be encouraged.

G-1 has no direct relationship with the operations of the War Plans Division. The Personnel Division of the Services of Supply Command, Army Ground Forces Command and Army Air Forces Command, deal directly with the War Plans Division in the *operation* of theatres of operation. Normally, personnel policies pertaining to War Plans operations will be initiated by G-1, only at the specific request of the Person-

nel Division of the Services of Supply Command, Army Ground Forces Command or Army Air Forces Command when no established policy covers the particular case."

Personnel transactions were at best thorny to handle and did not lend themselves well to control on a policy basis. The three major commands did handle, under approved G-1 policies, personnel questions applying to individuals under their jurisdiction. In addition to their Army Service Force work, the Adjutant General and the Personnel Division of Army Service Forces were supposed to act for G-1 on certain Army-wide personnel matters. Controversial questions of assignment and promotion had to be watched closely by G-1; otherwise conflicting actions would be taken that would cause trouble. The Personnel Division was reluctant to have the Adjutant General and the Personnel Division act on controversial matters because they were agents of one of the interested parties, the Army Service Forces. As an example, the commissioning of individuals direct from civilian life to fill specific jobs requiring special technical skill was a task that could hardly be covered by policy. If the Army Service Forces personnel agencies had had these cases, the other two commands would have appealed the case to G-1 if the grade in which the individual was commissioned was not high enough to qualify them. This problem became sufficiently acute that G-1 in December, 1942, recommended the creation of a Personnel Control Division. G-1's proposal was as follows:

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Personnel Control.

I. *Discussion.*

1. Circular No. 59 provides that the Personnel Division (G-1) 'is charged, *in general*, with those duties of the War Department General Staff relating to the personnel of the Army as individuals.' The same circular charges the Commanding General, Services of Supply, with 'the administration of all functions which are Army-wide in scope and which pertain to personnel as individuals, both civilian and military, to include pre-military training, mobilization of industrial manpower, and labor relations.'

2. *a.* In the reorganization of the War Department, it was contemplated that the Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply, would serve the Commanding General, Services of Supply with respect to military personnel matters pertaining solely to the Services of Supply, and at the same time would act as the operating agency of G-1 in connection with Army-wide personnel functions. This arrangement has

proved both complicated and confusing, and from the beginning it was necessary for G-1 to take back certain functions, operative in nature, but in which decisions had to be made at the General Staff level.

b. As overseas operations expanded, Operations Division became more and more concerned in personnel matters. At present a variety of instructions pertaining to personnel, often conflicting in their requirements are emanating from various War Department sources, including G-1, G-3, Operations Division, the Services of Supply, and The Adjutant General. The result is frequently a serious lack of coordination, with resulting inefficiency and confusion.

3. The present War Department organization envisages maximum decentralization of authority to the three major commands, with great freedom of action for each commander within his respective sphere of responsibility. This is desirable, and should be continued, but as the Army expands and active operations are extended, this desirable decentralization and freedom of action inevitably create conflicting personnel demands that must be evaluated and coordinated by the General Staff. The necessary interchange of various categories of personnel between the three major commands, and between those commands and overseas theaters and bases, renders it increasingly essential to establish a positive system of control to administer impartially the policies established by the General Staff.

4. This Division considers it imperative that there be immediately established a central agency for the control of personnel. This agency must be responsible only to the General Staff; it must be directly supervised by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, but authorized to deal directly with the various War Department agencies and the three major commands.

II. *Action recommended.*

1. That the general plan outlined in paragraph 4 above and as follows be approved:

1. A Personnel Control Division will be established under the direction of the assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. This Division will be charged with the administration of all military personnel matters which are Army-wide in scope.

a. It will operate directly with the personnel agencies of the headquarters, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply. The following recurring tasks, among others, are examples: Reassignment of officers and enlisted men between the major jurisdictions in case of non-concurrence; assembly of key personnel for special purposes when two or more jurisdictions are involved; control of over-

head allotments and the number of officers on duty in Washington; promotion problems; matters involving awards and decorations; wearing of the uniform; final action on reclassification of officers for efficiency under AR 605-230.

b. It will operate directly with the staff divisions of the War Department in the satisfaction of their own personnel requirements. It will confer with and obtain decisions from the G-3 Division to determine the monthly procurement of enlisted men; the grades and strengths for overhead positions; the establishment of priorities for distribution of men from reception centers and replacement training centers; and establishment of quotas to Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply. It will assist the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, by action upon messages pertaining to military personnel in or for overseas theaters and task forces. It will assist the Legislative and Liaison Division by developing and processing legislation pertaining to military personnel and assist as necessary in its presentation to the Congress.

c. It will maintain liaison with the Selective Service System, acquainting the War Department with the manpower situation, and transmit to the Selective Service System the decisions of the War Department pertaining to standards for induction and other matters.

d. It will be responsible, as circumstances require, for the suspension of routine personnel procedures and the initiation of special procedures with respect to units and organizations alerted for overseas movement, and will be responsible for the coordination of all personnel matters affecting such units prior to their departure.

e. It will be responsible for an effective overseas loss replacement plan, coordinating with the proper divisions of the War Department General Staff, and will be responsible for staff supervision of its efficient operation.

f. In addition to the above, the Division will perform such other personnel missions and functions as may be delegated to it from time to time by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

2. The Commanding General, Services of Supply, will be relieved of all responsibility in military personnel matters which are Army-wide in scope. He will retain full responsibility for military personnel matters which pertain to the Services of Supply.

3. The control and responsibility of civilian personnel matters will remain unchanged.

4. There will be no increase in the total number of officers and civilians on duty in Washington as the result of this reorganization

In general, the individuals performing these Army-wide functions will be transferred to the newly established Personnel Control Division."

This proposal was not accepted but all concerned were informed as follows by the Deputy Chief of Staff:

"The handling of personnel matters has not been entirely satisfactory. Changes in organization have been under consideration, but it has been decided not to recreate an operating division on the General Staff level at this time. The Military Personnel Division, SOS, as now organized, is charged with two separate and distinct functions:

a. With respect to military personnel matters pertaining solely to the SOS.

b. As an operating agency for the War Department in connection with Army-wide personnel matters. At present, instructions pertaining to personnel matters, often conflicting in their requirements, emanate from G-1, G-3, OPD, the Services of Supply, and The Adjutant General. Frequently there is a lack of coordination. Further, as the continued expansion overseas creates conflicting demands for interchange of personnel between the three major commands and overseas theaters, a positive system of control to administer impartially these conflicting demands is essential. Accordingly, it is desired that the SOS consider the advisability of setting up a military personnel control division responsible only for administering Army-wide personnel matters.

... It is considered necessary that a directive clearly defining the functions and duties of the SOS with respect to Army-wide personnel matters be issued at an early date."

By September, 1944, the Personnel Division of the General Staff had had to increase its personnel strength to 36 officers and 36 enlisted men. After a series of organizational adjustments G-1 came to the organization illustrated by the chart on page 507. The functions and duties of the various subdivisions were rewritten and stated as follows:

"1. Personnel Policy Branch.


a. Determine policies and procedures and prepares and revises regulations which concern military personnel (except general officers) and which pertain to over-all requirements, procurement, classification, allotments, reassignment and transfer, promotion and demotion, reclassification, and separation.

b. Analyzes and estimates loss replacements and determines calls to be placed with Selective Service.

c. Plans for demobilization and for post-war military establishment.

d. Maintains liaison with the Joint War Plans Committee and the

OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL DIVISION, G-1



16 SEPT. 1944

* Also responsible for Current Group.

CHART 26

divisions of War Department General Staff on matters relative to troop deployment, with the Joint Army-Navy Personnel Board on matters which require uniform personnel policy, with the Secretary of War's Personnel Board on matters pertaining to appointment and promotion of officers, with the Secretary of War's Separations Board on matters pertaining to officer separations, with the War Department Central Deferment Board, the Applied Psychology Panel of the National Defense Research Committee, and the War Department Personnel Research Board.

2. *Personnel Current Branch.*

a. Prepares original allotments of personnel and coordinates with G-3 and OPD on recommendations of the War Department Manpower Board.

b. Maintains contact with the Personnel Policy Branch on policies and procedures.

c. Processes current papers pertaining to the subjects assigned that branch.

3. *Miscellaneous Policy Branch.* Determines policies and procedures and prepares and revises regulations concerning prescribed uniforms and their wearing, decorations and awards, morale (including religion), pay, recreation, health, postal service, Army Exchange Service, Red Cross, Public Health Service, and similar agencies, leaves and furloughs, vice conditions, conscientious objectors, movement of dependents of military personnel and War Department civilians, civilian relationships including soldier voting, and racial problems.

4. *Miscellaneous Current Branch.* Maintains contact with the Miscellaneous Policy Branch on policies and procedures, and processes current papers pertaining to the subjects assigned that branch.

5. *Legislative and Special Branch.*

a. Reviews legislative matters affecting personnel of the Army.

b. Determines policies and procedures and processes current papers pertaining to the personnel of the Army who are prisoners of war, enemy aliens and prisoners of war (including their security), rules of warfare and international conventions affecting personnel of the Army, and military government and martial law, including coordination between civil and military law enforcement agencies.

c. Coordinates with the Judge Advocate General in securing and reviewing of legal opinions required by G-1.

d. Handles special projects as assigned.

6. *General Officers Branch.* Processes recommendations pertaining to the promotion, demotion, assignment, and separation of general officers.

7. *Statistical Branch.*

- a. Assembles and analyzes statistical data.
- b. Prepares and correlates reports, charts, and tables.
- c. Acts as clearing agency for release to government agencies and the public of statistical data on personnel.
- d. Makes regular studies on manpower, casualties, and personnel accounting."³

It will be noted that G-1 gradually developed subdivisions for policy and planning and a separate and distinct unit to handle current business. This was an interesting trend, for it revealed that in spite of all efforts to decentralize operational duties, it was still necessary to handle in G-1 a considerable amount of current business. To do this it was desirable not to load this work onto planning and policy workers but to establish a separate operating section within G-1. The Personnel Division was forced by circumstances to recognize that it had to operate, that personnel had to be handled as individuals, and that it required constant surveillance and checking to ascertain if personnel policies were not being interpreted to favor the interpreter and thus subject the War Department to criticism because of conflicting applications of the rule. The disadvantage of establishing an operating unit for current business within G-1 was that once this tendency was encouraged there was no stopping point except far beyond the appropriate jurisdiction of a General Staff division.

The Personnel Division of the General Staff during World War II demonstrated that personnel problems could not be treated entirely on the policy level. On the whole, great restraint was shown and the maximum decentralization of personnel operation was attempted. But in spite of this there remained an area in which G-1 had to operate. Almost the only rule that could be deduced was that G-1 should handle those personnel actions which the Chief of Staff would have handled himself if he had had unlimited time and capabilities. The Personnel Division always handled questions of the promotion of generals because the Chief of Staff personally determined these. Obviously G-1 had to perform all the necessary preliminary work. As the question of replacements, induction of eighteen-year-olds, discharge of high-point soldiers, and other similar problems became matters of nationwide and political interest, the Personnel Division had to take more and more direct action in these fields since the Chief of Staff himself became more and more directly concerned with these problems owing to their importance.

G-3, ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING DIVISION,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, IN WORLD WAR II

The Organization and Training Division, G-3, in reducing its personnel from 88 officers and 107 civilian personnel to 16 officers and 10 civilians after the 1942 reorganization, had to free itself from many functions and duties. This was not too difficult because G-3 could turn over completely to the major commands a substantial share of what had been G-3 work. With three major commands with ample staffs having training as one of their major functions, G-3 could and did step out of the training field except in questions of amphibious and combined air and ground training and in the development of new training doctrine. In addition, the Inspector General's Department relieved G-3 of the task of inspecting units to determine their state of training and readiness for overseas shipment. There were, however, a large number of special problems that took much time. G-3 had to be arbiter and set a limit on the number of technical personnel which the Army Service Forces would train for the Ground and Air Forces. Likewise, the G-3 Division had to determine the extent to which the Army would undertake the initiation of special training programs and facilities for jungle and for arctic training. The question of raising and training special national groups such as Norwegians and Austrians was another type of problem G-3 had to handle. In addition, there were the usual questions on the allocation of training ammunition in those calibers for which combat requirements were such that only limited amounts could be made available for training.

Prior to the war, G-3 had always scrutinized very closely all new tables of organization, and, with G-4, all new tables of equipment and allowances. Similarly, all training manuals for the Army had been reviewed carefully by G-3. Even before the 1942 reorganization, G-3 had had great difficulty in keeping abreast of the current work load in these fields. After G-3 was greatly reduced in size, careful scrutiny was impossible and even a casual reading tended to make G-3 a bottleneck in the processing of this kind of business. The result was that the three major commands were given almost complete freedom in prescribing new tables of organization, allowances, and equipment for units, and in issuing new training manuals, which were nevertheless issued as War Department documents. G-3 continued to supervise closely some of the larger projects and some of the changes that were of major consequence. There were advantages to this procedure. The three major commanders had the mission of organizing and training and equipping units and making them ready for combat. With this responsibility it

followed that the three major commanders should have the right to say what the organization should be and what the training doctrine should emphasize. With the very large volume of business in this field, the only practical solution to obtain expeditious action was to turn these tasks over completely to the three commands.

There were, however, certain disadvantages to this system. The three commands naturally tended to make the most of the opportunity to prescribe the tables of organization for their own ground, air, and service units. There was some tendency to increase unnecessarily the number of different military occupational specialties required in an organization and make the organization as a whole unnecessarily big and complicated. The underlying purpose of doing this was to obtain a greater number of technical ratings and thus comparatively higher pay for the members of the organization. At best, and even with careful study, this matter made a difficult problem. A good case could be made, for instance, for a large number of technical ratings and noncommissioned officer grades for an Ordnance unit which had to have a high degree of technical competence requiring special skills. An equally good case could be made for an Air Force organization. But then the Infantry supporters would argue with good reason that the greatest leadership, skill, courage, and risk were required from the Infantry noncommissioned officers who led their men in battle and who had to operate in combat on their own, away from any close supervision. These leaders should, by comparison, have the highest ratings and grades. This was all a very important and a very proper problem for the Organization and Training Division of the General Staff. However, it invaded what was represented to be the command authority and responsibilities of the three major commanders, and it was therefore not easy to solve. G-3 was never able to take the desirable simplifying action or to control firmly the questions in this area.

G-3's most pressing responsibility was the establishment of the troop basis and the authorization of activation of units pursuant to the troop basis plans. This was both a major planning and a coordinating task and involved collaboration with all the other General Staff divisions and the three major commands. The troop basis was one of the key wartime planning and control documents. It was simply a listing as of the present and as of three, six, nine, and twelve months hence of the number and types of units which composed or would compose the Army together with bulk allotments of personnel for overhead installations and other special purposes. Included was information on dates of activation, readiness, and deactivation of units. In brief, it was the book-keeping record of what the Army was doing with its men, what units

were available now and which ones would be available at stipulated dates in the future. It was naturally subject to constant change. Changes had to be made to provide the units required for planned combat operations in the future. Adjustments were required to reduce the number of units where they were no longer required due to a changed strategic situation and to convert the personnel thus made available into units for which there was a need. The accounting system involved in keeping the troop basis up to date had to take into consideration a great many factors. Monthly gains from Selective Service inductions, monthly losses due to battlefield casualties and other losses, inputs and outputs of schools, and the number of personnel in the pipeline all involved complex changes. The pipeline figure of men in transit was always a problem because in an Army of eight million there were hundreds of thousands en route to or from hospitals, schools, units, replacement centers and so forth. The requirements for men and units were always in excess of what could be made available and so it was a constant problem to devise adjustments whereby new future needs could be met by reducing or eliminating units required for old commitments that were possibly outmoded. Future requirements always demanded more men than could be made available from Selective Service inductions, yet commanders could be expected to protest and resist the withdrawal of units for other use or deactivation to provide units of personnel for future operations in other areas.

At the time of the 1941 expansion of the Army a troop basis plan for a well balanced Army was prepared. This merely insured that the proper balance and type of units would be provided. When the United States entered the war and as operational plans for specific operations and task forces were approved, changes were made in the G-3 troop basis which was the master list that showed for successive dates what Army units—air, ground and service—would be required. At first the number of antiaircraft units was large, but as the Allies gained air superiority these were reduced. The demands of all the operational planners and the air, ground or service enthusiasts who believed their particular forces could run or win the war single-handed could never be met because that many soldiers simply would not be available. Besides the all-important question of judgment as to what to include or delete from the troop basis, there was the almost equally important task of using the troop basis as an instrument of control. This was a problem in technique and will be described later.

By September, 1944, the Organization and Training Division, G-3, of the General Staff had increased to a strength of 34 officers and 41 civilian and enlisted clerks. The organization was as shown in the

OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATION ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING DIVISION, G-3





CHART 27

chart on page 513. The duties of G-3 remained substantially as stated at the time of the 1942 reorganization.

G-4, SUPPLY DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
IN WORLD WAR II

The Supply Division, G-4, of the General Staff had the greatest adjustment to make after the 1942 reorganization. Changing from a strength of 149 officers and 138 civilian employees to 16 officers and 26 civilian employees, was a major task in itself. The greater problem, however, was the relative position and the respective roles of G-4, the Logistics Group in the Operations Division, and the Army Service Forces which was headed by the former Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, G-4, and whose personnel included many key officers from the old G-4 Division. The major purpose of the reorganization had been to achieve decentralization and to free the General Staff from operational duties. It was therefore necessary for G-4 to exercise great restraint and, figuratively speaking, to stand back and let the Army Service Forces operate as they wished. This attitude was a credit to the Supply Division, but the disadvantage was that they were left standing with events passing them by very rapidly. Because of the old G-4 strain in Army Service Forces, it was probably inevitable that their concept of the supply job left no place for a G-4, Supply Division, War Department General Staff, under the reorganization. For the Army Service Forces to function they had to have a planning and a coordinating staff which duplicated G-4 and they questioned the need for the two. The Commanding General of the Army Service Forces expected to be and in many instances was the advisor whom the Chief of Staff called when supply questions arose. Despite the possible duplication, and despite the relatively superior position of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, both as an advisor and an operator, there was nevertheless a need for a General Staff Supply Division. Army Service Forces supply advice was not sufficient in cases of disagreement among the three major commands or in circumstances where there were critical supply shortages. As an operator, the Army Service Forces were great consumers and users of supplies and equipment. They therefore encountered difficulties in allocations, and when the Ground Forces or the Air Forces were not satisfied, then the Chief of Staff had to have someone besides the Army Service Forces to review the question as a disinterested agency, which the Army Service Forces could never be. In the development of new equipment, Army Ground Forces might insist that certain military characteristics and requirements must be met in a new weapon or a new equipment item. The Army

OUTLINE OF ORGANIZATION
SUPPLY DIVISION, G-4



6 FEBRUARY 1945

CHART 28

Service Forces technical production and design specialists might properly believe that the limitations imposed by time and production problems were such that the Ground Forces' wishes could not be met in their entirety. Here again was a General Staff job and it was appropriate that an Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply, G-4, be available to advise the Chief of Staff or to act for him in settling these cases. The same kind of questions arose about construction. The Army Air Forces might wish certain construction completed at an air base where the Chief of Engineers and the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, might properly believe that the circumstances did not justify the construction work at all, or that the standard of construction was too extravagant for a wartime job. There were many cases where there was a justifiable difference of opinion. To settle these questions a General Staff Supply Division was needed.

The Logistics Group in the Operations Division had the primary task of keeping the overseas Theaters and the Operations Division planners informed on what was available in supplies and equipment. It was proper for the Logistics Group to take the stand that they were the supply representative of the operational people. They might well insist that certain supplies and weapons be made available for a specific operation. The Army Service Forces might have to say that such munitions were not available except at the expense of higher priority demands. Here also was a spot for G-4 to function in. In all of these Supply Division tasks there was always present the same problem of what the technique of control should be or what the mechanics of performing a G-4 function were without duplicating the Army Service Forces work or slowing down operations.

By September, 1944, the Supply Division had increased in strength to reach a total of 34 officers and 45 enlisted and civilian employees. Their organization was as shown on the chart on page 515 with the following functions prescribed for the subdivisions:

"Planning Branch. The Planning Branch is charged with those functions of G-4 which relate to overall logistical planning, procedure, doctrine, and organization.

a. Theater Section. Formulates policies and directives governing utilization of the logistical forces of the Army.

(1) Collaborates with Organization and Training Division, G-3, in the preparation of the War Department Troop Basis.

(2) Collaborates with OPD on theater and task force logistical plans and organization, and theater requests for service units, and with the Navy Department in the development of joint logistical plans.

(3) Maintains liaison with joint and combined agencies, reviews and analyzes joint and combined staff papers, and initiates necessary action on matters of G-4 responsibility or interest.

(4) Coordinates and approves plans and policies for zone of interior hospitalization facilities, the allocation of beds to the theaters, and the evacuation of the sick and wounded.

(5) Reviews theater operational projects.

b. Organization Section. Studies theater logistical organization, reviews service unit tables of organization, and formulates policies and directives to effect revisions in standard service organization.

c. Special Projects Section. Formulates, reviews, and coordinates policies and directives governing logistical doctrine, procedure, and organization.

(1) Examines and analyzes theater logistical methods and procedure and formulates or initiates revisions in prescribed doctrine.

(2) Prepares, reviews, revises, and gives final approval to regulations, circulars, manuals, bulletins, directives, and War Department logistical publications.

(3) Collaborates with the Navy Department and the Army-Navy Staff College in the formulation of joint Army-Navy logistical doctrine, organization, and procedure.

(4) Formulates, reviews, or coordinates the logistical aspects of mobilization and demobilization plans.

(5) Studies the basic assumptions and plans for the peacetime military establishment, and formulates, reviews, or coordinates over-all plans and policies governing the types and general locations of required permanent Army installations.

Program Branch. The Program Branch is charged with those duties of G-4 which relate to the establishment of requirements and the procurement of materiel; the standardization and classification of equipment; the approval of non-standard items for overseas use; the establishment of allowances of equipment for units, organizations, and establishments of the Army; and the formulation, maintenance, and coordination of a program of requirements for Army installations.

a. Equipment Section. Formulates policies governing equipment.

(1) Prepares studies and summaries on equipment to determine the best employment of new items by balanced forces.

(2) Investigates plans for future operations, formulates policies, makes recommendations, and reviews action taken on re-equipping units to meet operational requirements.

(3) Reviews theater operational projects in connection with equipment employed.

(4) Takes necessary action on standardization of equipment, on recommendations for the classification of equipment and armament, and on the approval for shipment of non-standardized items for overseas use.

b. Requirements Section. Establishes the equipment requirements of the Army.

(1) Establishes bases for Army requirements by prescribing major command use of—

(a) appropriate data relative to the composition and deployment of troops, and

(b) the supply information provided in the Supply Supplement to the "War Department Troop Deployment."

(2) Establishes an Equipment Reserve—for unforeseen contingencies—in the form of troop units related to the overall composition of the Army.

(3) Approves for Army procurement, equipment requirements derived from operational projects.

(4) Approves for Army procurement, equipment requirements of other agencies.

(5) Establishes policies for, reviews, and coordinates the Army Supply Program, insuring proper scheduling of procurement to meet operational and reserve requirements; proper bases for computation of requirements; conformance with approved budget estimates; and satisfaction of such other elements of the program as may be necessary; and prepares directives to effect corrective action.

(6) In conjunction with appropriate War Department agencies, establishes policies and procedures for the development of requirements for the War Department War Reserve, and determines—in detail where necessary—the actual requirements for specific supplies to be held in the Reserve.

(7) Establishes a supply program for the peace-time Army.

c. Allowances Section. Establishes and approves the allowance of equipment for units, organizations, and establishments of the Army.

(1) Analyzes Tables of Equipment to determine correct allowances and proper types of equipment as compared with the number and classification of personnel in the Table of Organization and collaborates with G-3 on major items of equipment for combat units.

(2) Analyzes Tables of Allowances to determine proper basis of issue for equipment in comparison with tables of distribution or, in case of training units, with the number of students to be trained in a par-

ticular course or courses, and collaborates with G-3 on items desired as training equipment.

(3) Analyzes requests for special lists, studies desirability of approving requests and advisability of changing applicable table of equipment, and determines whether authorization should be granted as a special issue or a special list.

d. Army Installations Section. Establishes and maintains a program for Army installations.

(1) Analyzes general plans, policies, and other information developed by the Planning Branch, G-4, OPD, Special Planning Division, War Department Special Staff, and other agencies, concerning the present and future size, composition, and deployment of the Army in relation to present and future requirements for Army installations, and develops and maintains a specific program governing the posts, camps, stations, and other facilities to be disposed of, retained, or acquired, including:

(a) War Department overhead and the headquarters establishments of the major commands.

(b) General and special service schools.

(c) Adequate training areas, including a training theater of operations.

(d) Depot storage facilities for the supply of the active Army and the necessary storage facilities for housing the War Department War Reserve.

(e) Maintenance and repair facilities.

(f) A system of general hospitals for the active Army.

(g) Seacoast defense.

(h) Induction centers and separation centers.

(i) Research and development facilities.

(j) Tactical and strategic air installations.

(k) Tactical and strategic ground and service installations.

(2) Based on the Army Installations Program, establishes and maintains a subsidiary housing requirements program, including:

(a) Housing required for the enlisted strength of the postwar regular establishment in the continental United States.

(b) Additional housing required for the maximum enlisted strength of the mobilized postwar Army to be in the continental United States at any one time.

(c) Housing not required for the postwar military establishment.

(3) Analyzes the suitability of installations and coordinates their utilization by the major commands to meet the requirements of the Army Installations Program.

Policy Branch. The Policy Branch is charged with those duties of G-4 which relate to the formulation and interpretation of policies on current supply matters, including distribution, transportation, property and claims; the assignment of munitions to other of the United Nations; the assignment or allocation of civilian supplies for the liberated and occupied areas; the study of and determination of policies concerning the utilization of economic resources to meet military requirements; miscellaneous supply problems of immediate importance and not within the long-range interest of other branches of G-4; and collaboration with G-3 in a program of research and training in logistics and the economics of war.

a. Distribution Section. Determines policies governing the distribution, storage, issue, and maintenance of equipment and supplies for the Army.

(1) In collaboration with OPD, determines the levels of supply to be maintained in the various theaters of operations.

(2) Determines the levels of supply to be maintained in the various zones of interior installations.

(3) Reviews and approves theater days of supply, and theater replacement factors.

(4) Establishes theater credits for items in short supply.

(5) Approves the issue of equipment and supplies in excess of established allowances.

(6) Determines priorities within which equipment and supplies are to be distributed.

(7) Redistributes excess, reclaimed, and salvaged equipment and supplies.

(8) Approves the determination and disposal of surplus equipment and supplies.

(9) Coordinates action on the collection and distribution of captured enemy equipment and supplies.

(10) Determines policies relating to conservation, maintenance, reclamation, and salvage of equipment and supplies.

b. Property Section.

(1) Based upon information furnished by the Planning and Program Branches, acts upon plans and recommendations for the acquisition and disposition of land and facilities, and the construction, renovation, maintenance and disposition of buildings and facilities.

(2) Initiates studies concerning and prepares policies and directives to implement recommendations of the Joint Army-Navy Ammunition Storage Board.

(3) Determines policies with respect to property accountability and responsibility and to claims against the Army.

(4) Determines policies pertaining to transportation by land, air, and water.

c. Economics Section.

(1) Represents G-4 on the War Department Conference Groups of the Munitions Assignment Committee (Ground) and the sub-committee of the Joint Munitions Allocation Committee.

(2) Analyzes requirements and makes recommendations relating to the requirements of lend-lease governments for inclusion in Sections I and III of the Army Supply Program.

(3) Advises the G-4 representative on the Munitions Assignment Committee (Air) and Munitions Assignment Committee (Ground).

(4) Represents G-4 as a member or observer on Supply Sub-Committee of Combined Civil Affairs Committee, U. S. Procurement Committee, and related committees.

(5) Maintains liaison with the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, relative to supply requirements of occupied and liberated areas, and reviews policies and requirements affecting civilian supplies for such areas during the period of military responsibility.

(6) Maintains liaison with civilian agencies dealing with economic problems of interest to G-4.

(7) Studies the logistical implications of economic policies, including the effect of international trade on army supply requirements.

(8) Studies the impact of War Department supply policies on the civilian economy at home and abroad.

(9) Makes recommendations on Lend-Lease assignments and settlements with respect to their effect on the supply requirements of the United States Army."

G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT
GENERAL STAFF, IN WORLD WAR II

Organizationally and in many other respects the Military Intelligence Division, G-2 of the General Staff, was one of the difficult areas in the March 1942 reorganization. As early as January 1942, G-2 had some 390 officers and 599 civilian employees in Washington. The importance of effective intelligence was recognized and for this reason there was no special effort made to reduce drastically its personnel strength. Thus the Military Intelligence Division and the Military Intelligence Service were permitted to increase their departmental strength in Washington to a total of 358 officers and 1015 civilian employees and enlisted technicians on June 30, 1944. The G-2 solution for all their

problems was always more people, and yet it was very obvious that an increase in strength was not the sole answer. There were, therefore, more organization studies and reorganizations in G-2 than in any other General Staff division.

The general attitude toward G-2 at the beginning of the war appeared to be a continuation of past sympathy, apprehension, and exasperation. Hard-working, conscientious G-2 officers were apt to believe that the intelligence problem was misunderstood and unappreciated. This was true in part, for there were many critics who took delight in telling their G-2 friends that the entire 1500 of the G-2 personnel could be eliminated without adversely affecting the war effort, or at best could be replaced by general daily distribution of *The New York Times*. To this overstated jibe the Intelligence Service officers could make no reply without disclosing secret information but one of their principal characteristics was to consider as secret information everything that G-2 handled. Actually a large amount of very valuable military information was being collected by the Military Intelligence Division, but the volume of material tended to be so great that the nuggets often remained hidden until they were no longer timely. It was this that prompted the continuous cry for more personnel. As an example, during May of 1942, G-2 handled 125,779 communications, many of which by their own admission they considered to be unnecessary. Personnel increases would probably have swelled the volume proportionately, and the goal of quality instead of quantity would have remained as far away as ever. However, on the question of volume G-2 had a weighty argument. There was certain intelligence material where 10,000 searches, items, or communications might yield only two or three finds of military information, but these two or three would be of such vital importance as to justify handling of ten or twenty thousand possible pieces of information. If this statement was accepted, then it followed that G-2 must be given sufficient personnel so that the vital information could be found in time to be of use and to be fully exploited. This argument might have been accepted had not there been so many instances where G-2 personnel were being dissipated in work that was not productive and that might well have been delegated to other agencies and to headquarters of units in the field.

G-2 was also troubled by what might be termed friendly rivalry or competition which existed both within and without its organization. There was some basis for the commonly held impression that there were several sections and section chiefs within G-2 who were aspiring for the position of the lead team. In jockeying for the position there was little to be gained and much to be lost by personnel economies and

special efforts to disseminate choice bits of intelligence. When the Office of Strategic Services was established, it was not unnatural for many G-2 officers to be envious of their lavish funds and generous personnel staffing, and to believe that had these funds and personnel been given to G-2 there would have been no need for the Office of Strategic Services. Likewise, there was some concern and exasperation over the rapid growth of the Air Intelligence Staff in the Army Air Forces—especially where this had the noticeable results of overlapping and duplication.

At the center of many of the lesser problems was the major problem of spelling out in detail what the actual mission was of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff. It was easy to give the book answer—the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information. So much military information or what passed for military information could be sent in that G-2 would choke on it. It was, therefore, the announced policy that the War Department General Staff Intelligence Division would concern itself with strategic intelligence and that the overseas Theaters would not send in tactical intelligence. The difficulty here was that no two people agreed on the interpretation of these terms.

In practice G-2 engaged in many activities which made decentralization difficult and which, because of their diversity, did not lend themselves to any organizational cohesion. There was need for political, economic, geographic, and combat strength information to provide the background material for long-term strategic intelligence estimates. To give the intelligence report at the daily operational conferences demanded a G-2 knowledge of the current situation in as detailed a form as was normally available in an overseas Theater headquarters. Certain other intelligence activities by their very nature required so much detail, if they were to be effectively exploited that the process was not dissimilar in degree of detail to the tactical intelligence activities of small units. Then G-2 was involved in the laborious details of loyalty checks of personnel and of certain censorship reports.

There was also the technical intelligence field. In 1940 each of the chiefs of twelve of the arms and services had been directed to establish in their offices intelligence sections to collect and pass on to the Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff requests for information wanted, and to disseminate the information thus obtained. This, of course, greatly enlarged the field of activity in technical items—questions about the equipment, weapons, and performance data on planes and armor of other armies, those of the Axis in particular. It was under this directive that the Chief of Air Corps expanded the intelli-

gence activities of his office. With the establishment of the Army Air Forces in 1941, air intelligence activities greatly increased and reached a point where G-2 of the War Department General Staff raised the question of overlapping and duplication of effort and suggested that these activities of the Air Force, A-2, be restricted. G-2's objections were not sustained and the Air Force was permitted to engage in the intelligence required for possible air operations or air planning. At the time of the 1942 reorganization, the Military Intelligence Division emphasized the establishment of appropriate air sections, staffed with air officers, within G-2 to provide the Air Forces with air intelligence and to obviate the establishment of duplicate agencies. However, the emphasis placed on strategic bombing and the early establishment of virtually independent Air Forces overseas resulted in the continued expansion of the Army Air Forces intelligence agencies until they rivalled those of G-2. Eventually a mutual understanding was reached through which overlapping and duplication were reduced. Agreements were reached that the Air Forces Intelligence Division would concentrate on certain phases of intelligence which G-2 would disregard, and vice versa. In some subjects, such as photographic intelligence, cooperative projects were developed.

At the time of the 1942 reorganization efforts were made to find the answers to the following questions:

(a) How can greater emphasis be placed on those intelligence activities which are most productive of results and most directly related to the war effort.

(b) What relatively non-productive or unimportant activities could be eliminated, decentralized, or transferred elsewhere.

(c) How could key officers be relieved from the routine administrative and other tasks which monopolized their time and which left too little opportunity for the General Staff G-2 function of contemplation and planning.

(d) How could the operational activities be separated from the General Staff activities in the intelligence field.

(e) How could the processing of intelligence information be accomplished so that the chaff would be winnowed out in echelons lower than the General Staff.

(f) How could the mechanical processes of handling intelligence be speeded up without compromising military security.

(g) How could there be eliminated from intelligence estimates the bias of strong personal viewpoint of one individual and the substitution therefor of a composite judgment of several experts.

Could these questions only have been answered with finality and

G-2 reorganized accordingly, it would have been little short of a miracle.

It was the considered opinion of G-2 that the "conduct of any military intelligence organization was so closely associated with and based upon operational work that it was impossible to divorce the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff from certain operational functions." The reorganization solution attempted, therefore, to "separate a small directing staff from the much larger working or operating staff, but maintaining at the same time a close physical proximity between these two parts." This was to be accomplished by designating as the G-2 General Staff section chiefs those officers who were the "titular heads of and in closest touch with similar branches within the Intelligence Service." While these officers functioned in their capacity as General Staff officers, the Intelligence Service part of their duties was carried on by their senior assistant. Thus, after March 1942 there was a small Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff totalling 16 officers with 10 clerical assistants, and a Military Intelligence Service consisting of 342 officers and 1005 civilian and enlisted assistants. The Service was to carry out the operational and administrative activities for the General Staff section, and while there were to be two distinct agencies, some of the key officers were members of both organizations. This differentiation tended to be an artificial distinction and in practice there was but one organization.

At the same time when G-2 was increasing its personnel, continuous efforts were made to divert personnel from less important to more important duties. Certain counter-intelligence duties for which G-2 had been responsible were delegated to the Service Commands in the United States. In intelligence, as in other activities, there had been overlapping jurisdictions in the United States. G-2 had certain personnel out in the field at Service Command headquarters and elsewhere. The result was that many intelligence matters were handled through intelligence channels and a tendency developed for the commanding generals of Service Commands to disclaim their responsibility for such matters. This was changed and command channels and responsibility were substituted for technical channels and divided responsibility. Certain G-2 activities in connection with loyalty investigation were turned over to the Provost Marshal General's organization. Likewise, an Intelligence School was established at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, which took over some of the training activities formerly carried out in the War Department. Nevertheless, the volume of business in G-2 remained disturbingly large.

While improvements were made from time to time in the organiza-

tion of G-2 and in the manner in which G-2 operated, there remained something more to be desired. Organizational frictions continued to exist. These were due in part to the fact that there were many conflicting organizational strains or types present in G-2. Thus G-2 was organized in part on a geographical area basis; it was also split on the basis of how its information was obtained as, for example, from military attachés. There was one major division set up on the basis of how the information was obtained that virtually divided G-2 into two distinct and mutually exclusive compartments. Also, for a while there was differentiation on the basis of air and ground sections. In effect, G-2 was also divided because of its procedures and security controls into several layers—the lowest would handle only a relatively low order of secret material with the highest seeing the most secret material. Then, of course, there were geographical sections, economic sections, and a political section. Organizationally G-2 was a mongrel with many uncertain strains mixed in and not always recognizable.

1944 CHANGES IN G-2, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

A major effort was made to improve the War Department intelligence organization during the first half of 1944. In February a board of officers headed by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and consisting of Major General John P. Smith, Major General Clayton Bissell, and Brigadier General O. L. Nelson, was appointed to study and recommend organizational improvements in G-2. Mr. McCloy had long been interested in efforts to strengthen the intelligence organization. General Smith as the War Department representative with the Office of Strategic Services, was familiar with their set-up and work, and it was believed that his special knowledge would be useful. General Bissell had recently been appointed as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Assisting this committee was a working group consisting of Brigadier General Elliot D. Cooke, from the Office of the Inspector General. Colonel John H. Stutesman, Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Brigham, Captain Jerome Hubbard and Mr. George Schwarzwald from the Bureau of the Budget who had assisted the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff in making previous intelligence and security studies. A very thorough examination was made of the existing intelligence organization and procedures. Certain defects were listed as requiring remedial action. The same basic questions as were propounded at the time of the 1942 reorganization were studied and solutions considered. Certain basic issues were raised for decision. Probably the most important element of the survey was the detailed study made of

procedures and the flow of intelligence material. It was considered that the grinding out of military intelligence was not dissimilar to the job of publishing a large newspaper or news magazine. Members of the survey group were sent to study the organization and procedures of *The New York Times* and *Time Magazine*. Valuable suggestions resulted from this and these played a part in determining some of the recommended changes. After the recommendation of the McCloy Board had been approved, a group of officers within G-2 worked out with great thoroughness the manner in which the changes would be made.

The 1944 reorganization attempted to find better answers to the same questions that had been propounded in 1942. In addition, emphasis was placed on the development of better procedures. Additional personnel allocations were made. Some issues were admittedly still not satisfactorily resolved. The objective and philosophy of the reorganization were explained by the following letter which supplemented the directive prescribing the reorganization:

"1. The recommendations of the board of officers headed by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy for the reorganization of the Military Intelligence Division have been approved and have been forwarded for implementation. Because of the substantial changes recommended and in view of the many new concepts, this memorandum is designed to supplement the report of the board of officers and to describe the philosophy underlying the approved recommendations for the reorganization of the Military Intelligence Division.

2. The principal objectives sought in the reorganization of the Military Intelligence Division were as follows:

a. To establish policies which would direct the intelligence operating activities of the three major commands, overseas theaters and the Military Intelligence Division.

b. To separate distinctly intelligence policy activities of G-2 which relate to the entire Army and the intelligence operating activities of the Military Intelligence Service wherein military information is translated into useful military intelligence.

c. To tailor the intelligence organization to fit present war needs and to thus emphasize organizationally German and Japanese intelligence.

d. To eliminate those activities which do not contribute to the war effort.

e. To curb the flow of useless military information and to emphasize quality in lieu of quantity.

f. To keep the personnel and operations of the Military Intelligence Service as conservative in numbers and volume as possible by delega-

tion of all operations the actual control of which is not essential to its mission, in order that it might exploit to the fullest flexibility of organization, non-routine processes, and imaginative group action without the necessity of supervising large routine operations.

g. To exploit to the maximum presently productive intelligence activities.

b. To end the extreme compartmentation which has characterized past intelligence operational procedures.

i. To free the key persons responsible for the final intelligence product (Chief of the Service, sub-chiefs and intelligence specialists) from the necessity to become involved in the processing and reading of a mass of detailed intelligence reports and from the annoyances and details of administration.

3. It is important to understand that the Military Intelligence Division will consist of two distinct and separate activities, to wit:

a. A group of War Department General Staff officers who, as the G-2 policy group, are charged with enunciating and implementing military intelligence policies for the Army as a whole. Personnel of this policy group must be trained staff officers with a knowledge of General Staff problems and procedures. This group is not responsible for producing any intelligence information. It is, therefore, not concerned with the activities of the Military Intelligence Service except as it constitutes one of the several Army components for which intelligence policies must be established.

b. A military intelligence service which gets information and converts that information into usable military intelligence. Its primary duty is to obtain information from all sources available under established policies and to convert that information into military intelligence for use by the Chief of Staff, the General Staff, the War Department and theater commanders. The Military Intelligence Service will perform only those intelligence operating activities in the field which cannot be delegated or discharged by theater intelligence staffs or the three major commands.

4. To emphasize the present war situation the Military Intelligence Service is built to serve the needs and to emphasize the importance of the Japanese Specialist and the German Specialist. The Japanese Specialist may be two, three or four individuals who are the experts on all the intelligence pertaining to the Japanese irrespective of geographical origin. A similar arrangement will exist with the German Specialist. A change has been made from geographic or area concepts as a principle organization unit for the final stages of intelligence production and the national concept 'Japanese' has been substituted instead of 'Japan.'

5. The proposed organization seeks to eliminate extreme compart-

mentation by providing for the group method of operating. Thus no one unit has complete responsibility for all activity in an area indicated by the title of the unit. Military attachés, for example, are organized and 'controlled' by one unit, 'administered' as to housekeeping by another, while their material is received by another unit and analyzed and evaluated by two others. Finally, the product is disseminated after correlation with other material under the guidance and control of still another unit. This type of organization, while potentially able to produce an infinitely better result in a field as abstract as intelligence, places a great demand on top supervision and coordination. Top supervision must be free to devote a major portion of its time to conference, personal contact and verbal coordination. Of basic importance to the success of the proposed organization is:

a. A detailed and clear statement of precisely that part of the total process which each group is to do so that each group not only understands its part but is aware of the part being played by others.

b. Elimination of all channels in flow of intelligence material. Thus no unit receives any intelligence material (except information copies) unless it concerns that part of the total process for which it is responsible. This is also true to some extent with regard to other material. Thus, the Executive Officer is no longer a channel through whom *all* material flows. He only has such material referred to him (other than information copies) as is of immediate moment to administration.

6. A very important new concept is the conversion of intelligence-producing desks from Branches to Specialists. This will permit the semi-final stage of intelligence production to take place in an atmosphere completely divorced from the necessity to run or supervise anything. Two measures, other than securing personnel who understand how to operate and use the product of other's work without 'commanding' them, must be taken to protect this concept.

a. The top supervision must handle administrative and, to a great extent, policy matters without reference to the Specialist desks.

b. A research group supervised strongly from the top must be provided which is completely available and accessible, without any question of authorities involved, to service the Specialist desks. The organization of research will be by kinds of intelligence and will require top supervision to plan the extent and emphasis on kinds of intelligence, as: economic, geographic, military, logistic, ethnological, etc. The organization of the Research Group must be flexible and fluid except that in general research analysts specializing within kinds of intelligence will be grouped together.

7. An effort has been made to free the Specialists from the shackles

of a great amount of useless material which would absorb the greater part of their reading time. This is to be accomplished by the following:

a. Freeing of the Specialist desks from the necessity of reading all available intelligence. The implementation of this concept will require full-time attention and the taking of the following measures (other than securing proper personnel.)

(1) The Specialists must desire to be 'intelligent' rather than 'encyclopedic.' The top supervision must be such that they will feel comfortable in this. When factual information of a miscellany character is desired, top supervision must indicate by its attitude that it expects the Specialist to consult briefly before producing the information and the Specialist must have no embarrassment in getting the information elsewhere.

(2) The Specialist must analyze his own needs and draw up a bill of specifications for the guidance of other units which will service him. A suggested method of arriving at this bill of specifications is to determine what intelligence the Specialist will require.

(a) Continuously and instantaneously. Thus the Japanese Specialist may wish to receive immediately all information received regarding major movements or concentrations of the Japanese Army.

(b) Continuously but in summary form covering the latest information within say two weeks. Thus, the Japanese Specialist might wish to be kept informed in summary fashion as to the condition of the Japanese merchant marine, prisoners of war, casualties, etc. Such information can be extracted from current cables and summarized in report form weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly by the Research Group.

(c) Continuously but in trend form. Thus, the Japanese Specialist may wish to have a trend picture of Japanese steel production. Charts, tables or other methods of showing trend information can be maintained by the Research Group posting monthly, semi-annually or other periods on charts, maps, etc., in the Specialist's office.

(d) Available when wanted. Thus, the Japanese Specialist may need to have available detailed maps. Such information can be extracted by the Research library or file for quick reference or summarizing when wanted.

(3) The Receiving Group normally will not refer any incoming material to the Specialists until they know what specific items are to be sent immediately to the Specialists.

(4) Personnel for the Specialists' desks must be held to an absolute minimum of two or three officers.

b. Great emphasis has been placed on the organization of a Research Group with an integrity of its own. Everyone must understand that

although the head of the Research Group has access to the Director of Intelligence and may be called upon to verify the factual basis for a position taken by the Specialist he is, for day-to-day purposes, 'under' all the Specialists and exists solely to service them. Top supervision must assume responsibility for all matters of priority and scheduling of research in order that the Research head is never placed in a position of conflict between two or more Specialists regarding the relative importance of their work.

c. The proposed reorganization seeks to curb the in flow of useless material. To this end the Director of Information who controls the in flow of intelligence will be expected to issue timely instructions as to what information is desired and as to what information should not be sent in. Instead of attempting to cover the waterfront and attributing intelligence importance to all military information emphasis must be placed on screening, collecting instructions and other methods to insure that only intelligence information which is desired will be sent in.

8. The underlying concept is that intelligence operations must be confined to the minimum necessary to the production of needed intelligence at the G-2 level. The conception embodied in this proposal is that the best intelligence will be produced from a total system which is conservative as to personnel and which is not bogged down with a routine flow of a mass of information nor with the problems of administering huge operations. Although the study group was unable to be of any real assistance in developing a statement of the kinds of intelligence which is reasonably *needed* at the G-2 level, both MIS and the G-2 Policy Group must direct their attention to continuous study of this question so that collection agencies can limit themselves to useful material."

The new organization is shown on the chart on page 533. It was a wide departure from what had existed previously and it illustrated well the emphasis on the control of the flow of information. It was supposed to function in the following manner. The G-2 policy staff was restricted to policies and did not have a part in the flow of information. It was to be a true General Staff division and was divided into four policy groups. The Military Intelligence Service had three main branches—the first headed by a Director of Information, the second headed by a Director of Intelligence, and a third under an executive for administration. The Director of Information was responsible for the securing of such pertinent information as would insure the production of the necessary intelligence. He directed and controlled the personnel engaged in gathering information and he had the task of keep-

ing this personnel informed about what specific or general information was desired. To assist the Director of Information there was established a supervisor of information-gathering personnel (Source Control) and a supervisor of receiving, classification and distribution of information (Distribution). The supervisor of information-gathering personnel was charged with the selection of this personnel and, likewise, with seeing that they were properly instructed in their duties. He also determined the assignment of the personnel and made sure that each individual was fully qualified for the duties he was directed to perform. The supervisor was charged with keeping his personnel continuously informed regarding the type of information desired by the Director of Information. He was responsible that such information was secured and submitted in time to be of value to those charged with producing military intelligence.

The supervisor of receiving, classification and distribution was in charge of the receipt of all information submitted to the Military Intelligence Service. He was charged with organizing his personnel in the manner affording maximum security for both the information received and the source from whence it came. He was responsible for the immediate sorting, determining the destination, and prompt delivery of information to the proper persons or units within or without the Military Intelligence Service. To insure accurate distribution of incoming information, he was to keep constantly informed of the requirements of the Director of Information, and the intelligence Specialists. He apprised the supervisor of information-gathering (Source Control) personnel when the type of information requested by him was not being received, or when the information submitted was valueless or inconsequential. The receiving supervisor had useless information destroyed instead of permitting it to add to the Military Intelligence files. The personnel in the receiving, classification and distribution center had to be of the highest order as regards their loyalty, initiative and perception.

The Director of Information was supposed to cure the old habit of sending everything in to G-2. An elaborate machinery was set up to accomplish this. Not only were detailed instructions issued on what and what not to send in, but in addition an International Business Machine system was established to provide a check to see if the material that was received was used and if used whether it was considered to be good, bad, or indifferent. On the basis of these reports the senders of information were to be further instructed. But to restrict the flow was always a problem.

The Director of Intelligence was in charge of an editorial group, the

intelligence specialists, and the research section, and was responsible for the timely production of the military intelligence required.

The Editorial Group was responsible to the Director of Intelligence for the formulation, editing and production of intelligence reports, maps and publications to be furnished the Chief of Staff, the War Department General Staff, and the major commands. The data for these products was to be abstracted from reports submitted by the Intelligence Specialists, supplemented by such work as is requested of the Research department. The authenticity and value of these products remained the responsibility of the Editorial Group.

The Intelligence Specialists were charged with converting information into military intelligence. They were to be selected on their ability to perform this task, without regard to rank or precedent. Each specialist was responsible to the Director of Intelligence for the production of usable military intelligence in the designated field of intelligence activity, study or analysis assigned. These activities or fields of study, however, were all-inclusive, and not merely geographical in scope. A Japanese specialist, for example, would formulate and submit all intelligence on the Japanese, regardless of where the Japanese were operating, or where the information originated. The German and other Specialists would do the same, in regard to activities in which they specialized. These specialists were to tell the receiving supervisor (Source Control) what information they needed in order to accomplish their task, and also were to call upon the Chief of Research to supplement and assist them in their work. These Specialists were to rely upon the Research department for routine work, and were not to become involved in minutiae. They were expected, however, to anticipate and prognosticate future events, as well as furnish current intelligence. Their end product was submitted to the editorial group; or directly to the Director of Intelligence, when he so directed.

The Chief of Research was in charge of all major research activities within the Military Intelligence Service. He supervised the personnel engaged in research projects for the intelligence specialists and Editorial Group. Priority on research work was established by the intelligence Specialists, unless otherwise indicated by the Director of Intelligence. In addition to research activities, the Research Section was responsible for the "Who's Who" files, intelligence records and library. No restrictions were to be imposed upon the Chief of Research regarding the grouping of his personnel, either functionally or geographically. His organization was expected to be flexible and, in addition to routine research, was to be capable of bringing to bear the maximum effort upon each and every problem presented.

The Director of Administration had the duty of relieving the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, and the Directors of Information and Intelligence, of administrative annoyances and problems. He supervised the personnel of the administrative group and appended activities. He was not, however, to inject himself into the departments of information and intelligence, except to assist, by mechanical means, the furtherment of those activities. He was not to be utilized as an agency for transmitting orders of the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service to either of the two Directors, nor was the Director of Administration a channel through which those Directors passed in order to reach the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service. In addition, the filing of papers and documents relative to administrative matters was not to be merged with the records of the Research Department, but was to be kept separately and maintained under the supervision of the Executive for Administration.

The large volume of business in G-2 complicated the handling and filing of material. There were so many kinds of information all filed in the G-2 central files that there was a tendency for officers and sections to develop their own special files so as to have material readily available. This, of course, increased the difficulty of finding things. The reorganization stressed the separation of intelligence material from administrative and attempted to establish an intelligence library with modern equipment so that the information would be readily available. An expert in library procedures was brought in to assist in the change.

The idea behind the research assistants was to reduce the endless reading of an infinite amount of material and to free persons who had hitherto spent their days in endless reading of much inconsequential information. The system had been such that the passing of papers in an endless circle and the reading of those papers tended to become an end in itself. Needless to say, the reorganization plans did not work out without modification and without being materially influenced by the human element. But at any rate, the reorganization did improve the manner in which material was handled, and it did provide a method of operation that could increase decidedly the effectiveness of the intelligence specialists and thus the intelligence information supplied to all users.

WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL STAFF IN WORLD WAR II

If it had been possible, the 1942 reorganization would have transferred all of the special staff of the War Department to one of the three major commands. In fact, all were so transferred except the Bureau of Public Relations, the Inspector General's Department, and the Legisla-

tive and Liaison Division. The heads of these sections had such close relationships with the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the General Staff divisions that an intervening commander would have handicapped their operations. It was questionable, too, whether some of the other special staff groups should have been transferred, but it was decided that it was better to err on the side of decentralization.

No very clear principles or logic existed on what constituted a proper War Department Special Staff activity. The Judge Advocate General, the Adjutant General and the Chief Finance Officer all performed central administrative services that would normally be on the departmental level instead of in a subordinate echelon. The justifications for placing them in the Army Service Forces were that they were very large organizations, they operated on the basis of rules that were well understood, and therefore they could operate satisfactorily in their well established routine in a lower echelon and thus relieve the General Staff and Chief of Staff from being concerned with their daily operations. There were two serious objections to this rationalization. It was not appreciated to what an extent these agencies could be used as instruments of control to implement and check the effectiveness of General Staff policies. Likewise, any major change of policy involving the operation of a central administrative Service required a decision on the General Staff level. If this was admitted, then conceivably central administrative Services that provided techniques of control useful to the War Department General Staff should be part of the War Department Special Staff.

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT IN WORLD WAR II

The Inspector General's Department provided a most effective technique of control for the use of the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and their principal assistants on the General Staff. The normal peacetime activities of the Inspector General's Department, such as annual inspections to audit funds and property accounts, and other activities in investigating complaints, were important but these duties became secondary during World War II. The special inspections to ascertain if policies had been carried out and the special surveys to obtain needed information were the activities that paid dividends during the war.

Illustrative of a technique of control which lengthened the directing arm of the Chief of Staff were the special inspections made to ascertain the readiness of units for overseas movements. At the beginning of the war the Chief of Staff had been disturbed over reports that units and men were going overseas without being in every respect properly trained and equipped. The Deputy Chief of Staff was charged with the task of

correcting this condition and with seeing to it that units and men were properly prepared for going overseas. This required a system of supervisory controls to be devised.

The system established required that a status report describing the condition of the unit be submitted by the commanding general of the major command responsible for the training of the unit. This report listed the pertinent information concerning the unit, such as the efficiency rating of the unit commander, a summary of the training that had been given, the percentage qualifications of the unit in the weapons which had to be fired, the statement that the training required by mobilization regulations had been completed, and a statement that all required equipment was on hand or that it would be furnished on a certain date. These reports were excellent, but because they were made by the commander responsible for the training, it was considered desirable to obtain the comments of a disinterested agency.

For this reason, it was required that an officer of the Inspector General's Department spend several days with the unit in order to make a detailed inspection on the basis of which an independent report was submitted. The report indicated all deficiencies which had been observed in the unit and ended with a statement that the unit was or was not qualified for overseas shipment. The status report submitted by the responsible major command and the report of The Inspector General's report indicated deficiencies that were to be remedied by the direct shipment of equipment or supplies to the port of embarkation. It therefore became important to ascertain if certain critical equipment was actually received by the unit before it got on the boat. The services of The Inspector General were utilized to obtain a final, independent check, which was made at the time the unit embarked. Undoubtedly these numerous inspections were onerous to individual troop commanders who were all hard pressed to prepare their units for overseas in a very short period of time. However, the inspection system did help raise the standards. In itself, the knowledge that a unit would have to pass a severe inspection acted as an effective spur. The few horrible examples that were discovered were made the subject of drastic remedial action, not only with respect to the unit concerned but with the commanders and staffs whose supervision should have produced more acceptable units.

These inspections naturally required highly trained officers, a standardized procedure, and a great amount of continuing hard work. Obviously the General Staff divisions could not perform this kind of a continuing job as a description of the procedure will indicate. Before starting the inspection, the senior inspector general furnished all assistants with copies of the worksheets to be used by them and briefed them in

the work to be followed. These worksheets enabled the senior inspector general to determine the thoroughness with which inspections were conducted. Moreover, they showed definitely the percentage of items inspected and personnel examined. Assistants were required to report not only the condition of the equipment but also the qualifications of the technicians in their specialties. In inspecting organizational equipment, two different degrees of thoroughness of inspection were employed, depending upon whether the equipment was to accompany the unit or not. Equipment going with the unit was examined in sufficient detail to determine whether or not it was combat serviceable. Inspection was made of equipment that would not accompany the unit only to determine its state of maintenance.

One of the serious and recurring problems in preparation for overseas movement inspections was maintenance. In accordance with a War Department directive on the subject of supply and maintenance discipline, an inspector general who found maintenance to be unsatisfactory made an inquiry to determine who was responsible and submitted a recommendation for his relief unless it was found that the conditions were beyond the officer's control. In checking basic training on the check list used for Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) inspections, inspectors general covered the state of maintenance of the soldier's clothing, individual equipment, and individual firearm. In checking on technical training, they included the state of maintenance of vehicles and any other equipment which required technically trained men for adequate maintenance. Mainly, the items inquired into comprised five main categories—the basic qualities of personnel of the unit, the state of training, the completeness and serviceability of supplies and equipment, the state of efficiency of administration and records of the unit and its discipline and morale.

The check lists of results of the inspection, which were submitted by the senior inspector, contained his conclusions as to whether he would recommend that the unit was qualified to perform its mission. But the final decision as to whether the unit was considered "ready," "ready provided," or "not ready" rested with The Inspector General. (A unit was considered "ready" when it was ready to perform its mission at the time of the inspection. It was classified as "ready provided" when its deficiencies were, in the opinion of The Inspector General, correctible by the readiness date and it was believed that they would be corrected. A unit was classified as "not ready" when the seriousness of the deficiencies would prevent the unit from performing its mission and when the deficiencies were not correctible by the readiness date.) Upon re-

ceipt in the Washington office of the Inspector General of check-lists of results of inspection, a draft of the report was prepared. This draft was checked and a report prepared, in final form, for submission to the Deputy Chief of Staff. These reports were as brief as was consistent to enable the Deputy Chief of Staff to obtain a true picture of the readiness of the unit to perform its mission, and were, in general, sent to the Deputy Chief of Staff within 48 hours of receipt of the check-list. Copies of it were furnished, in varying numbers, to the headquarters of the major command to which the units belong.

Another very important aid to General Staff supervision was the work done by the Inspector General's Department in inspecting to find how effectively important directives on supply levels and supply procedures were being carried out. Questions of supply levels, and quantities of supplies in the so-called pipeline, became an issue when army buying caused severe civilian shortages. A board headed by Major General Frank McCoy investigated the supply levels being maintained and recommended certain changes. These recommendations were then studied by a War Department Special Committee for the Re-study of Reserves. As a result of the work of these two groups, which took six months, a basic supply directive containing 57 far-reaching paragraphs was issued on January 1, 1944 by the Deputy Chief of Staff. The task of implementing this directive was difficult and required that the instructions be transmitted to and understood by many echelons, not only in the United States but all over the world. The Inspector General was, therefore, instructed to devise a system of inspection and supervision to determine how thoroughly the directive was being implemented. Frequent reports were requested in order that remedial action could be directed in areas where progress in carrying out the directive was not satisfactory. Thus the task given to the representatives of the Inspector General's Department involved inspection schedules of gigantic proportions. The implementation of the directive was satisfactory only because of the fact that the staff supervision given by representatives of that Department was excellent.

The Inspector General likewise performed an important control function for the Under Secretary of War by inspecting procurement and construction activities. They included inspections of Government-owned, contractor-operated plants on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis and construction projects. In these inspections, the general purchasing and contracting methods were inquired into and a number of individual transactions reviewed. Inspection of military construction included also inspection of auditing systems to determine whether the measures were adequate to protect the Government's interests. Inspections were also made of

procurement districts of the Army Air Forces and all technical services of the Army Service Forces, manufacturing arsenals, and other procuring agencies, as well as of the administration and audit cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts in all Branches and Services. Incident to district inspections, the general system of procurement established in the districts was inquired into. This included all types of supply and service contracts. During this inquiry, the general method of negotiating contracts, the degree of competition and the pricing were examined, a small number of contracts were reviewed, and justification of contracts and expenditures under them determined. Renegotiation and repricing of contracts, terminations, and disposal of property transactions were carefully reviewed to determine whether or not the Government's interests were being protected. "Item studies" were conducted to ascertain the propriety of the purchase of a specific item in the case of any given item. This entailed, for instance, in the case of a shoe purchase, ascertaining the total shoe purchases being made, the total existing stockage of shoes, and the total requirements of the Army Supply Program, followed by an inspection of a number of individual shoe manufacturers, contracts, and plants for the purpose of price comparison, etc. The reports of inspections were transmitted through channels to the commanding general of the major command concerned and to higher authority when appropriate.

During World War II the Inspector General's Office also conducted many important investigations. At the direction of the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of War or the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief or Deputy Chief of Staff, or at the request of the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, or Army Service Forces, officers in the Investigations Division of the Inspector General's Office made confidential investigations of all kinds, including matters on which the War Department was desirous of obtaining a full and impartial presentation of conditions existing within the Army as well as matters concerning individuals which were brought to the attention of the War Department, either through military channels or in letters addressed to the War Department by the White House, Members of Congress, Government bureaus, civilian agencies, or individuals. In conducting these investigations it was the duty of the investigating officer to make as nearly complete a presentation of the evidence on both sides as was possible, and, before completing the investigation, to make known to the person concerned the exact nature of the prejudicial accusations against him as contained in documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, and to afford that person an opportunity to defend himself by his own oral testimony, by the testimony of any witness he

might desire heard in his behalf, and by such written statements of himself or others as he might desire to submit. The form and contents of the report of investigation were not prescribed for application to all investigations. Nevertheless the report, in addition to setting forth the authority, the matter investigated, the facts developed during the course of the investigation (all of which must be substantiated by sworn testimony or documentary evidence), and a discussion thereof when necessary, usually contained a concise statement of conclusions, based on the established facts and circumstances, followed by recommendations for such corrective and/or disciplinary action as was considered to be appropriate.

The Inspector General's Department was used to the limit of their capacity in the United States but only infrequently were they employed outside of the United States. There were several differing views on the proper scope of Inspector General work. When should the three major commands be asked to investigate and report and when should the job go to the Inspector General's Department? The answer depended on how highly one held the prerogatives of command. There were commanders who objected to an inspector from a higher headquarters coming into their commands and who believed that this indicated a lack of confidence. These commanders held that if you wanted to know anything about their commands, you should ask them and they would tell you. The policy followed by the War Department during World War II was of interest. Whenever possible the commander concerned was asked to investigate and report. Where a comparison involving several commands or where complete objectivity was especially desired, the Inspector General was used within the United States. Only in rare instances were inspections made overseas. Additional overseas inspections would have been very profitable but were not made because of the possibility that the attention of overseas commanders might be diverted from their combat duties.

THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

The Bureau of Public Relations and the Legislative and Liaison Division were the War Department Special Staff sections which in addition to providing a needed administrative service, were designed to provide another technique of control for the Office of the Secretary of War and the Office of the Chief of Staff. The War Department was obligated to furnish to the country as much war information in as timely a fashion as military security could permit. Thus, what the War Department reported had to be controlled and coordinated. The Secre-

tary of War and the Chief of Staff, with the advice of the General Staff, determined what could be released and the Bureau of Public Relations acted as the technical advisor and channel for the release.

At the time of the 1942 reorganization there was some disposition to permit decentralization in public relations activities. Accordingly, the three major commands established Public Relations sections. There was a tendency for commanders to pay either too little or too much attention to questions of publicity. Either extreme was bad, but it was the practice of paying too much attention to publicity activities that gave the War Department the most trouble. Whenever high ranking officers spoke, the public accepted their remarks as the official War Department viewpoint. Columnists and Congressmen often called a number of War Department offices for information or to obtain the War Department viewpoint. When the comments did not agree, the War Department was made to look ridiculous. The coordination required from the Bureau of Public Relations, and from the Legislative and Liaison Division for Congressional relations, was a delicate matter. In a democracy no one wanted a "canned" answer and all were suspicious of any control activities that seemingly prevented getting to the bottom of any incident. It was therefore essential that these special staff sections emphasize the service aspect of their duties and demonstrate that through them the quickest and most accurate information could be obtained. It was only on this basis that they could carry out their important control functions.

It was decided on the basis of considerable experience that decentralization in public and Congressional relations activities was not workable. Of interest was the directive of August 14, 1942 on the Reorganization of Public Relations Agencies, which stated:

"Conditions existing prior to December 7, 1941, and the rapid expansion of the War Department and the Army have contributed to an excessive development of public relations activities. To eliminate the present overlapping and duplication of activities, and to reduce personnel now employed in public relations work, public relations activities in the War Department and the Army are reorganized to conform to the following:

a. Mission of public relations activities.—The mission of public relations activities is to transmit to the public through the press, radio, motion pictures, publications, and directly, items of information pertaining to Army activities of general interest to the country, provided that their transmittal does not reveal information of value to the enemy.

b. Organization.

(1) All War Department and Army public relations agencies operate

under policies established by the Secretary of War, as announced by the Director of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations.

(2) The Director of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations will organize his bureau so as to provide for adequate representation within the War Department Bureau of Public Relations for the public relations offices of the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply. All public relations activities that involve the use of such national and regional media as the press, radio networks, motion pictures, and magazines, will be cleared through the War Department Bureau of Public Relations. Public relations offices in the field are authorized to clear public relations activities under the provision of section III, Circular No. 113, War Department, 1942.

(3) In lieu of the public relations offices now operating at the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply, an Office of Technical Information with a personnel strength of not to exceed four officers and eight enlisted men or civilians will be established at each of these headquarters. These offices will provide direct liaison between the organizations which they serve and the War Department Bureau of Public Relations. They will engage in the staff functions of planning or recommending public relations activities, the actual dissemination of which will be carried out by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations.

(4) Army Ground Forces Commands, Army Air Forces Commands, Defense Commands, Service Commands, and Administrative and Supply Services, Services of Supply, will restrict their public relations activities so that not more than two officers and four civilian employees or enlisted men will be employed in each office, command or agency.

(5) Training centers, replacement training centers, schools, and miscellaneous installations whose strength exceeds 5,000 men will operate their public relations activities so that the services of not more than two officers and two civilians or enlisted men will be required.

(6) Organizations and installations having a strength of less than 5,000 men will conduct their public relations activities so that the services of not more than one officer and one civilian employee or enlisted man will be required.

(7) In small commands and installations every effort will be made to conduct public relations activities in such a manner that the work may be performed as a part-time additional duty, subordinate to more important military assignments."

WAR DEPARTMENT PUBLIC RELATIONS POLICIES IN WORLD WAR II

In general, public relations activities were continual sources of con-

cern and required a great amount of personal attention from the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. Public relations with the Congress, the press, the radio, the members of a democratic army, and the people of the United States could appropriately be termed "General Staff" duties because they met the criterion that they involved questions which the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff would have handled personally had their capabilities been infinite.

The public relations policies followed by the Chief of Staff during World War II were quite different from those of General March of World War I. Every effort consistent with military security was made to explain why the Army was following a certain policy. A great amount of research work was done by the General Staff sections in preparing material for the use of the Chief of Staff in hearings before Congressional committees. Undoubtedly, the activities of Congressional committees and individuals were healthy stimuli; they never permitted the War Department or the Army to become smug in their attitudes. Constructive criticism was helpful and this was never resented.

The most difficult area in relations with Congress was how to handle requests that could not be granted. The average Congressman was reasonable, but necessarily concerned in making his constituents understand that he was interested in complying with their wishes. On these matters direct contact between members of the Legislative and Liaison Division and individual Congressmen created good feeling where a formal letter would have been considered as a "brush off" and would have aroused resentment. Illustrative of this was an instance that could have happened only in a democratic country. In response to the pressure of his constituents, a Congressman wired a particular unit commander asking that the furlough of one of his soldiers be extended ten days. The following was the exchange of telegrams:

"From the Congressman to the Unit Commander

Pvt. _____ of _____ on furlough expires April 17th. Brother Henry returning from two years overseas duty arrive home April 19th. Other brother confined in bed for past two years incurable condition. Respectfully request extension of ten days. Please wire . . . collect.

From the Unit Commander to the Congressman (Collect)

If Pvt. _____ desired extension of furlough he may wire to his commanding officer requesting same. Intervention by political powers is not required, and the officer approving or disapproving request is not obligated to answer correspondence from disinterested person."

Many an Army officer would have relished "telling a Congressman

off" in this manner. In this case the Congressman concerned held a key position in the House of Representatives. But the point to be emphasized was the reaction of the Congressman. He regarded the matter as a good joke and told the Army liaison officers that the unit commander was probably right. His attitude was reasonable because through his liaison contacts with the War Department he was convinced that everything possible would be done to meet reasonable requests. There were, of course, a few Senators and Representatives who could never be satisfied. They asked for secret information, and occasionally when it was made available, a part of the facts embellished with half truths and erroneous conclusions appeared in the press or in a columnist's release.

After the cessation of hostilities in September, 1945, all public relations and liaison activities were consolidated. This combined the Bureau of Public Relations, the Legislative and Liaison Division, and the Information and Education Division which had formerly been in the Army Service Forces. Development during the war had indicated how important it was for the soldiers of a democratic country to know what was going on, and to the extent possible to be taken into the confidence of the War Department. Under Major General Frederick H. Osborn, in whose activities the Chief of Staff had taken a great personal interest, the Information and Education Bureau, in establishing soldier publications, soldier radio service, and a soldier education and orientation program provided the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff a new and very important medium which could reach the soldiers of a democratic army and win their support. Here was an effective technique of control whose effectiveness was not always appreciated by senior officers both in the War Department and in the Army in the field.

THE SIX NEW WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS CREATED—1943-1945

For approximately one year after the 1942 reorganization the War Department resisted successfully all tendencies and recommendations to increase the number of special staff sections. Beginning in March 1943, however, there were established in rapid succession a total of six new staff sections—the Civil Affairs Division, the War Department Manpower Board, the Special Planning Division, the New Developments Division, the Budget Division, and the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office. In general, these new agencies were established on the War Department Special Staff level for one or more of the following reasons or purposes: (a) to handle a rapidly growing new activity which for various reasons could not be assigned to an existing General

or Special Staff agency or to one of the three major commands, (b) to raise to top War Department level a function whose importance merited emphasis and for whose development top relationships were considered essential, and (c) to provide an added technique of control for the War Department General Staff in areas where special problems had arisen.

CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

The Civil Affairs Division was established in March, 1943, because of the growing importance of problems of military government and questions in nonmilitary matters concerning areas of occupied enemy territory. The initial planning in this field, and the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division itself was done in Operations Division of the General Staff. Conceivably this agency might have remained a part of the Operations Division, but this possibility was rejected for several major reasons. First of all, the activities of the new section promised to be so diverse and so large that they would distract and divert the energies of OPD from its other important business and would overburden the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations who already had more duties and responsibilities than one person should have. In addition, the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of War were vitally interested in Military Government and intended to exercise close personal supervision. The creation of the Civil Affairs Division as an integral part of the Office of the Secretary or Assistant Secretary of War was considered. This was not accepted because the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of War were satisfied by the stipulation that the Director of the Civil Affairs Division would report directly to them in matters in which they were interested. Also, it was not considered desirable to increase the size of the Office of the Secretary of War. Finally, by establishing the Civil Affairs Division as a Special Staff section, General Staff supervision over appropriate parts of Civil Affairs activities would be obtained, and the channel on military matters would be through the General Staff and the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War. An added advantage in making the Civil Affairs Division a separate entity was that it emphasized the importance of this new field and thus counteracted the tendency of some to ignore or fail to appreciate certain crucial problems in this field.

Initially, the Civil Affairs Division consisted of some fifteen officers, organized into an Administrative Liaison, Military Government, Civilian Relief, and Economic section. Its mission was to do the civil affairs planning connected with future military operations, assist in the supervision and coordination of Military Government and Civil

Affairs matters, and advise the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of War and keep them informed on non-military activities in occupied areas. Communication with overseas commanders was to be accomplished through the Operations Division, and General Staff concurrence and clearance were to be obtained on questions falling within their purview. Liaison was to be maintained with the State Department, Lend Lease, Board of Economic Warfare, and the Treasury Department, but this liaison was not to replace previously existing relationships between the War Department and other governmental agencies. In the Civil Affairs Division the Military Government section was to handle policy relating to the type of government and was the agency which would work with the Civil Affairs Division on the staffs of Theater commanders. The Civilian Relief Group handled the initial stage when the economy was so tied in with military operations that it would be premature to have civilian relief handled by civilian agencies of the government instead of theater commanders. Under existing arrangements the theater commander had the responsibility for civilian relief until such time as this matter could be turned over to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. This group was concerned with the question of proper food supplies, medical matters, and the initial repairs which were needed to get essential facilities in an operation. The activities of the Economic Group had to do with questions involving labor, wages, agriculture, transport, industry, finance matters, and questions relating to export and import.

As the war progressed, the duties of the Civil Affairs Division increased materially. The selection and training of military government personnel became a major activity. Working through the Personnel G-1, and the Organization and Training G-3, Divisions of the General Staff and using the facilities and field installations of the Provost Marshal General's Office, the Civil Affairs Division provided the impetus for the recruitment and training of civil affairs officers which otherwise would have been even more neglected or assumed to be of secondary importance.

By July, 1944, the Civil Affairs Division had increased to a strength of 28 officers and 33 civilians. Organized into an Administrative, Liaison, Planning, Government, Economics and Relief, and Personnel and Training branches, the Civil Affairs Division had restated its functions and duties to include the following:

- "(1) Formulate policy and prepare plans for the conduct of civil affairs in occupied territories or those to be occupied.
- (2) Coordinate these matters with other agencies.

(3) Prepare directives, proclamations, etc., for the administration of civil affairs in these areas.

(4) Act as representative of the War Department on the Working Security Committee of the State Department and in other capacities, in relation to civil affairs in occupied or liberated territories.

(5) Prepare surrender terms and supervise the setting up of machinery for the control of enemy countries.

(6) Prepare and supervise training programs, procure personnel, and initiate action to furnish theater commanders with officers for civil affairs duties."⁴

The Civil Affairs Division remained throughout the war a staff agency in that it did not have any direct operational control over military government activities which were under the command of overseas theater commanders. Presumably Civil Affairs activities might have been handled by civil affairs sections in each of the General Staff divisions, but this would have had the disadvantage that on the War Department General and Special Staff level no one individual or section could be looked to for coordinating and supervising the Civil Affairs efforts. Interestingly enough, in some Theaters of Operations the Civil Affairs Section was accorded General instead of Special Staff rank and was designated as G-5. These Military Government sections in overseas Theaters performed many operational duties in connection with military government and civil affairs and might well have been organized as a Military Government Command.

SPECIAL PLANNING DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

The Special Planning Division was established as a special staff section to bring an army-wide planning activity of General Staff stature from a subordinate echelon to the War Department Special Staff. In the spring of 1943 a group had been established in the Army Service Forces to consider problems relating to demobilization. It soon became apparent that this work had to be approached on the basis of over-all postwar planning for the military establishment, that representations from the Air, Ground, and Service Forces were necessary, and that if this work was not to be performed by the various General Staff divisions, it must be done under their close supervision, and with their participation and concurrence. Accordingly, the group of officers who had been working in this field were constituted as a War Department Special Staff section with duties as prescribed by the following directive which was issued on July 23, 1943:

"1. The Special Planning Division is hereby established as a Special

Staff Division of the War Department and is charged in general with those duties and functions which relate to the planning for post war military and related industrial demobilization.

2. The Special Planning Division is specifically charged with the following:

a. Planning to determine the organization, composition and size of the post war military establishment.

b. Planning to determine the facilities, bases, installations, equipment, communications, military areas, and such other real property and appurtenances necessary thereto as may be required for the post war military establishment.

c. Planning to determine the procedure, timing and manner by which the wartime Army will be demobilized and the post war military structure established.

d. Planning to determine the procedure, timing and manner by which the war time military supply program can be terminated, with due regard to the provision of necessary war reserves in terms of military materiel, machine tools and industrial facilities, and with due regard for the economy of the country and for the necessity of cushioning the conversion from a war time to a peace time economy.

e. Planning to determine the procedure, timing and manner by which military personnel can be discharged, with due regard to protecting the economic well being of the demobilized soldier and the economy of the country.

f. Legislative planning to include the drafting of legislation and the timing of its submission to the Congress of those military postwar planning activities which require congressional legislation.

g. Liaison with other governmental agencies which are working on postwar planning.

h. Formulating the necessary War Department plans to carry out over-all governmental policies requiring War Department conformance and action.

i. Coordination and supervision of all postwar planning activities within the War Department carried on by the three major commands in their special fields or assigned to them.

3. The Director, Special Planning Division, will report to the Secretary of War through the Under Secretary of War on policy matters relating to industrial demobilization and through the Chief of Staff on matters relating to military policy. Military policy will be cleared through the appropriate General Staff divisions. Staff procedure will be as prescribed in AR 10-15."

By October, 1944, the Special Planning Division had grown to a strength of 28 officers and 23 enlisted and civilian clerks, and was organized into an administrative, research, service operations and transportation, legislative and liaison, organization, personnel and administration, material, and fiscal branches. Its duties and functions were restated as follows:

"(1) Formulate plans for the demobilization of the wartime Army and the curtailment of the wartime military supply program, with due regard for protecting the economic well being of the demobilized soldier, the necessity for facilitating the conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy, and the provision of necessary industrial and military war reserves.

(2) Formulate plans for the organization, composition, and size of the postwar military establishment, and the facilities, bases, installations, equipment, and real property and appurtenances necessary thereto.

(3) Coordinate and supervise postwar planning activities of the three major commands in their special fields, maintain liaison with other governmental agencies working on postwar planning, and formulate necessary plans to effect War Department conformance with over-all governmental policies.

(4) Review, plan, draft, or supervise the drafting of legislation on military postwar planning activities."

Both from an organizational standpoint and from the manner in which questions of responsibility and jurisdiction arose, the establishment of the Special Planning Division was questionable. If there was to be an organization of this type, its place was on the War Department General or Special Staff. The advantages of having such an all-embracing "purpose" organization were that it did concentrate the planning effort in this field and that it did permit a few able and experienced officers who had pioneered in this work to continue on in their work. There was much to support the view that the Special Planning Division was a prime example of over-organization. There was no reason why the various General Staff divisions should not have carried out the planning in the field in which they had primary interest. Injecting the Special Planning Division into normal General Staff planning fields raised difficult questions of responsibilities and jurisdictions. Planning concerning the size and composition of the postwar army was a normal G-3 and War Plans function. Likewise, planning in facilities and materiel was a normal G-4 problem, while G-1 was charged with plans relating to mobilization and demobilization of individuals and procedures relating thereto. G-1, G-3, and G-4

very properly raised the question of where their planning responsibilities ended and those of the Special Planning Division began. A working arrangement was devised which gave to the Special Planning Division the essentially long term postwar specific planning job, with everything else remaining with the General Staff divisions and with General Staff concurrence required on all phases of Special Planning Division work. But the distinction between short-term and long-term planning was at best uncertain. A preferable solution might have been to have placed in the G-3 Organization and Training Division a special postwar planning section to exercise leadership and effect coordination among the various General Staff divisions who would do the planning in their respective fields. At best the Special Planning Division was a special purpose organization established to carry out a specific task of importance and designed to last for but a limited period of time.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

The New Developments Division was established in October, 1943, and illustrated well the case of creating a separate staff section at top level in order to lend emphasis to and focus attention upon the work in that field. This move was supported strongly by the office of the Secretary of War. The function of coordinating among the major commands the development, test, and standardization of major new weapons and items of equipment had been assigned to the Supply Division, G-4, of the War Department General Staff, who was charged with all matters in this field involving War Department policy. G-4 was to work with the Navy Department and with the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. The handling of this function by G-4 was a workable arrangement. However, in response to the urging of Dr. Vannevar Bush, the head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and in recognition of the importance of development and research, what had been a subsection of G-4 became a separate special staff division.

The organization and procedures for stimulating research and development were more involved than was desirable, but the problem was complicated by the many agencies involved. In Headquarters, Army Ground Forces the Requirements Division was charged with the drafting of the specifications and capabilities which the Ground Forces would like to have incorporated into existing weapons and equipment. Likewise, they were supposed to indicate the areas and the purposes for which new weapons were needed. In the field were such agencies as the Infantry Board, Field Artillery Board, Tank Destroyer Board, concerned with developing and improving the weapons and equip-

ment of their Arms. Thus, in addition to the demands from tactical units for better weapons, there were a number of special agencies whose business it was to try to suggest where improvements were needed. A similar arrangement existed in the Air Forces. In each of the supply services of the Army Service Forces, there was a Technical Committee composed of representatives from the Ground and Air Forces and technical supply design and development officers. On this working level the users and suppliers were supposed to get together to make improvements in existing weapons and equipment or to devise new and better ones. To coordinate this work among the many supply Services, the Army Service Forces had established a Development Staff Section in their headquarters. Direct contact at this level with the Inventors Council and the Office of Scientific Research and Development had been developed and proved to be profitable. Also, questions of priorities and critical shortages in facilities or materials which were impeding development or research could be solved. Where there was disagreement or difficulties between the Air or Ground Forces on one hand and the Services Forces on the other, then the matter was taken up with G-4. Likewise, before the weapon or item of equipment was standardized or accepted, G-4's approval was necessary. The above described arrangement had the merit of accomplishing as much as possible at the lowest possible working level. It lacked the support or drive from a high-level organization and this was necessary in many instances. The role of an innovator was difficult enough ordinarily, but when existing facilities were overtaxed and materials were in short supply, it was especially difficult to arouse enthusiasm and get quick action on what might be regarded with skepticism as an impractical brainstorm. It was primarily to ease the path and shorten the route of those who were doing research and who were working on new inventions and improvements that the New Developments Division was established as a War Department Special Staff section in October, 1943.

The directive which was issued to the New Developments Division was as follows:

"1. The New Developments Division is hereby established as a special staff division of the War Department and is charged in general with those duties and functions which relate to the innovation, development, and application of new weapons, devices, and techniques of military value.

2. The New Developments Division is specifically charged with the following:

a. To initiate, coordinate, or direct research, development, standardi-

zation, and expeditious military application of new or improved weapons, devices, and techniques.

b. To survey continually the over-all status of new developments.

c. To obtain information concerning new weapons employed by the enemy and to initiate programs to provide appropriate counter-measures thereto.

d. To determine from a knowledge of strategic and tactical plans requirements and opportunities for the employment of new developments and to initiate prompt action to provide the necessary means.

e. To introduce and demonstrate to appropriate commanders or organizations new developments which have not received adequate consideration.

f. To advise non-military research agencies of Army requirements for new weapons, devices, and techniques.

g. To coordinate and integrate new developments programs and to allocate explicitly responsibility for the carrying out of approved parts thereof and to determine such modification or elimination of weapons in use or under development as may be advisable.

h. To maintain directly and through the New Weapons Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appropriate relations with other governmental and civilian organizations in order to coordinate programs of common interest and to recruit for special military projects the necessary specialists.

3. The New Developments Division will not supplant existing facilities or organizations in the Army but will, instead, complement by direct support or by necessary coordination such activities with emphasis on expediting programs of importance."

As the directive indicated, the New Developments Division had the role of a promoter, a salesman, and a middleman. This Division remained a small compact organization and by November, 1944, had only 10 officers and 12 civilian employees assigned for duty. Nevertheless, it did exercise an important influence. The tendency in large organizations is for the many new ideas and suggested improvements to die or become stalemated at the low organizational level where normally most of these ideas originate. Here was an instrument to effect topside leadership by providing the organization and the procedures to reach down and pull along to early fruition a needed improvement. Likewise, here was the place for salesmanship and advertising to stimulate the interest of a user who had failed to appreciate the potentialities of a research or development project which a supply service thought had great possibilities.

The Budget Division, the War Department Manpower Board and the Strength and Accounting Office were constituted to provide more effective controls in areas which were giving trouble and where the existing techniques of control had proved to be inadequate. The Budget Division had previously been on the War Department Special Staff level, but in the 1942 reorganization it had been assigned to the Army Service Forces. This was based on the concept that a Services of Supply would be established for the performance of supply and administrative services for the office of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, the Under Secretary of War, and the Ground and Air Forces. Circular 59 permitted the consolidation of all budgeting and fiscal business in the Office of the Fiscal Director of the Army Service Forces. It was considered that during wartime the budget and fiscal process could be handled on a service basis inasmuch as funds in wartime were not in short supply.

BUDGET DIVISION IN WORLD WAR II

After a year's experience with having the Budget Division in the Army Service Forces, it was concluded that even in wartime the War Department budget process provided a technique of control that could not be delegated to a subordinate agency for administration on a service basis. Accordingly, in July, 1943, the Budget Division was established as a War Department Special Staff section with the following duties:

"a. The Budget Division is charged with those duties which relate to the War Department budget and the supervision of financial policies, both foreign and domestic, pertaining to the activities of the War Department and the Army.

b. The Budget Division is specifically charged with the following functions:

- (1) The formulation and preparation of budget directives, the assignment of responsibility for preparation of estimates, defense of estimates, and administration of funds, and general supervision of the preparation of the annual War Department budget and all supplemental estimates, together with the language of proposed appropriation bills submitted by the War Department.

- (2) The review and adjustment of the estimated money requirements of all War Department agencies to assure conformity with the War Department program and to insure maximum economy, consistent with military necessity.

- (3) The coordination and control of all activities relating to the presentation and justification of estimates or other pertinent matters

to the Bureau of the Budget and the appropriations committees of both houses of Congress.

(4) The allocation to all War Department agencies of such appropriated funds as are necessary to implement the approved programs in accordance with the assigned missions, and the exercise of general supervision over expenditures.

(5) The development of plans with respect to the conversion, use, and transfer of War Department assets and such other matters of financial management as may be assigned."⁵

During World War II there was little difficulty in obtaining funds, for Congress was most generous and willing to provide the funds which the War Department indicated as necessary. The problem arose of diverting funds to projects other than those on which estimates and justification had been based. The budget estimates and the Congressional appropriation had to be made far in advance. War events, shifts in strategy, and the development of new weapons and techniques made it imperative that there be considerable flexibility in the use of funds. However, the responsibility for shifts in the use of funds was a top-level matter which necessarily had to be closely watched. It was therefore important that the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff be assisted not only by a Budget Officer reporting directly to them, but also by disinterested General Staff supervision.

The interrelation of control of funds, command, organization, and channels of procedures was interesting. For many years the funds for the Army had been appropriated to the various supply and administrative Services. Thus, funds for the pay of the Army were appropriated to the Finance Department, funds for food and subsistence to the Quartermaster Department, construction and maintenance funds to the Engineer Department, and so on. Under the Army Service Forces organization, a substantial part of these funds were suballotted to the nine Services Commands with the result that the Chiefs of the supply Services could not be responsible nor be particularly well informed on the details of how and for what purposes the funds were expended. Of interest in this connection were the following remarks which were made during the hearings on the War Department appropriation in the spring of 1943 before the House Appropriations Committee:

"*Mr. Snyder.* [Representative J. Buell Snyder of the Appropriations Committee] Speaking of the General Staff, it has been my observation, Mr. Secretary, during the course of these hearings, that the General Staff is getting out of touch, in a sense, with departmental administration. We have had branch chiefs here who did not seem to have the

answers; who were not in touch with the field here at home in the Service Commands or in the theaters of operation, for some reason or other. While these branch chiefs are subordinate to the commanding general of our Service Forces, after all they are the direct heads of their particular activities and the responsibility comes back to them for seeing that their part runs smoothly and is properly performed.

I realize that the General Staff has got its hands full, but it does seem to me that there would be better and more efficient administration if the General Staff would exercise complete military control and direction, extending down to the branch chiefs, through presently constituted agencies; and I think you should bring this matter to the attention of Secretary Stimson, General McNarney, and any others who should have a voice in the matter.

Mr. Patterson [Under Secretary of War]. I will.

Mr. Snyder. I think also, Mr. Secretary, that a mistake was made in taking the budget desk out of the War Department General Staff. General Carter is doing a grand job, but money runs the Army and controls every phase of its activity, and the control of the purse should be the General Staff's function, as it formerly was. It is the best coordinating instrumentality that I know of. I feel that there would be far better coordination and, I should say, economy, if there were a budget desk re-established in the General Staff. General Carter, of course, under the present organization, should continue in his present fiscal and accounting capacity. I wish you would see that this subject is given the consideration that its importance demands, discussing it, if you please, with the Secretary of War, General Marshall, General McNarney, General Somervell, and whoever else you think should be consulted in that matter.

I might say that perhaps there is no group in all the Congress that is in a better position to see the inside efficiency of a department than the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. Patterson. I will see that these matters are brought to the attention of the Secretary and the Chief of Staff."

The decision to transfer the Budget Division back to the War Department staff level had been made before Congressman Snyder made his recommendations but his remarks gave added justification for the action. Control of funds was an indispensable attribute of command and it was necessary for the War Department to provide procedures which would permit this control technique to be used throughout the chain of command and in a manner appropriate to and of assistance to the commanders of various echelons.

In 1944 the question of budget and fiscal organizations was again raised. The Army Service Forces through the offices of the Chiefs of the various supply Services were the big spenders of appropriated funds. The Army Service Forces through the office of the Fiscal Director also performed the disbursing and auditing functions. The question was properly raised on the desirability of vesting in the same major command these two functions. Likewise, funds were allotted through technical channels and these were in some instances different from command channels. To survey and submit recommendations on budget and fiscal organizations the Secretary of War designated a committee consisting of Mr. Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War; Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air; Mr. George L. Harrison, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War; Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser, and Brigadier General O. L. Nelson.

In the hearings conducted by this committee the spelling out of budget and fiscal controls and how they were exercised raised questions on the entire War Department organization. The Commanding General of the Army Service Forces pointed out very properly that because control of funds was an indispensable part of command the funds for the Army Service Forces should not be apportioned directly to the several Chiefs of the supply Services but should be as nearly as possible a lump sum appropriation to the Army Service Forces. Congress had continued to follow the traditional policy of appropriating funds to the several supply services. Procedures within the War Department were changed so as to channel the allocation of funds through the office of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. The Air Forces then pointed out that command channels should also be followed in the allocation of funds for the Air Forces. The practice had been for certain funds to be suballotted to the Service Commands, and thence to the Air Force post or station for Quartermaster, Engineer, and similar activities. The Committee agreed that it was desirable to use Air Forces command channels for the allocation and control of all funds for air force activities. The trouble with this was that it upset the Army Service Forces concept of an army-wide supply and administrative service for the Ground and Air Forces. If the Service Forces were to be responsible for the construction of buildings and facilities, for example, on an Air Force post, they must exercise control over the funds required through Army Service Force Headquarters—Service Command Headquarters channels. The Air Forces maintained that they were responsible for following War Department directives prescribing standards of construction and that the channel must therefore be through Headquarters, Army Air Forces, to Headquarters of an Air Force or major

Air Force field command, to Headquarters of the Commanding Officer of the Air Base.

The point to be stressed was that budget and fiscal procedures relating to the budgeting, allocating, disbursing, and auditing of funds provided techniques of control that a commander could not afford to ignore unless he was willing to default in part on his command responsibilities. The War Department reorganization of 1942 can rightly be criticized on the grounds that it treated command controls on a service basis, and that when given these effective command controls a service organization cannot help but function in, or be suspected of functioning in, a command rather than a service capacity.

WAR DEPARTMENT MANPOWER BOARD IN WORLD WAR II

The War Department Manpower Board was established in April 1943 to provide a much needed control technique in a field in which the General Staff had not been able to exercise satisfactory staff supervision. Army personnel policies were being criticized in Congress and in the press. At the same time the Army was favoring the drafting of fathers and eighteen-year-olds to provide the necessary manpower, critics charged that the Army was extravagant in the use of both military and civilian personnel in the United States, and that if the Army would only send overseas the men who were not being used, there would be no manpower shortage. The major commands insisted that they needed not only the military and civilian personnel which they had at that time, but also that they had additional requirements for more personnel. The General Staff had no means of disproving these statements of field commanders except through the use of the Inspector General's Department to make spot checks which could not be regarded as conclusive. G-1 and G-3 could have devised and applied work measurement techniques and prescribed manning tables on the basis of work loads, but this was not done. Instead, the job was given to the War Department Manpower Board. There was also the pressing requirement to find where civilians could be utilized to replace soldiers and where limited service soldiers could be employed to permit other soldiers physically fit for combat to be shipped overseas. These tasks were so important that it did not suffice to hope that the three major commands would do everything possible on their own initiative. The Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff could not avoid the problem; they had to find out through staff agencies of their own if everything possible was being done. G-1 and G-3 needed then an additional control technique which was provided by the establishment of the War Department Manpower Board.

By November 1944 the War Department Manpower Board consisted of 14 officers and 16 civilian employees in the War Department, with field representatives in each of the nine service command headquarters. The Board immediately made surveys of a number of similar establishments in order to determine an appropriate yardstick to measure the personnel needs at various installations. After obtaining this gauge to measure how many individuals were required normally to perform certain functions, the Manpower Board then inspected various posts and established manning tables with ceiling strengths sufficient to perform the overhead duties required of station complement personnel. After considerable experience in this type of work analysis, the Board devised for staff use the following criteria:

WAR DEPARTMENT MANPOWER BOARD STANDARD PERSONNEL
WORKLOAD RATIOS

No. 1—ASF Station Complements

1. Purpose.

This is the first of a series of WDMB Standard Personnel Workload Ratios that will be issued by the War Department Manpower Board covering certain important types of installations and activities of the War Department. This series differs from the WDMB Yardstick series in that the latter is applicable to the individual functions of an installation whereas the former deals with all personnel of a group of installations of a given type. The WDMB yardsticks can be applied only to actual inventories of individual installations. The WDMB standard personnel workload ratios are of broader application in that the measures of personnel requirements may be applied at the higher staff levels.

2. Ratios.

The standard ratios for use in measuring personnel requirements of ASF station complements are as follows:

<i>Military Population of Post</i>	<i>Station Complement Personnel Per 100 Post Population</i>
0-2500	22.9
2501-5000	17.1
5001-10000	13.4
10001-20000	11.8
20001-30000	9.7
30001-40000	8.4
Over 40000	8.3

3. Personnel Included.

Standard ratios set forth in paragraph 2 make provision for personnel for the following station complement functions: Post Administra-

tion, Public Relations, Finance, Personnel Administration, Special Services. Training of Station Complement Personnel, Internal Security, Central Administration of Supply and Services, Combined Maintenance Shops, Quartermaster Supply and Services, Ordnance Supply and Services, Chemical Warfare Supply and Services, Signal Corps Supply and Services, Post Engineer, Transportation, Engineer Property Supply, Station Hospital, Medical Dispensaries, Dental Clinics, Food Inspection, Sanitary Inspection, Post Surgeon Administrative and Property Functions, Janitor and Orderly Service, Administration of Military Personnel in Basic Administrative Units, Messing, and other normal station complement functions.

The work of the Manpower Board in the United States was effective not only because of their direct accomplishments but primarily because their activities spot-lighted and stimulated the efforts of field agencies to measure work loads and effect personnel economics. In fact, the Manpower Board's work was so successful that members of the Board were sent to North Africa and the British Isles to apply their technique to rear installations there in an effort to promote economy in the use of personnel. The Manpower Board worked in a very difficult field and had to develop the art of treading very lightly on what were very sensitive matters. It was fortunate that the Board was headed by Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser, a previous Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, who had been recalled to active duty from the retired list. He realized what a delicate business it was to suggest to commanders that personnel economies could be made in certain areas in their command. This was an explosive subject which required both tact and forcefulness.

WORLD WAR II PROBLEMS OF PERSONNEL AND TROOP BASIS CONTROL

During World War II the War Department's major headaches were over problems of personnel and troop basis control with all the minor related questions stemming from them. During the war there was a continuing need for more effective techniques of control to enable the War Department General Staff to plan, coordinate, and supervise the deployment of the Army under the constantly changing conditions of the war.

During the early days of the war there were few problems of personnel and troop basis control. Because the requirements for specific operations and task forces could not then be computed, the troop basis was merely a list of units which would make a balanced and well rounded army at some future date when the personnel for these units would

be available and could be given both individual and unit training. G-3 was able to keep the troop basis list and make the comparatively few weekly changes without the need for any complex system. The data was kept up to date in books and in long sheets, and from time to time these were copied by typists and the typewritten sheets photostated to provide the few copies which were needed. The troop basis then was the plan for the units to be activated and trained. Because the timing and extent of operations could not be predicted in those days, there was little coordination needed between our troop basis strength and our actual strength returns. Inductions provided men in excess of the needs of the moment. Many units were available in the United States for shipment overseas, bulk allotments of personnel were authorized for many purposes, overstrengths for units were granted freely, new tables of organization changing personnel strengths for units were published in great numbers, and old tables were revised in great numbers as experience dictated desirable changes. Overseas Theaters of Operation grew accustomed to the practice of establishing provisional units and very liberal authority was granted theater commanders to defer reorganization of units to conform to the latest table of organization. Replacements were sent overseas in greater numbers than required in an effort to build up a reserve strength before an operation started. Complete strength returns took six to eight weeks to reach and be compiled in Washington with the result that they were so out of date when they were received in G-3 that it was difficult to use them to check the troop basis which had undergone a number of changes in the meantime. So long as both individuals and units were plentiful and future operations indeterminate in timing, there was little pressing necessity for an over-all comparison between current strength as planned (troop basis), actual strength (strength return), and the strength planned for six months in the future (troop basis).

In what seemed to be a surprisingly short period of time, the situation changed materially. Dates for future operations were set and large planning staffs overseas sent in many requests for personnel and units. Overseas commanders estimated what their casualties and losses would be for future months and the War Department had the task of preparing large numbers of trained replacements in a number of different categories and skills. The troop basis grew at an astonishing rate and finally included some 25,000 units. Major commanders in the United States informed the War Department that they were not receiving sufficient personnel to meet their requirements for trained units and replacements. Overseas commanders reported that they were short in trained combat infantrymen. All of these claims were usually

supported by strength data prepared by the command concerned and obtained through its own independent reporting system, on its own forms, under interpretations which often varied from those made by the War Department or other independent commands. Where heavy fighting was occurring, it was useless to use official strength return figures which were two months old. There was so much argument over the figures and estimates that there was considerable questioning of the reliability of any and all personnel strength data.

During the period these difficulties were developing the War Department and the General Staff were making heroic efforts to solve the problems. However, a combination of circumstances and the nature of the problem operated to make effective adjustments exceedingly slow and difficult. Selective Service was falling behind the planned schedule of inductions and thus trained soldiers were not forthcoming at the rate or at the time which had been planned. The staffs of overseas commanders had been generous in their estimates for replacements. As an example, the War Department received requisitions, say, for tank personnel replacements to meet the expected heavy losses in an operation planned some six or eight months in the future. The personnel requested would be trained and shipped but the losses did not occur as estimated and there would thus be an excess over requirements. Exactly the opposite experience might and did occur for infantry replacements. The result was maladjustment. Vigorous demands came into the War Department about the shortages, but the field was not too concerned over the excess of men they had in various categories. These men could always be used in some provisional unit or for some overhead purpose. No commander ever won fame or battles by being overly concerned with personnel economies and thus running the risk of not having sufficient personnel. It was natural for all commanders, both overseas and in the United States, to do their utmost to obtain additional personnel. The General Staff in Washington could not tell, nor would the Chief of Staff have permitted it if they could have, overseas commanders that they were extravagant in their personnel requests. Likewise, it was difficult to get overseas commanders to account in detail how they were using the personnel which they had. They were not only too busy fighting the war, but there were individual subordinate commanders who were not eager to reveal that they had been smart enough to obtain sufficient additional personnel to form provisional units which materially increased their fighting power. And finally, the detailed strength and troop basis figures were so involved, and the procedures and definitions incident to their collection and computation so complex, that the key War Department officers were apt to exclaim,

"I do not understand the figures and I still wish to know why General Eisenhower is so short of infantry replacements."

STRENGTH ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING OFFICE IN WORLD WAR II

Individual action to improve the situation was taken by G-1, G-3, G-4, OPD, the Statistics Branch of the Office, Chief of Staff, the War Department Manpower Board, and the three major commands. Because of the large number of staff divisions who were vitally interested, it was decided to establish a Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, SARO, in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff and a Statistical Coordinating Committee consisting of representatives from the interested General Staff divisions. Each staff division was interested in certain data and the problem was to establish common definitions and to consolidate and standardize the information required. The Adjutant General had a machine records system of strength reporting but it needed speeding up, and this required top command action because it was a world-wide operation decentralized under many commanders. With an army of 8,000,000, it was also no simple matter to make basic changes in procedures.

The principal problem involved in the development of War Department Strength Accounting procedures was not obtaining new data needed by the General Staff but correlating that which was available. Many radios and reports were received in the War Department and were directed to agencies having primary operating interest. These data covered almost every possible activity of the Theaters and Commands. The difficulty was that they were not related to each other as to timing and originated from different levels in the Theaters and Commands. As a result, they did not reach the General Staff in a form to indicate the effect of one activity upon its related activities and they did not always represent the coordinated knowledge of the Theater commanders. In order to provide the General Staff with data that would be accepted by the Theater commanders, SARO was to develop a system of strength reporting with the following general purposes:

(a) To provide data for use of the Chief of Staff and the General Staff that will form context in which proposals of Theater commanders and the major commands may be studied in relationship to their effects on plans and conditions of the entire Army.

(b) To keep responsible General Staff Agencies periodically informed in sufficient detail to facilitate their work.

The organization for the operation of the reporting system included all facilities of the Army then engaged in strength accounting and reporting. Considered as an integral part of this organization and as co-

equal in responsibility were the agencies served by the system and using its presentations. Principal of these responsible agencies were:

(a) Office of Deputy Chief of Staff and General Staff Divisions.

(1) Statistical Coordinating Committee.

(2) Strength Accounting and Reporting Office.

(b) The Adjutant General's Office.

(1) Operations Branch.

(2) Machine Records Branch.

(c) Theaters of Operation.

(d) Major Commands.

The requirements of the system were the basic information required to provide:

(a) The Troop Basis, currently reflecting all changes.

(b) The War Department Authorized Strength of each unit or activity, currently reflecting all changes.

(c) The Actual strength of the Army to summary categories of the Troop Basis, currently reflecting all increases and decreases in total strength and all transfers between Theaters and major commands.

(d) The actual strength of each unit or activity, periodically (monthly).

(e) The actual strength of Theaters and commands by categories (arm or service, grade, component, race, etc.) of individuals, periodically (monthly).

(f) The operating strength (authorized strengths under which units and activities were currently operating) of each unit or activity, periodically (monthly).

(g) Analysis of replacement requirements. This included current data on casualties as related to types of units and operations, other losses to the Theaters according to each specific cause, and the number of replacements available through personnel present in and en route to the Theater.

(b) Current data as to the availability to the Theater, and use of major combat forces as divisions, air groups, etc.

(i) Analysis of operations in their effect on personnel, including re-assignments of large forces between Theaters.

The following actions were taken to meet the requirements:

(a) The Troop Basis was established on machine records cards to permit monthly publication and mechanical association of this data with authorized and actual strength.

(b) The War Department authorized strength of each unit was placed on machine records cards.

(c) The actual strength of the Army according to summary cate-

gories of the Troop Basis for each Theater and the Zone of Interior was computed through a bookkeeping system which reflected daily sailings and weekly casualty reports as added to the strength report of the Theater. It was planned to improve this procedure by obtaining a daily report from the Theaters that would include arrivals and departures in addition to other data to show the change from day to day in their strength.

(d) The monthly actual strength of each unit was obtained as of the last day of the month to reach Washington by the 12th day of the following month, from the Theaters and major commands in the form of reports for immediate use and as machine records cards for interrelation with authorized strength and troop basis records.

(e) The actual strength of Theaters and commands by categories (arm or service, etc.) of individuals was obtained from machine records strength summary cards currently furnished the Adjutant General.

(f) The operating strength (authorized strength under which units and activities are currently operating) of each unit or activity was obtained from monthly reports furnished by the Theaters. It was planned also to obtain machine records cards from the Theaters reflecting this data, to permit interrelation with actual and Troop Basis strength.

(g) The analysis of replacement requirements was provided through adding shipments to strength previously present in the Theater and deducting casualties and transfers to US and other Theaters. Weekly reports were to be obtained from the Theaters which would reflect changes in the number of personnel available as replacements.

The recurring reports which were prepared included:

(a) A series of graphic charts, reflecting current strength as of the date of presentation and to include actual, authorized, Troop Basis and Joint Chiefs of Staff planned strengths. These were published weekly for use of the Chief of Staff and others concerned in over-all problems of the Army's deployment.

(b) A volume of strength data, reflecting information in summary and detail. This was published monthly for use of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff and others concerned in over-all and detail problems of the Army's deployment.

(c) The War Department Troop Basis to be published monthly for use of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, the Theaters, the major commands and others concerned in planning and accomplishing the mobilization and deployment of the Army.

(d) The Troop List for Operations and Supply to be published monthly for the use of all agencies of the Army Service Forces in editing status reports and supply requisitions. It also provides operational information concerning the deployment of the military forces in the several

Theaters of Operations. It was not an instrument for the authorization of personnel but was a reflection of the actual organization of the Army being supplied. Complete dependence upon the records of the ports was inadequate for over-all Army supply management.

With many agencies working on the problem, it was natural that there should be a decided improvement. There was an advertising and selling problem present in that it was necessary to obtain an understanding of how the system operated and to persuade the staff sections and commands to use one standard set of figures. As a part of this campaign of education there were distributed charts and graphical presentations on the Troop Basis and Related Documents, an example of which appears on page 567.

The Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, the Statistics Section of the Office, Chief of Staff, the War Department Manpower Board, the Budget Division, and the Office of the Inspector General provided information and techniques of control which were indispensable to the General Staff for its proper functioning as a planning, coordinating, and supervising group to extend the directing arm of the Chief of Staff.

If there was any one significant feature in the development of the General Staff concept during World War II, it was the outstanding and continuing need for improved and more effective techniques of control. Despite the many changes in the conduct of war, the concept of a general staff to enlarge the leadership and directing activities of the commander was never questioned. The War Department reorganization of 1942 trimmed back the General Staff so drastically that only a small sprig was left to keep up with some very healthy giants in the form of the three major commands in the United States and the many overseas Theaters of Operation. Despite this a hardy, virile and streamlined General Staff existed at the close of the war. Its preeminence as a planning body was accepted.

In the Operations Division of the General Staff there had been developed for the first time in General Staff history an effective executive agency to direct the implementation of General Staff planning and the decisions of the Chief of Staff. The organization of the General Staff divisions did not need to undergo any substantial change. It can be assumed that this confirmed the effectiveness of the traditional General Staff organizational pattern into a G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 grouping. The establishment of Operations Division as a successor to the War Plans Division was logical and was likely to endure.

World War II demonstrated that the most pressing need for the General Staff was the development of more effective procedures and

more efficient techniques of control if they were to discharge satisfactorily their coordinating and supervisory duties. If the facilities for these controls are to be developed within the General Staff divisions, then a streamlined General Staff will be difficult to achieve. The creation of War Department Special Staff sections to provide the General Staff with the administrative services and controls which they need worked satisfactorily during World War II. Reliance upon agencies of the major commands for information and control technique was not generally satisfactory. If the General Staff is to prove of value as an advisor of the Chief of Staff, they must have the information and knowledge to justify their expert role. If they are dependent on information which is dished up to them from the major commands or from overseas Theaters or departments, the General Staff can be little more than an ineffective rubber stamp. World War II emphasized both the need and importance of adequate and impartial information together with effective and independent techniques of control.

The most competent observation on the work of the General Staff during World War II came from the Chief of Staff himself who, in his Biennial Report for the period July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, stated: "I wish to make official acknowledgment of the support given me by the War Department General and Special Staffs, which has been beyond all praise in the understanding and handling of the countless problems of global warfare."⁶

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER X

1. Compare with material in *The Art and Technique of Administration in German Ministries*, Arnold Brecht and Comstock Glaser (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940).
2. *War Department General Staff, Circular 5-5 Tentative*, October 4, 1944.
3. *War Department General Staff, Circular No. 5-1*, 16 September 1944.
4. *War Department General Staff, Circular 5-9*, September 19, 1944.
5. *Army Regulations 10-20*, 17 July 1943, par. 2.
6. *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War for the Period July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945*, p. 114.

Chapter XI

What Of The Future?

WORLD WAR II ended in the midst of developments whose impact on the organization for national defense promised to be revolutionary. For both the nation and the War Department this was not a new experience except in degree. It may therefore be especially useful in this concluding chapter to summarize the experience of the War Department and the Army in organization and administration and of the principles emerging from those experiences and their application to our present situation and our future requirements.

If there is any one principle that is crystal clear from all our experiences in organization for the common defense, it is the all important and basic truth that our *organization for national defense* must be an *organization for the future*. There is probably not a veteran in the United States who would advocate the extravagant luxury of retaining the War or Navy Departments merely because of their past accomplishments. The events of today itself in our myriad and world-wide military activities cannot be materially influenced or conditioned by what is done this day in Washington. The stage for today's events in the field was set irretrievably by decisions and actions taken days, weeks, months, and even years previously in the War and Navy Departments. On D-day for the invasion of France the War Department was powerless to influence that day's action. That action was completely in General Eisenhower's hands. War Department business on that day was properly concerned with operations of the future. This is so elementary and self-evident that apologies for stressing the point would be in order were it not for the fact that our national policy has been to consistently disregard and overlook this principle. Today's business in the War Department is future business insofar as it affects the ability and the capacity of our country to fight offensively or resist by defensive action. What then could be more clear than the compelling necessity of organizing our national defense for the future?

But throughout our nation's history, our organization for national defense has been so shackled in the grip of the past that at times nothing short of catastrophe could release it. It took the disgraceful events of the Spanish-American War combined with the heroic efforts of a great Secretary of War, Elihu Root, to establish a General Staff to plan for the future. And it took five years to put that basic idea across. During World War I it was not until the whole supply establishment was about to break down that action was taken to reorganize industrial mobilization under Bernard Baruch and the supply set-up in the War Depart-

ment and the Army under General Goethals. After World War I it took two years and all of General Pershing's prestige to secure the National Defense Act of 1920. In World War II it took the Pearl Harbor tragedy to precipitate effective action to reorganize the War Department and to constitute at least a semblance of necessary top machinery, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization.

It is now doubtful whether the atomic bomb will be sufficient to startle and frighten us into needed action, but if a forward-looking integration of our national defense does result, then that will be the true measure of the explosive effect of this new weapon. The situation has been well described by a respected military historian as follows: "What is the military policy of the United States? Our history gives a clear answer to this question. In all of our wars it has been the actual military policy of the United States to extemporize its war organization after war has begun or has become imminent. It would be impossible to conceive a worse national military policy."¹

FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Our future requirements demand a military establishment capable of supporting the international obligations and position of the United States, which can hold sufficient strategic bases to protect our vital installations, secure our air and sea lines of communications and routes, and form a protective shield while the nation mobilizes. From an organizational point of view, our needs include by whatever names or terms may be applied to them organizational entities to accomplish the following:

- a.* So organize and integrate the major components of the combat forces that they can be employed independently or as component parts in any number of combinations in order to provide properly tailored task forces or defense commands.
- b.* Organize auxiliary administrative and supply services both externally and internally with respect to the major components of the combat elements and available on an if-desired service basis.
- c.* Establish the organizational, administrative, and procedural means to achieve a coordination in the field on a geographic basis which would still permit the technical supervision of subsidiary activities under a functional or product type organization but controlled and commanded by over-riding standards and a regional organization.
- d.* Establish single chain of command and a clear fixing of responsibilities.
- e.* Insure a staff organization both at the top level and in varying degree at appropriate lower echelons to provide the information, plan-

ning, coordination, and supervision without which neither intelligent leadership nor able decisions are possible.

f. Set up effective techniques of control at staff levels with an organizational integrity of their own to make them effective and to facilitate desirable decentralization.

g. Provide the organizational means to facilitate anticipation of the new and the discard of the obsolete—a prime responsibility of military leadership.

The War Department's past experience with respect to each of these enumerated needs may now be summarized and the conclusions then applied to the situation ahead. It will be necessary to keep in mind the seven organizational needs just listed.

The War Department's history is rich in past lessons that have application for the future. One can profitably compare the situation existing after World War II with that just after the Spanish-American War. Then, the problem was to devise an organization which would coordinate the virtually independent segments of the War Department and the Army. The present problem is to provide the organizational means to coordinate the autonomous ground, sea, air, and service forces. The struggles to work out a workable procurement and supply system during the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II follow a similar pattern, a pattern that will obtain in the future unless the country applies the lessons which are there in history. The odds seem to be that the United States will go through the same motions and with about the same result of obtaining a National Defense Act of, say, 1946 as occurred after World War I in the activities leading to the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920. Many more analogies could be set down but they can all be summarized by this speculative and challenging statement: "In November 1945 the United States was in the same position with respect to an over-all organization for national defense that the War Department occupied in February, 1902." Whether future developments will parallel the War Department's past experience depends on whether we have learned anything through bitter experience.

THE THREE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE

There are three elements present in the military structure. At the base of the military organization is the line—the combat elements, which have sometimes been called the operating units or the field forces. Next are the service elements, which are necessary to the combat elements and which perform the technical, supply, or administrative services needed to maintain the combat forces. These services were originally performed by the combat elements themselves, but with the growth of

functional specialization and product-type organizations there has been a steady increase in the number of auxiliary service and administrative organizations. And third are the command elements at the top, the commander and the assistants he needs for adequate control.²

Understanding of these three basic elements has been made difficult by the more common but misleading grouping into two categories—line and staff.³ The term "line" in its proper sense denotes the combat forces—those units who come to grips with an enemy and have the mission of destroying him. It is not always remembered that success or failure depends ultimately on the line forces. But their position and needs are preeminent; everything else in the armed forces is secondary and justifiable only to the extent that it contributes to the effectiveness of the line. Increasing specialization has for three decades been dividing the line elements into more and more component parts. Infantry, cavalry and artillery were for centuries the principal line elements. Armored, chemical, antiaircraft, and air corps tactical units are more recent additions to the line. There has always been some disagreement over the inclusiveness of the term "line." Many argue that the Signal Corps and the Engineers perform combat functions and are therefore to be included in the roster of line units. The exact inclusiveness of the term is immaterial. It is important, however, to retain the distinction that the term *line* in its stricter sense means those operating agencies designed to carry out combat missions. Loose usage has caused many of the supply and service units which operate in the field with the combat element to be designated as line units. One of the Army's chronic organizational difficulties is traceable to the recurring tendency of certain officers in the supply and administrative Services to view their functions as embodying both line and staff duties. When this is translated into terms and attributes of combat, service and command elements, it is not hard to see why the supply bureaus in the War Department prior to the establishment of the General Staff in 1903 exercised such powerful influence.

If the terminology of line and staff is used, it is necessary to make a distinction between the special staff and the general staff. Special staff officers are those who carry out administrative and supply duties which the commander would delegate to others even though he had the time to perform these routine duties himself because they are not only subsidiary to the main task but also normally performed through routine procedures. The General Staff is a part of the command element and it exists only because of the complexity of command. Command at every level of the military hierarchy resides in a single individual. His authority is commensurate with his responsibility and neither may be delegated. If all commanders of all sized units had the capacity to per-

sonally perform the planning, coordinating, and supervising duties incident to exercising command, there would be no justification for a General Staff. But there might still be a special staff to which routine auxiliary administrative and technical services might be delegated. This was the situation that theoretically existed in the War Department until 1903. In practice, necessity forced upon the Adjutant General's Department and to a much smaller degree, the Inspector General's Department, the assumption of what may properly be called General Staff duties.

Thus, while the General Staff does not absorb any of the prerogatives of command, it owes its existence to the fact that size and complexity of organization and the problems resulting make it physically impossible for any one person to do all the planning, coordinating, and supervising indispensable to intelligent command. To perform these tasks the commander of any large unit must have a General Staff which as a body acts as his *alter ego*, greatly enlarging his capacity to command but without taking away from him any of his attributes of command. Thus, the military doctrine constantly emphasizes the fact that the General Staff officer has no right of command. Considering the General Staff to be the commander's *alter ego* does not preclude sensible specialization on the part of its component parts. Thus, there can be and there is considerable specialization in the performance by the War Department General Staff of its tasks of planning, coordinating, and supervising. The War Department doctrine, as given in official orders or taught at the service schools, has never made use of the concept of the General Staff as the commander's *alter ego*. Yet this idea is implied and the concept is highly useful for it makes the General Staff idea much more tangible and explicit. General Staff duties are always the duties the commander would perform for himself if he were able to, for they form an indispensable foundation for the exercise of command.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL TRENDS

It is not enough to know that the military structure consists of combat elements; technical supply and administrative service elements; and command elements. What must also be understood with respect to these elements are the organizational trends and their implications. Increasing size and complexity have forced increasing specialization in each of these elements, causing them to split into more and more cells. This has been regarded as a natural development except in the command element. Thus the consequences of increasing specialization have been faced only in part. The problems arise primarily in the organization and relationships of the armed forces in their operations in the field, but they have a marked effect on the Army and the War Department organization,

and upon the integrated or over-all organization for national defense.

In the ground force combat elements the trend toward greater specialization and the need for a more effective integration of the specialized parts have been recognized. Only a comparatively short time ago infantry, cavalry, and artillery were the three ground combat cells. While the need for mutual support was always present, nevertheless the time and space factors were such that each did its part in a manner approximating a separate and distinct performance. How different were conditions at the end of World War II! New weapons, equipment and requirements produced a bewildering specialization. Rifles, machine guns, mortars, rockets, tanks, antitank guns, antiaircraft weapons, artillery of varying calibers, reconnaissance vehicles, antitank units, amphibious and air transport, paratroopers and glider troops, radar technique for firing infantry mortars, the cub reconnaissance and spotting plane, the fighter, medium and heavy bomber, robot planes, the atomic bomb—all have operated to subdivide combat elements into countless cells and will continue to do so. At the same time, the space and time factors have now been so annihilated that a great many of these specialized cells must be available at the same time and place and in such small quantities that the commanders of small combat units can use them as means to carry out their missions. Because of the difficulty of welding together these many specialists into a small unit, the trend has also been to make the combat infantryman into a one-man army by giving him more and more weapons and equipment.

These developments are pertinent to the over-all national defense in two ways. First, the increasing combat specialization and the overcoming of space and time have complicated immeasurably the jobs of the command elements. Second, the vital necessity of forming well rounded, self-contained forces with the weapons and means to survive and win cries out for more effective ways of fitting together the specialized combat cells.

It is well known, for example, that the Navy has not only a sea force but ground, air, and service forces as parts of what is called the Navy. A commander will always insist that he have under his complete and immediate control the forces, tools, and weapons he needs, first to exist and secondly to fight. Any attempt to compartmentalize will inevitably produce within the ground forces combat elements now considered the exclusive property of the Air Force and the Navy. The same holds for the Air Forces and the Service Forces. Modern warfare, being what it is, requires as a condition for survival, not to mention winning, the concentration of the many specialized combat elements now segregated as sea, air, and ground forces.

It is thus inconceivable from an organizational viewpoint that the country could do without a top over-all organization for national defense, or that it should seek to isolate and insulate organizationally the three main groupings of air, ground and sea forces, and then expect to achieve their integration under the most difficult of all control and organization conditions—those of the battlefield. It seems obvious that if the organization and control mechanisms have not been provided, then the necessities of war will force a belated integration in the field of all the specialized combat elements within each of the three major forces.

This trend is both expensive and confusing, not only for commanders and troops in the field, but in Washington at the over-all top level and at the War Department–Navy Department–Air Force level. There would be just as much reason to have the Marine Corps and the Fleet Air Arm as independent organizational entities separate from the Navy Department as there is to have separate and mutually exclusive organizational structures for air, sea, and ground forces now or in the future. The situation as regards combining and integrating sea, air, and ground combat elements today is little different than the task of welding together the infantry-cavalry-artillery team of half a century ago. The grouping of all the many cells of the combat elements into air, sea, and ground elements is useful only for providing stock piles from which efficient combat mixtures can be made. If we lack an effective integration of all the combat elements, it is to be expected that each of the three major forces will feel the responsibility for defending the nation single-handed, and their requests for funds, personnel, and equipment will reflect this feeling.

UNIFIED SUPPLY AND SERVICE ELEMENTS NEEDED FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

As the combat elements increased in number and became more specialized, a similar development occurred in the supply and administrative service elements. But the growing volume of kinds and amounts of supplies and munitions required have made it increasingly necessary to supplement local command control in every sizeable unit with enough technical supervision to insure that the supplies will be available when, where, and in the amounts needed. The mission of these service elements is to provide "such technical, supply, or administrative services as are necessary to maintain the fighting efficiency of the combat elements."⁴ To provide these supplies vertical organizations have developed with the apex of each of these functionally specialized organizations in a War Department bureau under a chief who is responsible for

technical supervision. But technical supervision by a supply Service chief and command control by the field commander of the combat elements require that the supply and administrative officers within the combat elements play a dual role.

Operating a supply or administrative service which necessarily calls for a vertically integrated organization, the Chief of a War Department supply or administrative Service exercises technical supervision necessary to distribute his product or services. At the same time, supply and administrative officers serving with combat elements must be under the commander of the elements for whom they attend to supplies or services. The principle here is that authority must be given to the commander of the combat elements commensurate with his responsibility and this must include control over those service elements which render indispensable services. Lack of such control would prevent the commander from operating effectively. To effect these controls, the officer in charge of the auxiliary service is designated as a special staff officer on the staff of the appropriate line commander. Thus, there is a horizontal grouping at each organizational level. In effect, this places the auxiliary services under two masters—a situation which demands intelligent understanding by all concerned. Actually, no organizational or administrative principle is violated. The necessity of functional specialization dictates the one relationship; the responsibility for an assigned combat or training mission for which commensurate authority must be given governs the other. This concept of the position of the special staff has been confused because of its historical evolution and because the term "staff" has acquired so many different surface layer associations that the basic idea of the function of the special administrative and technical staffs remains blurred.

In an earlier day, when nearly all supplies could be procured locally, it was logical for the commander of the combat elements to have complete control over all his supply officers. In modern war, when the logistics, the when and where of adequate supplies and munitions, largely determine the strategy and tactics to be followed, it is also natural for the commander of the combat elements to want complete control over his supply and service facilities and personnel. A liberal interpretation is certainly warranted in support of the view that necessary control of supply and administrative services is indispensable to command. But this still needs further clarification.

The huge consumption of supplies and munitions and the insatiable demand for transport and services so characteristic of World War II combat operations have made it all the more certain that the combat commanders will demand all possible control over these facilities and

supplies. On the other hand, the actual supply side of the problem cannot be ignored. It will normally be impossible to satisfy the voracious demands of combat commanders for they add to their requirements as large a factor of safety as possible. No combat commander ever won fame by willingly being economical in personnel, equipment, and supplies, and it is only to be expected that in war such commanders will use every legitimate means to obtain more and more.

But the supply of munitions and equipment will always be short in the face of such demands and modern war requires complete industrial mobilization to satisfy even a portion of the requirements. As these problems have become more complex it has been necessary for the chiefs of supply Services to expand a vertical organization capable of procuring, producing, transporting, distributing, and maintaining the munitions and equipment for which they are primarily responsible. Traditionally, product type supply organizations have been the pattern. So many supply organizations have developed under a bureau type organization that in both World War I and II they required more coordination and supervision in an operating sense than it was appropriate for the General Staff to give. For this reason overseas Services of Supply organizations and the Army Service Forces were established.

Some such organization will be required for the future. The error to be avoided is that such a supply organization should not be put in the position of having to approve or disapprove the supply and service requests of commanders of combat elements. The supply bureaus of the Army Service Forces setup in Washington together with the practice of having combat unit supply officers as members of the special staff, or semi-independent in a service command type of organization, contributes to the undesirable circumstance in which commanders of combat elements are told "yes" or "no" by supply people. This is more of a shortcoming in the command element than it is a usurpation of command prerogatives by service elements. What, of course, is required is for the General Staff at each appropriate echelon to make the command element more articulate about such matters, and to effect better procedures. These procedures must usually take the form of explicit supply credits which set reasonable demands of combat elements against the actual quantities of supplies which supply and service elements can be expected to provide. The organizational and procedural means in Washington, throughout the United States, and overseas have frequently not been available to carry out this important function of command. The commander obviously cannot personally do all this, and therefore General Staffs should be expected to provide the organizational means and techniques of control. Combat elements have become increasingly mobile

and less and less restricted by time and place factors in their capabilities, but the geographical area setup has become more and more a limiting factor for supply and service elements. During World War II the requirements for space, personnel and critical utility and transportation facilities in any area were so great that the command element had to have within itself the means, the staff agency, to determine and make the best allocations possible of the facilities that were actually available. Likewise, there is a practical limit to the desire of combat commanders to have their own exclusive supply facilities. Wherever air, sea and ground elements operated close to one another, as often happened in World War II, exigencies forced consolidation of supply facilities because there was neither the time nor means to put in duplicate installations for all three. Unfortunately, organizational rigidities and pride all too often did result in wasteful duplication at times and places where economy was essential to prevent all waste of critically short resources.

THE EFFECTS OF SPAN OF CONTROL AND PRIDE OF PLACE

The continuing trend of establishing more and more cells in both the combat and the supply and service elements, together with the conflicting facts of still increasing combat element mobility and of ever-expanding supply needs making for immobilization of and fixed installations for the supply elements emphasize the need for future development in the command element. In the past, army doctrine has emphasized that command and its handmaidens, authority and responsibility, reside in one man at each echelon in the chain of command. When the complexities and problems of command became too great for one man to handle, then the solution was to establish additional echelons in the organization and to assign certain duties and responsibilities to additional subordinate commanders. Two human factors counterbalance each other and prevent excesses both of over-centralization and over-decentralization.

These are *span of control* and *pride of place*. Span of control has been defined as the administrative counterpart of the psychological conception of "the span of attention." Just as "the span of attention" limits the number of separate matters a single mind can encompass at any given time so does "the span of control" restrict the number of men who can be controlled by any one man. This has been one determining factor in the organizational pyramid of the War Department and the Army. It is chiefly responsible for the number of links in the chain of command, "the scalar chain." Putting it another way, the "span of control" determines the number of layers or stories in the organizational pyramid which is the War Department and the Army. The War Department doctrine on the basic principles of command and military organization

upon which command and responsibility rest has been stated as follows: . . . "In military organizations, it has been determined by experience that the maximum number of subordinates a commander can deal with, personally supervise, and control is limited. As the administrative functions and brain work of the commander increase and as the functions of command become more numerous and of broader scope, the number of subordinates with whom he has to deal directly should decrease."⁵

This tendency making for organizational skyscrapers is tenaciously resisted by a proclivity that can be designated as "pride of place" for lack of a better term. This includes all those forces which have persistently tended to prevent a lengthening of the chain of command in the Army and the War Department, and even to shorten it. Both senior and junior officers are generally impatient at delays incident to going through channels. Juniors whenever possible like to deal directly with the highest authority. Officers heading organizational entities resent being placed far down in the chain of command. In all sorts of ways "pride of place" exerts a dynamic force and it is a rare organizational entity in the War Department and the Army, the chief of which, if given any opportunity, does not try to climb higher on the organizational ladder. Without much conscious thought of these organizational principles the War Department and the Army have unconsciously, in the process of trial and error, yielded to their influence.

"Pride of place" has usually won out in times of peace, resulting in far more individuals reporting to one man than he could control. Where there are ambitious subordinates, soft-hearted commanders, and the complaisance characteristic of peacetime, "pride of place" flourishes. The awakening always comes but usually not until war or other emergency threatens. Then serious incidents in the form of grave errors, neglects, or delays forcibly remind commanders of the limitations imposed upon them by "span of control." And then, a commander realizes that as the number of subordinates reporting directly to him has become greater, the number of resulting relationships has increased not by arithmetical but by geometrical progression. It is this total number of relationships in a headquarters which in large part determines the complexity of command and the difficulty of coordination. With a General Staff, the commander's capacity for managing a large number of subordinates is greatly extended, but even so the limitations of "span of control" persist.

Of equal if not of greater importance than "pride of place" and "span of control" is the development of more effective command methods for the commander's exercise of control. To provide this was the basic purpose in establishing the General Staff, and in the future more emphasis

will have to be placed in making general staffs both in Washington and in the field more effective. This will not only require improvement in techniques of control but also emphasis on restricting their activities to those proper for a component part of the command element. Specifically, this means the transfer to one or more new or existing subordinate commands or to special staff sections all duties which are not appropriate General Staff activities. The criteria for this is always that his General Staff should not do those things a commander himself would not do if he had unlimited time and capabilities. In practice the best means of enforcing this has been to keep the General Staff small. A possibly desirable future development would be to reduce the number of special staff sections by establishing a service of supply command and to restrict the special staff to those agencies which provide the General Staff with needed techniques of control.

ORGANIZATIONAL NEEDS FOR THE FUTURE

Throughout this discussion of the three elements (combat, service, and command) of the military structure have been statements relating to future requirements for insuring the most efficient organization and integration of the combat forces, the proper position and role of auxiliary administrative and supply services, the best organizational and procedural means for achieving coordination and command on a geographic basis, and a single chain of command. Those who like to look back to the long ago accept an organizational arrangement in which there are no means other than mutual cooperation for bridging the gap between separate organizations in certain of the component parts of the combat elements. Some who are aware of World War II experiences but who retain a narrow branch-mindedness will nevertheless admit that in an overseas theater of operation the theater commander must command all combat and service elements in his theater. At the same time, they would deny to the commander the composite staff he needs for proper control, insisting that the major components break away organizationally at a point immediately below the theater of operations commander.

But the necessities of war appear to be forcing integration at lower and lower levels. If this trend is not reversed by some unforeseen development, the organizational machinery will have to be developed to permit integration of not only a Ground Force infantry division, an Air Force composite group, and a sea force task force, but of even smaller combinations. This is not a future but a present requirement, and an effective organization to meet this requirement cannot be improvised hurriedly without inviting disaster. With integration of smaller and smaller sea, air, and ground combat elements, a similar requirement

exists for supply and service elements. Here again the trend is unmistakable. There was a time very long ago when each separate major component of the combat elements had a separate and especially tailored supply organization to fill its needs. In each successive war necessity has forced more and more consolidation of the common articles of supply, and action to standardize so that there would be more common articles has persisted and increased despite the resistance of separate minded oldsters. In World War II there were innumerable instances of pooling and joint use of supplies despite the red tape and difficulties caused by organizational separation and the lack of cohesion higher up in the top levels of our organization for national defense. What seems obvious is that future requirements demand the organizational means to provide common supplies and pooling of supply and service resources at lower and lower organizational levels. Putting it another way, the wholesaling of military supplies needs to be extended downward and unnecessary duplication by excessive retailing within the combat elements must be curtailed. This extension of the wholesaling of supplies and munitions will be governed by and in direct proportion to three things: the per capita or per weapon increases in requirements for supplies and ammunition, the degree integration is extended to lower levels of sea, air, and ground elements of the combat forces, and the growing and unavoidable circumstance of elbowing and crowding among the component parts of the combat elements for operating room and base, transport, and communication facilities.

The problem of achieving necessary coordination and command on a geographic basis in the field is unquestionably complex but is so essential that its difficulty cannot be given as an excuse for failure. Mutual cooperation is no basis on which to operate when the demands of the cooperators in any geographic area exceed the available resources and supplies. During World War II there were many examples of this—in Hawaii, in the Western and Eastern Defense Commands, and in such cities as San Francisco, New York, Washington, Miami Beach and Miami. Only the military can determine the relative priorities among the armed forces. Yet during World War II the competition for labor and facilities were such in areas of the United States that civilian agencies sometimes had to weigh the various arguments and decide. The substantial economies made in personnel, office and warehouse space, transportation, and miscellaneous supplies are relatively minor advantages. The time when mutual cooperation in place of centralized command has no advocates is when the showdown comes in accepting responsibilities. Whoever gets the responsibility insists on commensurate

authority. Pearl Harbor is the classic example of what will always happen when you divide authority and responsibility.

Unified command in an area cannot be extemporized after an emergency begins, nor can it exist in any local area if there is more than a single chain of command to the higher headquarters. This does not preclude appropriate technical or training supervision from Washington headquarters of Army, Navy, Air, or supply components. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces are accustomed to this and it is not hard to differentiate between actual command channels and all others of technical and training instruction or information. A single chain of command requires at each link a single command element. One of the greatest obstacles to effective area command in World War II was the proclivity of a commander to double in his role and be both the over-all commander and the immediate commander of one of the major components. In discharging this dual role, usually but one staff was used. World War II experience makes it clear that the area commander should not also command directly one of his major components. In addition, a separate composite general staff is required; the staff of one of the major components cannot perform the staff work needed by the top area command element.

A GENERAL STAFF FOR THE FUTURE

The General Staff has been described as a significant part of the command element. Let us see in greater detail what the future requirements are for a staff organization with effective techniques of control to provide the information, planning, coordination, and supervision, without which neither effective leadership nor management is possible. Because staff organization in the command echelons in the field will follow the pattern set for Washington, we need to discuss only the General Staff organization in the War Department and an over-all General Staff for the Commander in Chief or the Secretary of a Department of National Defense.

First, however, it should be noted that of an importance equal to that of proper organization is the need for competent personnel in the four top staffs—ground, sea, air, and in the combined over-all staff. Here lessons from War Department experience must not be ignored. Throughout the entire existence of the War Department General Staff the question has persisted whether its members should be permanently assigned or detailed for a four-year or other maximum assignment. It is highly desirable to keep the top General Staffs closely in touch with field activities and this can best be done by the continual influx of new blood from the line. The detail system should therefore be retained as the

principal method of selecting General Staff officers. The influence and competence of the General Staff would be strengthened if a certain percentage of its members could be appointed for a six- or an eight-year period or even permanently. This would correct the condition that has existed at times when technical specialists on the special staff and other officers who have had long and repeated assignments on a specific type of duty question the competence of General Staff officers because of the high turn-over rate. Frequently, the comment has been made that just when the General Staff officer becomes and is accepted as an expert in his work, he is relieved from the General Staff and is assigned to other duties in the field. In addition, some increased degree of permanency of tenure for the members of the General Staff would assist in giving the General Staff an organizational integrity of its own. This is important because the General Staff can never be too objective or too impartial.

It is also remarkable but unfortunate that in both the War and Navy Departments civilian and military personnel have never been effectively intermeshed on job levels above those of clerical and secretarial assistants. An intermingling of highly competent civilians and military officers in the four top General Staffs would be most helpful and healthful.

Furthermore, in both the War and Navy Departments the organizations have tended to be hydra-headed in that several competing channels to the Secretary have existed. There should not be separate civilian and military channels and cliques. There should be an intermingling of civilians and the military at all levels.

For a general staff to function as the *alter ego* of the commander and do for him many of the tasks which he would do himself if time permitted, it is imperative that a general staff be a small, compact and intimate group. The maximum or optimum number is a variable depending in the case of the War Department on the ability of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War to reach and be reached by the General Staff advisors. Conferences and minutes of conferences are useful media for maintaining that close relationship and intimate understanding without which the ablest men lose the ability to function as a General Staff officer.

Specialization in the General Staff organization has steadily grown since the early days of forming *ad hoc* General Staff committees to study various problems. The practice of dividing the General Staff into a G-1 Personnel division, a G-2 Intelligence division, a G-3 Organizations and Training division, a G-4 Supply division, and an OPD-Operations division has worked fairly satisfactorily and has stood up under many stresses and strains. Certainly the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff need a General Staff group to advise them upon and handle for

them those questions of promotion and assignment which a commander cannot ignore. Likewise, because military decisions can be no better than the information on which they are based, there must be a General Staff group to provide military intelligence. Policy questions on training, unit organization, allocation of supplies, and standards of equipment and instruction require an Organization and Training division and a Supply division. World War II demonstrated how desirable it was to have an Operations division to provide the implementing spark, so to speak, and to act as the command post or executive agency for the Chief of Staff on tactical and operational matters. It would be advantageous in peacetime to change the title of this division to War Plans and Operations Division.

But there is nothing sacrosanct about the existing War Department General Staff organization. A good case can be established for certain changes. Certain Special Staff activities of the present are actually General Staff duties. The Budget Division, the Public Relations or Public Information Bureau, the New Developments Division, and the Inspector General's Department all perform duties which the Chief of Staff would do for himself were he omnipotent. The tasks of preparing, justifying, and defending the budget before Congress is essentially a command action and the allocation of funds is probably the most potent peacetime control which the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff have at their disposal. Explaining the Army to Congress, to the public, and to the men in the Army is a job which the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff would like to perform themselves in large measure, and the officers who assist them in this work are doing General Staff work. The revolutionary effect of new weapons and the catastrophic danger of retaining those that are obsolete make it imperative that the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff have assistance to enable them to exercise the leadership which their positions impose. This is a responsibility which cannot be delegated to subordinate echelons; it is primarily a top command responsibility for which General Staff assistance is essential. Under the title of New Developments there should be included not only those projects which relate to new and better weapons, equipment, and supplies, but also those which pertain to better procedures, useful economies and more effective management and organization. This kind of assistance to the command element is badly needed. In competitive business the entrepreneur who is a successful innovator reaps substantial rewards. In time of war this is also especially true of the military, but because the Army is an institutional organization with no adequate substitute for a cost-accounting and profit-and-loss system, innovation is heavily handicapped. The Inspector General's Department provides an inspecting

service indispensable to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff who find it difficult to probe beyond what they see during inspection visits when everything is artificially at its surface best and when the conventional response to their questions is that everything is fine. To retain a reasonable span of control there should be no more than six General Staff divisions and the raising of certain Special Staff activities to General Staff status calls for some consolidation. This could be accomplished in a number of ways. As an example, Inspector General's Department could become a part of the Operations Division and the G-1 and the G-3 functions might be combined.

THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE METHODS OF CONTROL

Perhaps the most important lesson of all to be derived from the War Department General Staff's work during World War II was the need for more effective techniques of control. It was not so much a question of having the right kind of an organization as it was the problem of developing procedures to make the organization effective. The G-1 personnel division was continually involved in the details of applying personnel policies because it could not achieve an adequate technique of control or satisfactory procedures for subordinate offices to handle certain details. The Intelligence Division had difficulty in receiving and disseminating military information except through agencies and personnel under their immediate control. G-3, G-4, and OPD handled much business where editing, checking, statistical, inspection, and pictorial presentation (special staff) services were required. The Statistical Section of the Office, Chief of Staff, and the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office provided G-1, G-3, G-4 and OPD with essential data without which they could not hope to assist the Chief of Staff in control and coordination. Very marked improvements were made during World War II in reporting systems and reports. The Progress Reports of the Army Service Forces and the reports on Air Force programming are types of techniques which the General Staff must adopt and improve upon if the future heavy responsibilities for our top military leaders are to be met. The pictorial and graphical methods developed by the Presentation Division of the Office of Strategic Services can well be adopted by the General Staff to improve its presentation of staff studies to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. In the future the ability to keep the General Staff small in numbers and true to the General Staff role will depend largely on how successfully such necessary techniques of control can be developed. These are types of devices needed to permit the General Staff to coordinate and supervise. Failure to adopt and improve them is certain to cause the General Staff to degenerate and take

on operational and administrative tasks which should be carried out by subordinate agencies under General Staff coordination and supervision.

THE GRAVE NEED FOR A TOP-LEVEL GENERAL STAFF

The future requirements for General Staffs in the War and Navy Departments or for the Air, Ground, and Sea Forces call for highly effective organizations to assist their commanders or department heads, but the crucial need is for a General Staff or some similar organization at the very top level. That national defense or security has always been essentially a single over-all problem has been recognized from the beginning of our nation by the designation of the President as Commander in Chief. It is unfortunate that he has lacked in increasing measure, as war has become more and more complex, the top management facilities vital for intelligent decisions and able leadership. When defense problems were simple and divisible into well defined and non-overlapping areas and responsibilities, the Cabinet sufficed for counsel, and the separate War and Navy Departments for operations. That this is no longer true has been amply demonstrated by the fact that wherever there was prolonged fighting in World War II, air, sea, and ground forces have been forced by circumstances to operate under one command. What has not been advertised is that lack of organizational cohesion at the top in Washington has made unity of command in the field more complicated and difficult. To give the President the top management facilities which he needed in both World War I and II, the committee system was tried but found lacking. President Wilson in World War I had tried to foster the idea of Cabinet committees but their work drew little praise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff committee organization worked only because of the caliber of the men who were in it, and only in spite of its organizational defects.

DEFECTS IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SET-UP

Especially with relation to peacetime needs does the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization have grave defects. Organizationally it is so constituted as to foster delay and compromise and make the President's role of Commander in Chief difficult by bringing controversial questions to him for decision but without providing him the impartial staff advice needed. During World War II, operational necessity was a powerful influence continually forcing the Chiefs of Staff to come to a prompt decision. Despite this pressure there were many instances of delays

when obvious and marked differences of opinion and interest existed. There was also much independent action never referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff even though the consequences of these actions affected all three services. An examination of the circumstances, disagreements, delays, and referrals to the President during World War II of the determination of total manpower ceilings for all the armed forces and their apportionment among the Army, Navy and Air Forces gives rise to extreme doubt and cynicism over the ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on a peacetime budget ceiling for all the armed forces and on the individual apportionments to Army, Navy and Air Forces. Judging by past performances of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this particular problem will always go to the President for decision and no politically wise Chief Executive is going to let himself become continually involved in this problem without at least obtaining better impartial and politically expedient advice than the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is capable of giving.

A basic fault of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that no organizational integrity exists. No one is completely imbued with what should be the Joint Chiefs of Staff objective and over-all attitude. Every individual and every committee member associated in any way with the Joint Chiefs of Staff is primarily a representative from one of the component parts of the armed forces. If he is not an uncompromising fighter for the special interests which he represents his work will be regarded as unsatisfactory by those who determine his promotion, assignment, and future success. Without any members who have the "general" point of view and with all the inducements for uncompromising advocacy of the special interests of the organization they represent, how can the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization expect to exercise the leadership required except in those rare instances when men rise above their organizational handicaps and by unselfish and objective individual action counteract those tendencies which the organizational structure fosters? During World War II the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no executive agency or command post like that which the Chief of Staff of the Army had in the Operations Division of the General Staff. Under a committee type of organization such as that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a secretariat cannot function in an executive capacity, and without such an organization the supervisory and coordinating functions become impotent. As an illustration, whenever a question arose over an interpretation of a Joint Chief of Staff document prepared by a Joint Chief of Staff Committee

and approved by the top committee of the four Chiefs of Staff, the secretariat could never undertake major clarification or executive action; the question had to be referred back to the different committees with resulting delays and periods of inaction when action was needed. As a purely planning agency in non-controversial fields the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was at its best, but there will be relatively few matters in peacetime on which there will not be basic disagreements among the parts of the armed forces over their relative roles and positions. As a peacetime medium to obtain over-all decisions, to prescribe common standards, and to exercise coordination and supervision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set-up is woefully inadequate. They have few techniques of control at their disposal.

There was one tendency that developed during World War II which is sure to become an issue if the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization continues in peacetime. The State Department, the Petroleum Administrator for War, and a number of governmental departments and agencies began the practice of asking for and receiving formal opinions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on questions with military implications. However, except in direct consultation with the President, actions and opinions taken or expressed by Army and Navy officers do not become the action or opinion of the War and Navy Departments until approved by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy. In peacetime the political heads of the departments will be apt to insist that a Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation be referred to them for approval and in a disagreement the question is right back where it started.

Any proposal to have a committee type of organization like that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recalls the early War Department experience when the War Council and other ineffective conference measures were suggested in place of a General Staff. Just as those in the War Department who resisted change then sought to circumvent it, there is danger now that the country will be sold a bill of goods which will in outward appearances provide the form for top level organizational control but which will lack the substance to make those alleged controls effective. Even worse than a committee type organization is the likely arrangement in which a Department of National Defense would be established with one Secretary to head the department and with an Under Secretary for each of the major forces but with no other means of obtaining that top level planning, coordination, and supervision so indispensable to an integrated system of national security. Present arrangements, defective

as they are, are much to be preferred over such a subterfuge and such an in-name-only unified defense organization.*

The planning, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities which exist at the very top level raise the same kinds of problems which confront the commanders and the General Staffs of each of the three component parts of our defense forces, air, sea, and ground. Unless there is the intelligent handling of top level questions of national security,

*This is what occurred in Canada and the following comment of a senior Canadian Army officer is illuminating:

"As I recall, (and the following remarks are entirely based on personal recollection), a generation ago there was a popular belief in Canada that war had become outmoded. The economy axe was therefore swung with great vigour, and every means were sought to make the different votes cover as much ground as possible. In those days we had the Navy and the Army; a separate Air Force had yet hardly made its appearance, and in its embryonic form it came under the tutelage of the Army General Staff. We therefore merged the two Service Departments into one Department of National Defense and set up one Chief of Staff. An honest effort was made to combine a number of services which could properly be held to be common services. This applied in some measure to Ordnance, Medicals, Central Registry, and so forth, but in point of fact we never achieved much progress. We were in an era of peace. The British Services were operating under the 'ten year rule,' that is to say, they had been advised by their Government that in their calculations they could count on there not being a major war for at least ten years. We naturally followed suit, if indeed we did not go them one better. Our defense horizon was cloudless, and apart from the provision of modest coast defenses at our ports, we had little in the way of defense problems, and certainly none that required us to cast our minds beyond our own shores. Our mobilization scheme, of course, provided for a big enough general reserve to make the dispatch of an expeditionary force possible should this become necessary.

We continued in this way for some ten years, when the gradual worsening international situation brought about the institution of what afterwards came to be known as the Chiefs of Staff Committee. This was a natural growth to meet a felt need, and consequently it developed on sound lines.

This Committee submitted joint advice and made joint recommendations to the Government in respect of matters of defense. But all the while there were no problems of sufficient importance to hold our Services as closely together as was contemplated by the Act setting up the Department of National Defense. And it followed that as the defense votes progressively increased they more and more went their own sweet way with the exception of Defense of Canada Plans, which were drawn up jointly by the Chiefs of Staff and their Planners. But when all this was said and done, and I can speak feelingly in this regard for I was one of the Planners, the Defense of Canada Plan was really a statement of the Forces available for static defense against the extremely moderate forms and scales of attack which we had laid down. There was little in the way of military co-ordination of the three separate defense votes. Co-ordination there was, but this was done by the Treasury, who laid down just how much would be made available to us, not from the standpoint of what was required, but from that of what could be spared.

Our experiment of twenty years ago does not, therefore, appear to have led to very much, and early in 1940 separate Ministers for Naval Services and Air were appointed. The Minister of National Defense (Army) possesses certain powers of co-ordination over his Naval and Air Colleagues, but as time has gone on he has used them less and less. The reason for this, as I have hinted above, is that (and there may be some differences of opinion as to this) the territorial integrity of our country has never been really threatened. Thus we have never been subject to real (as opposed to imagined) stress. Moreover, we are in the fortunate, or unfortunate position, of merely *contributing* to the common war effort of the United Nations and we have no part in the direction of the war effort. I mention this latter point only to explain the lack of external forces that might have driven us more closely together. As a consequence, the three Canadian Fighting Services have expanded during these last five years, and a very considerable expansion it has been, quite independently and subject only to over-riding budgetary considerations."

which can only be provided by a General Staff at that level, the work of subordinate General Staff organizations will be seriously if not vitally handicapped. This becomes evident from a brief look at the main problems that require a top level over-all General Staff to handle them.

TOP-LEVEL STAFF PLANNING

Neither the air, ground, or sea forces can prepare or keep up to date their various war plans until after strategic plans have been determined on the highest level and the highest authority has decided what shall be the respective role of each force. During World War II this was accomplished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint War Plans Committee. This was a workable arrangement during wartime, but this type of organization is unsuitable for the long-term peacetime strategic problems. No nation in history has been able to afford both a great land army and a powerful sea force. Not even the United States with its wealth can hope to have the largest army, the greatest navy, and the most powerful air force. This cannot be settled as simply a political question by the President or Congress. Both need impartial, objective, and expert analytical assistance to determine what the balance should be among the air, sea and ground elements. Likewise, expert and impartial advice is needed on the extent to which each of the major forces needs to develop all of the types of combat elements. Should the fleet air arm include planes for long-range strategic bombing which is claimed as the special forte of the Air Forces? To what extent must the Ground Forces have reconnaissance, troop carrier, and close support aviation as integral parts of their tactical organization, and to what degree can reliance be placed on the Air Forces to meet these Ground Forces requirements in view of the predilection of the Air Forces for long-range heavy bombers and fighter aviation? Must the Air Forces provide from within the Air Forces the ground antiaircraft and air base security battalions needed? Should paratroop and glider units be Air Force or Ground Force units? Have Air Force precision bombing and the use of radar for blind landing developed to the stage where the fixed heavy guns of seacoast defense can be abolished? Are the conditions of modern war and the use of cross-country vehicles such that the horse and the mule are really gone forever? These are the relatively easier questions to answer, but they illustrate the kinds of problems which will always arise when partial combinations of combat elements face modern warfare's compelling influence that all the types of combat elements be available at one time and place and under one commander. The best interests of the nation

can be served only by an impartial determination of these questions and this requires a General Staff rather than a committee type of organization.

TOP-LEVEL STAFF AND USE OF PROBABLE APPROPRIATIONS

There are also certain top level strategic tasks relating to the correlation of national policy and the military means to back it up which can be glibly discussed but which are exceedingly difficult of accomplishment. It has been our past experience that military leaders cried "Wolf! Wolf!" so often over the inadequacy of our military means to carry out the natural consequences of our national policies that little attention was paid to their warnings. There is virtually an untapped field which if exploited on a sound working-level basis would yield rich results. Modifications in national policies and an acknowledged reliance on international organization and covenants can bring substantial economies in defense costs. Similarly, prime national policies can be made increasingly meaningful and effective by developing the armed forces and our military design in the proper manner. All of this has been the subject of much general discussion. But the translation of meaningless platitudes into substantial accomplishment depends on organizational means. Over-all strategic planning with appropriate detailed war plans is not enough; such planning is at best only an intellectual exercise unless the means exist to translate the plans into action. Planning, coordination, and supervision of the highest competence are required to bridge the gap between the period when war plans are prepared and the time when those plans are executed. Unless strategic plans can be corrected in the light of month by month experience on what can be accomplished practically, they become of little use. After World War I, the War Department's personnel mobilization plan was initially scheduled for implementation at a rate greater than industrial mobilization would be able to support, and a considerable revision in the plans was necessary. From past experience the armed forces can expect that in peacetime the funds and the means will not be forthcoming in sufficient amount to make the transition from plans to action an easy problem. This is the crucial management problem.

Making available funds stretch to take care of the more essential requirements while insisting nevertheless that the obsolete must not be retained nor relied upon for false security requires leadership which cannot be exercised at either the top level or at the War-Navy-Air level without the equivalent of a General Staff organization. It is illuminating to consider the long-time trends in the availability of funds for national defense and then project these into the future to see how they

EXPENDITURES VERSUS NATIONAL INCOME




CHART 31

PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL EXPENDITURES CHARGEABLE TO VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS




CHART 32

will restrict what the armed forces consider as necessary. The appropriations for War Department military activities have followed on the average a consistent pattern. For the pre-World War I period, War Department military expenditures averaged three times the annual expenditures of the pre-Spanish-American War period. Similarly, annual expenditures during the pre-World War II period averaged roughly three times those of the pre-World War I era. On the basis of this long-time trend there is some likelihood that the War Department annual military appropriations for the post-World War II period will not exceed three times the amounts made available in the pre-World War II period. Annual expenditures for War Department military activities ran from two hundred and fifty million to three hundred and sixty-eight million dollars during the period 1922-1937 and then increased rapidly amounting to \$420,000,000 in 1938; \$496,000,000 in 1939, and \$667,000,000 in 1940. Taking \$333,000,000 as the average pre-World War II annual expenditures and applying the trend factor of three, it is doubtful if the War Department can expect in the post-World War II era funds in excess of a billion dollars annually.

Another trend figure comes from the experience that in peacetime years the annual expenditures for national defense were 1.5% of the national income and of this amount the Army received 45% and the Navy 55%. The most optimistic economists believe the nation will be most fortunate if the post-World War II annual national income of the United States reaches the one hundred and fifty billion dollar mark, which is high even in comparison with the peak 1929 figure of eighty-three billion. Applying this to the War Department's possible future appropriations gives again about one billion dollars. Another critical limiting figure can be deduced from a consideration of the long-time trend in the relationships between the expenditures of the national government and national income, and between national defense expenditures and total national government expenditures. On pages 592-593 are charts that show national government expenditures in terms of national income, and the percentage of federal expenditures chargeable to the different departments. On this basis it is doubtful if federal expenditures in the post-World War II period can exceed eighteen billion dollars annually. Sums required to service our huge national debt, provide for veterans care and pensions, and take care of the costs of unemployment benefits and other forms of social legislation whose costs are on a sharply upward trend are all difficult to estimate; nevertheless certain generalizations can be made. Bearing in mind the relationship between national income and federal government expenditures, it seems very optimistic to hope for annual government expenditures in excess of

eighteen or twenty billion dollars. If this represents the to-be-hoped-for government take, then at best the War and Navy Departments cannot expect more than a total of three or four billion dollars for all ground, air, and sea defense needs. While it is not possible to say with any degree of accuracy what the total defense needs will be, there is good basis for the estimate that the combined requirements as computed by the War and Navy Departments for air, sea, and ground defense needs will be over eight billion dollars annually for years to come. It is possible, of course, to do all sorts of juggling with statistical data. The purpose here has been to emphasize the very great likelihood that what can be made available will fall far short of what funds are considered extremely necessary. And this is where the management job comes in. On how well this management function is performed will depend the security of the United States.

Here it will be helpful to outline some of the organizational and administrative devices which a General Staff type of organization can use in providing top management assistance. It is immaterial whether in doing so we use the customary General Staff subdivisions, but this set-up does provide needed standards, policies, and a continuing review of plans to check conformance to standards and policies.

THE TOP-LEVEL STAFF AND PERSONNEL MATTERS

Personnel policies and standards are required not only as a matter of good business in peacetime, but also to prevent the dangerous misuse of manpower in time of war. A description, somewhat oversimplified and therefore distorted, of the situation before and during World War II leaves no doubt of the need for improvement. In general, the Air Forces and the Navy vied with each other for the cream of the nation's manhood. Men with technical skills were assigned to the Army Service Forces. What was left was assigned to the Army Ground Forces. The Navy did not wish to use Selective Service, insisting that the Navy's personnel needs could be filled through voluntary enlistments. But "voluntary enlistment" was hardly the right term for what was actually done. As additional groups or classes were about to be inducted by Selective Service, the Navy would secure the voluntary enlistment of what they considered to be the cream of the crop by selling them on the idea that in the Navy they would get better pay, more rapid advancement, better living accommodations, and more enjoyable service. The Air Force then attempted to out-bid the Navy to obtain personnel for their pilot combat crew program. Superficially, this might have appeared to be healthy competition but in the absence of over-all standards and control there was no intelligent competition. Men with leadership abil-

ity and men with high mental and superb physical qualifications were assigned to naval shore establishments and air force ground crew and air base jobs that did not require such talents while the need for combat infantrymen with these qualifications was very great.

During World War II there were appropriate priorities and carefully worked out plans for the best use of *materials* the supply of which was limited. In *human materials* a critical shortage existed, but adequate standards and controls for their allocation did not exist. A basic job classification of all air, ground, sea, and supply forces job assignment was needed to determine, compare, relate, and reduce to the fewest possible grouping the various job qualifications or what the Army calls a military occupational specialty. The number of these groupings should not, of course, be unmanageably large and the emphasis should be to expand the list of jobs common to all the forces and to provide a common denominator to relate and compare the rest. Included in such job specifications must be data from which a tabulation and ranking can be made on the basis of physical fitness, job hazards, leadership and educational attainments, and other factors.

After a just and workable framework of standards and policies has been established, then, and only then, can there be healthy competition. You can never adequately pay a man for risking his life for his country. But you can certainly jeopardize his fighting morale by making him feel that these arrangements are unfair. And a million infantrymen felt that way with much reason in World War II.

The piecemeal efforts to solve these problems during World War II were not adequate. For peacetime efficiency and war planning needs it is essential that an equitable system be developed to set the relationships among, and the specifications for, job qualifications and rewards. This will have to be attempted immediately to untangle and adjust the conflicting claims of combat infantrymen, including paratroopers and glider troops; combat, reconnaissance, and transport air pilots; air combat crews; submarine crews; aircraft carrier crews; air, naval, and ordnance mechanics; armored force fighters; air ground crews and naval airplane maintenance crews; and a number of others. To believe that such a basic personnel job can be done under a committee system of mutual cooperation is the height of optimism. The task requires great skill and authoritative decisions at both the over-all level and the air-sea-ground-service higher headquarters. Only after such a foundation has been laid can intelligent policies and procedures be formulated to effect the personnel mobilization required to implement war plans.

THE TOP-LEVEL STAFF AND ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

In organization and training, the needs for common standards, policies, and techniques of control are also urgent. Each unit table of organization and every manning table must be set up to meet the special purpose for which it was designed. Nevertheless, specialization needs to be offset by the application of the common denominator of standardization and work measurement. Extravagant use of men and skills in any military or naval unit should be only by design and never by accident, and standards of comparison are necessary for proper management. If for no other peacetime purpose than to justify the budget estimates, a listing of troop units and other organizations such as is done in the Army Troop Basis is required. The expansion of the peacetime list of organizations in accordance with war plans requires that both on the over-all and on the major-force level there be troop bases and strength accounting controls to permit effective coordination and supervision. In training there must be sufficient standardization to provide the necessary common understanding without which teamwork is impossible. This does not have to be at the expense of any necessary specialization; adequate opportunities exist for necessary simplification and standardization without invading the area of specialized training. A start has been made in achieving a common language and standard communication procedures, but this is only a beginning. In both individual and unit training there are many profitable opportunities to apply generally improvements made by one of the armed forces in training aids and methods. It is natural for the responsible officers of any specialized cell of the combat and service elements to go as far as possible in developing an elaborate and extravagant organization and to complicate and extend the time requirements for training. This is as it should be, but an equalizing influence is needed higher up. Useful comparisons and the questioning by higher authority of added refinements and differentiations make for simplification, and they are essential if limited means are to be made sufficient for the job at hand.

THE TOP-LEVEL STAFF AND SUPPLIES, FACILITIES, AND EQUIPMENT

Not only are desirable economies possible, but the basis for better teamwork can be obtained by action to establish common or appropriately comparable standards for facilities, supplies, and equipment. During World War II soldiers, sailors, and marines who saw different standards of construction for various training areas and installations were properly skeptical. In the absence of common standards of construction for all the armed forces as a whole it is understandable that

commanders of forces in the field should try to get all they could and let someone else worry about economy. There was no greater barrier to essential teamwork than the friction created by the realization by one unit that a near-by unit enjoyed better accommodations without any apparent or real justification. On a small Pacific island for a time during World War II were comparable Army and Navy units doing similar work. Both units drew the standard rations which the Army provided. But the Navy unit also received from a Navy refrigerator ship which stopped regularly and frequently such additional items as ice cream and fresh vegetables. This seemingly trivial discrimination in food was responsible for a state of mind that made cooperation out of the question. This does not mean that there cannot be a required differentiation in allowances, facilities, equipment, and supplies. This will be generally accepted when it is known that there are over-all common standards to which exceptions are made only when justified by the nature of the job the men of the favored unit are to do.

During World War II, procurement difficulties forced the standardization of specification for many Army, Navy and Air items of supply. This will always be a wartime necessity. The unfortunate thing is that during peacetime each of the armed services is insistent upon something a little different from the others for that is the way to obtain preferential treatment and special advantage. When this makes for progress, it is justified, but it needs to be followed by an over-all review to consolidate and distribute to all components the improvements that have been made.

These personnel, organization, training, supply, and other miscellaneous standards, policies, yardsticks, and procedures provide essential techniques of control in time of war and they are equally essential in peacetime. Without them there are no methods by which budget estimates can be prepared or scrutinized intelligently.

THE TOP-LEVEL STAFF AND THE BUDGET

During peacetime the budget can be a most effective instrument of control. In the War Department it has been customary to issue a budget directive to all the subordinate agencies who assist in the preparations of the budget estimates. Some such directive for each of the major forces is essential if the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces are to plan intelligently what they need and how they are going to use the funds. Three such directives cannot supplement and complement each other unless there is one over-all directive which in effect will translate into costs, financial outlays, and priority of needs the military, naval and air

forces means required to carry out our strategic plans and national policies.

It is at this top level where millions of dollars can be saved or wasted. Neither the President, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, nor a committee composed of a representative from each of three independent services can ever prepare such a document without the aid of an organization of the General Staff type. Such a directive and the directives issued in accordance with its principles by each of the major services ought to be a major concern of top management. After the budget estimates have been figured and consolidated, then the results must be checked to see whether every possible economy has been made in compliance with the directives. In the War Department this is done by a committee composed of representatives from the various General Staff divisions. How well such an impartial group can review the budget estimates depends in part on how clearly defined are the strategic plans and in part on how effective are the standards of work measurement, the yardsticks and policies on personnel utilization and manning requirements, and the expert determination of relative supply and equipment needs both as to quantity and quality. It seems obvious that there must be an expert and impartial review of these preliminary budget estimates by each of the major forces, and finally a review of the consolidated estimates by a top group of experts. Congress and taxpayers are entitled to have responsible answers and assurances about the following:

(a) That the funds requested will provide the defense forces to implement our strategic plans and national policies.

(b) That every possible economy has been made and that the estimates do not include requests for funds for unnecessary or duplicating activities or for unduly extravagant standards or purposes.

(c) That if the funds in the amounts requested cannot be made available in their entirety, the less important requirements will be curtailed to provide adequate funds for the essential activities.

THE TOP-LEVEL STAFF AND FUTURE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN WARFARE

Just as there must be the machinery to enable top leadership and management to be effectual through the budgetary process, so too must there be the organizational means to facilitate the performances of the most difficult and the most important responsibility of military leadership—to discover, develop, adopt and exploit new and improved weapons, equipment, tactics and techniques, and to discard the obsolete. As the War Department's experience so abundantly reveals, there are powerful forces of an institutional character that tend to stifle the de-

velopment of initiative in the armed forces. Responsibility naturally makes for conservatism. The easy formula for success in the Army and the Navy is to do only those things which have been tried and proved by experience to be sound. Conformance to past ways is comfortable. Change is risky and disturbing. No military man wishes to be branded as a radical or a crackpot. Yet the history of warfare is full of examples of how great the rewards have been in terms of success in battle to those who capitalized on the element of surprise—which is nothing more than trying the new or the unconventional in preference to the customary. In all of the armed forces there have always been enthusiasts for the new and the improved. All too often this state of mind has been mainly that of juniors despite the responsibilities of leadership at the top. A certain amount of radical and possibly crackpot ideas is healthy. This is needed to offset an environment that fosters a closed mind. The organizational machinery is needed to assist leadership to do what it is supposed to do in seeking out and testing the new. And there can be no leadership where there is no willingness to accept the risk of trying out the new. The General Staff system and the pattern set by the New Developments Division in the War Department—if properly supported and developed—do provide the organizational means. At a time when the developments in the use of atomic energy may revolutionize weapons, tactics, and techniques of warfare, it is more important than ever to have an organization that has no legacy from the past to defend—one that can view critically all present developments in the light of future possibilities. Not only in the War and Navy Departments, but in an over-all position is there the utmost need for the organizational means to bring in the new and throw out the old. Here is the arena in which an advocate can challenge what is regarded as hallowed and sanctified by the past. Here is where Billy Mitchell should have operated. Here is where the opponents of the battleship admirals should have their chance and be encouraged.

Research and Development must be guided into the most profitable channels. Officers with tactical and combat experience who know what the combat elements need and want, officers with supply and technical design backgrounds who have ideas which improve or change existing models, and civilian experts from industrial and educational fields must have a means to meet at the top level and chart the profitable fields of military research and development.

But this is not enough. New weapons exert a powerful influence on military strategy and organization. The planning of military strategy, the changes in military organization and doctrine, and the determination of how best to apportion military appropriations must be under-

taken with as complete a knowledge as possible of the implications of new weapons and the probable trends of their future development. Here we need only to think of the revolutionary effect of the development of the atomic bomb, the use of rockets instead of the conventional types of field artillery, and robot planes instead of man-operated to emphasize and illustrate the crucial importance of top-level organizational means to assist our military leaders in discharging their terrifying responsibilities of exploiting the new and of abandoning the obsolete and the useless.

THE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT AND THE FUTURE

The General Staff concept has come a long way since Elihu Root persuaded the Congress to establish it in 1903. It has abundantly justified its usefulness in extending the directing arm of leadership. Over a long peacetime period and during two World Wars the General Staff has come to be recognized as an effective instrument for planning, coordination, and supervision. As the complexities of modern warfare and the problems of command become more difficult, the greater is the need for an improved General Staff organization with more effective techniques of control. The General Staff concept still has a long way to go in reducing the top-level job of integrated national security to manageable proportions. This can be its most important contribution but it need not stop there. The application of such an instrumentality enlarging the capacity of the chief to direct is not inherently restricted to military use but is applicable to any organization whose size and complexity require that the directing head have something strong on which to lean.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER XI

1. *Hearings before the Select Committee on Post War Military Policy*, House of Representatives, Part I, April 24, 1944, Testimony of Brigadier General J. McA. Palmer, p. 5.
2. *Command and Staff Principles*, The Command and General Staff School (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, The C&GS School Press, 1937), p. 7.
3. See L. Gulick, *Notes on the Theory of Organization in Papers on the Science of Administration*, L. Gulick and L. Urwick. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937.)
4. *Command and Staff Principles*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
5. *Command and Staff Principles*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

Index

- Adjutant General
 - authority of, 6-7
 - and General Staff, 79
 - changed to Military Secretary, 82-83
 - insists on powers, 112
 - authority reaffirmed, 130f
 - under 1942 organization, 387
- Administration difficulties, 353
- Ainsworth, Fred C., 59, 80
 - military background, 85f
 - political sagacity, 89f
 - friendship with Wood, 133
 - clash with Wood, 138
 - muster roll controversy, 151f
 - attacks GS idea, 157
 - relieved by Stimson, 163
- Air Corps
 - see also Air Forces, GHQAF
 - redesignated from Air Service, 322
 - GHQ Air Force, 322f
 - functions of Chief, 323
- Air Force, Chief of, 323
- Air Force Combat Command, 323
- Air Forces
 - see also Air Service; Air Corps; GHQ
 - Air Force; Army Air Forces
 - established, 326
- Air Service
 - effect in 1920s, 300f
 - becomes Air Corps, 322
- Alger, R. A., 22, 24, 25f, 34
- American Expeditionary Forces
 - General Staff, 259f
- Appropriations, use of, 591
- Armored Force, Chief of
 - opposition from other arms, 330
- Arms, Services, Branches
 - see also Procurement; Supply;
 - Equipment
 - supply in Spanish-American War, 26
 - legal opinion on powers, 188
 - chiefs recommended for, 213f
 - offices organized, 292
 - set-up under 1920 act, 292
- Army
 - command of, 6, 15f
 - strength after Civil War, 11
 - strength in 1898, 12, 23
 - distribution in 1896, 13
 - distribution in 1898, 23
 - changes under 1920 act, 295f
 - actual changes in 1942, 360
 - developments 1941-45, 397f
- Army Air Forces
 - see also Air Service; Air Corps
 - under 1942 organization, 380f, 443
 - personnel strengths, comparison, 391
 - World War II organization, 409f
- director system, 410
- planning, World War II, 413
- program control office, 416
- statistical control system, 417
- relations with SOS, 423
- relations with ASF, 444f
- Army Ground Forces
 - under 1942 organization, 378f, 443
 - personnel strengths, comparison, 390
 - World War II organization, 405f
- Army Service Forces
 - see also Services of Supply; Supply;
 - Procurement
 - World War II organization, 425
 - relations with service commands, 430f
 - size of organization, 432
 - organizational problems, 435
 - line and staff organization, 437
 - relationships between units, 442
 - under 1942 organization, 443
 - relations with AAF, 444f
- Arnold, Henry H.,
 - holds three positions, 324
 - plans for WD reorganization, 337
- Artillery Branch, WDGS, 108
- Assignment. See Detail
- Assistant Secretary of War
 - see also Under Secretary
 - duties prescribed, 287
 - relation to WDGS, 301f
 - industrial mobilization problems, 303f
 - procurement planning in 1930s, 304f
- Assistant Secretary of War for Air, 323
- Authority, delegation of, 226
- Ayres, Leonard P., 253
- Baker, Newton D.
 - appointed Secretary, 187
 - decides WDGS position, 198f
 - delegates authority, 226
 - assures Pershing, 249
 - explains 1918 reorganization, 281
 - defines Assistant's duties, 287
- Baruch, Bernard, 237
- Bases, control of, 326f
- Bell, J. Franklin,
 - leans on AGD, 91
 - full term as Chief of Staff, 102
- Bliss, Tasker H., 69f
 - memorandum on war plans, 217f
- Board of Review, 182
- Boards, under 1942 organization, 385
- Breckinridge, Joseph, 27f, 58, 187
- Budget Bureau Director, 351
- Budget Division, WDGS, 554
 - future requirements, 598
- Bullard, Robert L., 225
- Bush, Vannevar, 551

- Carter, William H., 10-11, 15, 24, 41, 48, 73
 Chaffee, Adna R., 82
 Chamberlain, George E., 279
 Chief of Staff, and Office of
 establishment, 7
 authority, 65, 81
 Young appointed, 66
 legal opinion on powers, 188
 recommends branch chiefs, 213f
 functions defined, 231
 organization after 1918, 261f
 responsibilities in 1941, 328
 contact with President, 351
 daily conferences, 492f
 Churchill, Marlborough, 265
 Citizens Training Camps, 222
 Civil Affairs Division, 546
 Civilians, in supply reorganization, 241f
 Cleveland, Frederick A., 151
 Cockrell, Francis M., 86
 Coffin, Howard, 236
 Combined Chiefs of Staff
 composition and functions, 398f
 Command, GS thoughts on, 335f
 Commissions, military
 under 1942 organization, 385
 Communications. See also Correspondence
 under 1942 organization, 387
 Congress
 objection to Army increase, 1917, 218
 Conscription
 opposed by Congress in 1917, 218
 Contracts, investigation of, 539
 Control
 Graicunas theory, 180-181
 overlap of, in overseas bases, 326
 AAF system, 417f
 personnel control, 560
 span of control, effects, 578
 troop basis control, 560
 need for more effective methods, 585
 Coordination
 lack of in WD, 229
 Corbin, Henry C., 97
 Corps Areas
 see also Service Commands;
 Departments; Divisions
 established, 295
 Correspondence. See also Procedures
 handling in 1941, 332
 Crowder, E. H., 66
 defines powers of Chief of Staff, 188f
 Crowell, Benedict
 criticizes WD structure, 229
 comments on planlessness, 240
 background of, 242
 ideas on organization, 254f
 Cuban Pacification
 General Staff in, 101f
 Davis, George W., 55
 Defense commands, established, 325
 Denby, Colonel, 27
 Departments. See also Divisions,
 Corps Areas
 organization, 13f
 initial GS officers, 68-69
 reorganization, 1913-17, 221
 under 1920 act, 295
 Detail system, 95f
 controversy over, 106f
 system strengthened, 175
 comments of Pershing and Wood, 294
 Palmer's ideas, 294
 Developments. See New Developments
 Division
 Divisions, geographical
 see also Departments; Corps Areas
 organization in 1904, 92
 reconstitution of 1891, 104
 organization of 1911, 168
 Dodge Commission, 27f, 34f
 Edison, Thomas A., 236
 Egan, General, 28
 Enlisted Reserve Corps, 222
 Enlistments, change of term, 137
 Engineers, Chief of
 conflict with AG, 112
 Epidemics in Spanish-American War, 32
 Equipment. See also Supply; Procurement
 future requirements, 597
 Flagler, 28
 Floyd, John B., 43
 Garlington, E. A., 151
 Garrison, Lindley M., 175, 187
 Garrison organization, 167
 GS recommendations, 170
 abandonment, 171
 Gasser, Lorenzo D., 560
 Gates, Byron E., 422
 Gaus, John M., 4
 General, rank restored, 11
 General Commanding
 controversy with bureau chiefs, 42
 General Council
 in World War II, 496f
 General Headquarters
 establishment, 317
 development, 324f
 relations with WDGS, 325
 control of overseas bases, 326
 General Headquarters Air Force, 322f
 established, 323
 replaced by Combat Command, 323
 General Munitions Board, 237
 General Staff. See also Special Staff
 Special Staff, 7

- genesis, 39f
- WD opposition, 47f
- bill introduced, 51
- German system described, 56
- law passed, 58
- bill of 1903, 60f
- selection of officers, 61, 66
- regulations on, 62
- authority, 63
- theory of functions, 63f
- first organization, 66
- relations with AWC, 69
- struggle for existence, 73f
- first work, 75
- relations with AG, 79
- detail system criticized, 95, 106f
- functioning in 1905, 98f
- duties, 99f
- Cuban Pacification, 101f
- 1906-10 period, 102f
- work of 1907, 109f
- reorganization of 1908, 111
- Wood's ideas, 134f
- reorganization of 1911, 134
- attacked by Ainsworth, 157
- recommendations on garrisons, 170
- reduction of 1913, 173
- detail system strengthened, 175
- study on military policy, 1915, 177
- summary of work, 1904-16, 180
- discussion of powers, 188f
- Baker decides position, 198f
- Scott's views, 210f
- beginning of World War I, 217f
- Wilson denounces war plans, 217f
- feels war approaching, 1916, 218
- increase of 1917, 222
- strength at armistice, 225
- Bullard's opinion, 225
- Pershing's opinion, 225
- Harbord's opinion, 226
- supply system, 227f
- reorganization of 1918, 230
- causes of World War I breakdown, 234f
- in supply reorganization, 241f
- Statistics Branch established, 252
- powers in World War I, 253f
- AEF General Staff, 259f
- at end of World War I, 261f
- postwar concept, 274f
- National Defense Act 1920, 282f, 287f
- concept applied to corps areas, 296
- defined by Palmer, 297
- McArthur's ideas, 298
- 1921 reorganization, 299
- relations with Air Service, 300
- relations with Assistant Secretary, 301f
- Hagood's criticisms, 307f
- relations with GHQ, 325
- growth in personnel, 327
- 1941 application of concept, 332f
- 1941 thought on high command, 335f
- 1941 suggestions for reorganization, 342
- goes into World War II, 345
- procedure under 1942 reorganization, 366f
- functions under 1942 organization, 371f
- personnel strengths before and after 1942, 390, 468
- problems not solved by 1942 reorganization, 393f
- effect of JCS, 404
- during World War II, 465f
- system in World War II, 466f
- improvements in communications, 470
- unnecessary reports, 499f
- future requirements, 569, 582
- General Staff Corps, definition, 62
- Goodnow, Frank J., 151
- Graicunas, A. V., 180-181
- Gulick, Luther, 107
- Hagood, Johnson, 88, 134, 183, 307f
- Haldane, J. B. S., 5
- Hamlin, Rev. T. S., 34
- Harbord, James G., 226
- Harrison, W. K., 345
- Hay, James, 138
- Hilldring, John H., 501
- Howley, Representative, 51
- Ickes, Harold L., 2
- Industrial mobilization
 - problems of, 303f
 - before World War II, 320f
- Industrial Preparedness, Committee of, 236
- Ingraham, William M., 243
- Inspector General's Department
 - criticized by Dodge Commission, 35
 - retained, 58
 - under 1942 organization, 376
 - in World War II, 536
 - investigations, 540
- Johnson, Hugh S., 219
- Joint Army and Navy Board, 268f
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - establishment, 397f
 - composition and functions, 398
 - contrasts and weaknesses, 402
 - duties of officers, 402
 - effect on WDGS, 404
 - defects in set-up, 586
- Kahn, Julius, 219
- Keppel, Frederick P., 279
- Lamont, Daniel S., 22
- Lea, Homer, 103
- Learned, E. P., 414
- Legislative & Liaison Division, 541
- Life, 500
- Ludlow, William, 46

- MacArthur, Douglas
 ideas on GS system, 298
 comments on WD defects, 314
- Manchu law, 48, 175f
- Manpower Board, 558
- March, Peyton C., 219
 becomes Chief of Staff, 225
 describes supply system, 227f
 tribute by Snow, 230
 controversy with Pershing, 247f
 opposed to boards, 250
 assumes jurisdiction, 257
 plan for postwar army, 276f
 described by Keppel, 279
- Merritt, Wesley, 54
- Message Centers
 under 1942 organization, 387
 work of, 471
- Miles, Nelson A., 25f, 47
- Miley, John D., 29
- Military establishment. See National Defense
- Military Intelligence Division
 establishment, 232
 after World War I, 264
 in World War II, 521f
 1944 changes, 526
- Military policy. See also National Defense
 General Staff study, 1915, 177
- Military Secretary's Department
 established, 82-83
 absorbs Records & Pensions Bureau, 84
 redesignated AGD, 92
- Militia Affairs, Division of, 112
- Missions, military
 under 1942 organization, 385
- Mooney, James D., 5
- Moss, James A., 157
- Munitions Standards Board, 237
- Muster roll controversy, 151f
- McCain, Henry P., 163
- McKinley, William, 48
- McLachlan report, 135
- McNarney, Joseph T.
 heads reorganization, 347
 statement on 1942 organization, 394
- National Defense
 inadequacy aired, 103
 McLachlan investigation, 135
 GS study of, 177
 future requirements, 569f
 three main elements, 571
- National Defense Act, 1916, 182
 discussion of, 18ff
 GS provisions, 198f
- National Defense Act, 1920
 General Staff under, 282f
 War Council provisions, 284
 instructions on GS, 287f
- WD changes under, 292f
 Army changes under, 295f
- National Defense, Council of, 236f
- Naval Consulting Board, 236f
- Navy. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff
- New Developments Division, 551
 future requirements, 599
- New York Times Magazine*, 252
- Officers' Reserve Corps, 222
- Operations Division, WDGS.
 See also War Plans Division
 organization after World War I, 262
 in World War II, 480f
 command post for Chief of Staff, 490f
 directs worldwide operations, 492f
- Organization
 of garrisons, 167
 Root's ideas on, 200f
 implications of present trends, 573
 future needs, 580
- Organization & Training Division, WDGS
 World War II, 510f
 future requirements, 597
- Orders on 1942 reorganization, 371f
- Ordnance Department
 1918 reorganization, 243
- Palmer, John McAuley
 ideas on detail system, 294
 defines General Staff, 297
- Panama Canal Department, 221
- Patterson, Robert P., 320
- Pay Department
 absorbed by QMC, 167
- Pershing, John J.
 comments on General Staff, 225
 demands on WD, 245
 assured by Baker, 249
 controversy with March, 247f
 ideas on detail system, 294
- Personnel
 control, 560
 future requirements, 595
- Personnel Division, WDGS
 established, 232
 in World War II, 501f
- Planning
 top level staff planning, 590
- Porter, Horace, 40
- Posts. See Garrisons
- President's authority invoked, 350
- Procedures
 established by 1942 organization, 366f
 staff communication in 1942, 470
- Procurement. See also Supply
 planning in 1930s, 304f
 World War II organization, 428
- Promotion system, 108
- Public Relations, Bureau of
 under 1942 organization, 376
 in World War II, 541, 543
- Purchase, Storage & Traffic Division, 266

- Quartermaster Corps
unification, 167
1917 reorganization, 243
- Quartermaster General's Office
criticized by Dodge Commission, 35
breakdown in World War I, 235f
- Rawlins, John A., 17
- Records & Pensions, Bureau of, 84
- Reiley, Alan C., 5
- Reserve Officers Training Corps, 222
- Rhodes, Charles D., 25
- Robinson, C. F., 428
- Roosevelt, Franklin D.
comment on 1942 reorganization, 354f
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 28, 30
acts as own Secretary, 102
- Root, Elihu, 5, 39f, 144
resigns, 81
defends WD organization, 201f
- Rowan, Andrew S., 25
- Schellendorf, von, 56
- Schofield, John M., 54
- Schwan, Theodore, 17, 56
- Scofield, John C., 151
- Scott, Frank A., 240
- Scott, Hugh L.
views on General Staff, 210f
recommends branch chiefs, 213f
- Scovel, Sylvester, 31
- Secretary of War
authority of, 15f
position defined, 164
- Selective Service Act 1917, 224
- Service Commands. See also Corps Areas
organized, 7
relations with ASF, 430f
- Service elements
future requirements, 575
- Services of Supply. See also ASF
under 1942 organization, 382
personnel strengths before and after
1942, 391
relations with AAF, 423
redesignated ASF, 432
- Shafter, William R., 31f
- Sherman, William T., 16
- Smith, Walter B., 398
- Snow, William J.
tribute to March, 230
appointed Chief of FA, 232
- Spanish-American War. See Dodge
Commission
- Special Planning Division, 548
- Special Staff
before 1942, 7
in World War II, 535f
new sections created, 545
- Squier, George O., 275
- Stations, exempted, 385
- Stimson, Henry L., 149
relieves Ainsworth, 163
- Strength Accounting & Reporting
Office, 563
- Subsistence Department, 167
- Supply. See also Industrial Mobilization;
Procurement
in Spanish-American War, 28f
system, 227f
reorganization of civil and military, 241
relations to combat forces, 446f
future requirements, 575, 597
- Supply Division, WDGs
supervises supply arms, 322
in World War II, 514f
- Symbols of WD agencies, 388
- Taft, William H.
appointed Secretary, 81
supports GS idea, 93
- Tauney, Representative, 136
- Training, future requirements, 597
- Troop basis control, 560
- Under Secretary of War
See also Assistant Secretaries
office organization, 320f
industrial mobilization, 320f
- Upton, Emory, 40
- Wallas, Graham, 64
- War College
establishment, 46
relations with GS, 69
- War Council
1920 provisions, 284
in World War II, 496f
- War Department
definition, 1
inefficiency in 1898,
see Dodge Commission
reorganization of 1942, 7, 335
after Civil War, 10f
in 1890s, 12f
in Spanish-American War, 22f, 24f
changes from 1898 experience, 34f
opposition to GS, 47f
business routine, 80f
reform of 1904, 92f
complains against changes, 94f
Board on Business Methods, 151
Board of Review, 182
Root defines organization, 201f
at entrance into World War I, 220f
organization in 1917, 221
lack of coordination, 229f
reorganization of 1918, 230f
causes of World War I breakdown, 234f
Crowell on planlessness, 240
meeting Pershing's demands, 245f
March plan for postwar army, 276f
changes under 1920 act, 292f
organization criticized, 307f

- at beginning of World War II, 314f
- MacArthur comments on defects, 314
- GHQ established, 317
- difficulties of 1941, 330
- handling business in 1941, 332
- Arnold plans for reorganization, 337
- GS reorganization suggestions, 1941, 342
- wartime problems of reorganization, 347
- executive order for 1942 reorganization, 349, 371f
- comments by Budget Bureau Director, 351
- President's comments on reorganization, 354f
- minutes of reorganization committee, 355
- actual changes in 1942, 360
- Staff procedure under 1942 organization, 366
- summary of 1942 reorganization, 394
- developments in World War II, 397f
- GS system in World War II, 466f
- personnel strengths, 1942-44, 468
- War Council and General Council, 496f
- future requirements, 569
- War Industries Board, 237f
- War Plans Division, WDGS
 - See also Operations Division
 - after World War I, 268
- War Production Board, 239, 428
- Wellington, quoted, 465
- Whitney, Henry H., 25
- Wilkinson, Spenser, 40
- Willoughby, W. F., 4, 151
- Wilson, Woodrow, 1
 - objects to war planning, 217f
- Wood, Leonard
 - named Chief of Staff, 132
 - friendship with Ainsworth, 133
 - ideas on General Staff, 134f
 - clash with Ainsworth, 138
 - economy measures, 137
 - muster roll controversy, 151f
 - opposed by Congress, 171
 - ideas on detail system, 294
- Woodberry, Governor, 27
- World War I
 - GS at beginning of, 217f, 220f
 - causes of WD breakdown, 234f
 - General Staff powers, 253f
 - AEF's General Staff, 259f
 - GS organization at end, 261f
 - planning for postwar army, 274f
- World War II
 - defects in WD organization, 314f
 - industrial mobilization before, 320f
 - U. S. enters war, 345
 - WD and Army developments, 397f
 - AGF organization, 405f
 - AAF organization, 409f
 - ASF organization, 425
 - procurement set-up, 428
 - General Staff during war, 465f
 - Operations Division, 480f
 - War Council and General Council, 496f
 - unnecessary GS reports, 499f
 - Personnel Division, 501f
 - Organization & Training Division, 510f
 - Supply Division, 514f
 - MI Division, 521f
 - Special Staff, 535f
 - IGD, 536
 - Bureau of Public Relations, 541
 - Legislative & Liaison Division, 541
 - public relations policies, 543
 - new GS sections created, 545
 - Civil Affairs Division, 546
 - Special Planning Division, 548
 - New Developments Division, 551
 - Budget Division, 554
 - WD Manpower Board, 558
 - personnel control, 560
 - troop basis control, 560
 - Strength Accounting & Reporting Office, 563
- Wotherspoon, W. W., 151
- Young, Samuel B. M., 74

